Bayesians Still Don’t Learn from Conditionals

Acta Analytica 38 (3):439-451 (2022)
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Abstract

One of the open questions in Bayesian epistemology is how to rationally learn from indicative conditionals (Douven, 2016). Eva et al. (Mind 129(514):461–508, 2020) propose a strategy to resolve this question. They claim that their strategy provides a “uniquely rational response to any given learning scenario”. We show that their updating strategy is neither very general nor always rational. Even worse, we generalize their strategy and show that it still fails. Bad news for the Bayesians.

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Author Profiles

Mario Günther
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Borut Trpin
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

Citations of this work

Confirmation, Coherence and the Strength of Arguments.Stephan Hartmann & Borut Trpin - 2023 - Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society 45:1473-1479.

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References found in this work

On conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.
The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.
What conditional probability could not be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.

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