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Theory-based Bayesian models of inductive learning and reasoning
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (7):309-318 (2006)
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References found in this work
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.
A Theory of Causal Learning in Children: Causal Maps and Bayes Nets.Alison Gopnik, Clark Glymour, Laura Schulz, Tamar Kushnir & David Danks - 2004 - Psychological Review 111 (1):3-32.
From covariation to causation: A causal power theory.Patricia W. Cheng - 1997 - Psychological Review 104 (2):367-405.
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