Do individuals accept a moral point of view - if they are completely oriented towards their natural preferences and interests? The present article outlines the context of discussion concerning this question within moral philosophy and the social science. In addition it suggests a game-theoretical model with the help of which the question can be answered positively.

This chapter is on when and how formalization and model building contribute to theory construction in methodological individualism. It shows that formalization is not always needed but can sometimes be useful for making assumptions explicit and for deriving implications that would appear out of reach of, or even go counter to, informal reasoning. The chapter focuses on examples from different theoretical approaches and research fields, including meanwhile ‘classic’ as well as more recent contributions. We sketch both insights that do not (...) require elaborate formalization as well as implications that do require some degree of formalization. The exposition itself is largely informal. (shrink)

Investigations in meta-theoretical topics such as the definability of disposition terms or the explication of qualitative and quantitative concepts of confirmation, as well as discussions of various systems of modal logic, e.g., deontic logic, often deal with a number of well known paradoxes. In general, classical logic is used in deriving the paradox of the ravens, Goodman's paradox, the paradoxes of derived obligation, etc. The questions whether these paradoxes depend essentially on the use of classical logic and whether they can (...) be avoided by using intuitionistic or minimal logic are considered. (shrink)

We develop a theoretical model of network formation where actors are limitedly farsighted. In this way we extend current models with a new set of micro-foundations. Computer simulations are used to predict the stable network structures that are likely to emerge under the new assumptions. The co-author model by Jackson/wolinsky (1996) is used as an example. The co-author model formulates a tension between stability and efficiency when actors are myopic. Limitedly farsighted actors can overcome this tension but only if the (...) network is small enough. Thus, changing the micro-foundations of the network formation model leads to new implications at the macro-level in the sense that different networks are predicted to be stable than for existing micro-foundations. (shrink)

Die Kontroversen um Imre Lakatos' "Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme" haben zu der Frage geführt, ob auf Basis der von Lakatos entwickelten Standards für die Bewertung von konkurrierenden Theorien und Forschungsprogrammen auch heuristische Empfehlungen begründet werden können, die die von Wissenschaftlern auszuführenden Handlungen im Interesse der Maximierung von Erkenntnisfortschritt normieren. Eine solche Frage steht im Zusammenhang mit einem zentralen Anliegen der Popperschen Wissenschaftstheorie: "Wir wollen die Regeln, oder, wenn man will, die Normen aufstellen, nach denen sich der Forscher richtet, wenn er Wissenschaft (...) treibt, wie wir es uns denken". Ob die Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme, die Lakatos als Weiterentwicklung des kritisch-rationalistischen Falsifikationismus verstanden wissen will, diesen Ansprüchen genügt, wurde zuerst von Paul K. Feyerabend und Thomas S. Kuhn bezweifelt. Im folgenden werden zunächst deren Kritiken, die Antworten von Lakatos sowie Analysen von J. J. C. Smart, Wolfgang Stegmüller und Philip Quinn diskutiert. Anschließend wird ein neuer Versuch Alan Musgraves kritisch überprüft, unter Rückgriff auf die Bewertungskriterien der Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme heuristische Empfehlungen zu begründen. (shrink)

Conditional cooperation of selfish and rational actors is feasible in repeated encounters. We stress an important alternative for conditional cooperation: credible commitments that can be incurred via voluntary hostage posting (in the sense of pledging a bond). Hostages may facilitate cooperation in different ways. First, they reduce incentives to behave uncooperatively. Second, by offering some compensation for losses, hostages reduce the costs of suffering from uncooperative behavior of the partner. Finally, hostages may serve as signals about characteristics of the partner (...) that are related to his opportunities and incentives to behave uncooperatively. We show that signalling hostages may have lasting effects in durable relations. (shrink)

Various mechanisms are known that can stabilize trust relations. Examples are repeated interactions and credible commitments through warranties, deposits, and other kinds of ‘hostages’. Usually, these mechanisms are studied in isolation from one another. An integrated analysis is widely neglected. In this note, the effects of a ‘mix’ of mechanisms are analyzed. A simple case is offered, where a combination of repeated interactions and credible commitments can stabilize trust, while neither of the mechanisms alone can do so.

This paper brings two major research lines in current sociology together. Research on social networks has long focused primarily on network effects but meanwhile also addresses the emergence and dynamics of networks. Research on trust in social and economic relations shows that networks have effects on trust. Using game theory, we provide a simple model that allows for an integrated and simultaneous analysis of network effects on trust and for the endogenous emergence of the network. The model also allows for (...) characterizing the value of the network. We use standard assumptions on full strategic rationality. Testable implications of the model as well as model extensions are sketched. (shrink)

The integration of theory and empirical research in analytical social science has always been a core topic of Analyse & Kritik. This paper focuses on how analytical theory and empirical research have moved closer to each other in sociology, using rational choice theory and game-theoretic models as well as empirical research on problematic social situations (social dilemmas, collective action problems, etc.) as an example. We try to highlight the use of complementary research designs (surveys, vignette studies, lab experiments) for testing (...) the same hypotheses. We also try to show that empirical research indicates the need for the development of more complex theoretical models. (shrink)