Okosnica ovog doprinosa jest odgovor na neke opaske i predrasude Darka Polšeka iz Zagreba, iznesene u kritičkom osvrtu na moju kritičku procjenu njegova viđenja eugeničkog nasljeđa u biotehnološkom dobu. Za tu je svrhu doprinos podijeljen u devet paragrafa, koji donose filozofsku kritiku nekih Polšekovih prigovora. U doprinosu se rasvjetljavaju još neki novi problematični aspekti glavne Polšekove teze o takozvanoj ‘novoj eugenici’. Autor u ovom doprinosu iznosi argumente koji pokazuju i epistemološke i etičke slabosti takozvane nove eugenike, ali ne na način (...) isticanja ničim dokazanih pretpostavki i predrasuda, nego na način filozofske analize i prosudbe. Stoga iznesena argumentacija u ovom kritičkom odgovoru ostaje u okvirima diskutirane teme i pokušava čuvati dostojanstvo argumentirane rasprave. Jer, niti uz najbolju volju argument snage ne može zamijeniti snagu argumenta. Sve se ostalo prepušta kritičkoj prosudbi čitatelja.The framework of this contribution is an answer to some of the comments and prejudices madeby Darko Polšek from Zagreb, published in a critical analysis of the author’s critical judgementof his view of eugenic heredity in the biotechnological era. To this end, the article prints nineparagraphs philosophically criticizing some of Polšek’s objections. It also sheds light on a num­ber of other new problematic aspects of Polšek’s main thesis on the so-called »new eugenics«.The author of this contribution presents arguments that illustrate both the epistemological andethical weaknesses of the so-called new eugenics – not in the manner of accentuating unprovedpresuppositions and prejudices, but in the manner of philosophical analyses and judgements.Accordingly, the arguments set out in this critical reply remain within the framework of thetopic discussed and attempt to preserve the dignity of the argued discourse. For, the argumentof power can never replace the power of argument. All else is left to the critical judgement of the readers. (shrink)

The history of the idea of biological progress shows that it is not a selfexplanatory category, so a clear definition is required. Biological progress exists if: “more progressive” is defined as “more complex” – in that case evolution is synonymous with progress, i.e. development from simple to complex, from homogeneous to heterogeneous; we perceive the expression “more progressive” as more successful in relation to the environment, in these terms some groups in the history of life were more progressive because/so that (...) they survived, while others were retrogressive or less progressive because/so that they died out; on the other hand, within their ecological niches, certain forms of life are perfectly adapted to their environment as long as it is stable ; we take the span or reach of a potential adaptation of populations as a measure. However, there is no active, innovative problem solving in relation to the environment either with plants or animals – only the variability mechanism / selection is in place, automatism, instinct. In the light of the above-mentioned biological criteria, man is the most complex living creature by his constitution, he is the least dependent on the environment and can be innovative in relation to the environment. Man is the only living creature capable of establishing an active relationship with the environment through his special tool – culture. Considering the level of organization and quantity of information, the mammal genome is more progressive than the bacterium genome, while the human genome comprises most information which makes man the most progressive living thing. We can talk about biological progress if we define progressiveness as advancement toward complexity of organisation, but sometimes the simplification of structure enables survival. It seems that we can talk about progressivenessin biology only if we accept the anthropic principle – that is why only cultural progress is possible. Information is the link between biological and cultural-anthropological successfulness. Biological information is a “complete” piece of information to an animal. To a human being, it is only a condicio sine qua non for the reality of human spirit which receives, keeps and generates information. Progress can be measured according to the capability of establishing an active and innovative relationship with the environment, but only within some sort of anthropocentric outlook which is a criterion of value. It is not possible to talk about progressiveness of life if man is not the measure of all things. (shrink)

Brojne definicije vrste živog svijeta tvore suprotstavljene filozofske stavove oko pitanja postoji li samo jedna kategorija vrste ili više njih . Monisti vjeruju u načelnu mogućnost jedne kategorije vrste koja zrcali zbiljnost istovrsnog živog svijeta. Suprotno tome, pluralisti vjeruju da postoje različite kategorije vrste jer je ljudska spoznaja ograničena ili jer je vrstu moguće definirati na mnogo različitih načina. Proučavanje primjera poznatijih monističkih i pluralističkih definicija vrste upućuje na značajno udaljavanje u određivanju kategorije vrste i u prepoznavanju taksonomijskih vrsta. Divergentnost (...) određenja vrste implicira manje epistemološke, a više ontološke sudove o mogućnostima ljudske spoznaje vrsnosti živog svijeta i naravi vrsnosti tog svijeta. Pri tome, postoji konsenzus tek u tvrdnji o evolucijskom nastanku taksonskih vrsta i jedinstvenom drvetu života, ali s različitim klasifikacijama živog svijeta. Rasprava upućuje na suvremene ideje svojevrsne sinteze prema kojoj je narav vrsnosti živog svijeta sofisticirani monizam satkan od pluralističkih određenja vrste.Numerous definitions of living world species form opposite philosophical attitudes on question whether there is a single category of species or a number of categories . Monists believe in a general possibility of single category of species that reflect reality of the homogeneous living world. In opposite, pluralists believe that there are different categories of species due to the epistemological limitations of the human or is it possible to define species in numerous ways. Study of examples of well known monistic and pluralistic definitions of species suggest that there is a significant alienation in determination of category of species and recognition of species taxa. Divergent definitions of species implicates less of epistemological, and more of ontological propositions on aptitude of human cognition on living world genus and nature of genus. There is a consensus on statement on evolution formation of species taxa and single and unique tree of life, but with the diverse classifications of living world. Discussion leads towards contemporary ideas of synthesis according to which the nature of living world genus is a sophisticated monism based on the pluralistic classification of species. (shrink)

Znanstveno proučavanje postanka prvog života unutar zasebnog područja teorijske biologije počinje pedesetih godina 20. stoljeća. To područje do danas nema stabilan oblik niti vladajuću teoriju, nego je predstavljeno brojnim teorijama koje proučavaju zasebne dijelove velike slagalice koja objašnjava podrijetlo prvog života. Ovaj rad: 1) daje kratak pregled i problematiku područja; 2) predstavlja najvažnije teorije postanka prvog života; 3) izdvaja odgovore na pitanje kada je nastao prvi život; 4) pita se kakvog je bio oblika; te 5) tumači empirijske podatke iz filozofske (...) perspektive. Razmatranje postojećih teorija i tumačenje empirijskih podataka ukazuje na jalovost dosadašnjih pokušaja kojima nedostaje teorijska konzistentnost ili empirijska potpora, iz čega se mogu interpretirati divergentne tvrdnje o naravi živog svijeta.The foundation of the scientific study of the first life within a separate field of theoretical biology begins in the nineteen fifties. This area has not yet reached a stable shape neither a dominant theory, but a number of theories that examine the separate parts of a large puzzle which explains the origin of the first life. This paper: 1) offers brief overview of the problem areas; 2) presents the most important theories on foundation of the first life; 3) emphasizes certain answers to the question of the first emergence; 4) asks what the first life was like; and 5) interpret the empirical data from philosophical perspective. Consideration of existing theories and interpretations of empirical data points to the futility of past attempts which lack theoretical consistency or empirical support, from which divergent arguments about the nature or the origin of the first life can be interpreted. (shrink)

Znanstveno proučavanje postanka prvog života unutar zasebnog područja teorijske biologije počinje pedesetih godina 20. stoljeća. To područje do danas nema stabilan oblik niti vladajuću teoriju, nego je predstavljeno brojnim teorijama koje proučavaju zasebne dijelove velike slagalice koja objašnjava podrijetlo prvog života. Ovaj rad: 1) daje kratak pregled i problematiku područja; 2) predstavlja najvažnije teorije postanka prvog života; 3) izdvaja odgovore na pitanje kada je nastao prvi život; 4) pita se kakvog je bio oblika; te 5) tumači empirijske podatke iz filozofske (...) perspektive. Razmatranje postojećih teorija i tumačenje empirijskih podataka ukazuje na jalovost dosadašnjih pokušaja kojima nedostaje teorijska konzistentnost ili empirijska potpora, iz čega se mogu interpretirati divergentne tvrdnje o naravi živog svijeta.The foundation of the scientific study of the first life within a separate field of theoretical biology begins in the nineteen fifties. This area has not yet reached a stable shape neither a dominant theory, but a number of theories that examine the separate parts of a large puzzle which explains the origin of the first life. This paper: 1) offers brief overview of the problem areas; 2) presents the most important theories on foundation of the first life; 3) emphasizes certain answers to the question of the first emergence; 4) asks what the first life was like; and 5) interpret the empirical data from philosophical perspective. Consideration of existing theories and interpretations of empirical data points to the futility of past attempts which lack theoretical consistency or empirical support, from which divergent arguments about the nature or the origin of the first life can be interpreted. (shrink)

The history of the idea of biological progress shows that it is not a selfexplanatory category, so a clear definition is required. Biological progress exists if: “more progressive” is defined as “more complex” – in that case evolution is synonymous with progress, i.e. development from simple to complex, from homogeneous to heterogeneous; we perceive the expression “more progressive” as more successful in relation to the environment, in these terms some groups in the history of life were more progressive because/so that (...) they survived, while others were retrogressive or less progressive because/so that they died out; on the other hand, within their ecological niches, certain forms of life are perfectly adapted to their environment as long as it is stable ; we take the span or reach of a potential adaptation of populations as a measure . However, there is no active, innovative problem solving in relation to the environment either with plants or animals – only the variability mechanism / selection is in place, automatism, instinct. In the light of the above-mentioned biological criteria, man is the most complex living creature by his constitution , he is the least dependent on the environment and can be innovative in relation to the environment. Man is the only living creature capable of establishing an active relationship with the environment through his special tool – culture. Considering the level of organization and quantity of information, the mammal genome is more progressive than the bacterium genome, while the human genome comprises most information which makes man the most progressive living thing. We can talk about biological progress if we define progressiveness as advancement toward complexity of organisation, but sometimes thesimplification of structure enables survival. It seems that we can talk about progressivenessin biology only if we accept the anthropic principle – that is why only cultural progress is possible. Information is the link between biological and cultural-anthropological successfulness . Biological information is a “complete” piece of information to an animal . To a human being, it is only a condicio sine qua non for the reality of human spirit which receives, keeps and generates information. Progress can be measured according to the capability ofestablishing an active and innovative relationship with the environment, but only within some sort of anthropocentric outlook which is a criterion of value. It is not possible to talk about progressiveness of life if man is not the measure of all things.Povijest ideje biološkog napretka pokazuje kako to nije samorazumljiva kategorija, pa se traži jasna definicija. Biološki progres postoji ukoliko: “naprednije” definiramo kao “složenije” – evolucija je tada sinonim napretka, tj. prelaženja iz jednostavnijeg u složenije, iz homogenog u heterogeno; “naprednije” shvatimo kao “uspješnije” s obzirom na okoliš; u tom smislu neke skupine u povijesti života bile su naprednije jer/pa su opstale, dok su druge bile nazadnije ili manje napredne pa/jer su izumrle; s druge strane unutar svojih ekoloških niša pojedini oblici života savršeno su prilagođeni svojem okolišu dokle god je on stabilan ; kao mjerilo uzmemo raspon ili širinu moguće prilagodbe populacija jer tada postoje razlike; ipak ni u biljaka ni u životinja tu nema aktivnog inovatorskog rješavanja problema okoliša, nego djeluje samo mehanizam varijabilnost/selekcija, automatizam, nagon. U svjetlu gore navedenih bioloških mjerila čovjek je svojim ustrojstvom najsloženije biće , najmanje je ovisan u odnosu na okolinu, može se novativno nositi spram okoline. Čovjek je jedini kadar za pravi aktivni odnos prema svom okolišu putem specifičnog oruđa kulture. S obzirom na stupanj organizacije i količinu informacija, genom sisavca je napredniji od genoma bakterije, a genom čovjeka raspolažes najviše informacija, pa je on po tome najprogresivnije biće u prirodi. O biološkom progresu možemo govoriti ako progresivnost definiramo kao porast složenosti organizacije, no ponekad pojednostavljenje građe omogućava preživljavanje. Čini se da o progresivnosti u biologiji možemo govoriti samo usvajajući princip antropičnosti, zato je u svijetu moguć samo kulturni progres. Posjedovanje informacije je veza između biološke i kulturno-antropološke uspješnosti . Posjedovanje biologijske informacije za životinju je “potpuna informacija” , dok je za Čovjeka samo condicio sine qua non za zbiljnost ljudskog duha koji dobiva, posjeduje i stvara informaciju. Progres je moguće mjeriti prema sposobnosti aktivnog i inovativnog odnosa spram okoliša jedino u nekoj vrsti antropocentričnog obzora koji u središtu ima mjerilo vrijednosti. Nemoguće je govoriti o progresivnosti života ako svemu nije mjera sam čovjek. (shrink)

Proturječnost stavova o položaju biologije unutar ili izvan područja znanosti može se podijeliti na nekoliko osnovnih pristupa. Prvi pristup smješta biologiju izvan znanstvenog područja zbog nedostatka univerzalnosti, nedostatka strogih generalizacija i nedostatka stroge kvantitativne strukture. Drugi pristup smatra biologiju znanošću koju treba svesti na fiziku. Treći pristup vidi značajne razlike između biologije s jedne, i fizike i kemije s druge strane, ali ipak tvrdi da je biologija prava znanost, no samostalna i s vlastitim pojmovnikom i metodologijom. Poredba načela prirodne znanosti (...) s obilježjima biologije ukazuje na nedostatak determinizma, neprikladnost esencijalizma i manjkavosti redukcionističkog pristupa u području biološkog. S druge strane, biologija ima neka posebna obilježja. Biologija je znanost samostalna u određenju svoga područja i biranju prikladnog pojmovnika i metoda proučavanja. Njezino područje, pojmovnik, logika i metodologija ne podudaraju se potpuno s onima ostalih znanosti, ali se u potpunosti ni ne razilaze.Ambiguities of attitudes on the position of biology within or outside of science domain can be divided into few basic approaches. The first approach places biology outside the scientific domain due to its lack of universality, the lack of strong generalizations and the lack of strong quantitative structure. The second approach claims that science of biology should be reduced to physics. The third approach accepts significant differences between biology on one side, and physics and chemistry on the other side, but it still claims that biology is a hard science, autonomous and with its own terminology and methodology. Comparison of principles of natural science with features of biology demonstrates a lack of determinism, inappropriateness of essentialism and pitfalls of reductionist approach in biological sphere. On the other hand, biology has some specific features. Biology is a science that has autonomy in determining its domain and choice of appropriate terminology and inquiry methods. Its domain, terminology, logic and methodology are not entirely in accordance with other sciences, but also are not completely diverse. (shrink)

The Oparin hypothesis from 1936 was a milestone in the origin of life research, making a model that was at least in part empirically testable, and changing the course of life studies from a long tradition of metaphysics to a scientific domain of investigation. His hypothesis is based on the idea of the prebiotic synthesis of macromolecules as a fundamental step on the road to first life. Although the Oparin hypothesis brought fresh ideas and concepts, in its description of the (...) steps in the hypothesized transition from the inorganic to the organic world in detail, today some premises are considered unconfirmed, uncertain, or even rejected. With high respect to its metatheoretical reach and scientific impact on prebiotic chemistry, pushing the origin of first life research into an empirical context, from a contemporary viewpoint, its contribution is highly limited in the area of history of science and history of philosophy (of science). Keywords: biology, history of science, Oparin, origin of life, philosophy of science. (shrink)

The induction period is a very important time in the career of a teacher and has a long?term influence on the teacher?s professional development, efficacy, job satisfaction and the length of his/her career. One of the key roles in this period is played by the trainee?s mentor. This paper presents the results of the extensive project ?Partnership of Faculties and Schools?, carried out at the Pedagogical Faculty, University of Ljubljana, with the financial support of the European Social Fund and the (...) Slovenian Ministry of Education, Science and Sport. We studied an induction project involving 361 teacher trainees and 331 mentors. The study reveals the trainees? expectations towards their mentors and the mentors? and trainees? evaluations of how the mentor aids a teacher trainee in developing their competences. (shrink)

In order to realise increasingly complex objectives of compulsory education, it is necessary to have in place appropriate teaching concepts as well as assessment and testing guidelines. The question, however, is what should be assessed: levels of acquired knowledge, skills or attitudes? Should assessment be only a measure of the educational process outcomes, or should it also measure the process of knowledge acquisition itself? How should assessment be carried out in order to respect the principle of fairness and justice? In (...) this paper, we will present results of a research project in which we were interested to find out what teachers would assess if it were up to them to decide. Our survey was conducted on a representative sample of primary school teachers in Slovenia. In spite of clear regulations prescribing that teachers should only assess pupils’ progress in relation to the defined objectives and knowledge standards, teachers underlined the necessity to also consider other aspects of children’s development. (shrink)

Teacher competencies can be researched in many different ways. In the present article they are studied from the learner’s viewpoint. The article presents results of the extensive project “Teacher Education for New Competencies for the Knowledge Society and the Role of these Competencies in Educational Goal Attainment at School”, carried out at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Ljubljana, with the financial support of the Slovenian Ministry of Education and Sport. We present the results of the learner’s judgement (...) of the teacher’s didactic competencies. We formed a questionnaire with which we operationalised teacher competencies with the purpose of measuring the teacher’s efficiency of instruction. In order to achieve the goals of modern instruction it is important to engage both models: learner‐centred and teacher‐centred education. The research showed that elements of the traditional instruction model are more frequently used than the model that demands a changed learner role. (shrink)

‘Valence’ is used in many different ways in emotion theory. It generally refers to the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ character of an emotion, as well as to the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ character of some aspect of emotion. After reviewing these different uses, I point to the conceptual problems that come with them. In particular, I dis- tinguish: problems that arise from conflating the valence of an emotion with the valence of its aspects, and problems that arise from the very idea that (...) an emotion (and/or its aspects) can be divided into mutually exclusive opposites. The first group of problems does not question the classic dichotomous notion of valence, but the second does. In order to do justice to the richness of daily emotions, emo- tion science needs more complex conceptual tools. (shrink)

Valence is a central component of all affective states, including pains, pleasures, emotions, moods, and feelings of desire or repulsion.This paper has two main goals. One is to suggest that enough is now known about the causes, consequences, and properties of valence to indicate that it forms a unitary natural-psychological kind, one that seemingly plays a fundamental role in motivating all kinds of intentional action. If this turns out to be true, then the correct characterization of the nature of valence (...) becomes an urgent philosophical issue. There appear to be just two accounts that have the required generality. According to one, valence is a nonconceptual representation of value. According to the other, valence is an intrinsic qualitative property of experience. The second goal of the paper is to contrast and evaluate these two views of the nature of valence, drawing on the relevant empirical findings. Overall, I suggest that the representational account is more plausible. (shrink)

In a provocative and important article, Robert Solomon argues that emotion researchers should abandon the notion of valence: it is used many different ways, and no single construct captures the pretheoretical distinction between positive and negative emotions. I echo Solomon in arguing that some of the most popular theories of valence are unlikely to succeed, though my case against these constructs comes from a noncognitive, as opposed to cognitive, perspective. I then argue that there is one notion of valence, related (...) to reward and punishment, that may apply to all emotions, and align with pretheoretical taxonomies. (shrink)

This article gives a short presentation of reflexive imperativism, the intentionalist theory of valence I developed with Max Khan Hayward. The theory says that mental states have valence in virtue of having reflexive imperative content. More precisely, mental states have positive valence (i.e., feel good) in virtue of issuing the command "More of me!", and they have negative valence (i.e., feel bad) in virtue of issuing the command "Less of me!" The article summarises the main arguments in favour of reflexive (...) imperativism and against other intentionalist treatments of valence. (shrink)

Despite the swirling tide of controversy surrounding the work of Machery et al. , the cross-cultural differences they observed in semantic intuitions about the reference of proper names have proven to be robust. In the present article, we report cross-cultural and individual differences in semantic intuitions obtained using new experimental materials. In light of the pervasiveness of the Knobe effect and the fact that Machery et al.’s original materials incorporated elements of wrongdoing but did not control for their influence, we (...) also examined the question of whether the moral valence of actions described in experimental materials might affect participants’ responses. Our results suggest that uncontrolled moral valence did not distort participants’ judgments in previous research. Our findings provide further confirmation of the robustness of cross-cultural and intra-cultural differences in semantic intuitions and strengthen the philosophical challenge that they pose. (shrink)

After half a century exploring dialectical thought, renowned cultural critic Fredric Jameson presents a comprehensive study of a misrepresented, vital strain in Western philosophy. The dialectic, the concept of the evolution of an idea through internal contradiction and conflict, transformed two centuries of Western philosophy. To Hegel, who dominated nineteenth-century thought, it was a metaphysical system. In the works of Marx, the dialectic became a tool for materialist historical analysis, a theoretical maneuver that his critics derided and his descendants on (...) the Left have wrestled with ever since. Jameson brings a theoretical scrutiny to bear on the questions that have arisen in the history of this philosophical tradition, contextualizing the debate with essays on commodification and globalization, and with reference to the work of Rousseau, Fichte, Heidegger, Sartre, Derrida, and Lacan. Through rigorous, erudite examination, Valences of the Dialectic charts a movement toward the innovation of a "spatial" dialectic, culminating in a remarkable meditation on globalization, through a study of Paul Ricoeur. Jameson presents a new synthesis of thought that revitalizes dialectical thinking for the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Most theories of affective influences on judgement and choice take a valence-based approach, contrasting the effects of positive versus negative feeling states. These approaches have not specified if and when distinct emotions of the same valence have different effects on judgement. In this article, we propose a model of emotion-specific influences on judgement and choice. We posit that each emotion is defined by a tendency to perceive new events and objects in ways that are consistent with the original cognitive-appraisal dimensions (...) of the emotion. To pit the valence and appraisal-tendency approaches against one another, we present a study that addresses whether two emotions of the same valence but differing appraisals—anger and fear—relate in different ways to risk perception. Consistent with the appraisal-tendency hypothesis, fearful people made pessimistic judgements of future events whereas angry people made optimistic judgements. In the Discussion we expand the proposed model and review evidence supporting two social moderators of appraisal-tendency processes. (shrink)

We present a longitudinal computational study on the connection between emotional and amodal word representations from a developmental perspective. In this study, children's and adult word representations were generated using the latent semantic analysis (LSA) vector space model and Word Maturity methodology. Some children's word representations were used to set a mapping function between amodal and emotional word representations with a neural network model using ratings from 9‐year‐old children. The neural network was trained and validated in the child semantic space. (...) Then, the resulting neural network was tested with adult word representations using ratings from an adult data set. Samples of 1210 and 5315 words were used in the child and the adult semantic spaces, respectively. Results suggested that the emotional valence of words can be predicted from amodal vector representations even at the child stage, and accurate emotional propagation was found in the adult word vector representations. In this way, different propagative processes were observed in the adult semantic space. These findings highlight a potential mechanism for early verbal emotional anchoring. Moreover, different multiple linear regression and mixed‐effect models revealed moderation effects for the performance of the longitudinal computational model. First, words with early maturation and subsequent semantic definition promoted emotional propagation. Second, an interaction effect between age of acquisition and abstractness was found to explain model performance. The theoretical and methodological implications are discussed. (shrink)

Bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions share the striking property of being valenced, i.e. they are positive or negative. What is valence? How do bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions relate to one another? This chapter assesses the prospects of two popular theses regarding the relation between bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions in light of what we can reasonably think about valence. According to the first thesis, the valence of bodily (dis)pleasures is explanatory prior vis-à-vis the valence of emotions. According to the second, emotions contain (...) bodily (dis)pleasures. I argue that bodily (dis)pleasures are intentional states whose valence is to be understood in terms of evaluative experience, and bring to light the similarities and dissimilarities between their intentional structure and that of emotions. On this backdrop, I offer reasons to conclude that we should adopt neither of the two theses. (shrink)

Affective valence is increasingly thought to be the common currency underlying all forms of intuitive, non-discursive decision making, in both humans and other animals. And it is thought to constitute the good or bad (pleasant or unpleasant) aspects of all desires, emotions, and moods. This article contrasts two theories of valence. According to one, valence is an experience-directed imperative (‘more of this!’ or ‘less of this!’); according to the other, valence is a representation of adaptive value or disvalue. The latter (...) is shown to provide the better account. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions regarding the status of emotion as a scientific domain usually get framed in terms of the question whether emotion is a natural kind. That approach to the issues is wrongheaded for two reasons. First, it has led to an intractable philosophical impasse that ultimately misconstrues the character of the relevant debate in emotion science. Second, and most important, it entirely ignores valence, a central feature of emotion experience, and probably the most promising criterion for demarcating emotion from cognition (...) and other related domains. An alternate philosophical hypothesis for addressing the issues is pro- posed. It is that emotion is a naturally occurring valenced phenomenon that is.. (shrink)