U radu se kritički osvjetljava pojam slobode u okviru filozofske misli Immanuela Kanta. Ovime se prvenstveno misli na njegov etički nauk, pa posredno i na epistemološki i estetički, koji na njega upućuju i kroz njega se utemeljuju. Cilj rada je pokazati da se sloboda, tumačena u oba svoja aspekta , dade izjednačiti s konceptima autonomije i spontaniteta. Ovim se pak putem, obzirom da je sloboda ratio essendi moralnoga zakona, može argumentirati i u korist teze o praktičkom jedinstvu slobode i moralnog (...) zakona. Dodatno, u radu se analiziraju interpretativne implikacije kao i teškoće koje se javljaju čak i u tumačenjima eminentnih poznavatelja Kantove misli, poput L. W. Becka i N. Hartmanna.This paper aims to critically examine and evaluate the whole of Kant’s philosophy from the perspective of the notion of freedom. Freedom, both in its negative and positive capacity, as well as in it’s purely practical sense, serves as a cornerstone of Kant’s philosophical enquiry and the one true medium of the mind both in the practical and theoretical sense. Along with the aforementioned negative-positive dichotomy, freedom can further be distinguished as being one with the concept of the autonomy of the mind. Through this connection, freedom becomes, as its ratio essendi, practically one with the moral law itself, the latter being a form of the former. From the idea of freedom, various implications emerge, which have been dealt with through the course of the essay. In this respect, particular attention is paid to Kant’s notion of will and some of the misunderstandings it managed to create among notable Kant scholars like L. W. Beck and N. Hartmann. (shrink)