Matthew Frise claims that reliabilist theories of justification have a temporality problem—the problem of providing a principled account of the temporal parameters of a process’s performance that determine whether that process is reliable at a given time. Frise considers a representative sample of principled temporal parameters and argues that there are serious problems with all of them. He concludes that the prospects for solving the temporality problem are bleak. Importantly, Frise argues that the temporality (...) class='Hi'>problem constitutes a new reason to reject reliabilism. On this point, I argue that Frise is mistaken. There are serious interpretive difficulties with Frise’s argument. In this essay, I show that there are principled and reasonable temporal parameters for the reliabilist to adopt that successfully undermine the interpretations of Frise’s argument that only invoke plausible premises. There are interpretations of Frise’s argument that leave reliabilism without a clear parameter solution. However, I argue that these interpretations invoke controversial premises that are at best unmotivated, and at worst they merely re-raise older disputes about reliabilism. In any event, the temporality problem fails to constitute a new reason to reject reliabilism. (shrink)

A lot of people believe that distinct objects can occupy precisely the same place for the entire time during which they exist. Such people have to provide an answer to the 'grounding problem' – they have to explain how such things, alike in so many ways, nonetheless manage to fall under different sortals, or have different modal properties. I argue in detail that they cannot say that there is anything in virtue of which spatio-temporally coincident things have those properties. (...) However, I also argue that this may not be as bad as it looks, and that there is a way to make sense of the claim that such properties are primitive. (shrink)

This article proposes an interpretation of the status of the Grundnorm in Hans Kelsen’s legal theory which addresses the broader philosophical problem of the ultimate foundation of normativity. It begins by reviewing the main objections that have been raised against Kelsen’s theory, pointing out that most of these can be met by a ‘transcendental’ interpretation of the Grundnorm as a condition of possibility for legal cognition. It then argues that in order to solve the problem of the ultimate (...) foundation for legal validity it is also necessary to read the Grundnorm in light of the parallel category of ‘nomo-dynamicity’, which Kelsen introduced in all his legal writings beginning with the Pure Theory of Law of 1933. This yields a conception of legal validity as an ‘essentially temporal’ category, from the point of view of which the problem of ultimate foundations cannot emerge because the beginning is by definition not situated conceptually within time. The broader conclusion is therefore that overcoming the problem of the ultimate foundation of normativity requires abandoning the theologico-political assumption that valid norms are posited through a sovereign gesture analogous to that through which God is supposed to have created the universe ex nihilo. Construing normativity as ‘essentially temporal’ implies that the search for ultimate foundations must run into a category that is entirely foreign to political theology but well known to phenomenology: that of an ‘always-already’. (shrink)

This paper elaborates the problem of temporal unity for dynamic presentism and diagnoses the source of that problem in the dynamic presentist’s discarding the traditional C-series in its avoidance of McTaggart’s A-series paradox. This C-series provided the fixed structure of time which the transitory aspects of time then followed, and thereby unify those transitory aspects. It then considers ersatzer presentism as an ostensible solution to the problem of temporal unity by providing a new abstract C-series (...) for dynamic presentism. However, after a closer examination of the details of this proposal, it is found that the ersatz-B-series itself needs to be temporally variable to capture the transitory aspects of time that it is meant to track. Consequently, it cannot provide the fixed structure of time required to unify the transitory aspects of time into a temporal series. It is therefore suggested that dynamic presentists look for a more course-grained determiner of temporal progression to construct the presentist-friendly C-series required to unify their transitory aspects of time. (shrink)

Insight problems are likely to trigger an initial, inappropriate mental representation, which needs to be restructured in order to find the solution. Despite the widespread theoretical assumption t...

Biological individuality is a notoriously thorny topic for biologists and philosophers of biology. In this paper we argue that biological individuality presents multiple, interconnected questions for biologists and philosophers that together form a problem agenda. Using a case study of an interdisciplinary research group in ecology, behavioral and evolutionary biology, we claim that a debate on biological individuality that seeks to account for diverse practices in the biological sciences should be broadened to include and give prominence to questions about (...) uniqueness and temporality. We show that broadening the problem agenda of biological individuality draws attention to underrecognized philosophical issues and discussions and thereby organizes and enriches the existing debate. (shrink)

I discuss the general form of arguments that profess to prove that the view that things endure in tensed time through causally produced change (the dynamic view) must be false because it involves contradictions. I argue that these arguments implicitly presuppose what has been called the temporal parity thesis, i.e. that all moments of time are equally existent and real, and that this thesis must be understood as the denial of the dynamic view. When this implicit premise is made (...) explicit, the arguments turn out to be either circular, they presuppose what they profess to prove, or mere demonstrations of the fact that the dynamic view is incompatible with its own negation. Furthermore, I discuss the metaphysical consequences of accepting the temporal parity thesis, arguing that it deprives us of the means to provide natural explanations to empirical phenomena. (shrink)

In addressing the Lucretian symmetry problem, the temporal bias approach claims that death is bad because it deprives us of something about which it is rational to care (e.g., future pleasures), whereas prenatal nonexistence is not bad because it only deprives us of something about which it is rational to remain indifferent (e.g., past pleasures). In a recent contribution to the debate on this approach, Miguel and Santos argue that a late beginning can deprive us of a future (...) pleasure. Their argument is based on the claim that for birth or death to deprive a person of any value in life, the historically closest counterfactual situation that contains the value is such that the person begins to exist earlier or dies later. This is what they call the Historical Condition. However, the Historical Condition is untenable for several reasons. First, this condition substantially weakens the explanatory capacity of the deprivation account because it implies that most ordinary sorts of pleasures are not deprived by death. In addition, the Historical Condition is vulnerable to counterexamples. In particular, what they offer as a standard case of the deprivation of future pleasure due to a late beginning (what they call Seeing The Beatles), or some of its variants, can be used to falsify this condition. Finally, the Historical Condition is theoretically indefensible because it is based on a faulty analysis of deprivation. (shrink)

This paper elaborates the problem of temporal unity for dynamic presentism and diagnoses the source of that problem in the dynamic presentist’s discarding the traditional C-series in its avoidance of McTaggart’s (1908, 1927) A-series paradox. This C-series provided the fixed structure of time which the transitory aspects of time then followed, and thereby unify those transitory aspects. It then considers ersatzer presentism as an ostensible solution to the problem of temporal unity by providing a new (...) abstract C-series (namely an ersatz-B-series) for dynamic presentism. However, after a closer examination of the details of this proposal, it is found that the ersatz-B-series itself needs to be temporally variable to capture the transitory aspects of time that it is meant to track. Consequently, it cannot provide the fixed structure of time required to unify the transitory aspects of time into a temporal series. It is therefore suggested that dynamic presentists look for a more course-grained determiner of temporal progression to construct the presentist-friendly C-series required to unify their transitory aspects of time. (shrink)

Contrary to Hoerl & McCormack, we argue that the best account of temporal cognition in humans is one in which a single system becomes capable of representing time. We suggest that H&M's own evidence for dual systems of temporal cognition – simultaneous contradictory beliefs – does not recommend dual systems, and that the single system approach is more plausible.

I borrow an idea from the fiction of C. S. Lewis that future outcomes may affect the value of past events, defend this idea via the concept of a 'temporal whole' and show its promise as a part of a theodicy and its resonance with Christian theism.

The traditional generality problem for process reliabilism concerns the difficulty in identifying each belief forming process with a particular kind of process. Thatidentification is necessary since individual belief forming processes are typically of many kinds, and those kinds may vary in reliability. I raise a new kind of generality problem, one which turns on the difficulty of identifying beliefs with processes by which they were formed. This problem arises because individual beliefs may be the culmination of overlapping (...) processes of distinct lengths, and these processes may differ in reliability. I illustrate the force of this problem with a discussion of recent work on the bootstrapping problem. (shrink)

Hugh Mellor has proposed what appears to be a new solution to the problem of intrinsic change (Mellor 1998). Assuming endurantism and a B‐theoretic, nonpresentist view of time, facts are supposed to have only enduring things and atemporal properties (or relations) as constituents, but no times. The having of properties and relations is not relativised to times. Instead, the whole of a fact is conceived of as temporally localised. It will be argued that this interesting and novel proposal does (...) not succeed as an account of change in the intrinsic properties of things. The basic difficulty is that the view still leads into contradiction, since it makes it incomprehensible how one and the same thing can have both a property and some incompatible property. The having of these incompatible properties is treated as two facts. But to add that these facts have certain temporal locations is of no help for avoiding the contradiction. (shrink)

IT IS COMMON for critics of Kant's ethical theory to point out that he presents a distinctly ahistorical conception of the structure of moral experience and to conclude that this evident lack of historical understanding seriously vitiates his attempt to grasp the "universal" principles of morality. This objection is generally supported by an appeal to the evidence supplied by the study of anthropology and history. Both of these disciplines attest to the wide variety of moral codes and beliefs that characterize (...) different societies at different periods in their history; moreover, they confirm the possibility of significant innovation and development in the conceptual schemes that are embodied in respective moralities. In light of this diversity the Kantian program of analyzing the invariant presuppositions contained in the "moral knowledge of ordinary human reason" may be considered misguided, because it neglects the internal connection between historically specific cultural practices and "ordinary" moral convictions. (shrink)

As David Chalmers notes, the “hard problem of consciousness” has two aspects. The first concerns the felt quality of experience. The contents we experience—say, the color of a book or the warmth of the sun—are not just present but felt to be so. The question is: how is this possible? What are the conscious processes involved in this? The second concerns the relation of the subjective aspect of experience to the physical processes that are at its origin. What is (...) required, in Chalmers’s view, is an “explanatory bridge” that would link conscious processes to “the structure and dynamics of physical processes.” In this article, I first argue that Husserl’s account of temporal constitution accounts for the felt quality of experience. I then go on to show how we can see time-constituting phenomena as providing the explanatory bridge that Chalmers requires. (shrink)

Perhaps it is unfortunate that, no matter what problems a psychological investigator elects to attempt to discuss, he is almost always confronted by a number of different and often conflicting points of view. The twisting paths revealed by these may one day be found to unite into a broad road, but most of them have as yet been insufficiently explored. Certainly problems in the psychology of temporal perception seem to lie in many different directions, according to the ways in (...) which they are approached. It would be possible, for instance, to take the mass of experimental work, always patient, sometimes brilliant, which has had a fairly continuous history since Czermak, in 1857, building upon Weber's researches into space perception, planned and began to carry out a programme for an investigation of the estimation of short time intervals. (shrink)

Based on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger the article presents the possibility of actualizing Heidegger’s main question about the meaning of Being in the context of the analysis of so-called “a priori perfect.” During the development of fundamental ontology in the second half of the 1920s, Heidegger ponders the approach to Being in the history of philosophy and identifies such a feature of Being as a priori, a kind of antecedence of Being in relation to being. Although tradition invariably understands (...) Being in this way, in it, according to Heidegger, the question is no longer raised either about the sense of such antecedence, or about the temporal basis of this sense, and therefore a priori as the essential character of Being is left in total oblivion. We suggest that it is the problematization of apriority in its temporal origin that can contribute to resolving Heidegger’s fundamental philosophical question of time as the transcendental horizon of any concept of Being that precedes being. In this precedence there is a cherished temporal moment, the comprehension of which allows us to develop the “basic question of metaphysics” about the relationship of Being and time in a more concrete way than Heidegger’s four main themes of the question of Being: the ontological difference; the basic articulation of Being ); the truth-character of Being; the possible modifications of Being and the unity of Being’s variety. Revealing a priori question as the central question of all Heideggers thinking before the “Turn” we attempt to update this question and justify the need for its renewal on the basis of a fundamental ontology. With this task we relate the question of the essence of philosophy in general in its existential-temporal concept since philosophy appears as a temporality-based possible of the questioning return to the “earlier”: to the essential structures of being, knowledge, Being, Dasein. Our analysis is based on the following decisions: Being in relation to being is always pre-understood as “earlier,” and in this understanding a temporal definition operates, hence the main question of fundamental ontology about the relation of Being and time can be developed or at least clarified through the problem of meaning of a priori. The question of the meaning of the “earlier” and of the temporal basis for understanding Being as “earlier,” a priori, is concretized into the question of the conditions for the possibility of any ontology, including the fundamental ontology, which raises the question of the earlier in relation to Being and therefore “lives” in the light of the understanding of the “earlier” as such. This reflexive foundation of the fundamental ontology from itself is a necessary stage on the way of developing its project, if we remember that the main “duty” of the philosopher is to clarify “our inner nature” for the sake of opening the boundaries and conditions of the possibility of philosophy. The conclusion is that the possibilities of fundamental ontology in making sense of Being, time, and philosophy in general are far from exhausted, but await the questions that actualize them and new readings that allow to see the hidden richness of Heidegger’s thought. (shrink)

It has been claimed that the only way to avoid action at a temporal distance in a temporal continuum is if effects occur simultaneously with their causes, and that in fact Newton’s second law of motion illustrates that they truly are simultaneous. Firstly, I point out that this interpretation of Newton’s second law is problematic because in classical mechanics ‘acceleration’ denotes a vector quantity. It is controversial whether vectors themselves are changes as opposed to properties of a change, (...) and therefore if they can count as effects. Secondly, I argue that the problem of action at a temporal distance is generated by the assumption that forces operate on their effects, but that this assumption is not easily reconciled with Newton’s third law of motion, which is best read as saying that forces operate between objects. On that reading, there is no problem of action at a temporal distance even in a temporal continuum just as long as interacting objects coexist. (shrink)

This paper explores Nicholas of Cusa’s framing of the De pace fidei as a dialogue taking place incaelo rationis. On the one hand, this framing allows Nicholas of Cusa to argue that all religious rites presuppose the truth of a single, unified faith and so temporally manifest divine logos in a way accommodated to the historically unique conventions of different political communities. On the other hand, at the end of the De pace fidei, the interlocutors in the heavenly dialogue are (...) enjoined to return to earth and lead their countrymen in a gradual conversion to the acceptance of rites which would explicitly acknowledge the metaphysically presupposed transcendent unity of all true faiths. In light of these two aspects of the literary framing of the De pace fidei, the question that motivates this paper concerns the extent to which the understanding of history subtending Cusanus’ temporal political aims is consistent with the understanding of history grounded in his metaphysical presupposition that there is una religio in omni diversitate rituum. In addressing this question, I shall argue that the literary strategy of the De pace fidei sacrifices Nicholas of Cusa’s apologetic doctrinal aims insofar as the text creates an allegorical space in which the tension between its literal and figurative dimensions assigns to its readers the task of choosing their own orientations to the significance of history as a foundation for future action. (shrink)

Summary Music has been primarily conceived as a temporal art. However, over the last two centuries or so, researchers across different disciplines including musicology, psychology, and philosophy, have been intrigued by the spatial nature of music and sounds, using spatial concepts to define music. This paper aims to demonstrate that an understanding of music perception from a temporal perspective inherently implies a certain spatial dimension. To do this, first, I briefly examine some key arguments that lead to conceiving (...) sound perception in temporal terms. At the same time, I highlight some of the limitations of a purely temporal account of sound perception which necessitate the incorporation of spatial considerations into the conceptualization of sound perception. Consequently, I move on to consider prominent spatial accounts of musical sounds that have been elaborated by psychologists, musicologists, and music composers. In conclusion, I discuss some of the challenges arising from the analogy between music and space, whether conceived in perceptual or cognitive terms. (shrink)

Clark & Thornton's conception finds an echo in implicit learning research, which shows that subjects may perform adaptively in complex structured situations through the use of simple statistical learning mechanisms. However, the authors fail to draw a distinction between, on the one hand, subjects' representations which emerge from type-1 learning mechanisms, and, on the other, their knowledge of the genuine abstract “recoding function” which defines a type-2 problem.

This paper examines Husserl’s fascination with the issues raised by Hume’s critique of the philosophy of the ego and the continuity of consciousness. The path taken here follows a continental and phenomenological approach. Husserl’s 1905 lecture course on the temporalization of immanent time-consciousness is a phenomenological-eidetic examination of how the continuity of consciousness and the consciousness of continuity are possible. It was by way of Husserl’s reading of Hume’s discussion of “flux” or “flow” that his discourse on temporal phenomena (...) led to the classification of a point-like now as a “fiction” and opened up a horizonal approach to the present that Hume’s introspective analyses presuppose but that escaped the limitations of the language that was available to him. In order to demonstrate the radicality of Husserl’s temporal investigations and his inspiration in the work of Hume, I show how his phenomenological discourse on the living temporal flow of consciousness resolves the latter’s concern about the problem of continuity by re-thinking how, in the absence of an abiding impression of Self, experience is continuous throughout the flux of its impressions. (shrink)

This paper examines Husserl’s fascination with the issues raised by Hume’s critique of the philosophy of the ego and the continuity of consciousness. The path taken here follows a continental and phenomenological approach. Husserl’s 1905 lecture course on the temporalization of immanent time-consciousness is a phenomenological-eidetic examination of how the continuity of consciousness and the consciousness of continuity are possible. It was by way of Husserl’s reading of Hume’s discussion of “flux” or “flow” that his discourse on temporal phenomena (...) led to the classification of a point-like now as a “fiction” and opened up a horizonal approach to the present that Hume’s introspective analyses presuppose but that escaped the limitations of the language that was available to him. In order to demonstrate the radicality of Husserl’s temporal investigations and his inspiration in the work of Hume, I show how his phenomenological discourse on the living temporal flow of consciousness resolves the latter’s concern about the problem of continuity by re-thinking how, in the absence of an abiding impression of Self, experience is continuous throughout the flux of its running off impressions. (shrink)

The essay develops two major arguments. First, if John Buridan's 'first argument' for the reintroduction of natural supposition is only that the "eternal truth" of a scientific proposition is preserved because subject terms in scientific propositions supposit for all the term's past, present, and future significata indifferently; then Albert of Saxony thinks it is simply ineffective. Only the 'second argument', i.e. the argument for the existence of an 'atemporal copula', adequately performs this task; but is rejected by Albert. Second, later (...) fourteenth-century criticisms of Buridan's natural supposition, given in certain Notabilia from the anonymous author in, Paris, BnF, lat. 14.716, ff. 40va-41rb, are nothing but an interpolated hodge-podge of criticisms given earlier in the century against various views of Buridan's by Albert of Saxony. It is this fact that makes Albert the real source of late fourteenth-century criticisms of Buridan's view of natural supposition. (shrink)

Derrida’s philosophy is usually known as a form of critique of metaphysics. This article, however, argues that Derrida’s deconstructions do not only dismantle metaphysics from within, but also remain in themselves thoroughly, and problematically, metaphysical. Its goal is to determine exactly where the metaphysical features of Derrida’s work can be found. The article starts with an analysis of Derrida’s understanding of metaphysics, as well as its deconstruction, by explaining the working of différance, mainly focusing on its temporality. Further, it will (...) demonstrate how in the temporization or deferral of différance a metaphysical desire for purity remains effective. In readings of several texts, the mutual interdependence of metaphysics and deconstruction will be sketched. Then the ethical side of deconstruction will be highlighted, both in Derrida’s early work as well as in the slightly different elaboration of différance in the later ethical notions like justice, the gift and the messianic. This results in a distinction of three versions of différance. Finally, a critical discussion of the metaphysical side of deconstruction will be followed by a comparison of different readings of deconstruction and différance. (shrink)

This article is not intended to state what I positively believe to be true, but to make a suggestion which I think it well-worth working out. The suggestion is not altogether unfamiliar, but it has certain implications that seem to have been so far overlooked, or at any rate have never been developed. I do not think that it is the duty of a philosopher to confine himself in his publications to working out theories of the truth of which he (...) is convinced.… It is a part of a philosopher's work, as it is of a scientist's, to try out tentative hypotheses and examine their advantages and disadvantages. (shrink)

We define the logic FOTLT(n), to be a monadic monodic fragment of first-order linear temporal logic, with 2n propositions representing the read and write steps of n two-step concurrent database transactions and a time-dependent predicate representing queries giving the sets of data items accessed by those read and write steps at given points in time. The models of FOTLT(n) contain interleaved sequences of the steps of infinitely many occurrences of the n transactions accessing unlimited data over time. A property (...) of serializability is specified for FOTLT(n) formulae. We show that the serializability problem for FOTLT(n) formulae is decidable. (shrink)

Material objects extend through space by having different spatial parts in different places. But how do they persist through time? According to some philosophers, things have temporal parts as well as spatial parts: accepting this is supposed to help us solve a whole bunch of metaphysical problems, and keep our philosophy in line with modern physics. Other philosophers disagree, arguing that neither metaphysics nor physics give us good reason to believe in temporal parts.

This paper considers the prospects for a theory of intergenerational rights in light of certain ontologies of time. It is argued that the attempt to attribute rights to future persons or obligations to present persons towards future persons, faces serious difficulties if the existence of the future is denied. The difficulty of attributing rights to non-existent future persons is diagnosed as a particularly intractable version of the ‘problem of cross-temporal relations’ that plagues No-Futurist views like presentism. I develop (...) a version of the problem of cross-temporal relations regarding cross-temporal normative relations. I then consider and reject various solutions to the problem available to No-Futurists. The upshot of the discussion is that which ontology of time we choose sets constraints on the kinds of explanations we may offer for our future-directed obligations. (shrink)

In this paper I consider an objection that friends of the Metaphysic of Temporal Parts (MTP) press against other solutions to the problem of temporary intrinsics and turn it against the MTP itself. I do not argue that the MTP must be false, nor do I argue that there are no arguments in favor of the MTP. Rather, the conclusion I draw is conditional: if the MTP provides an adequate response to the problem of temporary intrinsics, then (...) the MTP provides no reason to reject our commonsense view of the nature of material objects. (shrink)

This piece reconstructs and reflects upon the terms of the theoretical projection underlying Max Tomba’s book,Marx’s Temporalities, with particular reference to his use of the concepts of multiple temporalities and temporal layers. Tomba’s use of these concepts, it is argued, productively relocates Marx’s writings within the framework of the twentieth-century philosophy of time. However, Tomba’s dependence upon received versions of these concepts, untransformed, reproduces theoretical problems implicit within them, which have been intensified by recent developments within global capital. The (...) application of these concepts to an understanding of the historical present, understood as a situation of globally disjunctive contemporaneity, is seen to be, in part, vitiated by their embeddedness within an increasingly exhausted past. (shrink)

Experiences of motion and change are widely taken to have a ‘flow-like’ quality. Call this ‘temporal qualia’. Temporal qualia are commonly thought to be central to the question of whether time objectively passes: (1) passage realists take temporal passage to be necessary in order for us to have the temporal qualia we do; (2) passage antirealists typically concede that time appears to pass, as though our temporal qualia falsely represent time as passing. I reject both (...) claims and make the case that passage-talk plays no useful explanatory role with respect to temporal qualia, but rather obfuscates what the philosophical problem of temporal qualia is. I offer a ‘reductionist’ account of temporal qualia that makes no reference to the concept of passage and argue that it is well motivated by empirical studies in motion perception. (shrink)

The standard definition of an instantaneous temporal part cannot properly deal with cases involving time travel. This paper provides a new definition of an instantaneous temporal part by appealing to David Lewis's distinction between external time and personal time. The new definition avoids the problems because it does not allow more than one instantaneous temporal part of an object at each moment of its personal time. We argue that this new definition, combined with our new perdurantist semantic (...) thesis, deals with cases of time travel successfully. (shrink)

Much previous work in artificial intelligence has neglected representing time in all its complexity. In particular, it has neglected continuous change and the indeterminacy of the future. To rectify this, I have developed a first‐order temporal logic, in which it is possible to name and prove things about facts, events, plans, and world histories. In particular, the logic provides analyses of causality, continuous change in quantities, the persistence of facts (the frame problem), and the relationship between tasks and (...) actions. It may be possible to implement a temporal‐inference machine based on this logic, which keeps track of several “maps” of a time line, one per possible history. (shrink)