t. 1. Bolcʻano da mecʻnierebis tʻeoria ; Aletʻologiis sapʻużvlebi --t. 3. Pʻilosopʻiis šesavali ; Xelovnebis tʻeoria -- t. 5. Petre Iberi da antikuri pʻilosopʻiuri memkvidreoba.

-- v. 4. Rustaveli i vostochnyĭ Renessans.

El autor busca reflejar –a partir de la propuesta de Habermas para diferenciar las acciones correctas moralmente- cómo la perspectiva comunicativa puede aportar a los procesos educativos universitarios y cómo ella puede constituir un buen referente para mejorar tanto la eficacia como la corrección moral de éstos. Propone luego un diseño educativo universitario comunicativo que no parta de la coacción, sabiendo que ello exigirá profundas transformaciones personales y sociales.

Ghesmat (roughly could be translated as ‘fate’) is one of the ancient cultural schemas among the Persians. This study explores the schema of ghesmat in the lives of Persian speakers as reflected in their language use among people with different age and educational level. Having introduced the schema of ghesmat in Persian, data was collected by giving a discourse completion test (DCT) to the participants of the study who were randomly chosen. The results of the analysis of data revealed that (...) Persians instantiated the cultural schema of ghesmat in different contextual circumstances of their lives. In addition, the use of this cultural schema was different among people with different age and education. It seemed young educated Persian speakers drew least on the schema whereas old uneducated ones mostly favored ghesmat schema. Finally the study discussed about the possible pattern for the distribution of cultural schemas. (shrink)

An extensive literature has been accumulating, in recent years, on face-processing in sheep and on the relevance of faces for social interaction in this species. In spite of this, spontaneous preferences for face or non-face stimuli in lambs have not been reported. In this study we tested the spontaneous preference of 8-day-old lambs (N = 9) for three pairs of stimuli. In each pair, one stimulus was a face-like display, whereas the other presented the same inner features displaced in unnatural (...) positions. One pair of stimuli was obtained from photographic images of ewes’ faces, the other two pairs were schematic face-like stimuli. Lambs could differentiate the two stimuli obtained by photos of conspecifics, looking longer at the non-face stimulus (p < 0.05). We interpret this as a novelty preference, proving that few day-old lambs have already encoded the structural properties that define a face and recognize violations of those general properties. (shrink)

An extensive literature has been accumulating, in recent years, on face-processing in sheep and on the relevance of faces for social interaction in this species. In spite of this, spontaneous preferences for face or non-face stimuli in lambs have not been reported. In this study we tested the spontaneous preference of 8-day-old lambs for three pairs of stimuli. In each pair, one stimulus was a face-like display, whereas the other presented the same inner features displaced in unnatural positions. One pair (...) of stimuli was obtained from photographic images of ewes’ faces, the other two pairs were schematic face-like stimuli. Lambs could differentiate the two stimuli obtained by photos of conspecifics, looking longer at the non-face stimulus. We interpret this as a novelty preference, proving that few day-old lambs have already encoded the structural properties that define a face and recognize violations of those general properties. (shrink)

Mediante el recurso que Rorty emplea para argumentar que Heidegger no ha dejado el canon Platón-Kant, vamos a mostrar que el mismo Rorty no puede salir del planteamiento platónico. Para ello nuestro artículo se divide en dos partes principales. En primer lugar, sistematizaremos la inversión de Heidegger que Rorty dejó meramente apuntada en «Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey», rastreando los supuestos ontológicos y epistemológicos en los que el pragmatista se basó para llevar a cabo su peculiar lectura de Heidegger. (...) Después, evidenciaremos que la técnica de inversión y recontextualización que emplea Rorty con Heidegger pueden volverse contra él y no permitirle salir de la matriz platónica. (shrink)

El artículo examina el origen del proyecto rortiano de acabar con la imagen única de Platón. En su escrito autobiográfico, Trotsky las orquídeas silvestres, Rorty describe su trayectoria filosófica y presenta su alternativa a Platón como pensada desde su más pronta juventud. Sin embargo, como vamos a mostrar, el proyecto central de acabar con la imagen única de Platón no es algo que esté pensado ni se dé desde un principio en sus obras. Defendemos que, pese a lo que el (...) propio Rorty indicó en sus escritos, encontramos indicios de que no es hasta la década de los noventa que Rorty piensa en elaborar una nueva relación alternativa al léxico último de Platón. (shrink)

Abraham Lincoln was a yogi. He never assumed the headstand or the lotus pose but in many aspects of his life, he behaved just like a yoga practitioner or a modern truth seeker. He would have agreed with certain points of view followed nowadays by spiritual people. This book was written to throw a spotlight on Lincoln s many regular, and even daily, habits that demonstrate his affinity with the ancient spiritual science of yoga.".

In this paper we review the literature on social learning mechanisms in the domestic chick, focusing largely on work from our own laboratories. The domestic chicken is a social-living bird that searches for food in flocks, avoids predators by following warnings from other flock members, and forms (stable) social hierarchies. All of these behaviors develop throughout ontogeny, largely during the very early stages post-hatch. Newly hatched chicks appear to have predispositions to orient towards and to pay greatest attention to the (...) biologically relevant characteristics of their immediate environment (i.e. to conspecifics: the mother bird and/or fellow hatchlings) from which they may subsequently learn. In addition, the chick has a lateralized brain; left and right hemispheres being specialized for certain behavioral functions and responses, and it appears that such behavioral lateralization is also transposed onto certain social learning situations, which will also be considered. Keywords: social learning; social cognition; chick; brain asymmetry. (shrink)

In this paper we review the literature on social learning mechanisms in the domestic chick, focusing largely on work from our own laboratories. The domestic chicken is a social-living bird that searches for food in flocks, avoids predators by following warnings from other flock members, and forms social hierarchies. All of these behaviors develop throughout ontogeny, largely during the very early stages post-hatch. Newly hatched chicks appear to have predispositions to orient towards and to pay greatest attention to the biologically (...) relevant characteristics of their immediate environment from which they may subsequently learn. In addition, the chick has a lateralized brain; left and right hemispheres being specialized for certain behavioral functions and responses, and it appears that such behavioral lateralization is also transposed onto certain social learning situations, which will also be considered. Keywords: social learning; social cognition; chick; brain asymmetry. (shrink)

This book maps out the lexico-conceptual articulation of Greene's narrative dramatization of ethical situations. This main aim issues from three working hypotheses: in the first place, a reduced set of terms such as peace, despair, pity or commitment have a striking lexical recurrence in Greene's texts. They are considered here as keywords that articulate his discourse at a conceptual level. In the second place, those keywords are invested with narrative potential. They have the capacity to generate narrative situations and developments. (...) In the third place, they articulate a particular narrative pattern. Such lexico-conceptual articulation is shaped mainly as ethical conflict dramatized in narrative form. Drawing on contemporary theories of community and ethics developed by Jean-Luc Nancy, Maurice Blanchot, J. Hillis Miller or Derek Attridge, this book sets out to explore a recurrent narrative pattern in Greene's work, emerging from his personal use of the language of ethics and community. (shrink)

This article aims to clarify the relationship between the Truth and Justification in the philosophies of Jürgen Habermas and Richard Rorty from their discussions. The thesis that I advocate is that the relationship between Truth and Justification depends on the Ontological and Epistemological assumptions that each maintains and is not a matter of conditions of speech as stated by Habermas.

RESUMEN El artículo examina el origen del proyecto rortiano de acabar con la imagen única de Platón. En su escrito autobiográfico, Trotsky las orquídeas silvestres, Rorty describe su trayectoria filosófica y presenta su alternativa a Platón como pensada desde su más pronta juventud. Sin embargo, como vamos a mostrar, el proyecto central de acabar con la imagen única de Platón no es algo que esté pensado ni se dé desde un principio en sus obras. Defendemos que, pese a lo que (...) el propio Rorty indicó en sus escritos, encontramos indicios de que no es hasta la década de los noventa que Rorty piensa en elaborar una nueva relación alternativa al léxico último de Platón. ABSTRACT The article examines the origin of the rortyan project to destroy Plato's unique image. In his autobiographical writing, Trotsky the Wild Orchids, Rorty describes his philosophical journey and presents his alternative to Plato as thought out from his earliest youth. However, as we will show, the central project of ending Plato's unique image is not something that is thought out or given from the beginning in his works. We argue that, despite what Rorty himself indicated in his writings, we find indications that it is not until the 1990s that Rorty thinks of elaborating a new alternative relationship to Plato's last lexicon. (shrink)

El artículo presenta algunos de los diferentes modelos teórico-explicativos sobre las necesidades humanas; revisa el estado del arte en las publicaciones recientes, y evalúa críticamente las limitaciones y potenciales que ellas tienen, desde una mirada sistémica y fenoménica desde un enfoque centrado en la persona.

La sociedad atraviesa una serie de transformaciones en sus relaciones entre instituciones y comunidad; en este marco la universidad, desde su misión académica centrada en la formación e investigación para el desarrollo de conocimientos, está promoviendo una mayor implicación hacia las necesidades de la sociedad, a lo que se denomina responsabilidad social universitaria (RSU). Este artículo presenta cómo, desde una perspectiva humanista, se constituye una comunidad social de investigación entre la Unidad de Investigación Enfoque Centrado en la Persona de la (...) Universidad de Valencia –España-, el grupo Prisma de la Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga –Colombia- y la Fundación Albeiro Vargas (FAVAC) –Colombia- cuya finalidad es la atención al adulto mayor. Mediante una metodología de investigación-acción participativa, se genera una base de cooperación institucional para la promoción del bienestar psicológico del adulto mayor. El voluntariado, a través de sus docentes y sus alumnos, se concreta así en una acción de responsabilidad social universitaria cuya primera actividad es la valoración del bienestar psicológico del adulto mayor en la fundación Albeiro Vargas. (shrink)

The paper addresses the family of questions that arose from the field of interactions between phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. On the one hand, apparently partial coextensivity of research domain of phenomenology and the cognitive sciences sets the goal of their cooperation and mutual inspiration. On the other hand, there are some obstacles on the path to achieve this goal: phenomenology and the cognitive sciences have different traditions, they speak different languages, they have adopted different methodological approaches, and last but (...) not least, their prominent exponents exhibits different styles of thinking. In order to clarify this complicated area of tensions, the paper presents the results of philosophical reflections of such topics as: 1) philosophical presuppositions and postulates of the cognitive sciences 2) abstraction of some phenomena during idealisation and the dialectical model of science's development 3) argumentation based on prediction of future development of the cognitive sciences. This finally leads to the formulation of a phenomenology-based postulate for adequate model of mind and the discussion of humanistic dimension of cognitive sciences. (shrink)

En su obra La fe que nos salva, Fernando Sebastián Aguilar lleva a cabo una introducción a la teolo- gía del acto de fe. La finalidad de este artículo es presentar los núcleos princi- pales de su reflexión. Para ello, atende- remos a los presupuestos y al itinerario de su preocupación por la fe, situando la cuestión del creer en el contexto de la nueva evangelización y mostrando cómo, según el autor, el análisis de la fe puede ayudar a su (...) fortalecimiento. Nos fijaremos en tres aspectos de este aná- lisis: la escucha del testimonio bíblico sobre el creer, el estudio de los rasgos comunes de la fe y su significatividad para la vida. (shrink)

In recent literature on plurals the claim has often been made that the move from singular to plural expressions can be iterated, generating what are occasionally called higher-level plurals or superplurals, often correlated with superplural predicates. I argue that the idea that the singular-to-plural move can be iterated is questionable. I then show that the examples and arguments intended to establish that some expressions of natural language are in some sense higher-level plurals fail. Next, I argue that these and some (...) other expressions should instead be classified as plurals whose reference is articulated, an idea explained and elaborated in the paper. I also show that the related categories of plural and superplural predicates collapse to that of ordinary predicates. In the process we also see that the law of substitutivity salva veritate should be elaborated for cases involving expressions more complex than singular ones. (shrink)

El principio de sustituibilidad de los idénticos salva veritate constituye una pieza de importancia central para la teoría leibniziana de la demostración, para no hablar de sus implicancias ontológicas. Sin embargo, ha recibido la crítica de que encierra una confusión entre uso y mención. No obstante, el presente trabajo defiende la tesis de que el principio no está afectado por esa supuesta confusión, utilizando para ello la distinción leibniziana entre “la consideración del modo de concebir” y la “consideración de la (...) cosa misma”. No obstante, la introducción de dicha distinción viene aparejada con la necesidad establecer restricciones en la aplicación del mencionado principio. (shrink)

This paper has three modest aims: to present a puzzle, to show why some obvious solutions aren’t really “easy outs”, and to introduce our own solution. The puzzle is this. When it was small and had waterlogged streets, Toronto carried the moniker ‘Muddy York’. Later, the streets were drained, it grew, and Muddy York officially changed its name to ‘Toronto’. Given this, each premise in the following argument seems true. Yet the conclusion is a contraction.

This is the third installment of a paper which deals with comparison and evaluation of the standard slingshot argument (for the claim that all true sentences, if they refer, refer to the same object) with the doxastic formulation.

This essay takes a critical look at Jonathan Berg’s theory of direct belief. Berg’s analysis of the concept of direct belief is considered insightful, but doubts are raised concerning his generalization of the purely extensional truth conditional semantics of direct belief ascription sentences to the truth conditional semantics of all belief ascription sentences. Difficulties are posed that Berg does not discuss, but that are implied by the proposal that the truth conditional semantics of belief ascription sentences generally are those of (...) direct belief ascription sentences, and that once mentioned must enter into an evaluation of the proposition that by implication all beliefs are direct. Another line of objection concerns Berg’s second main thesis that the pragmatics as distinct from the semantics of belief ascription sentences can explain away apparent substitution failure validity breakdowns in belief ascription sentences as inappropriate utterances according to rules of roughly Gricean conversational implicature, rather than correspondence or non-correspondence with the facts about such things as what it is that people actually believe. These two parts of Berg’s argument, that the truth conditional semantics of all belief ascription sentences are those exclusively of direct belief ascription sentences, and that apparent substitution failure is effectively salva propria rather than salva veritate, are explored within the general framework of Berg’s thought experiment, eventually arriving at diametrically opposed conclusions, reflecting on what we believe comic book character Lois Lane believes and does not believe about Superman, and what she believes and does not believe about Clark Kent. (shrink)

Semantics in the Montagovian tradition combines two basic tenets. One tenet is that the semantic value of a sentence is an intension, a function from points of evaluations into truth-values. The other tenet is that the semantic value of a composite expression is the result of applying the function denoted by one component to arguments denoted by the other components. Many philosophers object to intensional semantics on the grounds that intensionally equivalent sentences do not substitute salva veritate into attitude ascriptions. (...) They propose instead that the semantic values of sentences must be structured propositions. In rejecting intensional semantics, philosophers who endorse structured propositions also usually reject functional compositionality, undermining both tenets of the Montagovian programme. I defend a semantic theory that incorporates both structured propositions and functional compositionality. I argue that this semantic theory can preserve many explanatory benefits of Montague semantics. Finally, I show how treating composition functional application can resolve core problems internal to a theory of structured propositions. (shrink)

The „Paradox of the Concept Horse" arises on the assumption of the Reference Principle: that co-referential expressions should be cross-substitutable salva veritate in extensional contexts and salva congruitate in all. Accordingly no singular term can co-refer with an unsaturated expression. The paper outlines a number of desiderata for a satisfactory response to the problem and argues that recent treatments by Dummett and Wiggins fall short by their lights. It is then pointed out that a more consistent perception of the requirements (...) of the Reference Principle leads not to the Paradox but to the result that Frege had no business extending the notion of Bedeutung to unsaturated expressions in the first place. Rather the relation between, e.g., predicates and the entities that comprise the range of higher-order logical variables must be logically unlike that between singular terms and their referents; the way is therefore opened for singular terms to refer to entities of the former kind after all. The Concept Horse is a concept (and a Fregean object too.). (shrink)

Some contemporary Russellians, defenders of the view that the semantic content of a proper name, demonstrative or indexical is simply its referent, are prepared to accept that view’s most infamous apparent consequence: that coreferential names, demonstratives, indexicals, etc. are intersubstitutable salva veritate, even in intentional contexts. Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames argue that our recalcitrant intuitions with respect to the famous apparent counterexamples are not semantic intuitions, but rather pragmatic intuitions. Strictly and literally speaking, Lois Lane believes, and even knows (...) that Clark Kent is identical to Superman, since she believes and knows that Superman is identical to Superman. Salmon and Soames attempt to soften our reaction to this shocker by allowing that it is typically misleading to utter the sentence ‘Lois Lane knows that Clark Kent is identical to Superman’, since it pragmatically implicates, without semantically entailing, that Lois Lane would accept the sentence ‘Clark Kent is identical to Superman’. Our compulsive tendency to claim that ‘Lois Lane knows that Clark Kent is Superman’ is false, rather than merely misleading, is due to a confusion between semantics and pragmatics, between truth conditions and conditions of appropriateness of utterance.1 It is probably fair to say that the common reaction to this move in defense of Russellianism is negative. Mark Richard says the following. (shrink)

Homotopy Type Theory is a putative new foundation for mathematics grounded in constructive intensional type theory that offers an alternative to the foundations provided by ZFC set theory and category theory. This article explains and motivates an account of how to define, justify, and think about HoTT in a way that is self-contained, and argues that, so construed, it is a candidate for being an autonomous foundation for mathematics. We first consider various questions that a foundation for mathematics might be (...) expected to answer, and find that many of them are not answered by the standard formulation of HoTT as presented in the ‘HoTT Book’. More importantly, the presentation of HoTT given in the HoTT Book is not autonomous since it explicitly depends upon other fields of mathematics, in particular homotopy theory. We give an alternative presentation of HoTT that does not depend upon ideas from other parts of mathematics, and in particular makes no reference to homotopy theory, and argue that it is a candidate autonomous foundation for mathematics. Our elaboration of HoTT is based on a new interpretation of types as mathematical concepts, which accords with the intensional nature of the type theory. 1 Introduction2 What Is a Foundation for Mathematics?2.1 A characterization of a foundation for mathematics2.2 Autonomy3 The Basic Features of Homotopy Type Theory3.1 The rules3.2 The basic ways to construct types3.3 Types as propositions and propositions as types3.4 Identity3.5 The homotopy interpretation4 Autonomy of the Standard Presentation?5 The Interpretation of Tokens and Types5.1 Tokens as mathematical objects?5.2 Tokens and types as concepts6 Justifying the Elimination Rule for Identity7 The Foundations of Homotopy Type Theory without Homotopy7.1 Framework7.2 Semantics7.3 Metaphysics7.4 Epistemology7.5 Methodology8 Possible Objections to this Account8.1 A constructive foundation for mathematics?8.2 What are concepts?8.3 Isn’t this just Brouwerian intuitionism?8.4 Duplicated objects8.5 Intensionality and substitution salva veritate9 Conclusion9.1 Advantages of this foundation. (shrink)