Although research on epistemic injustice has focused on the effects of prejudice in epistemic exchanges, the account of prejudice that emerges in Fricker's (2007) view is not completely clear. In particular, I claim that the epistemic role of prejudice in the structure of testimonial justification is still in need of a satisfactory explanation. What special epistemic power does prejudice exercise that prevents the speaker's words from constituting evidence for the hearer's belief? By clarifying this point, it will be possible to (...) address two more general issues concerning the nature of prejudice: its resistance to counterevidence and the steps involved in overcoming prejudice. I propose a hinge account of prejudice, based on the recent perspective of hinge epistemology, to help clarify these aspects. According to the hinge account, prejudices share a fundamental feature with hinges: they work as norms of evidential significance, and as such, they determine what can and cannot count as evidence for belief. (shrink)

Although research on epistemic injustice has focused on the effects of prejudice in epistemic exchanges, the account of prejudice that emerges in Fricker’s (2007) view is not completely clear. In particular, I claim that the epistemic role of prejudice in the structure of testimonial justification is still in need of a satisfactory explanation. What special epistemic power does prejudice exercise that prevents the speaker’s words from constituting evidence for the hearer’s belief? By clarifying this point, it will be possible to (...) address two more general issues concerning the nature of prejudice: its resistance to counterevidence and the steps involved in overcoming prejudice. I propose a hinge account of prejudice, based on the recent perspective of hinge epistemology, to help clarify these aspects. According to the hinge account, prejudices share a fundamental feature with hinges: they work as norms of evidential significance, and as such, they determine what can and cannot count as evidence for belief. (shrink)

This paper makes use of the Wittgenstein-inspired perspective of hinge epistemology in connection with research on epistemic injustice. Its aim is to shed light on the neglected relationship between hinges and prejudices, by focusing on the role of the “radical doubter” in epistemic practices.

Recently, hinge epistemologists have applied Wittgenstein’s metaphor of hinges to religious belief. The most prominent proposal in this context is Pritchard’s “quasi-fideism”. This paper examines some historical precursors of the notion of religious hinges, with the aim of shedding more light on it. After outlining the framework of hinge epistemology and its application to religious belief, I briefly examine the views of Thomas Reid and John Henry Newman as acknowledged forerunners of this framework (or cognate views). Next, I turn to (...) two hitherto unacknowledged forerunners, the pragmatists William James and Charles S. Peirce. I then focus on some insights that the pragmatists offer. On this basis, I conclude that religious beliefs are a special class of hinges. As such, while they can be defended through hinge epistemology, they cannot constitute a model through which we can interpret the nature of hinges in general. (shrink)

In this commentary on Nuno Venturinha’s Description of Situations, after highlighting what in my view are the most significant and innovative features of his work, I focus on Venturinha’s infallibilist approach to knowledge. This topic allows for a wider discussion concerning the pragmatist aspects of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I discuss this in three steps: first, by describing the general similarity between Wittgenstein and the pragmatists with respect to the emphasis on contexts; second, by focusing on the kind of fallibilism (...) endorsed by the pragmatists and its compatibility with Charles S. Peirce’s concept of the “indubitables,” which I take as a precursor of Wittgenstein’s concept of hinges; and, finally, by advancing the hypothesis that it is possible to find a form of fallibilism in the later Wittgenstein too, notwithstanding his insistence on the impossibility of mistakes. My conclusion is that while Venturinha’s contextualism finds support in the later Wittgenstein’s writings, his infallibilism does not. (shrink)

This essay addresses one of the central questions in the ongoing debate about just war theory: are soldiers morally responsible for serving in unjust wars? Francisco de Vitoria addressed this question in the sixteenth century using the concepts of invincible and vincible ignorance. He excused soldiers serving in unjust wars, if they did not know the war was unjust and if they did not have the means to overcome their ignorance; if they had the means, they were morally culpable. In (...) modern just war theory, ignorance is still used both to blame and excuse military service in unjust wars. This essay identifies ten different ways that scholars have used ignorance to argue about the moral responsibilities of soldiers. It then applies the different meanings of ignorance to soldiers serving in Western nations and, using Vitoria’s means tests, evaluates if modern soldiers do indeed have the means to overcome their ignorance. Since many soldiers do have the means, invincible ignorance should no longer be used as an excuse for their service in unjust wars; furthermore, soldiers may, in fact, be morally culpable for serving in them. (shrink)

Although the expression “form of life” and its plural “forms of life” occur only five times in Philosophical Investigations, and generally few times in his works, it is commonly agreed that this is one of the most relevant issues in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Starting from the analysis of the contexts in which Wittgenstein makes use of this concept, the paper focuses on the different interpretations that have been given in secondary literature, and proposes a classification based on two axes of (...) debate: the monistic versus pluralistic interpretation, and the empirical versus transcendental interpretation. After placing some well-known readings in the resulting scheme, an attempt will be made to offer an evolutionary reading of Wittgenstein’s own ideas about forms of life. It will be argued that the empirical and plural view that seems characteristic of his writings in the Thirties, slowly appears to turn towards a monistic view, sometimes with transcendental tones, although within a pragmatic perspective. This turn remains nevertheless rooted in Wittgenstein’s general attitude towards philosophy intended as a conceptual inquiry with clarifying and therapeutic aims. (shrink)

The volume uncovers the most pragmatic and pragmatist aspects of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy, particularly of On Certainty, through a comparison with the pragmatist tradition as expressed by Charles S. Peirce and William James. On Certainty is often described as 'pragmatic' in literature and this pragmatic aspect is said to characterize a new turn in its author’s thought. Yet, what is still missing is a study of what specifically are the features which make these writings 'sound like pragmatism', as Wittgenstein himself (...) put it (OC 422). The book therefore aims to verify if and to what extent it is possible to sustain that there is an objective convergence between his thought and pragmatism. In doing so, the volume also proposes a clarification of the main differences between Peirce’s and James’ vision of some key ideas of classical pragmatism like doubt and certainty, common sense, the pragmatic maxim, action. Among the achievements of the work are: an analysis of Wittgenstein’s first mention of pragmatism; some pieces of evidence in favour of the hypothesis that Wittgenstein did read some works by Peirce; a documented investigation on the relevance of Frank Ramsey for the development of Wittgenstein’s idea of pragmatism. The volume does not sustain the thesis that Wittgenstein was a pragmatist (nor the opposing thesis that he was not), but highlights the objective convergences and the divergences between his perspective and pragmatism through a balanced analysis running both on an exegetical and on a theoretical level. (shrink)

There is no doubt about the relevance of Cheryl Misak's Cambridge Pragmatism, the accuracy with which she has brought to light documents, diaries, manuscripts, and letters, the readability of her writing and at the same time the strength of her theses. One of the many merits of her remarkable work is, I think, the light she sheds on how Ludwig Wittgenstein was exposed to pragmatism in 1929, chiefly thanks to Frank Ramsey, and on how pragmatist seeds continued to shape his (...) later work, in spite of his open aversion to the pragmatist Weltanschauung. In what follows, however, I will only briefly touch on the subject of Ramsey and Wittgenstein (on which I expanded elsewhere: Boncompagni 2016a:... (shrink)

Wittgenstein mentions “forms of life” only on a limited number of occasions in his writings; however, this concept is at the core of his approach to language, as the vast literature on the subject shows. My aim in this paper is neither to adjudicate which of the many competing interpretations of “forms of life” is correct nor to propose a new one. I start with a methodological take on this notion and test it by applying it to a specific case. (...) In my view, the notion of forms of life is a methodological tool that Wittgenstein uses to draw attention to the embeddedness of language in our lives and practices. This reading, I suggest, allows us to oppose those who want to see in Wittgenstein a conservative thinker, based on his remark on forms of life as “the given” that must be accepted. In particular, it becomes possible to put his notion to use in the study of linguistic and social change. Hence, I propose as an example the case of innovative language games in trans communities. In this context, the notion of forms of life enables us to see with more clarity how linguistic change occurs, which also helps us better understand phenomena such as disagreement, conflict, and hermeneutical injustice. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been increasing concern about unethical conduct within corporate business, not least because of the scandalous behavior of former chief executives at top blue chip companies such as Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat, and Volkswagen. These scandals have not only threatened the privileged position of senior corporate employees but also the solvency of the companies they manage and lead. The high profile cases of corporate crime and corruption that occurred in the early 2000s together with the 2008 Wall (...) Street bailouts and the growth in criminal prosecutions since have raised the profile of business ethics to an unprecedented level. Greater public sensitivity toward and awareness about the unlawful and immoral conduct of firms in the United States and elsewhere, has created demand for organizations to become more accountable and socially responsible and prompted greater regulatory scrutiny. It has also served to highlight the embryonic and delimited state of research and scholarship on business ethics, where the focus has tended to remain on leadership. A neglected, though important, line of ethical enquiry concerns followership. Corporate wrongdoing would be less formidable and extensive if it was not aided and abetted. Two key questions arise. First, what prompts followers to support rather than oppose bad leaders? Second, what can be done to stem or at least curtail their allegiance to bad leaders? (shrink)

Preserving dignity during the dying process requires reviewing the roles of those involved in the treatment, care methods and decision-making. This article examines the participation and responsibility assigned to nurses regarding decision-making in the final stages of life, as laid out in the Rights to and Guarantee of Dignity for the Individual During the Process of Death Act. This text has been analysed on the levels of socio-cultural practice and discourse practice, using the critical discourse analysis methodology. The results show (...) that, although the law is another result of the social trend of patient empowerment, the responsibility of the nurses is not recognised, and they are left out of the decision-making process in the final stages of life. (shrink)

El problema de la exclusión social –situación de quienes encuentran cerrado el acceso a los bienes y servicios que permiten un básico desarrollo de la personalidad– constituye un desafío para la legitimidad del sistema social y las normas penales. Principalmente porque ello supone que en una misma sociedad hay individuos con estatus de persona –ciudadanos “normales”, incluidos– y otros que, por estar privados de los derechos asociados al estatus, están total o parcialmente excluidos del mismo. De cara a evitar su (...) instrumentalización penal se propone, en los delitos más conectados con la noción de ciudadanía que con la de dignidad, la atenuación o exclusión de la pena por disminución de la exigibilidad. Si el delito no se explica sólo por déficit de motivación del sujeto, sino también por un déficit de socialización imputable al propio sistema social, lo que tiene lugar es una especie de corresponsabilidad. (shrink)

This paper explores the enactive approach in cognitive science with an eye on the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The aim is not that of answering the question: was Wittgenstein an ante litteram enactivist? He was not, because he was not an ante litteram (cognitive) scientist of any kind. The aim, conversely, is that of answering the question: can enactivism be Wittgensteinian? In answering positively, it will be argued that a Wittgensteinian framework can help enactive cognitive scientists in dissolving certain old problems (...) which they sometimes seem not to be able to get rid of. After the Introduction, the first two sections of the paper concern the Wittgensteinian standpoint on psychological concepts (Section 2) and the enactivist approach in its general terms (Section 3). Section 4 attempts a closer examination of some key concepts – chiefly representations, the inner, the “explanatory gap”, the “hard problem” of consciousness – considering both the enactivists’ and Wittgenstein’s attitude towards them. The Conclusion surmises the benefits of a Wittgensteinian perspective also hinting at some other problems which it can help to clarify. (shrink)

En el presente estudio se abordarán los crímenes cometidos por mujeres durante los últimos años de la España de la Restauración y la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera. De igual modo, se profundizará en la dicotomía espacial y discursiva que suponen estas acciones al ser cometidas en el ámbito de lo privado, pero pronto extrapoladas a lo público con fines sen­sacionalistas. Recortes de prensa, fragmentos literarios y pun­tualmente sentencias judiciales serán las fuentes de las que nos valdremos para desarrollar esta (...) investigación con el objeto de profundizar en esta difusa línea divisoria de actuación dialécti­ca. Contra los preceptos definidos por el discurso dominante en torno al «sexo femenino» que encasillaba a las mujeres en una concepción de perpetua debilidad, belleza y letargo, la trans­gresión nacida en el seno de lo privado se hará pública demos­trando que las idealizaciones creadas sobre ellas poco tenían que ver con la realidad. (shrink)

Partiendo del intenso impacto que está teniendo el big data y el resto de tecnologías conexas en nuestra existencia personal y social, el presente artículo busca, en primer lugar, realizar una aproximación a la naturaleza del conocimiento que los datos masivos generan desde el concepto foucaultiano de saber-poder, como también desentrañar el modo en que dicho conocimiento es utilizado para legitimar decisiones que se toman en la incertidumbre. En segundo lugar, intentará analizar qué novedad supone dicho saber en relación a (...) su más inmediato precedente: la estadística y, por último, tendrá como fin examinar el tipo de poder que surge de dicho saber, en relación especialmente con las ideas, de nuevo en la estela de Michel Foucault, acerca del poder pastoral y la conducción a través de la verdad confesada. (shrink)

In this commentary on Nuno Venturinha’s Description of Situations, after highlighting what in my view are the most significant and innovative features of his work, I focus on Venturinha’s infallibilist approach to knowledge. This topic allows for a wider discussion concerning the pragmatist aspects of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I discuss this in three steps: first, by describing the general similarity between Wittgenstein and the pragmatists with respect to the emphasis on contexts; second, by focusing on the kind of fallibilism (...) endorsed by the pragmatists and its compatibility with Charles S. Peirce’s concept of the “indubitables,” which I take as a precursor of Wittgenstein’s concept of hinges; and, finally, by advancing the hypothesis that it is possible to find a form of fallibilism in the later Wittgenstein too, notwithstanding his insistence on the impossibility of mistakes. My conclusion is that while Venturinha’s contextualism finds support in the later Wittgenstein’s writings, his infallibilism does not. (shrink)

Wittgenstein likens philosophy both to an illness and to a therapy. The reflections he dedicates to mental disturbance in On Certainty shed some light on this ambivalence, by pointing at the intertwined themes of common sense, doubt, mistake, reasonableness, and normality. Wittgenstein’s remarks have sometimes been compared to the description of the symptoms of what psychopathologists have called the loss of natural self-evidence, or the loss of common sense. Besides briefly recalling some of the outcomes of this debate in literature, (...) I focus on Wittgenstein’s conception of “hinges”, the basic practical certainties which patients suffering from the loss of common sense seem to lack. By working on this comparison, I offer an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s idea of philosophy that clarifies both its insane and its therapeutic side. (shrink)

This paper applies the framework of epistemic injustice to the context of the asylum process, arguing that asylum seekers are typically at risk of this kind of injustice, which consists in their not being considered credible and not being listened to due to prejudices toward their social identity. More specifically, I address hermeneutical injustice in the adjudication of LGBTQ asylum claims, as well as the possibility of developing practices of hermeneutical justice in this context. I start with a general analysis (...) of epistemic injustice in the asylum process, examining the different ways in which stereotypes and prejudices hinder the process. Next, I focus on hermeneutical injustice in LGBTQ cases. In section 3, I expand on the possibility of developing hermeneutical justice in this context. Finally, I conclude by hinting at hinge epistemology as a feasible framework for research on hermeneutical injustice and justice, and at broader theoretical themes stimulated by this reflection. (shrink)

El planteo que pretendo desarrollar en el presente trabajo surge de la reflexión sobre mi práctica docente en la cátedra de 'Introducción a la Filosofía' de la Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata, en la que me desempeño impartiendo clases teóricas desde el año 2003 a la fecha. Los destinatarios de las mismas son, principalmente, alumnos de la carrera de Psicología, en sus variantes de licenciatura y/o profesorado, de la Facultad de (...) Psicología de la UNLP. Las principales características de la materia son el abultado número de alumnos que la cursan, su organización cuatrimestral, y, como es obvio, su ubicación inicial en la carrera; su acreditación depende de la aprobación de un examen parcial escrito, en las clases de trabajos prácticos, y de la aprobación de un examen final, de modalidad oral. (shrink)

This work is a dialogical exercise between Georges Bataille, Maurice Blanchot and Didi-Huberman. The notion of revolt and the surrealist movement will be postulated as central axes of this dialogue. The hypothesis that guides this text is the possible relation between the unsolvable and sovereignty through desire. The surrealism will be recognized as a theoretical-aesthetic background from which these philosophers are nourished and positioned, either as referents or readers. We will analyze the networks woven between the following concepts: sovereignty, revolt (...) and submission. And, finally, we will think of the sphere of desire as that ontological substratum that allows human sovereignty to survive. (shrink)

En este artículo se presentan las reflexiones epistemológicas del filósofo Francisco Fernández Buey (1943-2012), las cuales, han estado continuamente presentes en la obra del autor al menos desde la publicación en 1991 de La ilusión del método, y culminan en su obra póstuma Para la tercera cultura (2013) en una apuesta por la complementariedad entre ciencias positivas y reflexión humanística. Partiendo de un marxismo heterodoxo tanto en el plano ético-político como en el epistemológico, Fernández Buey apuesta por una idea de (...) ciencia alejada del positivismo, a la vez que critica las filosofías contrarias a aquella en la medida en que la consideran como un conocimiento meramente reductor de una realidad que no puede ser aprehendida por la ciencia. Desde el concepto de dialéctica de Manuel Sacristán; el reconocimiento a la figura de Einstein como ejemplo de científico que no renuncia a otros modos de conocimiento; y la reflexión sobre la filosofía de la ciencia en la segunda mitad del siglo XX, el autor nos muestra la necesidad de un diálogo entre cultivadores de la ciencia y las humanidades para afrontar los desafíos del siglo XXI. (shrink)

Los summaria alexandrinorum (conocidos como ǧawāmiʿ al-iskandarāniyyīn en árabe) son resúmenes de obras galénicas que solo sobreviven en versiones hebreas o árabes. Tradicionalmente, estas traducciones se han atribuido a Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq (s. IX) y se han vinculado a la enseñanza de la medicina en la Alejandría de los siglos VI y VII. En este artículo presentamos la edición de uno de estos ǧawāmiʿ al-iskandarāniyyīn, en concreto el compendio árabe del De simplicium medicamentorum facultatibus de Galeno que se conserva en (...) el manuscrito Huntington 600/2 de la Bodleian Library de Oxford. Con la publicación de este texto inédito pretendemos contribuir a comprender mejor la naturaleza y el origen de este tipo de textos, así como a facilitar su consulta y estudio por parte de otros especialistas. Añadimos una breve introducción sobre los summaria alexandrinorum y su importancia en la enseñanza y la transmisión de la medicina en la Edad Media, seguida de una serie de apuntes acerca del De simpl. med. fac. A continuación, se describe el manuscrito fuente tanto en forma como en contenido y se fijan los criterios de edición. Asimismo, se han extraído del texto los usos y las características más comunes de la farmacopea galénica. Con el fin de ofrecer una edición rigurosa, se ha cotejado el texto con la traducción completa del De simpl. med. fac. al árabe, así como con otros tratados de simples andalusíes. (shrink)

The paper examines some remarks Wittgenstein expresses on pragmatism in manuscripts and lectures during the first half of the Thirties. These remarks focus principally on the Jamesian conception of truth, very roughly summarized in the claim that a belief or a proposition is true if it is useful. Wittgenstein acknowledges that this conception is able to capture some characters of ordinary language, but at the same time, he criticizes some aspects of it, and his criticism strongly resembles Frank Ramsey’s attitude (...) towards the same topics. In this sense, it is argued that Ramsey had a role both for Wittgenstein approaching pragmatism, and for the partly negative attitude with which he came to judge it, at least in this period. Yet, the two thinkers’ general perspectives diverge when it comes to the place of theory in philosophical activity. (shrink)

This paper does not take for granted, and indeed questions, the common assumption that pragmatist philosophers endorse some form of relativism, and examines the issue in more detail with reference to both the classical pragmatists-Charles S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey-and more contemporary thinkers such as Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. The article calls for a more nuanced characterization of the relationship between pragmatism and relativism, which in turn results in a more nuanced characterization of the pragmatist tradition itself, (...) one opposed to the easy dichotomy between the Peircean anti-relativist legacy on the one hand, and the Jamesian-Deweyan relativist strand on the other. (shrink)

The present article is trying to study the alliance of religion and philosophy, from Farabi's view, by citing to his works. In this regard, first, we analyzed the historical reasons for the need for philosophy, then we will introduce the Farabi's purposes for constitution of this alliance, through which the necessity of this alliance becomes clear. The main claim of the article is that Farabi correlates the two through two different ways. The first depends upon the historical procedure of the (...) emergence of the language. Accordingly, philosophy would be chronologically prior to religion. And in the second way, he explains the relation between the two, by considering their methodological distinctions, toward pedagogy. Then we can claim that the first way is criticizable but the second is defensible. (shrink)

Introduction to the Special Issue "Varieties of Immediate Experience: Between Wittgenstein and Pragmatism".

The idea of ‘committing oneself’ or ‘being committed’ by the use of language, or ‘linguistic commitment’, occurs in Wittgenstein’s notebooks and lectures from the end of 1930 together with remarks characteristic of this period, such as those on language as a system, and early reflections on other themes that would assume more importance in later years, such as rule-following and meaning as use. This paper examines the nature and contours of the concept of linguistic commitment (as well as some cognate (...) concepts),with a focus on the question why Wittgenstein temporarily insisted on the concept, but rapidly abandoned it. In doing so, I aim to shed light on some features of Wittgenstein’s middle period, both in their own right and in their relationship to later reflections. One aspect that will emerge is that, contrary to what is normally believed, pragmatic and even pragmatist themes began to play a role in his thought as early as 1930. (shrink)

Enactivist approaches claim that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. An ongoing challenge for these approaches is the problem of accounting for normativity while avoiding overly reductionist outcomes. This article examines a few proposed solutions, including agent-environment dynamics, participatory sense-making, radical enactivism, the skillful intentionality framework, and enactivist cultural psychology. It argues that good examples of enacted normativity are gestures of appreciation/disapproval performed in the aesthetic domain. Both Wittgenstein and Dewey explore this issue (...) and their ideas could be productively worked upon in an enactive account. (shrink)

“Our later and more critical philosophies are mere fads and fancies compared with this natural mother-tongue of thought”, says William James in his lecture on common sense. The deep bond connecting language, common sense and nature is also one of the main concerns of the later Wittgenstein. The aim of this paper is to compare the two philosophers in this respect, particularly focusing on James’ Pragmatism and on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Similarities, but also differences, will be highlighted. A further element (...) will be offered by the analysis of a fragment of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, which anticipates his image of the river-bed of thought through the critique of James’ stream of thought. By means of this comparison, I will question Wittgenstein’s explicit refusal of pragmatism. I will argue that his late philosophy can be said to be even more pragmatist than James’, in that it delineates a conception of the common sense certainties which shape our Weltbild (world-picture) as practically, and not merely epistemically, connected to our life. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the first reference to pragmatism in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s manuscripts, dating back to the beginning of 1930. The remark refers to the pragmatist conception of truth. In what follows, I will offer ahistorical framework for as better understanding of this reflection, and show how it was embedded within a philosophical atmosphere in which the roots of various philosophical perspectives merged into each other. Different possible sources of Wittgenstein’s perception of pragmatism will be examined, including William James’ and (...) Charles S. Peirce’s writings and Wittgenstein’s conversations with Frank P. Ramsey in 1929. The analysis is meant to illustrate the relevance of this early “encounter” with the pragmatist tradition for the development of Wittgenstein’s thought. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is the notion of 'imponderable evidence', employed on a few occasions by the later Wittgenstein. Our perception of others' feelings, thoughts and emotions, Wittgenstein observes, is ordinarily guided by an imponderable evidence, which, while remaining unmeasurable and ultimately ungraspable, gives us access to an immediate-yet fallible-form of understanding. This understanding, I will argue, is essentially qualitative. Section 1 of the paper introduces the issue through the examination of some remarks on how our attitude towards living (...) beings differs from our attitude towards objects. Sections 2 and 3 present the notion of imponderable evidence in the framework of Wittgenstein's approach to the philosophy of psychology and his remarks on aesthetic judgment. In section 4, I will turn to Dewey's conception of 'qualitative thought' as an aid to clarify further the sense of Wittgenstein's terminology. The final section concludes on why philosophers should care about the qualitative dimension of human existence. (shrink)

Influenzati entrambi in modo particolare da John Dewey, Sidney Hook e Morton White si caratterizzano per un impegno costante verso l'estensione dell'approccio naturalista da un ambito strettamente scientifico a uno piu' ampio, etico e sociale. Hook, coniugando l'ottica pragmatista con l'accentuazione dei caratteri conflittuali della realta', concepisce la democrazia stessa come un'applicazione dell'intelligenza sperimentale alla soluzione dei conflitti nella vita sociale e politica. White propone un pragmatismo olistico che mira a rimarginare non solo la dicotomia tra analitico e sintetico, ma (...) anche la divisione tra credenze scientifiche e credenze morali e, piu' ingenerale, tra il piano descrittivo e il piano normativo. Se l'ampliamento del naturalismo e l!'nteresse per i temi epistemologici caratterizzano entrambi i pensatori, si puo' dire che il percorso di Hook si intreccia costantemente con la dimensione politica, mentre quello di White si sviluppa nel dialogo con la dimensione storica. (shrink)

The paper compares the way in which Ludwig Wittgenstein and Charles S. Peirce deal with 'facts of life', or the ordinary. Starting from the former's well-known remark on forms of life as 'the given', it shows its proximity to some themes also explored by Peirce. This leads to examine in more detail the Peircean notion of habit and its connection with the everyday, an aspect on which the two philosophers bear interesting similarities. The examination of the only remark Wittgenstein expressed (...) on Peirce, still largely neglected in literature, also highlights relevant differences. The paper concludes on how, differences notwithstanding, both thinkers consider 'facts of life' as the proper terrain of philosophical activity. (shrink)

This paper offers a philosophical outlook on the subject of the communication of certainty and uncertainty, by focusing on the later Ludwig Wittgenstein’s image of “hinges”. Hinges are basic common sense certainties which ordinarily “go without saying”. In a sense, they even require not to be said. Lingering over the debate on the ineffability of hinges which is at the core of the Wittgensteinian secondary literature, but also hinting at some studies in psychopathology, the paper argues that in extraordinary contexts (...) to assert explicitly a hinge-certainty is possible and may be important, while in ordinary contexts certainty can only be communicated through silence: when a certainty which “goes without saying” is explicitly said, the situation paradoxically results in uncertainty. (shrink)