Abstract

The volume uncovers the most pragmatic and pragmatist aspects of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy, particularly of On Certainty, through a comparison with the pragmatist tradition as expressed by Charles S. Peirce and William James. On Certainty is often described as 'pragmatic' in literature and this pragmatic aspect is said to characterize a new turn in its author’s thought. Yet, what is still missing is a study of what specifically are the features which make these writings 'sound like pragmatism', as Wittgenstein himself put it (OC 422). The book therefore aims to verify if and to what extent it is possible to sustain that there is an objective convergence between his thought and pragmatism. In doing so, the volume also proposes a clarification of the main differences between Peirce’s and James’ vision of some key ideas of classical pragmatism like doubt and certainty, common sense, the pragmatic maxim, action. Among the achievements of the work are: an analysis of Wittgenstein’s first mention of pragmatism; some pieces of evidence in favour of the hypothesis that Wittgenstein did read some works by Peirce; a documented investigation on the relevance of Frank Ramsey for the development of Wittgenstein’s idea of pragmatism. The volume does not sustain the thesis that Wittgenstein was a pragmatist (nor the opposing thesis that he was not), but highlights the objective convergences and the divergences between his perspective and pragmatism through a balanced analysis running both on an exegetical and on a theoretical level.