The basal and reciprocal models of the relationship between androgen secretion and dominance are not mutually exclusive. Individuals may differ in basal levels of androgen secretion, reactivity to experiences, and androgen sensitivity. Early experiences might affect any of these parameters.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.4 (2003) 369-372 [Access article in PDF] Unity of Agency and Volition:Some Personal Reflections Stephen Weiner The issues of unity of agency, self-as-narrative, and more generally, volition are highly personal to me. Indeed, I would say I have frequently been obsessed with them. I am 52 years old, and date the onset of my psychiatric symptoms—my long-term misery—very specifically: 11:00 pm Pacific Standard Time, August (...) 28, 1965. At almost precisely that time, I started obsessing that I was homosexual and, in fact, turning into a girl. Within days, derealization followed: for instance, the houses in my neighborhood seemed one-dimensional—they seemed as though they were painted, as though I could stick my hand or an object through them. Colors seemed less bright as well—but I hardly had words for all this at the time: it was an overwhelmingly preverbal feeling, but I found some words for it.I was also depressed, and knew I was depressed—that is, I was worried, had trouble sleeping, and had suicidal thoughts and feelings. Within weeks, I asked my parents if I could see a psychiatrist, and I did. I remember asking my psychiatrist if he ever thought about the possibility that everything might be an illusion, and he quoted the refrain from "Row, Row, Row Your Boat": "merrily, merrily, merrily, merrily, life is but a dream." But just asking him produced a chilling feeling that he did not exist and, largely for this reason, I did not mention unreality feelings again to therapists for another 20 years.So, like Dr. Wells' patient Edward, described by James Phillips (2003), I was in trouble; like Edward, I was starting to construct a narrative. I started feeling that I had "to tell my story" at about this time—before then, I had not felt a need to do that. That may be partly because young children take life for granted (at least, I did), and it may be partly because suffering, by its very nature, demands explanation; both reasons were probably operating—certainly, both my parents told me years later that I had seemed emotionally distressed as a child, and my mother told they would have given me Ritalin if it had been available. So, to other people (my parents and my teachers) I was mentally ill in some sense, and I have some pretty clear memories of what I now recognize as depression, especially in the second and third grades; but I did not think of myself as sick and I did not think of myself as suffering—and I did not experience the duality (at least) of selves that I started to experience almost immediately in August 1965.Phillips further points out that the "future Edward" could look back in his narrative, at a later age, and reconstruct his history either as someone with a continuing mental illness, or as someone who had attained a secure, healthy adulthood and saw his experience as adolescent pain in the service of ultimate adult health and integration. I see my story, I am sorry to report, as [End Page 369] one of unremitting basic pain but with the positive dimension that I was able to go on, obtain a good education, work a good deal in my adult life, and father a child. But my narrative—and am I not, as a highly verbal person, almost constrained to think of my life as a narrative?—has been one, as Phillips (following Kleinman) realizes, of suffering. It is, above all else, an illness narrative. I find the approach of J. Melvin Woody (2003)—of privileging performing and performing arts and spatial metaphors over story—less relevant and true to myself, although I see no reason to argue with Mary's preference for such forms. It may be that the temporal discontinuities she has experienced predispose her to see herself in such terms—may, in fact, necessitate doing so. I am not exactly sure why, but it probably has to do with acting, with trying on and performing one role... (shrink)

Darrel E. Christensen presented the following paper to the Charles Sanders Peirce Society meeting held on October 5–7, 1978, at Bloomington, Indiana.

A critique of Whitehead’s conccpt of God from the standpoint of absolute idealism in general and of Hegel and Whitehead’s relation to Hegel in particular.

A tendency has been discernible in recent decades, more marked within the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, to regard a turn or a return to Hegel as a reverie for rumination following a flight from “critical principles” which had been thought secure but which have failed. A result has been that the critical dimensions of his thought, resting upon its hard logical core, the principle of the spekulativen Satz, has very frequently been deemphasized or entirely overlooked.

The contemporary crisis of authority is in part to be understood as a reflection of certain philosophical doctrines of the recent past. The emotivist and the existentialist theories of value language, which remain most prevalent today, have contributed to a disposition to regard only the informed decision of the individual as authentic, and to construe moral judgments as without fault except when not fully informed or not one’s own. Where an individual differs from constituted authority, following either of these views, (...) there is no way in which it can be said that either is in error. The philosophical solution to the present crisis must lie in a realistic theory of empirical value knowledge. (shrink)

Ivor Leclerc, citing the following passage from Adventures of Ideas, interprets Whitehead’s metaphysics as an explication of the concept of an actual entity construed as a “complete fact”.

Scholarly attempts to analyze the history of science sometime suffer from an imprecise use of terms. In order to understand accurately how science has developed and from where it draws its roots, researchers should be careful to recognize that epistemic regimes change over time and acceptable forms of knowledge production are contingent upon the hegemonic discourse informing the epistemic regime of any given period. In order to understand the importance of this point, I apply the techniques of historical epistemology to (...) an analysis of the place of the study of astrology in the medieval and early modern periods alongside a discussion of the “language games” of these period as well as the role of the “archeology of knowledge” in uncovering meaning in our study of the past. In sum, I argue that the term “science” should never be used when studying approaches to knowledge formation prior to the seventeenth century. (shrink)

Two key phenomena of Merleau-Ponty's _Phenomenology of Perception are habit and inhabiting. Their chief characteristics, respectively, are generalizing actions and actively familiarizing. They are essentially and reciprocally related: inhabiting consists of being in habits and habitual actions are a way of inhabiting. The article focuses on three aspects of Merleau-Ponty's discussions: habit as simultaneously motor and perceptual, the interplay of sedimentation and spontaneity, and the body's inhabiting of space and incorporating of expressive spatiality. Merleau-Ponty's typist example and four examples of (...) the author illustrate that the relationship of habit and inhabiting is a basic structure of being-in-the-world. (shrink)

A collaboration has been arranged for the preparation and publication in three dual-language volumes within the Hegel series presently in preparation by Fr. Frommanns Verlag of new critical editions of Hegel’s 1821 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, to be included in one volume with the up to now unpublished first form of his Encyclopedia, and Hegel’s 1824 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, in two volumes. The new German editions are to be prepared by Professor Dr. K.-H. Ilting. The (...) English translations are to be prepared by Professor Darrel E. Christensen. The anticipation is that the first of these editions will appear some time in 1973. (shrink)

Although the above listed works are quite different in character on other accounts, each may fairly be said to be dominated by the conceptuality of Immanuel Kant and, at the same time, to go some way toward exhibiting the line between Kant and Hegel less as one that calls for a choice between members of an either-or dichotomy than as one between conceptualities that are in important ways compatible, and over which a traffic of ideas may be seen to move (...) with some freedom in both directions. Having said that each goes some way toward doing this, I hasten to add two qualifications: Werkmeister, although, like Yovel, he presents us with a Kant interpretation that can have the effect of going very far toward preparing the reader for an easy transition to Hegel, unlike Yovel, he does not concern himself directly with Hegel; if the subsumption of Prauss' work under the foregoing characterization may perhaps give rise to protest either from, or on behalf of, the author, I shall nonetheless show grounds for doing so. With the foregoing qualifications in view, in pointing to the distinctive manner in which each author, in turn, contributes to this common character, I shall be presenting what I believe may be regarded as a trend in contemporary Kant scholarship that is deserving of attention. (shrink)

The task of designing effective economic and political institutions requires substantial foresight. The designer must anticipate not only the behavior of individual actors, but also how that behavior will aggregate. Rising complexity brought about by increases in speeds of adaptation, diversity, connectedness, and interdependence make institutional design all the more challenging. Given the focus on equilibria, the extant literature on mechanism design might appear incapable of coping with this complexity. Yet, I suggest that a deeper engagement with the origins of (...) the mechanism-design framework reveals insights that may help us design robust, adaptive institutions that can harness complexity. (shrink)

Devoted to making available, in English, contributions to philosophical comprehension originating in German, Contemporary German Philosophy will be a yearbook following volumes reviewing the 1960-80 period. CGP's aim is in no sense to displace the German language as a medium for philosophical discourse, but rather to provide for the reader who is more at home in English some points of access to such of the more pivotal recent and contemporary contributions originating in German as can lend themselves to translation. In (...) the selection of German-language articles for translation, some preference is given to authors whose work for the most part has not yet appeared in English. Original articles by German scholars also will be featured, and there will be reviews and comments by a worldwide body of scholars concerned with German philosophical traditions. CGP is open to the full range of philosophical interests and orientations to which philosophy in the German language and tradition contributes. It is open as well to items which consider the bearings of insights within such allied fields as mathematics, political science, historiography, and linguistics upon philosophical issues. The term "contemporary" is intended to refer, not to any particular style of doing philosophy, but to philosophical literature of recent origin. (shrink)

Several metabolites serve as substrates for histone modifications and communicate changes in the metabolic environment to the epigenome. Technologies such as metabolomics and proteomics have allowed us to reconstruct the interactions between metabolic pathways and histones. These technologies have shed light on how nutrient availability can have a dramatic effect on various histone modifications. This metabolism–epigenome cross talk plays a fundamental role in development, immune function, and diseases like cancer. Yet, major challenges remain in understanding the interactions between cellular metabolism (...) and the epigenome. How the levels and fluxes of various metabolites impact epigenetic marks is still unclear. Discussed herein are recent applications and the potential of systems biology methods such as flux tracing and metabolic modeling to address these challenges and to uncover new metabolic–epigenetic interactions. These systems approaches can ultimately help elucidate how nutrients shape the epigenome of microbes and mammalian cells. (shrink)

Consensus plays an ambiguous role in deliberative democracy. While it formed the horizon of early deliberative theories, many now denounce it as an empirically unachievable outcome, a logically impossible stopping rule, and a normatively undesirable ideal. Deliberative disagreement, by contrast, is celebrated not just as an empirically unavoidable outcome but also as a democratically sound and normatively desirable goal of deliberation. Majority rule has generally displaced unanimity as the ideal way of bringing deliberation to a close. This article offers an (...) epistemic perspective on this question of consensus versus disagreement. For ensuring the production of better decisions, we argue, the normative appeal of consensus varies depending on the deliberative task – whether it entails problem solving or prediction. We argue that in pure problem-solving contexts, consensus retains a strong normative appeal and forms the ideal deliberative outcome of deliberation. In contrast, on predictive tasks, consensus should generally not be used as a stopping rule noris it likely to be epistemically desirable as an outcome. Instead deliberators may be better served by ending the deliberation with a form of deliberative disagreement we call ‘positive dissensus’, which paves the way for more accurate aggregate predictions. (shrink)

Following the Introduction, the essays to be listed, each with a reply by Errol E. Harris, comprise the principal content. B. Blanshard, “Harris on Internal Relations”; G.R. Lucas, Jr., “Science and Teleological Explanations”; J.E. Smith, “Harris’ Commentary on Hegel’s Logic”; G. Rinaldi, “The Identity of Thought and Being in Harris’ Interpretation of Hegel’s Logic”: T. Rockmore, “System and History: Harris on Hegel’s Logic”; R. Hepburn, “The Problem of Evil”; W. H. Walsh, “Hegel on Morality”; W.N.A. Klever, “The Properties of the (...) Intellect”; P. Muller, “The pons asinorum in Philosophy”; Wm. Earle, “The Evanescent Authority of Philosophy.”. (shrink)

This is volume 14 of Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, edited by Jude P. Dougherty. The Preface begins.

The fundamental issue of Kainz’s “contemporary reconstruction of the Hegelian problematic” is the relationship of three factors: paradox, dialectic, and system. More specifically, “might it not be the case that dialectic, paradox, and system are necessarily interrelated, so that, for example, a dialectic without paradox would be suspect, and philosophically significant dialectical paradoxes might be optimally presented in a system”? The issue is complicated by the fact that these three not only have multiple meanings, but are - despite significant interrelationships (...) - separable. From examples of their different combinations in the history of philosophy, “it would seem that almost any combination of the three factors is possible, and/or actually achieved”. This point is illustrated by Nicolas of Cusa, Kant’s “Transcendental Dialectic,” Marx and Engels, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Bradley, and Derrida. (shrink)

In the spring of 1780 there appeared a short work by J. H. de Magellan, published in London but written in French, which contained the first table of specific heats to appear in print. Magellan attributed the table to Richard Kirwan, but in none of his published works does Kirwan refer to it, so that the circumstances of its compilation are obscure. Kirwan's correspondence, however, provides evidence both of his association with Magellan and of his long concern with theories of (...) heat. In a series of letters concerned principally with his forthcoming publication, written to James Watt at the beginning of 1780, Magellan attacked Joseph Black for his failure to publish his own work on heat. (shrink)