I argue that, in order to address the ideal world problem while remaining faithful to our concept of morality, Contractualists should no longer determine which actions I must perform by seeing whether they accord with certain principles for the general regulation of behavior. Instead, I argue, Contractualists should determine whether it is right or wrong for me to perform an action by evaluating any maxim that might be reflected by my action. I call the resulting view “Maxim Contractualism.” It states (...) that an agent’s action is morally required just in case any maxim that he might adopt that involves not performing that action is one that someone could reasonably reject. Finally, I argue that, although Act Contractualism also provides us with the materials to solve the Ideal World Problem, it is a worse solution because it cannot account for the fact that, sometimes, what would happen if I performed an action over time is relevant to whether I am permitted to perform that action right here, right now. (shrink)

Salomon Maimon: Geschichte des eigenen Lebens Erstdruck in zwei Teilen: Berlin (Vieweg) 1792 und 1793. Vollständige Neuausgabe. Herausgegeben von Karl-Maria Guth. Berlin 2014. Textgrundlage ist die Ausgabe: Maimon, Salomon: Geschichte des eigenen Lebens (1754–1800). Berlin: Schocken, 1935. Die Paginierung obiger Ausgabe wird in dieser Neuausgabe als Marginalie zeilengenau mitgeführt. Umschlaggestaltung von Thomas Schultz-Overhage. Gesetzt aus Minion Pro, 11 pt.

In the present article, we consider the question of the primary elements in Plato’s Timaeus, the components of the whole universe reduced, by an extraordinarily elegant construction, to two right triangles. But how does he reconcile such a model with the infinite diversity of the universe? A large part of this study is devoted to Cornford’s explanation in his commentary of the Timaeus and its shortcomings, in order to finally propose a revised one, which we think to be entirely consistent (...) with Plato’s text. This analysis is an essential step for the understanding of the connection between the sensible world and the mathematical principles that underlies Timaeus’ cosmological account. (shrink)

"Brilliant and bedraggled, the picaresque Jewish philosopher Solomon Maimon was one of the great thinkers of the eighteenth century.

Extraits de la Source de vie de Salomon ibn-Gebirol.--Ibn-Gebirol, ses écrits et sa philosophie.--Des principaux philosophes arabes et de leurs doctrines.--Esquisse historique de la philosophie chez les Juìfs.--Appendice.--Texte hébreu des extraits de la Source de vie (2 p.l., 36 numb. l. at end).

In this paper, we study the so-called ‘Mathematical part’ of Plato’s Theaetetus. Its subject concerns the incommensurability of certain magnitudes, in modern terms the question of the rationality or irrationality of the square roots of integers. As the most ancient text on the subject, and on Greek mathematics and mathematicians as well, its historical importance is enormous. Its interpretation presents a certain degree of difficulty because of the intertwined fields that play a role in it : philosophy, history and mathematics. (...) But conversely, correctly understood, it provides clues on both the question of the origins of the irrationals in Greek mathematics and some points concerning Plato’s thought. Taking into account the historical context and the philosophical background generally forgotten in mathematical analyses, we get a new interpretation of this text which, far from being a tribute to some mathematicians, is a radical criticism of their ways of thinking. And the mathematical lesson, far from being a tribute to some future mathematical achievements, ends on an aporia, in accordance with the whole dialogue. (shrink)

Introduction -- Matter, form of cognition, form of sensibility, form of understanding, time and space -- Sensibility, imagination, understanding, pure a priori concepts of the understanding or categories, schemata, answering the question Quid Juris, answering the question Quid Facti, doubts about the latter -- Ideas of the understanding, ideas of reason, etc. -- Subject and predicate. the determinable and the determination -- Thing, possible, necessary, ground, consequence, etc. -- Identity, difference, opposition, reality, logical, and transcendental negation -- Magnitude, alteration, change, (...) etc. -- Truth, subjective, objective, logical, metaphysical -- On the I, materialism, idealism, dualism, etc. -- Short overview of the whole work -- My ontology -- On symbolic cognition and philosophical language. (shrink)

History is familiar with great scientific traditions which have been substantial, effective, cumulative and progressive.* At the level of great eras of civilization, extensive and not episodic phenomena, very ancient Chinese science, Greek science and Arab science are objects of investigation for historical erudition, but also for the scientific historian and the philosopher of sciences. Many of the elements of these systems were the source of “modern science”, as it is called, or are integral parts ol’ this system of knowledge (...) and practice which has been constructed over a little more than three centuries. Diachronically, the “scientific revolution” of the classical age in Europe does not signify a total break with what preceded it: Chinese astronomy, Arab algebra and the hospital organization of the Islamic world were used, even if the ideology of scientists when they wrote their own history, particularly from the 19th century onward, tends to make of modern science a purely European phenomenon. (shrink)

This article articulates our everyday notion of cooperation. First, I topple an orthodoxy of shared agency theory by arguing that shared intentions to J are neither necessary nor sufficient for J to be cooperative. I refute the necessity claim by providing examples of shared intention-free cooperation (in institutional contexts and beyond). I refute the sufficiency claim by observing that coercion and exploitation need not preclude shared intentions but do preclude cooperation. These arguments, in turn, lead to my positive proposal. People (...) cooperate, I argue, just in case their activities are coordinated in ways that do not undermine any participant’s agency. (shrink)

Jñānapraśaṃsā: In Praise of Knowledge. Essays in Honour of E. G. Kahrs. Edited by Alastair Gornall. Studia Indologica Universitatis Halensis, vol. 22. Halle an der Saale: Universitäts-Verlag Halle-Wittenberg, 2022. Pp. 375. €118.

Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows this question has no one-size-fits-all answer and offers a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency. The first part argues obligations to do one's bit have three degrees of involvement in shared activity. Such obligations might, obviously, bolster co-participants’ resolve to act as planned (degree 1). Less obviously, there also are higher and lower degrees of involvement. Obligations to do one's bit might provide our (...) agency-pooling mechanism. When they do, we act together by virtue of satisfying them (degree 2). Conversely, some shared activities involve no obligation (degree 0). In the second part, I argue shared agency theory is best served by a non-moralistic conception of obligation, one on which co-participants’ obligations need be neither strict-performance obligations, nor directed ones. Overall, my arguments suggest that we can choose how to coordinate normatively our shared activities. (shrink)

Se presenta la obra de Vicente Raga Rosaleny sobre el escepticismo de Montaigne. Con el fin de resaltar la importancia de esta investigación, para el público hispanohablante, se hace una breve relación de los apartados acerca de Montaigne en algunas historias de la filosofía al uso, los cuales se caracterizan por su exigüidad y la reiteración de lugares comunes, sin ningún espíritu crítico; y, también, se muestra la suerte de los Ensayos en español, los cuales han estado signados por la (...) censura. Es en este escenario: de ausencias, lugares comunes y de tenue recepción y censura, que se debe valorar y acoger con la mayor fruición esta publicación. (shrink)

This paper is an updated translation of an article published in French in the Journal Lato Sensu (I, 2014, p. 70-80). We study here the so-called 'Mathematical part' of Plato's Theaetetus. Its subject concerns the incommensurability of certain magnitudes, in modern terms the question of the rationality or irrationality of the square roots of integers. As the most ancient text on the subject, and on Greek mathematics and mathematicians as well, its historical importance is enormous. The difficulty to understand it (...) lies in the close intertwining of different fields we found in it: philosophy, history and mathematics. But conversely, correctly understood, it gives some evidences both about the question of the origins of the irrationals in Greek mathematics and some points concerning Plato's thought. Taking into account the historical context and the philosophical background generally forgotten in mathematical analyses, we get a new interpretation of this text, which far from being a tribute to some mathematicians, is a radical criticism of their ways of thinking. And the mathematical lesson, far from being a tribute to some future mathematical achievements, is ending on an aporia, in accordance with the whole dialogue. Résumé. Cet article est une traduction anglaise révisée d'un article paru en français dans la revue Lato Sensu (I, 2014, p. 70-80). (shrink)

Pour rendre compte de la première démonstration d’existence d’une grandeur irrationnelle, les historiens des sciences et les commentateurs d’Aristote se réfèrent aux textes sur l’incommensurabilité de la diagonale qui se trouvent dans les Premiers Analytiques, les plus anciens sur la question. Les preuves usuelles proposées dérivent d’un même modèle qui se trouve à la fin du livre X des Éléments d’Euclide. Le problème est que ses conclusions, passant par la représentation des fractions comme rapport de deux entiers premiers entre eux, (...) i.e. la proposition VII.22 des Éléments, ne correspondent pas aux écrits aristotéli­ciens. Dans cet article, nous proposons une nouvelle démonstration, conforme aux textes des Analytiques, fondés sur des résultats très anciens de la théorie du pair et de l’impair. Ne passant pas par la proposition VII.22, ni par aucune autre propriété établie par l’absurde, cette irrationalité apparaît comme le premier résultat que l’on ne pouvait établir par une autre méthode. L’importance de ce résultat, révélant un nouveau domaine mathématique, celui des grandeurs irrationnelles, rend compte de la centralité que cette forme de raisonnement acquiert alors, d’abord en mathématique, puis dans tout type de discours rationnel. À partir des conséquences qui suivent de cette nouvelle démonstration, on peut interpréter très simplement la leçon sur les irrationnels du passage mathématique figurant dans le Théétète de Platon (147d-148b), ce que nous ferons dans un article à paraître dans un prochain numéro. (shrink)

By definition, pain is a sensory and emotional experience that is felt in a particular part of the body. The precise relationship between somatic events at the site where pain is experienced, and central processing giving rise to the mental experience of pain remains the subject of debate, but there is little disagreement in scholarly circles that both aspects of pain are critical to its experience. Recent experimental work, however, suggests a public view that is at odds with this conceptualisation. (...) By demonstrating that the public does not necessarily endorse central tenets of the “mental” view of pain (subjectivity, privacy, and incorrigibility), experimental philosophers have argued that the public holds a more “body-centric” view than most clinicians and scholars. Such a discrepancy would have important implications for how the public interacts with pain science and clinical care. In response, we tested the hypothesis that the public is capable of a more “mind-centric” view of pain. Using a series of vignettes, we demonstrate that in situations which highlight mental aspects of pain the public can, and does, recognize pain as a mental phenomenon. We also demonstrate that the public view is subject to context effects, by showing that the public’s view is modified when situations emphasizing mental and somatic aspects of pain are presented together. (shrink)

El trabajo desea mostrar la especial relación que se entabla entre el pensamiento de heidegger y la metafísica. En tal sentido se propone la tentativa de dotar de un nuevo fundamento a la metafísica a través de la analítica existenciaria emprendida en El Ser en el Tiempo. Siguiendo esta misma obra señala cómo un análisis original del tiempo aunado a la revisión crítica (de-construcción) de la Historia de la Metafísica -tarea te será asumida ulteriormente- concluyen 1 un "abandono" del pensamiento (...) fundacional y por tanto en una "renuncia" a la metafísica. Ella empero no ha de ser rechazada sino más bien plenamente asumida ·y sobrepasada- comprendiéndola dentro del pensamiento que medita la Historia del ser como auténtico nihilismo, es decir como la "época" necesaria en la que el Ser en proceso de su desocultación se dispensa tanto retirada. (shrink)

This article considers Ernst Bloch’s philosophy of hope in terms of its significance for debates in contemporary humanist thought. It is argued that Bloch achieves a commendable balance between, on the one hand, the maintenance of Utopian ideals, and, on the other hand, ethical vigilance towards the vulnerable position of the human individual. Bloch’s Utopian hermeneutics offers a corrective to the limitations and shortcomings of anti-totalitarian humanism. The potential for a constructive dialogue between an interpretation of Bloch’s work and anti-totalitarian (...) authors is explored. Bloch’s phenomenology of death indicates the extent to which his philosophy remains attentive to the existential experiences of the individual human being. The emotion which characterises the individual subject’s realisation of his / her mortality is characteristically one of melancholy over the incomplete work of life. (shrink)

(2001). Sosiaal-etiese verantwoordelikheid in Suid-Afrika: ’n Perspektief vanuit Levinas. South African Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 20, No. 3-4, pp. 321-338.