Reinhart Koselleck is among the most original German theorists of history and historiography. His international reputation is due in part to his contributions as theorist and editor of the remarkable lexicon Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (GG). The GG is an exceptional reference work that goes far towards realizing Koselleck's program and distinctive version of Begriffsgeschichte (the history of concepts, conceptual history). What is presented here is a translation in full of Koselleck's own entry on Krise (crisis). Few articles in the GG (...) demonstrate more successfully Koselleck's theoretical concerns, his method, and innovative use of sources. (shrink)

In these fifteen essays, one Of Germany's most distinguished philosophers of history invokes an extraordinary array of witnesses and texts to explore the concept of historical time. The witnesses include politicians, philosophers, theologians, and poets, and the texts range from Renaissance paintings to the dreams of German citizens in the 1930s. Using these remarkable materials, Koselleck investigates the relationship of history to language, and of language to the deeper movements of human understanding.Reinhart Koselleck is Professor of the Theory of (...) History at the University of Bielefeld. (shrink)

In this way progressive bourgeois philosophy, which seemed to offer the promise of a unified and peaceful world, in fact produced just the opposite.The book ...

Les essais réunis dans Le futur passé proposent des réflexions précieuses et peut-être plus libres que celles d'autres ouvrages de Koselleck, tout du moins en ce qui concerne trois sujets : l'histoire conceptuelle, la théorie de la modernité et la théorie des temps historiques. " Les analyses sémantiques présentées ici ne portent pas essentiellement sur l'histoire de la langue ", précise l'auteur. " Elles s'attachent à la structure linguistique des expériences temporelles, là où celles-ci sont ancrées dans la réalité passée. (...) Ces analyses s'élargissent au champ social et linguistique, tout en essayant de passer de la sémantique des concepts à la dimension historique et anthropologique inhérente à tout acte de langage. " Le livre que l'on présente aujourd'hui est déjà reconnu comme un texte de référence par la communauté internationale des philosophes comme des historiens. (shrink)

In the framework of the minimalist program, the assumption that wh-in-situ move covertly to be assigned wide scope is infeasible. Rather, it is assumed that they must be interpretable in situ, and that syntactic conditions like ‘superiority’ are effects of economy, which restricts overt rather than covert movement of a wh-element. The remaining syntactic problem for this line of reasoning is the putative ECP effects of adverbial wh-adjuncts, which were the strongest evidence for covert movement. A serious semantic problem is (...) that the interpretative procedures which have been proposed for wh-in-situ – unselective binding or absorption – fail to capture correctly their interpretation. I will argue first that both problems are solved if the interpretation in situ employs choice functions, and it is the function variable, rather than an individual variable, which is long-distance bound by the question existential operator. Adverbial adjuncts, which cannot be interpreted via choice functions, cannot, therefore, be interpreted in situ. However, the concept of economy underlying the account of overt superiority effects requires both theoretical and empirical clarification (as it leaves some empirical problems unaddressed). I argue, following a proposal by Golan (1993), that in this case the economy considerations apply at the interface (‘interface economy’) and that they consider not only different derivations out of the same numeration, but also their semantic representation. (shrink)

No one, including Heidegger himself, disputes that he has completed a turn in the development of his thinking. Roughly put, this leads from human existence as something to be analyzed in phenomenological and transcendental philosophy to the “Being” which is to be proclaimed directly in its concealment and disclosure. Above all others, Löwith and Schulz have proposed the thesis that this turn involves at least a reinterpretation of the original tendency, if not an inversion or an erosion. Löwith’s book on (...) Heidegger gives a hint of the judgment presently widespread, that the latter has fallen back from his significant beginning in Being and Time and has stopped being a philosopher in order to give himself over to the mysticism of Being. According to Schulz, however, the turn has world-historical significance: Heidegger’s essay “What is Metaphysics?” is not merely the end of his first period of work, but is even “the metaphysical finale of traditional metaphysics.”. (shrink)