The philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and the later Wittgenstein are shown to yield a common position opposing 'realist' attempts to reduce appearance, sense, and meaning to perception-independent objects and relations. Their 'Gestalt Philosophy' thus constitutes a new form of 'anti- realism'.

In his book Wittgenstein’s Metaphysics, John Cook argues that from 1912 until his death Wittgenstein was a proponent of neutral monism. This involves, according to Cook, Wittgenstein’s espousal of phenomenalism---the view that there can be nothing beyond immediate experience---and the consequent elimination of matter, causality, and other minds. I argue that this conflicts with almost everything that Wittgenstein wrote after 1932, including the passages cited and systematicalIy misinterpreted by Cook.

In his book Wittgenstein’s Metaphysics, John Cook argues that from 1912 until his death Wittgenstein was a proponent of neutral monism. This involves, according to Cook, Wittgenstein’s espousal of phenomenalism---the view that there can be nothing beyond immediate experience---and the consequent elimination of matter, causality, and other minds. I argue that this conflicts with almost everything that Wittgenstein wrote after 1932, including the passages cited and systematicalIy misinterpreted by Cook.

In his book Wittgenstein’s Metaphysics, John Cook argues that from 1912 until his death Wittgenstein was a proponent of neutral monism. This involves, according to Cook, Wittgenstein’s espousal of phenomenalism---the view that there can be nothing beyond immediate experience---and the consequent elimination of matter, causality, and other minds. I argue that this conflicts with almost everything that Wittgenstein wrote after 1932, including the passages cited and systematicalIy misinterpreted by Cook.

This book is a foray into the thorny interpretive issue of what to make of Kant's so-called "Metaphysical Deduction" of the categories. As with many of the arguments in the first Critique, the claim of the Metaphysical Deduction is easier to make out than its argument. The claim is that by some or other reference to "general logic," one may obtain a "transcendental logic," i.e., a justification (or "deduction") of the categories (of the understanding) necessary to the (very) possibility of (...) experience. But how? By, Kant says, discerning, in general logic, a "clue" to transcendental logic. But what sort of clue? And then what clue exactly? We need a meta-clue to get a clue.Herein lies the very mixed reception the .. (shrink)

Bottom line on top: this is a wonderful book.

Bottom line on top: this is a wonderful book.

In the pre-postmodern era, subtitles were truly and merely “sub” and were reserved for books. They served to characterize and categorize a book so as to let the innocent consumer know what he was getting into if he could not tell from the title proper; thus, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics or Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. But the proper subtitle has evolved into an entire second title, is routinely used for journal articles and conference presentations, (...) and not every author can stop herself at merely the second title. The new style subtitle—the second title—is still supposed to shed light on the first title, but not by way of a categorizing characterization the way old style subtitles did. The first title of John Searle’s latest book is Mind, Language and Society. The second title is Philosophy in the Real World. It is not immediately clear what this new style subtitle means. It is too subtile. It needs an old-style subtitle to shed light on it that it may shed light on the first title. And, in his introduction, Searle very nearly supplies such. (shrink)