The rational conceptual philosophical thinking originated in ancient Greece on the basis of mythical imaginary thinking. The bipolar-complementary thinking still had its place in Miletian philosophy, although not in the form of images, but in the form of conceptual variants and archetypal representations of archaic ontology. The Dyonisian cult and orfism contributed to the development of rational thinking through the realization of the individuality and the notion of the only genuine divinity - Zeus, which at the same time embodied the (...) whole universe. On the basis of these ideas Xenophanes built up his conceptual image as the fixed and the only essence of the universe, and Pythagoras his conception of fixed and unchangeable numeral essences. Then came Parmenides, who founded the metaphysics through the determination of the duality of One and Many, the being and the non-being. It was a dichotomic break and turning away of the bipolar-complementary thinking from the dualistic type of thinking. This author's claim is supported by Parmenides criticism of his predecessors. Parmenides elevated the Being to a "pure concept" or abstraction. This radical turn in the history of Greek thinking meant not only the dismissal of the previous philosophical views, but also the beginning of the rational abstract thinking on the basis of logical laws, namely the law of excluded middle and the law of contradiction. (shrink)

The Parmenides poses the question for what entities there are Forms, and the criticism of Forms it contains is commonly supposed to document an ontological reorientation in Plato. According to this reading, Forms no longer express the excellence of a given entity and a Socratic, ethical perspective on life, but come to resemble concepts, or what concepts designate, and are meant to explain nature as a whole. Plato’s conception of dialectic, it is further suggested, consequently changes into a value-neutral (...) method directed at tracing the interrelation of such Forms, an outlook supposedly documented in certain passages on method from the Sophist and the Statesman as well. -/- The article urges that this reading is untenable. For in the Parmenides the question for what entities one should posit Forms is left open, and the passages on method from the Sophist and Statesman neither encourage a non-normative ontology nor a value-neutral method of inquiry. What the three dialogues encourage us to do is rather to set common opinions about the relative worth and value of things aside when conducting ontological inquiries; and this attitude, the article concludes, demonstrates a close kinship, rather than a significant difference, between Plato’s Socrates and his Eleatic philosophers. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that Parmenides invented extended deductive argumentation and the practice of demonstration, a transformative event in the history of thought. But how did he manage this seminal accomplishment? In this book, Benjamin Folit-Weinberg finally provides an answer. At the heart of this story is the image of the hodos, the road and the journey. Brilliantly deploying the tools and insights of literary criticism, conceptual history, and archaeology, Folit-Weinberg illuminates how Parmenides adopts and adapts this image from (...) Homer, especially the Odyssey, forging from it his pioneering intellectual approaches. Reinserting Parmenides into the physical world and poetic culture of archaic Greece, Folit-Weinberg reveals both how deeply traditional and how radical was Parmenides' new way of thinking and speaking. By taking this first step toward providing a history of the concept method, this volume uncovers the genealogy of philosophy in poetry and poetic imagery. (shrink)

In what follows I propose to consider the relevance of Plato's early claim that his Forms are explanatory to the structure of, and several of the main arguments of, the Parmenides. The first section of the paper looks into some implications of separate existence, exploring connections between the criticism of separation and the conception of Forms as explanatory principles. I focus attention on what the Forms do not explain, and suggest that the burden of much of Parmenides’ criticism (...) centers on that question. Part two deals with Plato's evidently changing stance on the issue of explaining the Forms themselves. The third section takes up passages from the Parmenides in support of the view that Plato came to believe that his Forms stood in need of the same sort of explanation as he had originally thought was required for sensory particulars. The discussion is largely exploratory, and the connections adumbrated are intended as guidelines for further investigation. (shrink)

Limits of the Conversation about Forms. Types of Knowledge and Necessity of Forms in Plato's "Parmenides". - Forms (ideas) are among the things that Plato is serious about. But about these things he says in his "Seventh Letter": "There neither is nor ever will be a treatise of mine on the subject." (341c, transl. J. Harward). Plato's statement suggests the question, why one does not and never can do justice to the Platonic forms by means of a written text about (...) the forms. Another big question of Plato research is whether the conversations documented in the Platonic dialogues are also affected by this verdict. This paper aims to provide, as far as possible, newly substantiated answers to these two questions. To this end, the systematic limits of the discussion about forms, which are particularly evident in Plato's dialogue "Parmenides", are examined in eight steps: First, two types of knowledge are presented that play an important systematic role in Plato's philosophy with regard to the limits of conversation: knowledge-how (practical knowledge) and knowledge-that (propositional knowledge) (I). Then the Socratic model of these two types of knowledge is interpreted, which is drafted in the tenth book of the "Republic". This model uses the example of bridle, bridlemaker and rider to explain the primacy of practical knowledge and the limits of propositional knowledge (II). Subsequently, it will be shown how the dialogues "Republic" and "Parmenides" are connected with each other in content and form (III). The gradation of the two types of knowledge, which is indicated by the motifs of the bridle and the horse on the image level of the "Parmenides", proves to be the structure that systematically underlies the structure of the entire dialogue (IV). It also makes clear why the conversation about the forms in the first part of the "Parmenides" has to fail (V). The assumption that the two parts of the "Parmenides" express two different types of knowledge in dealing with forms is supported by the results of a logical analysis of the last defence of the acceptance of forms (135b-c). This analysis shows why, for reasons of principle, it is impossible to speak adequately about forms (VI). Forms have the function of being presuppositions of 'talking about something'. Thus forms are always presupposed in conversation when one talks about them, and thus elude appropriate discussion in conversation (VII). That this is not only a methodical insight of the Platonic Parmenides, but can also be attributed to Plato himself, is demonstrated by the concluding reinterpretation of the central sentence of the critique of writing in Plato's "Seventh Letter". It will become apparent that, contrary to the now widespread view of the representatives of the Tübingen school, philosophical and also good philological reasons speak for the fact that Plato related his criticism only to the communicability of forms through treatises, i.e. tract-like writings (VIII). (shrink)

Plato's Parmenides is very commonly read as a turning-point in Plato's philosophical development. Most contemporary scholars agree with the view that Plato seriously criticizes his theory of Forms in this dialogue. According to some proponents of this view, Plato deemed these criticisms too damaging to his theory of Forms, and subsequently abandoned this theory. Other proponents of the serious-self-criticism view argue that, instead of abandoning his theory of Forms, Plato lays the foundations of a new and improved theory of (...) Forms in Parmenides--there is little agreement on what this new theory entails. Against this prevailing scholarly wisdom, Mehmet Tabak illustrates that Parmenides is exclusively a satirical dialogue in which Plato attempts to expose the absurd nature of the doctrines and method of his philosophical opponents. Tabak's accessible, historically-sensitive, detailed, and comprehensive account is the first decisive illustration of this view, which has been sporadically defended for many centuries. (shrink)

The Parmenides is known as the dialogue in which Plato makes a criticism of his theory of forms. Through paradoxes, the character Parmenides criticizes the theory of forms presented by Socrates in the dialogue, targeting the relation they have with sensibles and with each other, call for participation, and the discoursive consequences of this relation. I present a reading of the Parmenides that suggests that the self-criticism points out inconsistencies in the Platonic theory of participation as it is (...) presented in the Parmenides, and that will be corrected later in the Sophist. (shrink)

In modern work on the Parmenides it is commonly supposed that in the First Part of the dialogue Plato's main concern is criticism of his own doctrine of Forms, or of some formulations of that doctrine, and that the criticisms have some sort of validity and are in some degree ‘damaging’ to the doctrine. It is thus often assumed that Plato's purpose is to make the reader ask himself, ‘Where is Plato wrong? Where is his doctrine of Forms, or (...) his statement of it, inadequate?’ This is no doubt due partly to the fact that no reply is offered to the criticisms, and partly to the fact that they are put into the mouth of Parmenides, for whom Plato had a very great respect. Nevertheless, Plato can hardly have had a greater respect for Parmenides than he had for Socrates; and therefore on general grounds it is at least as likely that he intends us to ask ourselves the question, ‘Where is Parmenides wrong, or inadequate?’ It is, of course, obvious that Socrates is represented as a young man, who, in his enthusiasm for a new doctrine which he has invented himself, has not thought out all the difficulties involved in it or prepared replies to all the possible criticisms. Yet again, on general principles it is not likely that Plato would have written a dialogue primarily to represent Parmenides' position as substantially more satisfactory than that of Socrates. It is therefore of the first importance not merely to have clearly in our minds the nature and purpose of the doctrine of Forms, but also to examine carefully the basis of the criticisms which Parmenides is made to bring against Socrates, and the methods by which Parmenides conducts his arguments. (shrink)

Mourelatos’ study of the fragments of Parmenides’ poem combines traditional philological reconstruction with the approaches of literary criticism and philosophical analysis in order to reveal the thought structure and expressive unity of the best preserved and most important, influential, and coherent text of Greek philosophy before Plato. Through philosophical, philological, and literary analysis, Mourelatos examines the morphology of images and metaphors in Parmenides’ text with the aim of articulating and interpreting the poem’s key concepts and component arguments. Relevant antecedents (...) and parallels from the tradition of epic poetry, especially from Homer’s Odyssey, are explored in depth. (shrink)

Towards the end of fragment 1 of his Poem, Parmenides puts forward two methods or paths that a priori explain the same object of study: the existence of the fact or state of being. One of the options leads to the core of the truth and is, therefore, pursued. The other is merely a set of contradictory opinions and is, accordingly, abandoned. These two paths are expounded in the rest of the Poem, while fragment 4 shows that even the erroneous (...) conception, which had to be set aside, can still be fruitful. Once the firm foundation of truth has been established, fragments 10 and 11 propose to widen the inquiry to the whole of reality. This interpretation suggests a rejection of the arrangement of the Poem that has become canonical, and a criticism of the doxographic tradition that since Aristotle has “Platonised” the philosophy of Parmenides by assimilating the “opinions” (which are only points of view) to the “appearances” (in the Platonic sense of the term). (shrink)

A close reading of the contexts of several Homeric passages reveals that Homer often uses εἰδώς with ironic force. This realization sheds light on several passages discussed herein, including: 1) Homer's description of the location of Ithaca, which is shown to be Odysseus’ strategic lie that directs the Phaeacians to the local stronghold (nearby Dulichium), and 2) the manuscript reading of Parmenides B1.3, which is shown to harbour no internal conflict even if its εἰδότα φῶτα (‘one who knows’) is in (...) a state of confusion (ἄτῃ), because εἰδότα can signal incomplete or confused knowledge, or even a lack of it. Other literary clues in Parmenides B1 are shown to support this reading. (shrink)

On débat encore de l'interprétation des hypothèses contradictoires du Parménide de Platon. Je tente ici d'esquisser une réponse en examinant l'affirmation surprenante soutenant que tout être est dans le temps. Cette affirmation joue visiblement un rôle décisif à l' intérieur des hypothèses. Mais si on l'examine à la lumière du Timée, il devient évident qu'on ne peut plus l'attribuer à Platon. Reliée à la critique aporétique des Idées dans la première partie du Parménide, l'affirmation en question montre où sont les (...) lacunes de toute l'argumentation des hypothèses — d'où la possibilité de trouver une voie médiane entre les extrêmes bien connus du rejectionnisme et du compatibilisme. It is still highly controversial, how the contradictory hypotheses in Plato's Parmenides are to be understood. In my paper I try to give the outlines of an answer by interpreting the startling claim that all being is in time. This latter claim obviously plays a central part in the hypotheses. But once read against the background of the Timaeus it becomes clear that it cannot be considered as a view Plato held himself. Taken together with the aporetic criticism of ideas from the first part of the Parmenides, the claim in question shows in which respect the whole argumentation of the hypotheses is failing. This in turn makes it possible to find a way between the well-known extremes of rejectionism and compatibilism. (shrink)

"This is the first English translation of Pilo Albertelli's seminal translation of the work of Pre-Socratic Greek philosopher Parmenides. It is a work that is cited and listed by leading philosophy scholars, acknowledging the importance of the original Albertelli Italian translation"--.

Placing Parmenides in his proper historical context by taking seriously the impact of Persian Zoroastrianism on his developing monoism, Henn supplies precise interpretation of the most difficult and vexing of Parmenides's fragments, while...

Das Lehrgedicht des Parmenides über das Wesen des Seienden (ca. 515 v. Chr.) begründete die Ontologie – und damit die abendländische Philosophie. Für diese Wirkungsgeschichte war es entscheidend, dass Parmenides nicht nur das in Wahrheit Seiende vom Nicht-Seienden unterschieden, sondern es auch als Eines, Unveränderliches, in sich Vollendetes, Ganzes und in sich Zusammenhängendes bestimmt hat. So kann Parmenides schon dadurch ein gegenwärtiges Bewusstsein beeindrucken, dass man bei ihm erstmalig die Unterscheidung begründet findet, ohne die auch wir in der Bewältigung unserer (...) Wirklichkeit nicht auskommen können, nämlich diejenige zwischen dem, was in Wahrheit ist, und dem, was in Wahrheit nicht ist, aber dennoch den Anschein erweckt, ein Wahres zu sein. Ebenso findet sich bei ihm ein Verständnis des Seienden, das sich nicht darauf beschränkt, ein bloßes Vorhandensein von etwas zu registrieren, sondern darin eine Kraft ausgedrückt findet, wie sie von einem Werk der Kunst oder der sinnlichen Präsenz einer Person ausgehen kann. Wir leben alle von solchen Eindrücken und zugleich von dem irritierenden Wissen, dass auch sie täuschen und in einer zunehmend durchmedialisierten Welt sogar häufig bewusst vorgetäuscht sein können, so dass es nach wie vor wichtig ist, Kriterien dafür an der Hand zu haben, überzeugend wirkliches Sein von Nicht-Seiendem unterscheiden zu können. Und vielleicht ist es auch für uns noch so, dass das, was für uns ein ›in Wahrheit Seiendes‹ ist, etwas Dauerhaftes darstellt, das nicht das eine Mal ist und dann wieder nicht oder mal diese und dann wieder jene Gestalt annimmt, sondern ein Wirkungskontinuum des Vollkommenen, das von seiner »Mitte aus nach allen Seiten gleich sich schwingt« (Parm., Fr. 9, 42ff.). (shrink)

Excerpt from The Fragments of Parmenides Two dollars per volume; single number, fiftyfienfgs; three volumes (or three copies of either volume), five dollars; first four volumes (015 feur copies of either volume), six dol lars; ten copies of Vol. III. Or IV. For ten dollars. Vols. I. And II. Bound in one volume, in [muslin, $4 50; Vol. III. In muslin, $2 50. Back numbers may be had at fifty cents apiece. All subscriptions should be addressed to the Editor. About (...) the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Kenneth M. Sayre - Plato's Forms in Transition: A Reading of the Parmenides - Journal of the History of Philosophy 46:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 46.1 169-170 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Kenneth M. Sayre University of Notre Dame Samuel C. Rickless. Plato's Forms in Transition: A Reading of the Parmenides. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. v + 272. Cloth, $90.00. Rickless construes Plato's middle-period account of the Forms as a theory comprising axioms, auxiliary principles, (...) fundamental theorems, and specific premises and conclusions constituting particular arguments. This book attempts to reconstruct that theory , to trace its further development and subsequent criticism in Parmenides 126a–35c.. (shrink)

La vision des sages de la Grèce archaïque est sortie profondément transformée par la réflexion qu'a menée tout au long de sa vie Jean Bollack. Son ambition est ici de surmonter la fragmentation d'un poème exceptionnel que nous avons perdu. Il construit un ensemble avec des pleins et des vides à remplir. Le caractère initiatique de cet exercice de méditation facilite la tâche du déchiffrement ; tout s'y tient et le lecteur moderne peut se conformer à ses lois. L'analyse du (...) langage prime. La pensée s'y libère et découvre un référent sûr. Une cosmologie s'y projette, des astres à la vie des hommes, de l'Etant au Monde, dont ce livre s'applique à dégager les correspondances. (shrink)

Parmenides, um 500 v. Chr. in Unteritalien lebend, ist neben Xenophanes aus Kolophon und Heraklit aus Ephesos der älteste der griechischen Denker, von dessen Überlegungen wir eine genauere Vorstellung gewinnen können. Seine Wirkung auf die Geschichte der Philosophie bis in die Gegenwart lässt sich kaum abschätzen: Er ist, wie die Griechen sagen würden, der "Erfinder" der Ontologie, er entdeckte die Sphäre der Logik und gab als Erster eine umfassende Beschreibung und Deutung der empirischen Welt. Die von Ernst Heitsch vorgelegte Ausgabe (...) der wörtlich erhaltenen Fragmente gibt eine neue Übersetzung und versucht durch einleitende Erläuterungen zentraler Begriffe und durch Erklärung eines jeden Fragments, dem modernen Leser einen Zugang zu den faszinierenden Anfängen der europäischen Philosophie und Wissenschaft zu vermitteln. (shrink)