In his theory of time Aristotle does not often mention the present time and nowhere gives a detailed account of it. Nonetheless, present time plays an important role in his conception. I primarily argue for the following claims: (1) According to Aristotle there is a perception of motion and there is a perception of time. These combined perceptions can neither occur in the past nor in the future nor in an indivisible now. Thus, there must be a present time. (2) (...) Aristotle acknowledges the passage of time. This passage of time can only be understood as a passing present. And since an indivisible now cannot pass, the passage of time delivers a further argument for the basic assumption of a present time. – For the most part I simply follow Aristotle’s argument in Physics IV 10 and 11. In doing so, I distinguish present time and now in the introductory puzzles, investigate the passing present in the co-perception of change and time, discuss the relation between change and the passage of time as well as the relation between the passing present and the different nows. (shrink)

être et temps dans le Parménide de Platon, p. 159. On débat encore de l’interprétation des hypothèses contradictoires du Parménide de Platon. Je tente ici d’esquisser une réponse en examinant l’affirmation surprenante soutenant que tout être est dans le temps. Cette affirmation joue visiblement un rôle décisif à l’intérieur des hypothèses. Mais si on l’examine à la lumière du Timée, il devient évident qu’on ne peut plus l’attribuer à Platon. Reliée à la critique aporétique des Idées dans la première partie (...) du Parménide, l’affirmation en question montre où sont les lacunes de toute l’argumentation des hypothèses – d’où la possibilité de trouver une voie médiane entre les extrêmes bien connus du rejectionnisme et du compatibilisme. (shrink)

As is well known, Leibniz criticises Descartes for not having shown that God (considered as ens perfectissimum ) is possible, and tries to fill this gap by proving God’s possibility on the basis of absolutely positive and simple perfections. For many readers, however, these perfections have appeared problematic or unintelligible. In my paper, I primarily want to show, that they can be made comprehensible by working out their foundations in Plato’s theory of ideas. On this basis, I want to explain, (...) how this allows to understand the compossibility of perfections, essences or ideas (in the Leibnizian regio idearum ) and how such an understanding fits into his version of the ontological proof. For this purpose, the first part of my paper follows two closely related lines of investigation. On the one hand, I focus on Leibniz’s theory of ideas and try to explain in which way he combines his criticism of Descartes’s proof with a criticism of the Cartesian understanding of clear and distinct ideas. On the other hand, I discuss his transformation of Platonic ideas into essences leading from actually existing entities to real possibilities. In order to provide a foundation for this, I start with a glance at Descartes’s ontological proof and at his replies to Caterus and Mersenne concentrating on the problem of God’s possibility. The second part of my paper will work out Leibniz’s own version of the ontological proof and its Platonic background. (shrink)

Wann können wir sagen, dass wir glücklich sind? In der Ethik Aristoteles ist dies eine wichtige Frage. Ist glücklich, wer über eine tugendhafte Seelenverfassung verfügt oder braucht es äußere Güter? Reicht eine kurze Zeit aus oder bedarf es eines ganzen tugendhaften Lebens, um das höchste Gut um eudaimonia zu erreichen? Dieser Band geht davon aus, dass die aristotelische Theorie des guten Lebens nur unter Berücksichtigung der Zeit angemessen zu verstehen ist. Wie sieht also die Zeitstruktur eines gelungenen Lebens aus? Welche (...) Antworten gibt Aristoteles für den Umgang mit der Zeit? (shrink)

On débat encore de l'interprétation des hypothèses contradictoires du Parménide de Platon. Je tente ici d'esquisser une réponse en examinant l'affirmation surprenante soutenant que tout être est dans le temps. Cette affirmation joue visiblement un rôle décisif à l' intérieur des hypothèses. Mais si on l'examine à la lumière du Timée, il devient évident qu'on ne peut plus l'attribuer à Platon. Reliée à la critique aporétique des Idées dans la première partie du Parménide, l'affirmation en question montre où sont les (...) lacunes de toute l'argumentation des hypothèses — d'où la possibilité de trouver une voie médiane entre les extrêmes bien connus du rejectionnisme et du compatibilisme. It is still highly controversial, how the contradictory hypotheses in Plato's Parmenides are to be understood. In my paper I try to give the outlines of an answer by interpreting the startling claim that all being is in time. This latter claim obviously plays a central part in the hypotheses. But once read against the background of the Timaeus it becomes clear that it cannot be considered as a view Plato held himself. Taken together with the aporetic criticism of ideas from the first part of the Parmenides, the claim in question shows in which respect the whole argumentation of the hypotheses is failing. This in turn makes it possible to find a way between the well-known extremes of rejectionism and compatibilism. (shrink)

Leibniz tries to prove God’s possibility on the basis of absolutely positive and simple perfections. I primarily want to show, how these controversial perfections can be made comprehensible by working out their foundations in Plato’s theory of ideas. After having concentrated on the Cartesian proof and Leibniz’s criticism in the first part of my paper, I now focus on his own version of the proof and its Platonic background. First, I discuss the structure, the advantages and disadvantages of the famous (...) argument in “Quod ens perfectissimum existit” [1676]. Then I investigate his reasons for assuming absolutely positive and simple perfections by tracing them back to Platonic ideas, including the paradigmatic role of the kosmos noȇtos for the compossibility of essences in the regio idearum. I also consider in which sense Plato’s theory of ideas already preforms the structure of ontological proofs, and how it tells against the assumption of a strictly univocal meaning of existence. (shrink)