Este ensayo trae a colación importantes puntos, tanto teóricos como prácticos,desde la perspectiva de la teoría crítica, con referencia al multiculturalismo. Me interesa delinear lo que sería una línea programática para un multiculturalismo viable. Tomando en cuenta el contexto neoliberal actual, me interesa enfatizar el problema práctico de hacer posible un multiculturalismo que no sea exclusivamente neoliberal, problema que ha logrado instalarse en el debate público con toda su intensidad.

Feeling moved or touched can be accompanied by tears, goosebumps, and sensations of warmth in the centre of the chest. The experience has been described frequently, but psychological science knows little about it. We propose that labelling one’s feeling as being moved or touched is a component of a social-relational emotion that we term kama muta. We hypothesise that it is caused by appraising an intensification of communal sharing relations. Here, we test this by investigating people’s moment-to-moment reports of feeling (...) moved and touched while watching six short videos. We compare these to six other sets of participants’ moment-to-moment responses watching the same videos: respectively, judgements of closeness, reports of weeping, goosebumps, warmth in the centre of the chest, happiness, and sadness. Our eighth time series is expert ratings of communal sharing. Time series analyses show strong and consistent cross-correlations of feeling moved and touched and closeness with each other and with each of the three physiological variables and expert-rated communal sharing – but distinctiveness from happiness and sadness. These results support our model. (shrink)

Some see health care as primarily an individual responsibility. Others see it as a public responsibility. Behind these approaches are strong conflicting beliefs about ethical matters, specifically about the kind of good that health care is. On the one side the underlying belief is that health care is no more than an individual good and hence calls for a distributive policy based on the market. On the other side the underlying belief is that it is a public good and hence (...) calls for a distributive policy based on widespread agreement.' There will be intermediate approaches which try with varying success to justify themselves by piecing together beliefs from both sides. I shall explain what is involved in calling something a public good. Then I shall try to show that, if health care is to satisfy some rather plausible criteria, it must have the character of a public good. (shrink)

When do people say that they are moved, and does this experience constitute a unique emotion? We review theory and empirical research on being moved across psychology and philosophy. We examine feeling labels, elicitors, valence, bodily sensations, and motivations. We find that the English lexeme being moved typically (but not always) refers to a distinct and potent emotion that results in social bonding; often includes tears, piloerection, chills, or a warm feeling in the chest; and is often described as pleasurable, (...) though sometimes as a mixed emotion. While we conclude that it is a distinct emotion, we also recommend studying it in a more comprehensive emotion framework, instead of using the ambiguous vernacular term being moved as a scientific term. (shrink)

Little is known about the psychological processes that can explain how connectedness to nature evolves. From social psychology, we know that emotions play an essential role when connecting to others. In this article, we argue that social connectedness and connectedness to nature are underpinned by the same emotions. More specifically, we propose that social relational emotions are crucial to understanding the process, how humans connect to nature. Beside other emotions, kama muta (Sanskrit: being moved by love) might play a particular (...) crucial role when connecting to nature. Future research should address the consideration of social relational emotions in a range of areas when investigating the human-nature relationship. (shrink)

When speaking of society’s role in ethics, one tends to think of society as regimenting people through its customs. _Ethics and Social Survival_ rejects theories that treat ethics as having justification within itself and contends that ethics can have a grip on humans only if it serves their deep-seated need to live together. It takes a social-survival view of ethical life and its norms by arguing that ethics looks to society not for regimentation by customs, but rather for the viability (...) of society. Fisk traces this theme through the work of various philosophers and builds a consideration of social divisions to show how rationalists fail to realize their aim of justifying ethical norms across divisions. The book also explores the relation of power and authority to ethics—without simply dismissing them as impediments—and explains how personal values such as honesty, modesty, and self-esteem still retain ethical importance. Finally, it shows that basing ethics on avoiding social collapse helps support familiar norms of liberty, justice, and democracy, and strives to connect global and local ethics. (shrink)

The following questions are discussed here. Is induction a reasonable procedure in the context of a denial of physically necessary connections? What is physical necessity? If induction does presuppose physical necessity, what amount of it is presupposed? It is argued that with logic as the only restriction on what is to count as a possible world, it is unreasonable to claim that observed connections, whether universal or statistical, will continue to hold. The concept of physical necessity is no more problematic (...) than that of logical necessity, once it is recognized that the necessity of physical and logical necessity is the same. A variant of Keynes' principle of limited independent variety answers the question of the amount of physical necessity presupposed. (shrink)

This book offers a political theory combining elements from the Marxist and liberal traditions. It presents the reader with a disturbing view of the contemporary state as at war with itself. This internal conflict is no accident but stems from the state's having the double task of spurring on the economy and protecting the welfare and rights of all its citizens. Such conflict does not end at national boundaries but extends through the system of any imperial state. This perspective illuminates (...) the fractures and instability within the imperial system. This book will be of particular interest to political scientists, political philosophers, and those engaged in policy studies. (shrink)

G.A. Cohen interprets Marx as a technological materialist: the productive forces are “primary” in history. There are several mistakes here. First, for Marx technology is neither always nor predominantly the direct stimulus - either causal or functional - of the social relations of production. Second, it is not even the case that for Marx primacy in explanation is a matter of being a direct stimulus. It has to do rather with being a framework that underlies interconnections between direct stimuli and (...) their results. It turns out that this framework cannot be technology but only the relations of production. Third, technological development is not an autonomous process but is for Marx one that is dependent on the cooperation of producers. This introduces the political element of the class struggle into technological development and refutes a technological reading of why a given class rules. (shrink)

This essay attempts to interpret John Rawls's concept of the state in his "Theory of Justice". His concept is not an analysis of the existing monopoly capitalist state. Such an analysis can be found in, for example, "The Fiscal Crisis of the State" by James O'Connor. Rawls's concept is, by contrast, not one of the actual state but of an idealized state. Ideals, though, touch reality at some point. At what point does Rawls's concept of the state touch reality? The (...) market is the key to a realistic interpretation of Rawls's concept of the state. His view of the market is even at the basis of his renowned principles of justice. The 'efficiency' and 'freedom' of the market are prized by Rawls and other liberal theorists. Income inequality and large capital concentration threaten these prized virtues of the market. Rawls requires a strongly interventionist state to counteract the dangers of monopoly. His idealized state intervenes, not to promote concentration in the manner of the monopoly capitalist state, but to promote greater equality. This equality is needed if the market is to display efficiency and freedom. It is through this intervention that the state promotes justice. Properly interpreted, the assurance problem on which Rawls bases the need for the state arises from market tendencies. The market enables initial advantages to be increased. This is ultimately why people with advantages support the market, whether the context is private ownership or bureaucratic control within so-called market socialism. The inequality resulting from increasing initial advantages interferes with efficiency and freedom. Rawls's state intervenes to preserve the market while restraining it. This can be seen as an attempt to preserve class society from itself. Consequently, Rawls's conception of justice is founded on classes. (shrink)

When communal sharing relationships suddenly intensify, people experience an emotion that English speakers may label, depending on context, “moved,” “touched,” “heart-warming,” “nostalgia,” “patriotism,” or “rapture”. We call the emotion kama muta. Kama muta evokes adaptive motives to devote and commit to the CSRs that are fundamental to social life. It occurs in diverse contexts and appears to be pervasive across cultures and throughout history, while people experience it with reference to its cultural and contextual meanings. Cultures have evolved diverse practices, (...) institutions, roles, narratives, arts, and artifacts whose core function is to evoke kama muta. Kama muta mediates much of human sociality. (shrink)

This volume aims to capture the basic thrust of progressive views about justice in the recent period. Fisk's selections show that in the ground-breaking work now being done, there is a unity of ethical and political considerations. Theoretical concerns and studies of practical justice are also addressed. The editor incorporates high theory as expounded by figures like Rawls and Habermas, as well as applications to issues of race, gender, law, ecology and class. Since the 19th century intellectual background is (...) important for studying current developments in justice, J S Mill, Marx and T H Green are also included to represent the current of social change from that time. Finally, recent debates on whether justice can be colour- or gender-blind are represented in the writings of a number of known African-American and women writers. The anthology focuses on applied issues. It should be of interest to students taking courses in political philosophy, political theory, ethics, social theory and intellectual history. It should also be a useful guide for graduate students and instructors who wish to follow the current debate on justice. (shrink)

I. The Metaphysics Behind the New Idealism. My remarks in this paper focus on the question of the connection between thought and the world from the perspective of recent critical discussions of the correspondence theory of truth. In some of these discussions, the notion of the world has been branded a will o’ the wisp. The plain implication of these discussions is the reintroduction of something like “objective idealism” back into the philosophical arena. For, the world is countenanced only in (...) a sense that ties it closely to a common set of beliefs, while it is rejected in the sense that would make it other than thought. There is no attempt, within the new idealism, to eliminate familiar physical objects or to insist that the set of beliefs are those of the first person. And so neither of the important characteristics of “subjective idealism” are present. (shrink)

The view that analytic propositions are those which are true in virtue of rules of use is basically correct. But there are many kinds of rules of use, and rules of some of these kinds do not generate truth. There is nothing like a grammatical analytic, though grammatical rules are rules of use. So, this rules-of-use view falls short of being an explanatory account. My problem is to find what it is that is special about those rules of use which (...) do generate truth. I shall argue that they are distinguished from others by their purpose rather than their content. Given their special purpose, one can explain how they generate truth. It will follow that linguistic regularities, considered apart from the purposes of those who use language, fail to provide a basis for understanding analyticity. On my account of it, analyticity turns out to be a less important characteristic of propositions than necessity. This is be- cause necessity, unlike analyticity, has its roots, not just in a contemporary system of usage, but in a wide family of systems of belief and usage. My efforts to deflate the philosophical value of the analytic will be summed up in the conclusion that analytic propositions can be contingent. I think this conclusion is behind the feeling that the propositions of logic and arithmetic are not merely analytic. For, if they were merely analytic, that is, true only in virtue of transitory conventions, then they would be contingent. Justice can be done to this feeling by the view that they are both analytic and necessary. (shrink)

I shall enumerate concepts which pick out the chief components of causation and describe the interrelations between them. There will be no full dress refutation of the necessary sequence view, my main concern here being to paint a detailed picture of the causal action view. Further, I shall not concern myself with how one knows in a given instance of causation that there is causal action and not just the sequence one observes. In fact, I shall assume from the start (...) that the relation of causation to action can be established prior to settling this epistemological issue. (shrink)

Specifically, the aim of a philosophical investigation of science which is cosmological in orientation would be formulated differently in the light of different views of the status of scientific theories. The realist, who treats theory as a literal description of the world, will, predictably, set his sights on, say, finding from theory the nature of time itself. The time of everyday experience is then explained as a by-product of interaction with the world. The positivist, who does not treat theory as (...) a literal description of the world, will instead set his sights on describing the concept of time in a certain theory or, if he shares the present historical mood, on describing the development of that concept through successive theories. His particular epistemological bias does not bar the way to an investigation of the time of everyday experience which would proceed independently of science. (shrink)