Journées d'études « Une pensée de la structure. À l'occasion du centenaire de la mort de Dilthey » Responsables : Christian Berner, Hölger Schmid et Edouard Jolly, organisées dans le cadre du réseau thématique international « Herméneutique, mythe et image ». Université de Lille 3, 15-16 septembre 2011. Programme Jeudi 15 septembre 2011 Histoire et structure 14h – 15h40 Président de séance : Christian Berner, Univ. Lille 3 Jeffrey BARASH, Université de Picardie, « Mémoire et théori...

17/02/2005 Synthèse du mémoire de la maîtrise soutenue en juin 1998 sous la direction de J.-P. Fruit et P. Clergeot à l’Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne. Les aspects spatiaux sont la traduction privilégiée des mutations de la ruralité en Europe et sont au cœur d’une approche géographique de ces récentes évolutions. Au sein de l’Union Européenne, les Pays-Bas sont l’un des pays les plus sensibles aux enjeux fonciers, en raison de p...

Le problème de l’identité personnelle est une préoccupation essentielle des philosophes modernes depuis que la conscience est mise en scène philosophiquement. Cependant parmi eux il n’y en a pas beaucoup qui considèrent la mémoire comme le fondement de l’identité humaine, bien qu’aujourd’hui, et grâce aux neurosciences, on sache pourtant qu’elle joue un rôle capital. D’une manière générale, les empiristes s’y intéressent davantage que les rationnalistes. Ceux‐ci ayant comme idéal normatif les systèmes mathématiques ne pensent pas qu’elle puisse contribuer à élargir (...) nos connaissances du monde. C’est ce qui explique que le système des idées claires et distinctes chez Descartes, s’établit directement par la conscience présente. De son côté, l’empiriste sceptique Hume, bien qu’il ait souligné l’importance de la mémoire dans notre personnalité, n’a pas pu mettre en pleine lumière sa nature et son fonctionnement. L’esprit considéré comme l’ensemble des perceptions et des idées est loin de constituer l’identité de l’homme normal. On voit dans les théoriesbergsoniennes de la durée et de la mémoire une toute autre perspective qui fonde l’identité personnelle sur l’équilibre mental de la conscience présente et de l’inconscient, c’est‐à‐dire du moi superficiel et du moi profond. (shrink)

L'article adopte un point de vue plus systématique qu'historique sur la métaphysique de Christian Wolff et, en particulier, sur sa théorie de la conscience. Il s'intéresse à des écrits de controverse de l'époque, impliquant Lange, Ludovici et un certain Bequignole, officier dans l'armée prussienne. Ce dernier, bien qu'il ne fût pas un philosophe professionnel, a relevé dans la Métaphysique allemande quelques défauts graves de la théorie wolffienne de la conscience. En refusant d'attribuer la raison aux bêtes et en décrivant la (...) mémoire du chien en termes très proches de la mémoire de soi propre aux personnes, le philosophe de Halle n'a pas pu éviter de se contredire. The paper adopts a more systematic than historical point of view on Christian Wolff's metaphysics and, in particular, on his theory of consciousness. It is interested in controversial writings of those days with reference e.g. to Lange, Ludovici and an officer of the Prussian army so-called Bequignole ; the latter, though he tvas no professional philosopher, found a few serious defects of Wolff's theory of consciousness in the latter's German Metaphysics. By refusing to grant reason to animals and by describing the dog's memory in terms very close to the self memory specific to persons, Wolff couldn't avoid contradicting himself. (shrink)

En parallèle avec le dossier d’œuvres que Warren Neidich a préparé pour la rubrique Icônes, cet article pose les bases théoriques d’analyses conceptuelles et d’expérimentations politiques faisant du « cerveau sans organes » un principe de résistance aux dangers posés par le « cerveau câblé ». La multiplication d’interfaces promettant d’assurer une communication directe entre nos systèmes nerveux et nos appareils de computation est ici envisagée à travers la mutation du cognitariat du capitalisme cognitif en un « précariat surordonné » (...) du capitalisme neuronal, c’est-à-dire d’une force de travail disponible 24/7 dont les capacités cognitives, affectives, mémorielles et imaginatives seraient techniquement modulables selon les besoins de l’appareil productif. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps, and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may (...) freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Feminist Studies 45, no. 1. © 2019 by Feminist Studies, Inc. 235 Vivyan Adair Stigmata: A Memoir of Pain and Resistance For some of us poverty is not experienced from a distance or from the position of an audience member or critic, but as the most pressing truth of our existence, past or present and our core sense of identity. —Roxanne Rimstead, Remnants of Nation: On Poverty Narratives (...) by Women Shame My own mother—with four children under the age of seven by the time she was twenty five—taught, nurtured, and loved us ferociously but struggled and utterly failed to keep us fed, sheltered, and safe. We clung desperately to her fragile dignity, grace, and laughter, against all the forces of a cruel and indifferent world. Yet, in the end she was crushed by the weight of our shame and our raw, unrelenting pain as my brothers and sister and I were bent and broken and taken from her; with scars that never faded; injuries, infections, and ailments for which we found neither respite nor repair; with feet mangled by cheap, used Salvation Army shoes; the gnawing void of hunger and insecurity clawing at our tender backs; public indignities and humiliations for which I still can find no words. With access to neither medical insurance nor care, when my already fragile, toddling sister’s forehead was split open by a car door slammed in frustration, my brother and I had to pin her tiny body to the ground as 236 Vivyan Adair my mother sewed the angry gash together with needle and thread, practicing the meticulous dressmaker’s stitches for which she had received a modicum of acclaim, but so little reward. My sister somehow endured, but registered the pain, the terror, and the trauma with a brand, a stigmata, an angry and frightening scar as an indelible sign of our poverty, visually cleaving her very forehead in two, for the remainder of her life. In our school cafeteria “free lunchers” were reminded with a large and colorful sign to “line up last.” In that auditorium each fall we were coerced up onto a makeshift stage, with the promise of first dibs on free milk. There, our pristine school nurse sat upright and sucked air through her teeth as she donned surgical gloves to cautiously check only the hair of poor hungry children, one by one, for lice. I burned and choked and raged with shame, as our far more decent working-class colleagues and friends, in color-coordinated Sears sweater sets and matching tartan knee high socks, averted their eyes from our reluctant genuflections, while silently spooning their mac and cheese and sipping their Tree Top from tiny Dixie cups. In dilapidated and unsafe housing often without heat, hot water, or lights and with access to only public bathrooms, I developed a stubborn case of ringworm, scabies, and a series of painful urinary tract infections. When my second grade teacher would not excuse me every hour or so—because, as she said I was “willful”—I could not help but wet my pants in class. My schoolmates guffawed at my flea bitten legs, my ducttaped shoes, my crooked and ill-serviced teeth, and the way my siblings and I stank. Kids, teachers, and strangers stepped away from us intuitively and then, with great shows of distress, feigned concern and then outrage and disgust. Regularly our teachers excoriated us for our inability to concentrate in school and our refusal to come to class with proper school supplies, calling us out as greedy when we tried to take more than our share of free lunch. Whenever backpacks or library books came up missing, we were publicly interrogated and sent home to think about our offenses, often accompanied by notes that reminded my bewildered mother that she should be working twice as hard to make up for the discipline and order that had supposedly walked out the door with my father. And when occasionally we cried foul and lashed out, our behavior was used to justify even more elaborate punishment that exacerbated the effect of our growing anomie. Vivyan Adair 237 Guilt As children, our disheveled and unkempt bodies were produced as... (shrink)

I once attended a writing conference for aspiring authors of books for children, at which one speaker enraged the audience by making the pronouncement that, in his view, parents were disqualified to be authors of children's fiction. His reason: parents have to protect themselves from the reality of their children's pain and so wouldn't be able to write about childhood traumas with sufficient awareness and honesty. To this the audience, largely composed of mothers, shot back that parents are especially qualified (...) to write for children, for precisely the opposite reason: they live with children in a relationship of great intimacy and so know children in a way that non-parents 1 do not. But, assuming, as I am inclined to do (as myself a writer of books for children who is also a parent), that the parents are correct here, or at least correct in asserting that they have a distinctive avenue of access to children on which they can draw to enrich the writing of their books, what ethical problems, if any, arise? If children do indeed provide their author-parents with "material," is this material the parents are entitled to use? If the children grow up themselves to be authors some day, will they be able to draw on their own childhoods -- and their relationships with parents and siblings -- to craft their own novels, or memoirs? (Flannery O'Connor is quoted as saying that no author need ever be at a loss for subject matter to write about: "All you need is a childhood.") Can friends write about friends, while still remaining friends and being true to the expectations and obligations of friendship? In this essay I want to highlight -- and then partially seek to dissolve, or resolve -- the particular tensions that arise between the obligations of friendship (or family relationships) and the necessity for an author (of either fiction or memoirs) to draw on her own life -- that is to say, her own relationships with friends and family -- in her work.. (shrink)