In this book, Michael Arbib, a researcher in artificial intelligence and brain theory, joins forces with Mary Hesse, a philosopher of science, to present an integrated account of how humans 'construct' reality through interaction with the social and physical world around them. The book is a major expansion of the Gifford Lectures delivered by the authors at the University of Edinburgh in the autumn of 1983. The authors reconcile a theory of the individual's construction of reality as a (...) class='Hi'>network of schemas 'in the head' with an account of the social construction of language, science, ideology and religion to provide an integrated schema-theoretic view of human knowledge. The authors still find scope for lively debate, particularly in their discussion of free will and of the reality of God. The book integrates an accessible exposition of background information with a cumulative marshalling of evidence to address fundamental questions concerning human action in the world and the nature of ultimate reality. (shrink)

Logic, Methodology, and the Philosophy of Science, the Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress at Stanford, is heavily weighted towards technical problems of logic, foundations of mathematics, and the special sciences, especially psychology, economic models, and structural linguistics, with little discussion of general problems of the philosophy of science. Problems about the idealization involved in the relation of theories to the world become problems about probabilistic models at various levels of abstraction ; induction becomes a problem in decision theory ; (...) language becomes the subject-matter of formalized syntactics, and so on. There is nothing in the least undesirable about these inquiries in a Philosophy of Science Congress, but there is a danger that, if they are not balanced by more informal discussions, real points of dispute are missed, or decided over-hastily in the brief preliminaries of formalization. The philosopher's job ought sometimes to be the more irritating one of returning to these points of dispute; a job which is well done in some of the contributions to this volume, but one could wish to find it being done in more. In what follows I shall have to restrict myself to commenting on only a handful of these more philosophical papers. (shrink)

Mary Hesse's well-known work on models and analogies gives models a creative role to play in science, which rests on developing certain analogical properties considered neutral between the two fields. Case study material from Irving Fisher's work (The Purchasing Power of Money, 1911), in which he used analogies to construct models of monetary relations and the monetary system, highlights certain omissions in Hesse's account. The analysis points to the importance of taking account of the negative properties in (...) the analogies and to certain differences between "ready-made" analogies (models of systems based on existing analogical structures) and "designed" analogies (models built up from separate analogical features). (shrink)

A long-standing tradition presents economic activity in terms of the flow of fluids. This metaphor lies behind a small but influential practice of hydraulic modelling in economics. Yet turning the metaphor into a three-dimensional hydraulic model of the economic system entails making numerous and detailed commitments about the analogy between hydraulics and the economy. The most famous 3-D model in economics is probably the Phillips machine, the central object of this paper.

Public health care interventions—regarding vaccination, obesity, and HIV, for example—standardly take the form of information dissemination across a community. But information networks can vary importantly between different ethnic communities, as can levels of trust in information from different sources. We use data from the Greater Pittsburgh Random Household Health Survey to construct models of information networks for White and Black communities--models which reflect the degree of information contact between individuals, with degrees of trust in information from various sources correlated with (...) positions in that social network. With simple assumptions regarding belief change and social reinforcement, we use those modeled networks to build dynamic agent-based models of how information can be expected to flow and how beliefs can be expected to change across each community. With contrasting information from governmental and religious sources, the results show importantly different dynamic patterns of belief polarization within the two communities. (shrink)

In this work, I discuss the role of Husserl’s phenomenology in Paolo Parrini’s positive philosophy. In the first section, I highlight the presence of both empiricist and constructivist elements in Parrini’s anti-foundationalist and anti-absolutist conception of knowledge. In the second section, I stress Parrini’s acknowledgement of the crucial role of phenomenology in investigating the empirical basis of knowledge, thanks to its analysis of the relationship between form and matter of cognition. In the third section, I point out some lines of (...) development of the phenomenological form of empirical realism as revealed in Parrini’s reflection, through a comparison of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, Mary Hesse’s network model and the tradition of neutral monism. (shrink)

En s'inscrivant dans une problématique posée par Pierre Schaeffer à propos d'une utilisation des moyens de communication au profit de groupes sociaux d'intérêts communs, cet article présente les conditions d'émergence et de fonctionnement des réseaux spécifiques de communication sociale à partir de l'exemple concret de la radio Antélim, et il s'interroge sur une éventuelle préfiguration d'Internet. Dans un premier temps, un rappel des théorisations, recherches et expériences, menées au cours des années 1960-1970, dégagera les conditions d'une communication participative, interactive et (...) multipolaire, modèle alternatif à celui, dominant, des mass média. Puis, l'étude de l'expérimentation d'Antélim menée en France entre 1978 et 1985 avec le milieu de la marine marchande mettra en lumière l'origine du projet, sa mise en oeuvre et présentera une évaluation de l'expérience. Enfin, la question de la préfiguration d'Internet par ces réseaux spécifiques de communication sociale via la radio sera posée pour tenter de définir des parallèles possibles entre ces deux dispositifs.By entering in a problem posed by Pierre Schaeffer about a use of means of communication for the benefit of groups of common interests, this article presents the conditions for the emergence and operation of specific networks of social communication from the example of the radio Antélim, and he wondered about a possible forerunner of the Internet. At first, a reminder of the theories, research and experiments, conducted in the years 1960-1970, will identify the conditions for participatory communication, interactive and multipolar alternative model to the dominant, mass media. Then, the study of Antélim experimentation conducted in France between 1978 and 1985 with the middle of the Merchant will highlight the origin of the project, its implementation and present an evaluation of the experience. Finally, the question of the forerunner of the Internet by these specific networks of social communication via the radio will be asked to try to identify possible parallels between these two devices. (shrink)

Humans can recollect past events in details and/or know that an object, person, or place has been encountered before. During the last two decades, there has been intense debate about how recollection and familiarity are organized in the brain. Here, we propose an integrative memory model which describes the distributed and interactive neurocognitive architecture of representations and operations underlying recollection and familiarity. In this architecture, the subjective experience of recollection and familiarity arises from the interaction between core systems and (...) an attribution system. By integrating principles from current theoretical views about memory functioning, we provide a testable framework to refine the prediction of deficient versus preserved mechanisms in memory-impaired populations. The case of Alzheimer's disease is considered as an example because it entails progressive lesions starting with limited damage to core systems before invading step-by-step most parts of the model-related network. We suggest a chronological scheme of cognitive impairments along the course of AD, where the inaugurating deficit would relate early neurodegeneration of the perirhinal/anterolateral entorhinal cortex to impaired familiarity for items that need to be discriminated as viewpoint-invariant conjunctive entities. The integrative memory model can guide future neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies aiming to understand how such a network allows humans to remember past events, to project into the future, and possibly also to share experiences. (shrink)

On a longtemps rendu compte des comportements de déplacements des hommes dans l’espace par un terme renvoyant à une logique collective et de masse, celui de migration . L’intégration dans l’observation et la compréhension de toute la palette des motifs de déplacements et l’individualisation croissante des pratiques ont amené l’usage d’un terme plus générique, emprunté aux sciences sociales et notamment à ceux qui s’intéressent à la fluidité dans l’espace social, celui de mobilité. Ce glissement n’est pas purement sémantique : il (...) exprime le passage de l’empire de la nécessité aux capacités stratégiques et aux désirs des acteurs, de la représentation aréolaire d’un territoire rassemblant une « société locale » « contenant » les déplacements de ses membres à des représentations réticulaires , multi-territoriales . Sur tous ces points, les enquêtes initiées dans les années 1960 par les ingénieurs pour alimenter leurs modèles de trafic nous ont permis, grâce à l’élaboration d’indicateurs, de concepts, de représentations nouvelles, de comprendre en profondeur la dynamique et les rôles respectifs des rationalités individuelles et de la formation de normes sociales dans le champ spécifique de la mobilité quotidienne. C’est de cette construction dont nous rendons compte dans cet article, qui livre aussi à partir des quelques résultats saillants des recherches conduites, les convictions fortes en matière de dynamique de la mobilité qui s’en dégagent et les paradigmes qu’il conviendrait de mieux explorer.Spatial behaviour was studied in the past through group concepts, such as residential or regular migrations from home to work. The will to understand travel behaviour for the full range of trip purposes and the growing personalisation of behaviour leads to adopt the term of mobility from social sciences. This change is not purely semantic. It expresses the transition from a vision based on the needs to the consideration of the strategic capabilities of the persons, from areola-based representations of a local society to network and archipelago-based representations of individual behaviours. We have used, in conjunction with the international community of travel behaviour analysts, the travel surveys introduced in the sixties to feed traffic models, to build concepts, indicators and representations of travel behaviour, to understand in depth the transformations of mobility patterns and to analyze the roles of individual rationality and social norms. The paper relates this history, highlights some key results and strong beliefs, and questions the need to explore new paradigms. (shrink)

While numerous studies show that brain signals contain information about an individual’s current state that are potentially valuable for smoothing man-machine interfaces, this has not yet lead to the use of brain computer interfaces (BCI) in daily life. One of the main challenges is the common requirement of personal data that is correctly labelled concerning the state of interest in order to train a model, where this trained model is not guaranteed to generalize across time and context. Another (...) challenge is the requirement to wear electrodes on the head. We here propose a BCI that can tackle these issues and may be a promising case for BCI research and application in everyday life. The BCI uses EEG signals to predict head rotation in order to improve images presented in a Virtual Reality (VR) headset. When presenting a 360° video to a headset, Field-of-View approaches only stream the content that is in the current field of view and leave out the rest. When the user rotates the head, other content parts need to be made available soon enough to go unnoticed by the user which is problematic given the available bandwidth. By predicting head rotation, the content parts adjacent to the currently viewed part could be retrieved in time for display when the rotation actually takes place. Eleven participants generated left- and rightward head rotations while head movements were recorded using the headsets motion sensing system and EEG sensors. We trained neural network models to distinguish EEG epochs preceding rightward, leftward and no rotation. Applying these models to streaming EEG data that was withheld from the training showed that 400 ms before rotation onset, the probability ‘no rotation’ started to decrease and the probabilities of an upcoming right- or leftward rotation started to diverge in the correct direction. In the proposed BCI scenario, users already wear a device on their head allowing for integrated sensors. Moreover, it is possible to acquire accurately labeled training data on the fly, and continuously monitor and improve the model’s performance. The BCI can be harnessed if it will improve imagery and therewith enhance immersive experience. (shrink)

This history of physics focuses on the question, "How do bodies act on one another across space?" The variety of answers illustrates the function of fundamental analogies or models in physics as well as the role of so-called unobservable entities. Forces and Fields presents an in-depth look at the science of ancient Greece, and it examines the influence of antique philosophy on seventeenth-century thought. Additional topics embrace many elements of modern physics--the empirical basis of quantum mechanics, wave-particle duality and the (...) uncertainty principle, and the action-at-a-distance theory of Wheeler and Feynman. 1961 ed. (shrink)

The argument from analogy is examined from the point of view of Carnap's confirmation theory. It is argued that if inductive arguments are to be applicable to the real world, they must contain elementary analogical inferences. Carnap's system as originally developed (theλ -system) is not strong enough to take account of analogical arguments, but it is shown that the new system, which he has announced but not published in detail (theη -system), is capable of satisfying the conditions of inductive analogy. (...) Finally it is shown that an elementary analysis of analogical inference yields postulates of the η -system with a minimum of arbitrary assumptions. (shrink)

Hempel's qualitative criteria of converse consequence and special consequence for confirmation are examined, and the resulting paradoxes traced to the general intransitivity of confirmation. Adopting a probabilistic measure of confirmation, a limiting form of transitivity of confirmation from evidence to predictions is derived, and it is shown to what extent its application depends on prior probability judgments. In arguments involving this kind of transitivity therefore there is no necessary "convergence of opinion" in the sense claimed by some personalists. The conditions (...) of application of the limiting transitivity theorem are most perspicuously described in terms of De Finetti's notion of exchangeability, which leads to a suggested revaluation of the function of theories in relation to confirmation and explanation. (shrink)

The authors study U.S. stockbrokers, workers directly affected by the technological and economic forces of globalization. Drawing on interviews with 61 brokers and managers in four firms, they find that competition from electronic communication networks and international markets has increased the pace of work for stockbrokers, spurred online and after-hours trading, and may prompt the major stock exchanges to establish later trading sessions known as extended-hours trading. These events are lengthening already long working days for brokers and contributing to a (...) deficit of the time and energy they have to care for their families. These developments also reinforce gender inequality at home and in the workplace. The authors also find an alternative response to this globalization: The discount firm model, which creates the conditions for more gender balance in jobs and careers and thus the possibility for greater gender balance in the provision of care. (shrink)

In his paper “William Whewell on the Consilience of Inductions” Professor Laudan has suggested that Whewell’s use of “consilience of inductions” is not the same as mine in my paper of that title. Suppose we have a theory T which entails three empirical laws L1, L2, L3. L1 is supposed already confirmed by direct evidence of its instances, but we have as yet no direct evidence for L2 or for L3. Then Laudan distinguishes two problems: Whewell’s problem: T is suggested (...) to explain L1 and is supported by L1; how much is our confidence in T increased if it also predicts L2, and L2 is subsequently directly confirmed? My problem: T is suggested to explain L1 and is supported by L1; T also entails L3; how much is our confidence that L3 will turn out a correct prediction increased by the fact that T entails it? (shrink)

The argument from analogy is examined from the standpoint of Carnap's confirmation theory. Carnap's own discussion of analogy in relation to his c*— function is restricted to cases where the analogues are known to be similar, but not known to be different in any respect. It has been argued by the author in a previous work,, and by P. Achinstein, that typical analogy arguments involve known differences between the analogues as well as similarities. Achinstein shows that for such arguments none (...) of Carnap's Δ— system of conflrmation functions gives satisfactory values, and it is further shown in the present paper that for these arguments the confirmation never rises above its initial value, irrespective of evidence drown from an analogue. it is argued that even if inductive arguments are to be applicable to the real world, they must in principle be capable of taking into account known differences between the instances of an inductive generalization. Hence Carnap's Δ— system is inadequate as an explication of both induction and analogy.Three conditions are stated as necessary for any confirmation theory which gives a satisfactory explication of analogical inference:I. If two individuals a and b are known to agree in certain properties and differ in others, and if in addition a has a further property, then the confirmation of the hypothesis that b also has this property is greater than its initial confirmation, at least if the weight of the similarities is sufficiently great compared with the weight of the differences.II. The confirmation‐value increases or decreases with the weight of the similarities between the analogues compared with the weight of their differences.III. The confirmation that b has a certain property is greater if a has that property than if a does not have it.The Δ— system sastisfles none of these conditions. Carnap and Stegmüller have now, however, presented a new anxiom system for confirmation functions. the — system, Which is introduced primarily to deal with languages whose primitive predicates fall into families such that each individual can only be qualified by one predicate of each family. They construct a c‐ function which, as well as dealing with a language having two families of such predicates, also depends, unlike the functions in the Δ— system, on similarities between otherwise different individuals. The system is not developed far enough in this Appendix to enable the authors to discuss the confirmation in analogy arguments satisfying conditions I — III above, but it is shown in the present paper that, with a simple generalization of the measure‐function defined by Carnap and Stegmüller, and in the simplest non‐trivial case, condition I — III are all satisfied, indeed a stronger form of condition I is satisfied, in which no known similarity of the analogues is postulated.Finally it is remarked that Carnap and Stegmüller's method of introducing their Δ— system is extremely arbitrary and ad hoc, and an alternative method of introducing is suggested. Bearing in mind the fundamental nature of the argument from analogy in all application of induction to the real world, it is suggesetd that the fundamental inductive inference needing explication is not the inference of‘P1b, from ‘P,1a, but the analogical infeence of‘P2b, from‘P1P2a.P1b,. It is posinitial confirmation of‘P2b, and the confirmation of‘P2b, given‘P2a” and that the later two confirmation‐values are equivalent to those in the Δ— system. It is then shown that Carnap and Stegmüller's new measure‐function follows from their axiom system together with these postulates. Thus some of the arbitrariness of the — system is removed by general considérations regarding inductive and analogical inference. (shrink)

In his paper “William Whewell on the Consilience of Inductions” Professor Laudan has suggested that Whewell’s use of “consilience of inductions” is not the same as mine in my paper of that title. Suppose we have a theory T which entails three empirical laws L1, L2, L3. L1 is supposed already confirmed by direct evidence of its instances, but we have as yet no direct evidence for L2 or for L3. Then Laudan distinguishes two problems: Whewell’s problem: T is suggested (...) to explain L1 and is supported by L1; how much is our confidence in T increased if it also predicts L2, and L2 is subsequently directly confirmed? My problem: T is suggested to explain L1 and is supported by L1; T also entails L3; how much is our confidence that L3 will turn out a correct prediction increased by the fact that T entails it? (shrink)

Questions about the structure and justification of theories, the interpretation of data, and the problem of realism have been in the forefront of debate in recent philosophy of science, and the topic of models and analogies is increasingly recognized as integral to this debate. Models of physical matter and motion ‐ for example, models of atoms and planetary systems ‐ were already familiar in Greek science, but serious analysis of “model” as a concept entered philosophy of science only in (...) the nineteenth century. This was largely the result of proliferation in classical physics of theoretical entities such as “atom,” “electro‐magnetic wave,” and “electron,” for which there appeared to be no directly observable evidence (see theoretical terms). (shrink)

Models as Mediators discusses the ways in which models function in modern science, particularly in the fields of physics and economics. Models play a variety of roles in the sciences: they are used in the development, exploration and application of theories and in measurement methods. They also provide instruments for using scientific concepts and principles to intervene in the world. The editors provide a framework which covers the construction and function of scientific models, and explore the ways in which they (...) enable us to learn about both theories and the world. The contributors to the volume offer their own individual theoretical perspectives to cover a wide range of examples of modelling, from physics, economics and chemistry. These papers provide ideal case-study material for understanding both the concepts and typical elements of modelling, using analytical approaches from the philosophy and history of science. (shrink)

As in the case of great books in all branches of philosophy, Pierre Duhem's Le Théorie Physique , first published in 1906, can be looked to as the progenitor of many different and even conflicting currents in subsequent philosophy of science. On a superficial reading, it seems to be an expression of what later came to be called deductivist and instrumentalist analyses of scientific theory. Duhem's very definition of physical theory, put forward early in the book, is the quintessence of (...) instrumentalism: A physical theory is not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible a set of experimental laws [p. 19]. (shrink)

Kuhn 's incommensurability thesis of 1962 still implies a very radical critique of standard theories of meaning. It is argued that incommensurability is sufficiently pervasive throughout the development of theories as to call in question standard linguistic palliatives, and that Kuhn 's critique of extensionalist translation must be carried further into a theory of interpretation which not only depends on holistic meanings, but also explicitly addresses the ostensive and analogical processes of language learning. Such a theory is required for the (...) pervasively metaphoric character of natural language, as well as for the understanding of theoretical terms in science. (shrink)

During the last two centuries, the way economic science is done has changed radically: it has become a social science based on mathematical models in place of words. This book describes and analyses that change - both historically and philosophically - using a series of case studies to illuminate the nature and the implications of these changes. It is not a technical book; it is written for the intelligent person who wants to understand how economics works from the inside out. (...) This book will be of interest to economists and science studies scholars. But it also aims at a wider readership in the public intellectual sphere, building on the current interest in all things economic and on the recent failure of the so-called economic model, which has shaped our beliefs and the world we live in. (shrink)

Martin Eger's comparison of controversies in science and morals is extended to a consideration of the nature of “rationality” in each. Both theoretical science and moral philosophy are held to be relativist in social and historical terms, but science also has definitive non‐relativist pragmatic criteria of truth. The problem for moral philosophy is to delineate its own appropriate types of social criteria of validity.

The first two volumes of the Minnesota Studies contained some of the classic accounts of this view, especially Carnap's "The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts," and Hempel's "The Theoretician's Dilemma," but even in these volumes anticipations of a change of view are discernible, in Sellars' "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," Scriven's "Definitions, Explanations, and Theories," and Pap's excellent "Disposition Concepts and Extensional Logic," in which the adequacy of the empiricist's refuge in extensional logic is queried. Volume III contains two (...) papers within the "orthodoxy." One is a careful examination by Hempel of the structure of statistical explanation, which is shown to differ in important respects from the deductive pattern. The other is Rozeboom's "The Factual Content of Theoretical Concepts," which defends a "Thesis of semantic empiricism," namely that "the semantic properties, if any, of theoretical expressions derive,... wholly from their use with the observation language". Rozeboom holds that the factual content of a theory is designated by its Ramsey sentence, although the theory may be enriched in different and perhaps incompatible ways to entail further theoretical sentences, in which case a theoretical term may "designate" two or more different entities. The analysis is ingenious, but gives little comfort to those who want to allow for a "meaning" of theoretical concepts not wholly derived from the observation language. (shrink)

As in the case of great books in all branches of philosophy, Pierre Duhem's Le Théorie Physique, first published in 1906, can be looked to as the progenitor of many different and even conflicting currents in subsequent philosophy of science. On a superficial reading, it seems to be an expression of what later came to be called deductivist and instrumentalist analyses of scientific theory. Duhem's very definition of physical theory, put forward early in the book, is the quintessence of instrumentalism:A (...) physical theory is not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible a set of experimental laws [p. 19]. (shrink)

In his theory of rational discourse, Habermas has made essential use of the concept of 'force of the better argument'. He does not explicitly discuss the theories of meaning and of inference that must underpin this concept, but usually construes it in terms of univocal meaning and propositional inference. These assumptions are challenged by means of examples from the use of metaphor and analogical argument in science, and it is suggested that a generalisation of such arguments applies to philosophical discourse (...) also. Habermas's conception of modes of argument as monotonically directed towards truth should therefore be replaced by dialogue and dialectics, but it does not follow from this that argument is without rational rules. (shrink)

Faced with what he saw as the danger to society in the ascendancy of natural science and decline in religion and morals, the great French sociologist Emile Durkheim sought the origins of both religion and science in their function in primitive societies as guarantors of social solidarity. In contrast to Frazer, Tylor, and other early anthropologists, he looked for the internal intelligibility of myth and ritual in social terms, rather than regarding them just as failed attempts to state objective truths (...) about the natural world of the same kind as those later arrived at by natural science. One does not have to accept Durkheim's ultimately atheistic identification of God with Society, nor the politically authoritarian consequences which have some-times been held to follow from this identification, to see that Durkheim has raised a set of issues of crucial importance for a discussion of science and the myths and doctrines of religion. For what he has done is to reintroduce a third factor into the perennial and by now rather frustrating dichotomy between science and religion, namely society and the sciences of man. It is some consequences of this approach that I want to explore in this paper. (shrink)

I am grateful to Brendan Minogue for his careful and detailed discussion of the concept of “intensional reference” as it appears in my book The Structure of Scientific Inference. He concludes that my account contains some important inconsistencies that vitiate my attempt to reconcile the idea of cumulative acquisition of scientific knowledge with radically changing theories. He rightly sees that this attempt depends crucially on the account of translatability between theories, and this in turn upon the notion of “identity of (...) intensional reference.” This means that the attempt fails if there are inconsistencies in the concept of IR. Since Minogue's careful analysis nevertheless contains some misunderstandings, I must plead guilty to a number of unclarities, but I do not believe there are basic inconsistencies. Let me try again. (shrink)

The discovery of the role of models in science by Granger parallels the analogous discovery made by Mary Hesse and Marx Wartofsky. The role models are granted highlights the linguistic dimension of science, resulting in a 'softening' of Bachelard's rationalistic epistemology without lapsing into relativism. A 'linguistic' theory of metaphor, as contrasted with Bachelard's 'psychological' theory, is basic to Granger's account of models. A final paragraph discusses to what extent Granger's 'mature' theory of models would imply a revision of (...) his early economic methodology. (shrink)

Modelling became one of the primary tools of mathematical economic research in the twentieth century, but when we look at examples of how nonanalogical models were first built in economics, both the process of making representations and aspects of the representing relation remain opaque. Like early astronomers, economists have to imagine how the hidden parts of their world are arranged and to make images, that is, create models, to represent how they work. The case of the Edgeworth Box, a (...) class='Hi'>model widely used for theoretical work in twentieth-century economics, provides a good example to explore the process of making mathematical representations of the economy. It shows how, in making these new representations, conceptual elements were developed which could not have been represented in the older verbal forms of economics. (shrink)