On solipsism and the transmission of memories in the experience of history Resumen: Este artículo está dedicado a la problemática de la experiencia histórica y a varias de sus ramificaciones. De especial interés resulta aquí la cuestión de la preeminencia del testigo respecto a otras instancias en la construcción del relato. Una cuestión que está, sin duda, estrechamente vinculada a las diferentes concepciones del tiempo histórico y de su experiencia. A este respecto, merece especial atención la figura del historiador alemán (...) Reinhart Koselleck por el destacado papel que jugó en los debates en torno a los monumentos erigidos en conmemoración a las víctimas del Holocausto, pero también por las deficiencias teóricas de la historia conceptual koselleckiana a la hora de abordar el papel de las emociones que emanan de la experiencia histórica.: This article is about the problematic of historical experience and several of its ramifications. Of special interest here is the question of the pre-eminence of the witness in relation to other instances in the construction of the story. This question is undoubtedly closely linked to the different conceptions of historical time and its experiences. In this respect, the figure of the German historian Reinhart Koselleck deserves special attention for the prominent role he played in the debates concerning the memorials built in commemoration of the victims of the Holocaust, but also for the theoretical weaknesses of Koselleckian conceptual history in dealing with the role of emotions emanating from historical experience. Palabras clave: memoria, historia, experiencias primarias, testigo, víctima, espacio público. Keywords: memory, history, primary experiences, witness, victim, public sphere. (shrink)

Introducción al número monográfico "Emociones en la Historia Conceptual. La historia como emoción".

El artículo muestra una estrategia metodológica para garantizar la dirección del proceso educativo para el desarrollo de la habilidad intelectual modelación en los estudiantes; devela sus principales fundamentos epistémicos, sus etapas y acciones esenciales. Para ello se aplicaron métodos científicos de investigación. La constatación de los resultados brinda evidencias positivas acerca de su pertinencia, al considerar el carácter coparticipativo y coprotagónico que adquieren las influencias educativas en el contexto institucional en la dirección de un proceso educativo único. The article shows (...) a methodological strategy to ensure the teaching process direction in order develop intellectual skill modeling in students; It reveals its main epistemic foundations, its stages and essential actions. That is the reason for which different research scientific methods were applied. Verification of results provides positive evidence of its pertinence when considering the collaborative nature of the educational influences within the institutional context in the direction of a unique educational process. (shrink)

Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume's argument. The discussion is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll's Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist reply to Hume is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is necessary condition for having the justification. But then the subject does not have reasons for believing what she believes. I (...) defend a moderate externalist account that seeks to partly accommodate that objection to the radical externalist proposal. It is based on an extension of Peacocke's theory of concepts: possession conditions for predicative concepts standing for natural properties include dispositions to project them to new cases in accordance with inductive inferential patterns. (shrink)

Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume’s argument. The discussion is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll’s Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist reply to Hume (defended by Dauer and Van Cleve) is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is a necessary condition for having the justification. But then the subject does not have (...) reasons for believing what she believes. I defend a moderate externalist account that seeks to partly accommodate that objection to the radical externalist proposal. It is based on an extension of Peacocke’s theory of concepts: possession conditions for predicative concepts standing for natural properties include (fallible) dispositions to project them to new cases in accordance with inductive inferential patterns. (shrink)

This paper shows the brain correlates of Cloninger’s personality model during the presentation of social scenarios under positive or negative valence situations. Social scenarios were constructed when participants played the Dictator game with two confederates that had two opposites roles as the cooperator and non-cooperator. Later the same day during a fMRI scanning session, participants read negative and positive situations that happened to confederates in the past. Participants were asked to think “how do you think those people felt during that (...) situation?” A dissimilarity matrix between stimuli were obtained from fMRI results. Results shown that Harm Avoidance trait people make use of right middle frontal gyrus and left superior frontal gyrus to discriminate between Coop and NoCoop. Cooperation as a trait makes use of the right superior temporal gyrus and the right precuneus to discriminate between Coop and NoCoop in positive social scenarios. Finally, Self-directedness trait people make use of the right inferior parietal lobe to discriminate between Coop and NoCoop in negative social scenarios and the right precuneus to discriminate between Coop and Strangers. An intuitive link between discrimination findings and behavioral patterns of those personality traits is proposed. (shrink)

Resumen: El pasado siglo XX ha sido testigo de un renovado interés por los planteamientos de la filosofía aristotélica, en especial de la mano del filósofo alemán Martin Heidegger. Pues bien, junto con esta vuelta al estudio de la filosofía peripatética, ha surgido como en paralelo un nuevo interés por la filosofía del ser de Tomás de Aquino, en particular por su noción de esse ut actus essendi. Esto ha desembocado en diversas líneas de investigación, a veces confrontadas, que han (...) versado sobre todo en la cuestión de la recepción tomasiana de la noción de ente y los aspectos en ella implicados. En este trabajo se procurará dar a conocer algunos aspectos importantes de esta recepción, así como de esas distintas líneas de interpretación confrontadas. Abstract: The past 20th century has witnessed a renewed interest in the approaches of Aristotelian philosophy, especially from the hand of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. Well, along with this return to the study of peripatetic philosophy, a new interest in the philosophy of being of Thomas Aquinas has emerged as a parallel, particularly in his notion of esse ut actus essendi. This has led to various lines of research, sometimes confronted, which have dealt mainly with the question of the Tomasian reception of the notion of being and the aspects involved in it. In this work we will try to make known some important aspects of this reception, as well as of those different lines of interpretation confronted. (shrink)

Se suele pensar que la culpa procede de una transgresión a la norma o la ley. La razón universal determina a obrar conforme al deber de un sujeto replegado dentro de sí mismo. La acción que emana de la obediencia a la ley es la virtud moral del singular. Pero Hegel propone la tragedia de una oposición entre dos deberes que compelen a obrar, al mismo tiempo, de acuerdo a ellos. Sin embargo, al acatar una de las leyes se transgrede (...) la otra. De esa manera, la virtud de seguir la ley es, al mismo tiempo, transgresión respecto de la otra ley opuesta. El destino condena a Antígona a violentar la ley de la razón, obrando, empero, conforme a su deber. La sustancia ética se rompe. ¿Cómo eludir la culpa?. (shrink)

Uno de los temas más debatidos en el período inmediatamente posterior a la muerte de Tomás de Aquino fue cómo interpretar fielmente de acuerdo a sus textos el concepto de esse, dada la cualidad metafísica particular que éste adquiría en esta nueva ontología. Teniendo en cuenta que durante la escolástica los pensadores trataban de servirse de la filosofía como instrumento para explicar la fe, la comprensión del esse como distinto realmente de la esencia, fue el centro del debate por ser (...) la base del principal argumento para mostrar la diferencia ontológica entre Dios y las criaturas. (shrink)

Habitar la ciudad tiene que ver con el respeto entre sus miembros. Ese respeto deriva del reconocimiento que uno tiene del otro a partir del sentido de responsabilidad. El sujeto en sí mismo está obligado por el otro. El yo dispuesto al otro responde a su demanda, es libre en cuanto se debe al otro. Por otro lado, Sloterdijk habla de la topósfera como el lugar donde se habita en esferas en las que uno y otro se reconocen. Una ciudad (...) cuyas esferas son armónicas es estética, y es a la vez una ciudad ética. En tiempo de pandemia prevalece el aislamiento, el desorden, la irresponsabilidad, y se vive en un thanatopo. Se hacen sugerencias para una mejor vida en la ciudad en tiempo de pandemia. (shrink)

I deal here with one of Boghossian’s arguments against content externalism, related to ourinferential rationality(to use his term). According to his reasoning, the apriority of our logical abilities is inconsistent with certain externalist assumptions. Nevertheless, the problem constitutes an important challenge foranytheory of content, not just for externalism. Furthermore, when we examine what internalists may propose to solve the problem, we see that externalists have at their disposal a more promising repertoire of possible replies than internalists. In that sense, insofar (...) as Boghossian’s scenario is relevant to the debate externalism/internalism, it can be seen (against Boghossian’s original intention) as providing additional evidence for content externalism. (shrink)

This article examines the role of social media and journalistic media in presidential electoral processes. A systematic review of scientific articles published from 2012 to 2022 was conducted. The results indicate that the media has a significant influence on public perception and the political agenda during election campaigns. Furthermore, the importance of evaluating political leaders in the voters' decision-making process is emphasized. In summary, the article provides valuable insights into how the media can shape the narrative and public opinion during (...) presidential elections. (shrink)

Manuel Alejandro Serra Pérez L’expression « virtus essendi » utilisée par Thomas d’Aquin dans certains passages de ses oeuvres a été un des sujets abordés dans le thomisme contemporain chez les plus importants commentateurs d’Aquin. Étienne Gilson fut le premier des commentateurs qui écrivit des notes explicatives sur son sens, montrant que ce pouvoir dont l’expression parle fait référence à la source d’où provient toute perfection et actualité, l’esse ut actus essendi. De son côté, le dominicain canadien Lawrence (...) Dewan, particulièrement intéressé à montrer que cette « virtus » est partagée par les deux co-principes de l’étant, à savoir, la forme et l’être, considère au contraire que la doctrine thomiste de la « virtus essendi » développe plutôt le thème que la forme est le principe de l’être (principium essendi). Face à ces deux lectures contraires, dans cet article nous proposons d’en faire une analyse systématique et de proposer une possible piste d’investigation qui éclaire le sens de ce que Thomas d’Aquin comprend par l’expression « virtus essendi ». (shrink)

El objetivo fundamental del presente artículo es la configuración de una constelación de ficciones delirantes en la literatura latinoamericana contemporánea, a partir de la conceptualización del delirio literario y el análisis del proceso de construcción del relato delirante. Dado que, algunos narradores latinoamericanos despliegan ficciones delirantes en nuestros días, y existe un amplio número de casos, en donde el delirio se evidencia en la literatura de nuestro continente, autores como: Mario Bellatin, Roberto Bolaño, Rita Indiana Hernández, Horacio Castellanos Moya, Cristina (...) Rivera Garza, entre otros. Por consiguiente, se centrará la atención en la creación de una base crítica para la interpretación del delirio de algunos personajes de la literatura latinoamericana contemporánea, como un constructo cultural que transgrede el orden social, y es asumido como resistencia y articulación de una praxis creativa. (shrink)

The relationship between ethics and performance has previously been addressed in the literature, although there are still some gaps, for example, the relationship of ethical ideologies to student performance. This work aims to contribute to the literature with a statistical evaluation using partial least squares path modelling (PLS-PM) regarding whether university students’ ethical ideologies and moral meaningfulness influence their level of student performance and academic achievement. Results indicate that the ideologies of justice and deontology increase moral meaningfulness, moral meaningfulness in (...) turn increase student’s citizenship behaviours and student’s in-role performance, and finally, student’s in-role performance positively influences academic achievement. This research provides resources applicable to the fields of pedagogy and ethics to encourage performance during the study and highlight the value of the ideologies of justice and deontology. (shrink)

For one of the current scholars of Thomism, Serge T. Bonino, research on Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy of being has polarized into two tendencies, the axis of which is the Dominican Thomistic school. One of them is represented by the harsh criticisms that the French medievalist Étienne Gilson made of the positions of this school. The second, on the other hand, is characterized by a staunch defense of the theses of the main commentators of this school. During the 20th century, one (...) of Gilson’s students, the Canadian Lawrence Dewan, openly opposed Gilsonian Thomism on the basis of the traditional interpretation. Today, some of his students consider this Dewanian proposal as a “nouvelle métaphysique thomiste,” assuming that it is a movement that brings a genuine renewal. In this article we will show that this movement, although it claims to be a novelty, is nothing more than the revitalization of the formalist theses of the Dominican school, and therefore cannot be considered a valid interpretation of Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

La filosofía del ser de Tomás de Aquino es en parte deudora de la ontología aristotélica. Étienne Gilson, reconocido por sus estudios sobre el esse tomasiano, habla de un nivel de la substancia en el Aquinate. Sin embargo, su original concepción del esse como acto del ente, llevó al medievalista francés a poner de relieve la doble composición que integra el ente bajo la primacía del esse. Lawrence Dewan, desde un tomismo más aristotélico, criticó a Gilson por concebir la esencia (...) como algo negativo. En nuestra investigación discutiremos sobre esta disputa con el fin de esclarecer cuál de los dos autores se acerca más a la enseñanza tomista. (shrink)

A common view about Moore’s Proof of an External World is that the argument fails because anyone who had doubts about its conclusion could not use the argument to rationally overcome those doubts. I agree that Moore’s Proof is—in that sense—dialectically ineffective at convincing an opponent or a doubter, but I defend that the argument (even when individuated taking into consideration the purpose of Moore’s arguing and, consequently, the preferred addressee of the Proof) does not fail. The key to my (...) defence is to conceive the Proof as addressed to subjects with a different epistemic condition. To sustain this view I formulate some hypothesis about the common general purpose of arguing and I defend that it can be fulfilled even when the addressee of an argument is not someone who disbelieves or doubts its conclusion. (shrink)

The expressivist account of knowledge attributions, while claiming that these attributions are nonfactual, also typically holds that they retain a factual component. This factual component involves the attribution of a belief. The aim of this work is to show that considerations analogous to those motivating an expressivist account of knowledge attributions can be applied to belief attributions. As a consequence, we claim that expressivists should not treat the so-called factual component as such. The phenomenon we focus on to claim that (...) belief attributions are non-factual is that of normative doxastic disagreement. We show through several examples that this kind of disagreement is analogous to that of the epistemic kind. The result will be a doxastic expressivism. Finally, we answer some objections that our doxastic expressivism could seem to face. (shrink)

Según Williamson, saber y creer son estados mentales, pero creer algo verdadero y creer justificadamente algo verdadero no lo son. Ese tratamiento discriminatorio es relevante para la epistemología de Williamson. Su principal tesis epistemológica negativa y su principal tesis epistemológica positiva están en peligro si su teoría metafísica sobre lo mental es incorrecta. Presento aquí un problema para dicha teoría: impone limitaciones implausibles a los posibles usos de conceptos y expresiones lingüísticas. Describiré algunas opciones que tendría Williamson para evitar el (...) problema; pero sostendré que acarrean cierta dosis de arbitrariedad. (shrink)

I present an epistemological puzzle about perceptual knowledge and its relation to the evaluation of probabilities. It involves cases, concerning a given subject S and a proposition P in a determinate context, where apparently: S has perceptual knowledge of P; the epistemic justification S has for believing Not-P is much greater than her epistemic justification for believing P. If those two theses were true, the following very plausible epistemological principle would fail: If S knows P, then the epistemic justification S (...) has for believing Not-P is not greater than her epistemic justification for believing P. I offer a solution to the puzzle, which is compatible with basic intuitions and theses of orthodox Bayesianism. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson has defended the claim that any philosophically satisfying conception of modality that encompasses possible worlds semantics (PWS) commits us to the Barcan Formula. His argument depends on the assumption that the domain of what there is (the domain of the actual world) has to be identified with the domain D(@), where @ is the index or possible world that in PWS represents , or stands for , the actual world. I work out an interpretation of the relation between (...) PWS and possible worlds terminology that makes it plausible to reject that assumption. (shrink)

E. Machery and some collaborators have used survey data to criticize Kripke’s anti-descriptivism about proper names. I highlight a number of drawbacks in the tests of Machery et al. Some of my objections concern their ambiguity. In particular, the responses that–according to them–reveal descriptivist intuitions can be interpreted as anti-descriptivist responses. Furthermore, their vignettes are inconsistent. I also discuss other issues related to the role of intuitions in philosophy; Machery et al.’s theses depends on an unjustified assumption: there is not (...) expertise regarding intuitions. (shrink)

Necessitism about individuals claims that necessarily every individual necessarily exists. An analogous necessitist thesis attributes necessary existence to properties and relations. Both theses have been defended by Williamson. Furthermore, Williamson specifically argues against the hybrid conjunction of first-order contingentism and higher-order necessitism; a combination that would bring about additional drawbacks. I work out a defence of the hybrid combination, including some replies to Williamson’s additional objections. Considerations of ontological parsimony and pre-theoretical intuitions favour the hybrid view over necessitism at all (...) orders. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWe discuss the thesis of universality of geometric notions and offer critical reflections on the concept of “natural geometry” employed by Spelke and others. Promoting interdisciplinary wor...

El objetivo del presente texto es realizar un acercamiento a las diferentes corrientes de pensamiento económico feminista en función de sus propuestas de redefinición del objeto de estudio de la economía; propuestas que pueden entenderse como intentos de deconstrucción de las dicotomías económico/no-económico, trabajo/no-trabajo propias de los marcos teóricos androcéntricos. Se identifican dos estrategias de deconstrucción, con diferentes implicaciones tanto para el ámbito de la teoría económica como para el del análisis empírico y la propuesta política. La primera de ellas (...) está basada en el descubrimiento y revalorización del “otro” económico, el trabajo doméstico. La segunda, en proporcionar un “término bisagra”, el de sostenibilidad de la vida, que permita trascender las dicotomías y a partir del cuál se revisan conceptos asociados, como el de trabajo. Finalmente, se argumentará que se está produciendo un desplazamiento teórico hacia esta última estrategia. (shrink)

En este artículo presento, clarifico y exploro algunas virtudes potenciales de una determinada teoría —de carácter intencionalista— sobre lo cómico. Su tesis mínima principal establece una condición necesaria para la comicidad: quien evalúaaprecia una situación como humorística/cómica reconoce un perjuicio o daño ocasionado a ciertos sujetos intencionales. Una versión más fuerte establece que la comicidad deriva de dicho perjuicio. El perjuicio es aquello que, cuando se combina con otros factores, encontramos humorístico/cómico. Clarificar la teoría conlleva una tarea de comparación con (...) otras concepciones del humor, en particular, con la teoría de la incongruencia. (shrink)

Williamson defiende la regla del conocimiento, RK, sobre las aseveraciones: debemos aseverar que p sólo si sabemos que p. En este trabajo exploro algunas consecuencias interesantes de RK: (a) en ocasiones, al hacer una aseveración correcta transmitimos (como implicatura) un significado no literal verdadero, que \sin embargo\ no podría ser correctamente aseverado; (b) ese tipo de implicatura se da, entre otros casos, en una cierta subclase de las implicaturas: las implicaturas argumentativas; (c) RK y la noción de implicatura argumentativa permiten (...) explicar la tendencia a tratar de forma equivalente diferentes tipos de argumentos antiescépticos inspirados en Moore.Williamson defends the knowledge rule, KR, about assertions: one must: assert p only if one knows p. In this work I explore some interesting consequences of KR: (a) sometimes, when making a correct assertion we transmit (as an implicature) a true non-literal meaning which \nevertheless\ could not be rightly asserted; (b) this kind of implicatures are present, for instance, in a certain subclass of implicatures: argumentative implicatures; (c) KR and the notion of argumentative implicature allow for an explanation of the tendency to treat different kinds of Moore-like antiskeptical arguments as if they were equivalent. (shrink)

Review of: José Ferreirós. 2016. Mathematical knowledge and the interplay of practices. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

The establishment of Mexico's National Bioethics Commission (Comisión Nacional de Bioética), in 1992, was conceived within the context of a global movement aimed at raising awareness of the ethical implications of technological and scientific development, especially in biomedicine. In 2005, a new decree put the commission under the scope of the Secretariat of Health and granted it technical and operational autonomy, allowing it to become a regulatory agency aimed at promoting a culture of bioethics, encouraging reflection on human health, and (...) developing guidelines for health care, research, and education, through a global, secular, and democratic perspective. The commission became the leading actor in the strategy for institutionalizing bioethics in Mexico after reforms to the country's General Health Act in 2011, which required that public, social assistance, or private health care facilities establish a hospital bioethics committee to address bioethical dilemmas or issues and, when relevant, a research ethics committee to address research with human subjects. This assignment has shifted the focus of the activities and goals of the National Bioethics Commission toward establishing these committees in line with current regulations and developing mechanisms to ensure that they operate with the highest standards of ethical conduct, performance, and accountability. (shrink)

Empiricist philosophers like Carnap invoked analyticity in order to explain a priori knowledge and necessary truth. Analyticity was “truth purely in virtue of meaning”. The view had a deflationary motivation: in Carnap’s proposal, linguistic conventions alone determine the truth of analytic sentences, and thus there is no mystery in our knowing their truth a priori, or in their necessary truth; for they are, as it were, truths of our own making. Let us call this “Carnapian conventionalism”, conventionalismC and cognates for (...) short. This conventionalistC explication of the a priori has been the target of sound criticisms. Arguments like Quine’s in “Truth by Convention” are in our view decisive: the truth of conventionalismC requires that the class of logical truths and logical validities be reductively accounted for as conventionally established; however, no such reduction is forthcoming, because logic is needed to generate the entire class from any given set of conventions properly so-called. Granted that conventionalismC is untenable, we want to take issue with a different, usually made criticism. Although the argument uncovers some difficulties for the way conventionalist claims are defended by some of its advocates, we will try to show that it fails. The criticism thus stands in the way of a proper appreciation of why the Carnapian account of the a priori is not correct. We will try to illustrate this by showing that the criticism we will dispute would dispose of conventionalist claims not only regarding philosophically problematic cases – logical and mathematical truths –, but also regarding cases for which they have some prima facie plausibility. One such case is that of truths that follow from mere abbreviations, “nominal” definitions; ‘someone is a bachelor if and only if he is an unmarried adult male’ can serve at this point for illustration. We will try to articulate a clear sense in which the contents of assertion such as this can be truths by convention. We do not need to prove that a conventionalist claim is true in those cases; it is enough for us to show that it is intelligible, for the arguments we will confront question even this. (shrink)

Tanto la Fórmula Barcan como la postulación de possibilia contradicen los juicios intuitivos preteóricos de la mayoría de los sujetos, favorables al actualismo sobre la naturaleza de los mundos posibles. En este artículo discuto y rechazo dos argumentos que pretenderían contrarrestar tales juicios, y que conciben erróneamente la relación entre la semántica de mundos posibles y nuestros lenguajes naturales modales. El argumento más importante asume que el dominio de todas las entidades es idéntico al dominio de @. Desarrollo una interpretación (...) de la SMP conforme a la cual esa tesis no está suficientemente justificada. /// Barcan Formula and the postulation of possibilia contradict the pretheoretical intuitive judgments of most people, which favour actualism about possible worlds. In this paper I discuss and reject two arguments against such judgments, both of which conceive wrongly the relation between possible worlds semantics and modal natural languages. The more important argument assumes that the domain of the actual world is identical to the domain of @. I develop an interpretation of PWS which elucidates why that thesis is unwarranted. (shrink)

Kripke formula cuatro objeciones en contra de una solución disposicionalista simple al enigma wittgensteiniano sobre seguir una regla. En este trabajo presento dos propuestas parcialmente disposicionalistas diferentes a la teoría disposicionalista simple que Kripke discute y defiendo que aquellas cuatro objeciones no les afectan. Una de esas dos propuestas puede atribuirse, con cierta precaución, al propio Wittgenstein. La otra, que me parece preferible, invoca una noción teleológica de disposición. Ambas propuestas apelan al concepto de simplicidad, o —alternativamente— al concepto de (...) similitud natural. Rechazo también ciertas críticas que Kripke hace del uso de tales conceptos para solucionar el enigma sobre seguir una regla. (shrink)

This paper critically analyzes the deconstructive tendency that some authors have shown against the so-called Metaphysics of Exodus, promoted by philosophers such as Étienne Gilson. The most original notion in Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy is that being (esse) is said to derive not from the Bible as Gilson claims, but from Neoplatonic sources of pagan ambience, such as the author of the De causis (Proclus) or the Dionysius Areopagite. We carry out an analysis of the status quaestionis by showing, contrary to (...) the critics of the ‘Metaphysics of Exodus,’ that this deconstructive tendency is unfounded and untenable. (shrink)

En este artículo discuto el supuesto compromiso de la lógica modal cuantificada con el esencialismo. Entre otros argumentos, Quine, el más emblemático de los críticos de la modalidad, ha objetado a la lógica modal cuantificada que ésta se compromete con una doctrina filosófica usualmente considerada sospechosa, el esencialismo: la concepción que distingue, de entre los atributos de una cosa, aquellos que le son esenciales de otros poseidos sólo contingentemente. Examino en qué medida Quine puede tener razón sobre ese punto explorando (...) una analogía entre la lógica modal y la logica clásica de primer orden. Con ello se pretende proporcionar una visión clarificadora sobre el estatus de la lógica modal y su relación con la lógica en general.In this paper I discuss the alleged commitment of quantified modal logic to philosophical essentialism. Besides some other more or less related arguments against quantified modal logic, Quine (its more prominent critic) objects to it by claiming its commitment to a philosophical doctrine usually regarded as suspicious, essentialism: the view that some of the attributes of a thing are essential to it, and others are accidental. I study to what extent Quine can be right about this specific issue. I defend some of his views by exploring an analogy between modal logic and standard first order logic. That serves to get a better understanding of the status of modal logic and its relation with logic in general. (shrink)

En este artículo discuto el supuesto compromiso de la lógica modal cuantificada con el esencialismo. Entre otros argumentos, Quine, el más emblemático de los críticos de la modalidad, ha objetado a la lógica modal cuantificada que ésta se compromete con una doctrina filosófica usualmente considerada sospechosa, el esencialismo: la concepción que distingue, de entre los atributos de una cosa, aquellos que le son esenciales de otros poseidos sólo contingentemente. Examino en qué medida Quine puede tener razón sobre ese punto explorando (...) una analogía entre la lógica modal y la logica clásica de primer orden. Con ello se pretende proporcionar una visión clarificadora sobre el estatus de la lógica modal y su relación con la lógica en general.In this paper I discuss the alleged commitment of quantified modal logic to philosophical essentialism. Besides some other more or less related arguments against quantified modal logic, Quine objects to it by claiming its commitment to a philosophical doctrine usually regarded as suspicious, essentialism: the view that some of the attributes of a thing are essential to it, and others are accidental. I study to what extent Quine can be right about this specific issue. I defend some of his views by exploring an analogy between modal logic and standard first order logic. That serves to get a better understanding of the status of modal logic and its relation with logic in general. (shrink)