En este artículo se recorren las principales tendencias que la teología ha desarrollado en la reflexión sobre Dios. Sobre todo se presta atención a la crítica de Heidegger a la ontoteología, la cuestión del mal, de la relación con la ciencia, el encuentro con las otras religiones y el desarrollo de la teología trinitaria. El recorrido deja ver las líneas de fuerza y también se plantean algunas cuestiones críticas. This article shows the main tendencies theology has developed about God, paying (...) special attention to Heidegger’s criticism on ontotheology, problem of evil, relation with science, meeting with other religions and development of Trinitarian theology. Strong lines can be seen in this review and critical questions are asked. (shrink)

En este artículo se recorren las principales tendencias que la teología ha desarrollado en la reflexión sobre Dios. Sobre todo se presta atención a la crítica de Heidegger a la ontoteología, la cuestión del mal, de la relación con la ciencia, el encuentro con las otras religiones y el desarrollo de la teología trinitaria. El recorrido deja ver las líneas de fuerza y también se plantean algunas cuestiones críticas. This article shows the main tendencies theology has developed about God, paying (...) special attention to Heidegger’s criticism on ontotheology, problem of evil, relation with science, meeting with other religions and development of Trinitarian theology. Strong lines can be seen in this review and critical questions are asked. (shrink)

En este trabajo se recorre las relaciones entre la fe y la razón en la modernidad. Constatando el conflicto inicial el autor recuerda el reconocimiento que la fe y la teología han tenido siempre hacia la razón, pero también apunta a las dificultades que tenía la reflexión teológica para hacerse entender por el pensamiento ilustrado. La crisis actual del pensamiento ilustrado, que es sobre todo una crisis moral, apunta a unas nuevas relaciones entre fe y razón. Así lo apunta el (...) papa actual y algunos pensadores contemporáneos como Habermas. En una segunda parte del trabajo se presentan a la fe y a la razón como dos dimensiones de la persona humana, que se implican mutuamente, y están llamadas a cooperar en la elaboración de un nuevo humanismo. (shrink)

I offer here a critical assessment of Beall and Ficara’s most recent take on Hegelian contradictions. By interpreting differently some key passages of Hegel’s work, I favor, unlike them, a no-gaps approach which leads to a different logic.

Seen from the point of view of evaluation conditions, a usual way to obtain a connexive logic is to take a well-known negation, for example, Boolean negation or de Morgan negation, and then assign special properties to the conditional to validate Aristotle’s and Boethius’ Theses. Nonetheless, another theoretical possibility is to have the extensional or the material conditional and then assign special properties to the negation to validate the theses. In this paper we examine that possibility, not sufficiently explored in (...) the connexive literature yet.We offer a characterization of connexive negation disentangled from the cancellation account of negation, a previous attempt to define connexivity on top of a distinctive negation. We also discuss an ancient view on connexive logics, according to which a valid implication is one where the negation of the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent, and discuss the role of our idea of connexive negation for this kind of view. (shrink)

A dimensional reduction algorithm is applied to an intelligent classification model with the purpose of improving the efficiency and accuracy. The proposed classification model, used to distinguish the operating mode: Hard- and Soft-Switching, is presented and an analysis of the synchronized rectified step-down converter is done. With the aim of improving the accuracy and reducing the computational cost of the model, three different methods for dimensional reduction are applied to the input dataset of the model: self-organizing maps, principal component analysis (...) and correlation matrix. The obtained results show how the number of variable is highly reduced and the performance of the classification model is boosted: the results manifest an improve in the accuracy and efficiency of the classification. (shrink)

To most of us – believers and non-believers alike – the possibility of a perfect God co-existing with the kinds of evil that we see calls out for explanation. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the belief that God must have justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see has been a perennial feature of theistic thought. Recently, however, a growing number of authors have argued that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with the existence of gratuitous (...) evil. Given powerful, millenia-long sensibilities about power and love and justice, it isn’t hard to find that suggestion simply incredible. Nonetheless, in this paper I will argue that the most prominent theistic alternatives to what has seemed incredible to most of us throughout most of history are themselves patently unacceptable for the theist as well. On any of the most widely accepted accounts of how God could have justifying reasons for permitting some evils, God’s existence means that we have justifying reasons for perpetrating and allowing every evil that we see. That's hard to swallow too. If I’m right about all of this, then two competing outcomes seem to present themselves as a possible result. On the one hand, for the theist, the apparently outrageous suggestion that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with gratuitous evil no longer looks like it faces a formidable, hard-to-resist alternative. On the other hand, some like me might think that my arguments go no distance at all towards dispelling the incredibility of the gratuitous evil nouvelle vague. On this line, theism may seem now to be between the rock and the hard place: it seems hard to make sense of the existence of a perfect God whether or not He has justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see. (shrink)

Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.

This article aims to revisit the second essay of Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, in order to show some aesthetic-theoretical assumptions present in his genealogical investigation on memory and suffering. Central to the purposes of this analysis is Homer’s role, more precisely, the artistic strategies and procedures of his poetics.

Cognitive Science, Volume 45, Issue 11, November 2021.

Sustainable development is often framed as a social issue to which corporations should pay attention because it offers both opportunities and challenges. Through the use of institutional theory and the resource-based view of the firm, we shed some light on why, more than 20 years after sustainable development was first introduced, we see neither the adoption of this business model as dominant nor its converse, that is the total abandonment of the model as unworkable and unprofitable. We focus on multinational (...) corporations (MNCs) because they were among the organizations first called to take action. In order to illustrate the institutional pressures MNCs face and their strategic response to these pressures, we analysed four major oil and gas multinationals subject to similar sustainable development pressures – climate change, biodiversity, renewable energy development and social investment. We argue that normative and coercive isomorphism does not occur at the global level because sustainable development is largely a stakeholder-driven rather than a broad social pressure. That is, host country interpretation of sustainable development pressures varies across an MNC’s subsidiary network. Based on the analysis of the four major MNCs’ annual reports from 2000 to 2005, we argue that mimetic isomorphism may occur, but since it implies the use of complex and intangible resources, mimetic processes are slow, rare and discretionary. (shrink)

There seem to be good reasons to think that there must be body representations or some kind of body content required for riding a bike or grabbing a cup of coffee. However, when I ride a bike or grab a cup of coffee, am I just representing the bike and the cup? Or am I actually also representing my body and bodily movements? The thesis of this paper is that the body not only figures in the content that guides everyday (...) activities but that it must. How is this possible? Exactly what elements of the subject’s body can be said to figure in this content? I will proceed in three steps: in the first, I bring together the conceptual resources that seem to be required; in the second, I discuss a couple of proposals about how to link the notion of affordance and the topic of bodily representations, arguing that they are misguided; finally, I propose a view according to which the body’s physical and spatial properties are an unavoidable part of the content that guides everyday activities. (shrink)

Aesthetic subjectivism takes the truth of aesthetic judgments to be relative to the individual making that judgment. Despite widespread suspicion, however, this does not mean that one cannot be wrong about such judgments. Accordingly, this does not mean that one cannot gain higher-order evidence of error and fallibility that bears on the rationality of the aesthetic judgment in question. In this paper, we explain and explore these issues in some detail.

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again to (...) argue that Hilary Kornblith’s criticism of Richard Feldman’s defense of is incomplete. Finally, I argue that Feldman’s defense is insensitive to the relation between normative requirements and privileged values: values that have normative authority over us. (shrink)

Recent investigations surprisingly indicate that single RNA "stem-loops" operate solely by chemical laws that act without selective forces, and in contrast, self-ligated consortia of RNA stem-loops operate by biological selection. To understand consortial RNA selection, the concept of single quasi-species and its mutant spectra as drivers of RNA variation and evolution is rethought here. Instead, we evaluate the current RNA world scenario in which consortia of cooperating RNA stem-loops are the basic players. We thus redefine quasispecies as RNA quasispecies consortia (...) and argue that it has essential behavioral motifs that are relevant to the inherent variation, evolution and diversity in biology. We propose that qs-c is an especially innovative force. We apply qs-c thinking to RNA stem-loops and evaluate how it yields altered bulges and loops in the stem-loop regions, not as errors, but as a natural capability to generate diversity. This basic competence-not error-opens a variety of combinatorial possibilities which may alter and create new biological interactions, identities and newly emerged self identity functions. Thus RNA stem-loops typically operate as cooperative modules, like members of social groups. From such qs-c of stem-loop groups we can trace a variety of RNA secondary structures such as ribozymes, viroids, viruses, mobile genetic elements as abundant infection derived agents that provide the stem-loop societies of small and long non-coding RNAs. (shrink)

James Sterba has recently argued that the free will defense fails to explain the compossibility of a perfect God and the amount and degree of moral evil that we see. I think he is mistaken about this. I thus find myself in the awkward and unexpected position, as a non-theist myself, of defending the free will defense. In this paper, I will try to show that once we take care to focus on what the free will defense is trying to (...) accomplish, and by what means it tries to do so, we will see that Sterba’s criticism of it misses the mark. (shrink)

Embodied cognition is a well-established and increasingly influential branch of the cognitive, neural, and psychological sciences. Unlike embodied cognition, extended cognition is not as well-established or influential. Our goal is to defend the idea that if cognition is truly embodied, then it is embodied in systems, and if it is embodied in systems, then it extends beyond animal boundaries. In order to demonstrate this, we situate the idea of extended cognitive systems in a historical context. Then, we present a theoretical (...) and methodological framework for investigating extended cognitive systems. Finally, we discuss some potential experimental work that could adjudicate the existence of extended cognitive systems. (shrink)

This is not a guide for your writing process. You should write in whatever way expressing and making sense of your ideas feels most natural and most productive to you. This is a guide for organizing your ideas, after you have captured some of them in fits and starts of prose, into a particular kind of final product: the basic philosophy paper.