"Law week soccer competition: 16-19 May 2005." Ethos: Official Publication of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory, (198), pp. 25.

Is it right to convict a person of a crime on the basis of purely statistical evidence? Many who have considered this question agree that it is not, posing a direct challenge to legal probabilism – the claim that the criminal standard of proof should be understood in terms of a high probability threshold. Some defenders of legal probabilism have, however, held their ground: Schoeman (1987) argues that there are no clear epistemic or moral problems with convictions based on purely (...) statistical evidence, and speculates that our aversion to such convictions may be nothing more than an irrational bias. More recently, Hedden and Colyvan (2019, section VI) describe our reluctance to convict on the basis of purely statistical evidence as an ‘intuition’, but suggest that there may be no ‘in principle’ problem with such convictions (see also Papineau, forthcoming, section 6). In this paper, I argue that there is, in some cases, an in principle problem with a conviction based upon statistical evidence alone – namely, it commits us to a precedent which, if consistently followed through, could lead to the deliberate conviction of an innocent person. I conclude with some reflections on the idea that the criminal justice system should strive to maximise the accuracy of its verdicts – and the related idea that we should each strive to maximise the accuracy of our beliefs. (shrink)

In Wilmot-Smith’s recent ‘Law, “Ought”, and “Can”,’ he argues that legal obligation does not imply ability. In this short reply, I show that Wilmot-Smith’s arguments do not withstand critical scrutiny. In section 1, I attack Wilmot-Smith’s argument for the claim that allowing for impossible obligations makes for a better legal system, and I introduce positive grounds for thinking otherwise. In section 2, I show that, even if Wilmot-Smith had established that impossible obligations make for a better legal system, his subsequent (...) attack on OIC fails. (shrink)

BackgroundThe nursing profession requires ethical and legal regulations to guide nurses’ performance. Ethical climate plays a part in shaping nurses’ ethical practice. Therefore, ethico-legal aspects and ethical climate contribute to improving nurses’ ethical practice and competencies with reducing medical errors in hospital settings.ObjectiveThis study examined the effect of ethico-legal aspects and ethical climate on managing safe patient care and medical errors among nurses.Materials and methodsA cross-sectional correlational study was carried out on 548 nurses. Data were collected through self-administered questionnaires about (...) nurses’ knowledge in both ethical and legal aspects, ethical practice, competencies, ethical climate and experience with medical error.ResultsThe main sources of nurses’ knowledge of ethical and legal aspects were undergraduate lectures, job experience and colleagues. Nurses’ knowledge in both ethical and legal aspects, nurses’ ethical practice and competencies were insufficient. Nurses fairly perceived their ethical climate. Also, nurses experienced medical errors about 22.6% in their units. Nurses’ knowledge of ethical and legal aspects, as well as the ethical climate were positive predictors of inadequate nurses’ ethical practice and competencies. Additionally, nurses’ knowledge in both ethical and legal aspects, ethical climate and practice had a negative influence on the occurrence of medical errors.ConclusionEnhancing nurses’ knowledge in both ethical and legal aspects as well as ethical climate could significantly influence improving nurses’ ethical practice, competencies and reducing medical errors in the study units. Therefore, planning for enhancing the nurses’ ethico-legal learning and ethical climate seems to be mandatory. (shrink)

Introduction -- Defamation Criteria: Fact or Value? -- The Elusive Distinction between Fact and Opinion -- Defamation and Freedom of Expression -- Conclusion -- 10 Conclusion: A Unifying Prescription -- Introduction -- Socialist Positivism -- Critical Legal Positivism -- Feminist Positivism -- Alternative Dispute Resolution -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.

I propose a new formalist account of legal (/proximate) causation – one that holds legal causation to be a matter of amoral, descriptive fact. The account starts with a metaphysical relation, akin to but distinct from common-sense causation, and it argues that legal causation aligns exactly with that relation; it is unified and principled.

A world of legal conflicts -- The limits of sovereigntist territoriality -- From universalism to cosmopolitanism -- Towards a cosmopolitan pluralist jurisprudence -- Procedural mechanisms, institutional designs, and discursive practices for managing pluralism -- The changing terrain of jurisdiction -- A cosmopolitan pluralist approach to choice of law -- Recognition of judgments and the legal negotiation of difference.

In order to perform certain actions – such as incarcerating a person or revoking parental rights – the state must establish certain facts to a particular standard of proof. These standards – such as preponderance of evidence and beyond reasonable doubt – are often interpreted as likelihoods or epistemic confidences. Many theorists construe them numerically; beyond reasonable doubt, for example, is often construed as 90 to 95% confidence in the guilt of the defendant. -/- A family of influential cases suggests (...) standards of proof should not be interpreted numerically. These ‘proof paradoxes’ illustrate that purely statistical evidence can warrant high credence in a disputed fact without satisfying the relevant legal standard. In this essay I evaluate three influential attempts to explain why merely statistical evidence cannot satisfy legal standards. (shrink)

The concept of legal gap is tackled from a number of logical perspectives and semantic methods. After presenting our own goal (Section 1), a first introduction into legal logic refers to Bobbio’s works and his formalization of legal statements (Sections 2 and 3). Then Woleński’s contribution to the area is taken into account through his reference to the distinction between two juridical systems (viz. Common Law vs Civil Law) and the notion of conditional norms (Section 4). The notion of reason (...) is also highlighted in the case of Raz’s legal logic, thereby leading to a future connection with von Wright’s logic of truth and an analogy made with an anti-realist reading of truth-values and norms (Section 5). Our personal contribution is introduced through a reflection on how logic should deal with the logical form of norms (Section 6), before entering a number of crucial definitions and distinctions for the concepts of norm, legal statement, and promulgation (Section 7). The final point is a proposed semantics for legal statements, which is both many-valued and gap-friendly (Section 8). A distinction between a number of requirements for permission and forbiddance leads to a set of non-classical juridical systems in which non-permission and forbiddance are not equivalent with each other any more; this does justice to Woleński’s former distinction between Common Law and Civil Law, also leading ultimately to a non-classical square of legal oppositions in which several legal operators may collapse into other ones (Section 9). (shrink)

Tom Campbell is well known for his distinctive contributions to legal and political philosophy over three decades. In emphasising the moral and political importance of taking a positivist approach to law and rights, he has challenged current academic orthodoxies and made a powerful case for regaining and retaining democratic control over the content and development of human rights. This collection of his essays reaches back to his pioneering work on socialist rights in the 1980s and forward from his seminal book, (...) The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism (1996). An introductory essay provides an historical overview of Professor Campbell's work and argues for the continuing importance of 'democratic positivism' at a time when it is again becoming clear that courts are ineffective protectors of human rights. (shrink)

The paper purports to provide an analytical treatment of the truth and legal interpretation issue. In the first part, it lays down a conceptual apparatus meant to capture the main aspects of the legal interpretation phenomenon, with particular attention paid to the several kinds of linguistic outputs resulting from interpretive activities. In the second part, it recalls three different notions of truth, focussing, so far as systemic truth is concerned, on the difference between deductive and rhetorical normative systems. In the (...) third, and last, part, it shows in which ways the phenomenon of legal interpretation encompasses truth-apt entities, leaving the choice between austere and liberal alethic pluralism to the reader. A few, final remarks address the formalism/scepticism problem. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Jurisprudence: Method and Subject Matter Legality and Authority Positivism: Austin vs. Hart The Authority of Law Judicial Discretion Incorporationism and Legality Raz' s Theory of Authority Incorporationism and Authority Conclusion Postscript References.

This paper investigates the basis arguments of so-called legal logic and their relation to logic in its standard meaning. There is no doubt that legal arguments belong to logic in the wide sense (sensu largo), but their reduction to schemes of formal logic (logica sensu stricto) is a controversial issue. It can be demonstrated that only some legal arguments fall under explicit rules of formal logic, that is, having a deductive character. Most such reasoning is fallible, and its correctness depends (...) on appealing to extra-logical principles taken from legal norms. For instance, if we say, “If it is permitted more, then it is permitted less” (argumentum a maiori ad minus), we assume that the concepts expressed by the words “more” and “less” are already defined. (shrink)

An annotated bibliography of legal epistemology.

Approaches to legal pluralism vary widely across the spectrum of different disciplines. They comprise normative and descriptive perspectives, focus both on legal pluralist realities as well as public debates, and address legal pluralism in a range of different societies with varying political, institutional and historical conditions. Emphasising an empirical research to contemporary legal pluralist settings in Muslim contexts, the present collected volume contributes to a deepened understanding of legal pluralist issues and realities through comparative examination. This approach reveals some common (...) features, such as the relevance of Islamic law in power struggles and in the construction of (state or national) identities, strategies of coping with coexisting sets of legal norms by the respective agents, or public debates about the risks induced by the recognition of religious institutions in migrant societies. At the same time, the studies contained in this volume reveal that legal pluralist settings often reflect very specific historical and social constellations, which demands caution towards any generalisation. The volume is based on papers presented at a conference in Münster (Germany) in 2016 and comprises contributions by Judith Koschorke, Karen Meeschaut, Yvonne Prief, Ulrike Qubaja, Werner de Saeger, Ido Shahar, Katrin Seidel, Konstantinos Tsitselikis, Vishal Vora and Ihsan Yilmaz. (shrink)

Law is the main regulator of public relations, and the question of the proper use and understanding of legal language is essential for law enforcement. This topic is of interest to both lawyers and philosophers, who often join efforts to study it. This article attempts precisely to take such an interdisciplinary approach when examining legal rules as specific linguistic conventions. First of all, for the sake of a better and more thorough understanding of legal language, legal norms are viewed both (...) from the point of view of semantics and from the point of view of pragmatics. Therefore, for this purpose, a distinction is made between legal norms and legal provisions as their linguistic equivalent. Legal norms are then explored through Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy, which describes their semantic content. The pragmatic aspect of the question is explained through John Austin's theory, thus treating legal rules as a kind of specific speech act of a conventional nature. (shrink)

Legal positivists maintain that the legality of a rule is fundamentally determined by social facts. Yet for much of legal history, ordinary officials used legal terminology in ways that seem inconsistent with positivism. Judges regularly cited, analyzed, and predicated their decisions on the ‘laws of justice’ which they claimed had universal legal import. This practice, though well-documented by historians, has received surprisingly little philosophical attention; I argue that it invites explanation from positivists. After taxonomizing the positivist’s explanatory options, I (...) suggest that the most viable option appeals to conceptual change: classical Romans, early modern Europeans, founding-era Americans were not using ‘law’ (or ‘lex’ or ‘jus’) to refer to the subject matter of contemporary legal philosophy. But the strategy is costly. It renders positivism’s truth surprisingly parochial. And it supplies new reasons for doubting positivist accounts of contemporary practices, including the treatment of moral principles in modern adjudication. (shrink)

What is law (and why should we care)? -- Crazy little thing called "law" -- Austin's sanction theory -- Hart and the rule of recognition -- How to do things with plans -- The making of a legal system -- What law is -- Legal reasoning and judicial decision making -- Hard cases -- Theoretical disagreements -- Dworkin and distrust -- The economy of trust -- The interpretation of plans -- The value of legality.

It is possible to write a Kelsenian ‘Legal-Philosophical Tractate’ – based on Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law – after the example of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The following main and sub-propositions analogous to the main and sub-propositions of the Tractatus are a proof thereof and give an initial impetus to it: “May others come and do it better”. Unlike Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, that ends with the famous proposition 7 that one should be silent about what cannot be spoken, a Kelsenian Tractate would (...) not end with an analogous main proposition, but with two sub-propositions that show the (relative) value of both ‘the speaking’ and ‘the silence’ of positive law. (shrink)

Demystifying Legal Reasoning defends the proposition that there are no special forms of reasoning peculiar to law. Legal decision makers engage in the same modes of reasoning that all actors use in deciding what to do: open-ended moral reasoning, empirical reasoning, and deduction from authoritative rules. This book addresses common law reasoning when prior judicial decisions determine the law, and interpretation of texts. In both areas, the popular view that legal decision makers practise special forms of reasoning is false.

Legal Judgment Summarization (LJS) can highly summarize legal judgment documents, improving judicial work efficiency in case retrieval and other occasions. Legal judgment documents are usually lengthy; however, most existing LJS methods are directly based on general text summarization models, which cannot handle long texts effectively. Additionally, due to the complex structural characteristics of legal judgment documents, some information may be lost by applying only one single kind of summarization model. To address these issues, we propose an integrated summarization method which (...) leverages both semantic and structural information to improve the quality of LJS. Specifically, legal judgment documents are firstly segmented into three relatively short parts according to their specific structure. We propose an extractive summarization model named BSLT and an abstractive summarization model named LPGN by adopting Lawformer as the encoder. Lawformer is a new pre-trained language model for long legal documents, which specializes in capturing long-distance dependency and modeling legal semantic features. Then, we adopt different models to summarize the corresponding part regarding its structural characteristics. Finally, the obtained summaries are integrated to generate a high-quality summary involving semantic and structural information. We conduct comparative experiments to evaluate the performance of our model. The results show that our model outperforms the baseline model LEAD-3 by 14.78% on the mean ROUGE score, which demonstrates our method is effective in LJS and is prospected to be applied to assist other tasks in legal artificial intelligence. (shrink)

Legal structures may form barriers to, or enablers of, adoption of precision agriculture management with small autonomous agricultural robots. This article develops a conceptual regulatory framework for small autonomous agricultural robots, from a practical, self-contained engineering guide perspective, sufficient to get working research and commercial agricultural roboticists quickly and easily up and running within the law. The article examines the liability framework, or rather lack of it, for agricultural robotics in EU, and their transpositions to UK law, as a case (...) study illustrating general international legal concepts and issues. It examines how the law may provide mitigating effects on the liability regime, and how contracts can be developed between agents within it to enable smooth operation. It covers other legal aspects of operation such as the use of shared communications resources and privacy in the reuse of robot-collected data. Where there are some grey areas in current law, it argues that new proposals could be developed to reform these to promote further innovation and investment in agricultural robots. (shrink)

In this book, William Brant inquires how violence is reduced. Social causes of violence are exposed. War, sexual domination, leadership, propagandizing and comedy are investigated. Legal systems are explored as reducers and implementers of violence and threats.

Prepare for practice with the essential text dedicated to Canadian legal and ethical issues! Focused solely on the ever-changing, and often complex health care landscape in Canada, Ethical & Legal Issues in Canadian Nursing 4th, Edition expertly covers the often intertwined ethical and legal issues that health care professionals face today. This fourth edition includes discussion points at the end of every chapter along with tables and illustrations to help you fully comprehend the material. Plus, the clear and straightforward writing (...) style presents information just as you will encounter it in your day-to-day practice, ensuring you're even more prepared to make an impact from the start! -- From the publisher. (shrink)

Scholarship in experimental jurisprudence has reported surprising findings about various concepts of legal significance: _acting intentionally_, _causation_, _consent_, _knowledge, recklessness_, _reasonableness,_ and _law_ itself. Often, these studies examine laypeople’s ordinary concepts and draw broader conclusions about legal experts’ concepts. This Article questions such inferences, from empirical findings about ordinary concepts to conclusions about the concepts of those with legal expertise. It presents a case study concerning what it means to act _intentionally._ An experiment examines intentionality judgments across four populations (N (...) = 774): laypeople, law students, non-law students, and United States judges. Legal training affected judgments in three ways that are consistent with the acquisition of a distinctive legal concept. This case study supports the Article’s broader claim: Laypeople’s ordinary concepts are not equivalent to experts’ legal concepts. The acquisition of legal concepts is an important form of legal expertise. (shrink)