Resumo: No capítulo 5 do Livro III De anima (430a10-19) Aristóteles distingue entre o νοῦς ποιητικός (nous poietikós), chamado pelos Latinos intellectus agens (intelecto agente), e νοῦς παθητικός (nous pathetikós), chamado pelos Latinos intellectus passivus, ou seja, intellectus possibilis (intelecto possível), termos técnicos e filosóficos mais comuns. O capítulo 5 é de grande importância não só para a filosofia antiga e para os comentadores das obras de Aristóteles, como os comentários de Teofrasto, de Alexander de Afrodisias, de Simplício e Themístius (...) entre outros, mas também para a filosofia do mundo árabe e da Europa latina. Sabe-se que Aristóteles não escreveu um tratado próprio sobre o intelecto, embora possam ser encontradas várias observações acerca do intelecto em suas obras. Os tratados do Intelecto começam com Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicena e sobretudo Averróis, e se refletem, num sentido crítico e afirmativo, (nos debates) dos tratados latinos, por exemplo, nos tratados de Alberto Magno, de Tomás de Aquino, de Sigério de Brabant entre outros. Este artigo apresenta observações preliminares e preparatórias ao projeto de traduções bilíngue (Latim-Português) dos tratados medievais sobre o intelecto ‘Teorias do Intelecto na Idade Média’ que está em desenvovlimento no Centro Internacional de Estudos Medievais da UFU. Palavras-chaves: Unidade do intelecto; Imaginação; Intencionalidade; Luz intelectual e cognição. Theories of the Intellect in the Latin Middle Ages. De anima III, cap. 5 of Aristotle and his Medieval Tradition Abstract: In the chapter 5 of the III. Book of De anima (430a10-19) Aristotle distinguishes between the νοῦς ποιητικός (nous poietikós) called by the Latins intellectus agens (agent intellect) and the νοῦς παθητικός (nous pathetikós) called by the Latins intellectus passivus, or intellectus possibilis (possible intellect), most common technical and philosophical terms. The chapter 5 is of great importance not only to ancient philosophy and to the commentators of Aristotle’s works such as the commentaries of Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, of Simplicius, and Themistius among others, but also to the philosophy of the Arabic World and the Latin Europe. One knows well that Aristotle does not have written a proper treatise on intellect; although there are several observations about the intellect in his works. Separate treatises begin with Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and especially Averroes, which Latin treatises as of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant among others reflect in a critical as well as an affirmative sense. This article can be read as preliminary and preparatory observations to a bilingual (Latin-Portuguese) translation project of treatises corresponding to ‘Theories of Intellect in the Middle Ages’ which is ongoing at the International Center for Medieval Studies at UFU. Key-words: Unity of the Intellect; Imagination; Intentionality; Intellectual Light; and Cognition. Theorien des Intellekts im Lateinischen Mittelalter. De anima III, 5 des Aristoteles und seine mittelalterliche Tradition Zusammenfassung: Im 5. Kapitel des III. Buchs von De anima (430a10-19) unterscheidet Aristoteles zwischen dem νοῦς ποιητικός (nous poietikós), von den Lateinern intellectus agens (tätiger Intellekt) genannt und dem νοῦς παθητικός (nous pathetikós), von den Lateinern intellectus passivus oder auch intellectus possibilis (möglicher Intellekt) genannt, gemeinhin bekannte technische und philosophische Begriffe. Dieses 5. Kapitel ist von grösster Bedeutung nicht nur für die antike Philosophie und die Kommentatoren der Werke des Aristoteles wie die Kommentare des Theophrastus, des Alexander von Aphrodisias, Simplicius und Themistius unter anderen, sondern auch für die Philosophie der arabischen Welt und des lateinischen Europas. Bekanntlich hat Aristoteles keinen eigenen Traktat über den Intellekt geschrieben, obgleich sich viele Beobachtungen zum Intellekt in seinem Werk antreffen. Selbständige Traktate über den Intellekt beginnen mit Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna und besonders Averroes, die sich in den lateinischen Traktaten, z.B. des Albertus Magnus, Thomas von Aquin, Siger von Brabant und anderen zustimmend wie kritisch widerspiegeln. Dieser Artikel kann als vorläufige und vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einem zweisprachigen (lateinisch-portugiesischen) Übersetzungsprojekt von Texten gelesen werden, welche „Theorien des Intellekts im Lateinischen Mittelalter“ betreffen. Dieses Projekt ist am Internationalen Zentrum für Mittelalterstudien der UFU in Arbeit genommen worden. Schlüsselwörter: Verstand; Vernunft; Intentionalität; Anschauung und Erkenntnis. Data de registro: 12/03/2020 Data de aceite: 21/10/2020. (shrink)

Was Interkulturelle Philosophie ist, und worin ihr besonderer Beitrag zur Philosophie im ganzen bestehen kann, das kann sich allein in konkreten Ausarbeitungen erweisen. Der vorliegende Band repräsentiert eine breitgefächerte Auswahl sowohl der unterschiedlichen Ansatzpunkte, von denen interkulturelles Philosophieren ausgeht, als auch der diversen Forschungsgebiete innerhalb der Philosophie, die durch interkulturelle Fragestellungen angesprochen sind. Die Vielfalt der historischen und systematischen Zugangsweisen reflektiert die Überzeugung, daß Interkulturelle Philosophie kein in sich geschlossenes Lehrgebäude ist und ein solches auch nicht werden kann, sondern interkulturelles (...) Philosophieren eine bestimmte Einstellung und eine Haltung darbietet, die auf der grundlegenden Annahme beruht, daß die letzte philosophische Einsicht, _die_ Wahrheit im Singular, von niemandem allein erlangt worden ist und auch nicht erlangt werden kann. (shrink)

Was Interkulturelle Philosophie ist, und worin ihr besonderer Beitrag zur Philosophie im ganzen bestehen kann, das kann sich allein in konkreten Ausarbeitungen erweisen. Der vorliegende Band repräsentiert eine breitgefächerte Auswahl sowohl der unterschiedlichen Ansatzpunkte, von denen interkulturelles Philosophieren ausgeht, als auch der diversen Forschungsgebiete innerhalb der Philosophie, die durch interkulturelle Fragestellungen angesprochen sind. Die Vielfalt der historischen und systematischen Zugangsweisen reflektiert die Überzeugung, daß Interkulturelle Philosophie kein in sich geschlossenes Lehrgebäude ist und ein solches auch nicht werden kann, sondern interkulturelles (...) Philosophieren eine bestimmte Einstellung und eine Haltung darbietet, die auf der grundlegenden Annahme beruht, daß die letzte philosophische Einsicht, _die_ Wahrheit im Singular, von niemandem allein erlangt worden ist und auch nicht erlangt werden kann. (shrink)

Regular musical activity as a complex multimodal lifestyle activity is proposed to be protective against age-related cognitive decline and Alzheimer’s disease. This cross-sectional study investigated the association and interplay between musical instrument playing during life, multi-domain cognitive abilities and brain morphology in older adults from the DZNE-Longitudinal Cognitive Impairment and Dementia Study study. Participants reporting having played a musical instrument across three life periods were compared to controls without a history of musical instrument playing, well-matched for reserve proxies of education, (...) intelligence, socioeconomic status and physical activity. Participants with musical activity outperformed controls in global cognition, working memory, executive functions, language, and visuospatial abilities, with no effects seen for learning and memory. The musically active group had greater gray matter volume in the somatosensory area, but did not differ from controls in higher-order frontal, temporal, or hippocampal volumes. However, the association between gray matter volume in distributed frontal-to-temporal regions and cognitive abilities was enhanced in participants with musical activity compared to controls. We show that playing a musical instrument during life relates to better late-life cognitive abilities and greater brain capacities in OA. Musical activity may serve as a multimodal enrichment strategy that could help preserve cognitive and brain health in late life. Longitudinal and interventional studies are needed to support this notion. (shrink)

Existing research on developing countries emphasizes the decisive power of teacher unions in education politics. Yet that power varies, and a full understanding of the roots of union power and the sources of cross-national variation requires deeper analysis of organizational dynamics within unions. This analysis supports four arguments. First, teachers have a range of advantages in overcoming obstacles to collective action. Second, unions are not all alike; they vary widely, from interest groups to powerful political machines. Third, the source of (...) this variation lies in factors that shift power within unions from members to leaders in political-machine unions. Fourth, analyzing the dimensions of variation helps explain the different outcomes of recent reforms to teacher careers in Latin America, especially in highlighting the staunch opposition from political-machine unions. (shrink)

Given the recent interest in the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness it is no wonder that many authors have once more started to speak of the need for pheno- menological considerations. Often however the term ‘phenomenology’ is being used simply as a synonym for ‘folk psychology', and in our article we argue that it would be far more fruitful to turn to the argumentation to be found within the continental tradition inaugurated by Husserl. In order to exemplify this claim, (...) we criticize Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory as well as Strawson's recent contribution in this journal, and argue that a phenomenological analysis of the nature of self-awareness can provide us with a more sophisticated and accurate model for understanding both phenomenal consciousness and the notion of self. (shrink)

This article examines the structure of self-consciousness in people with schizophrenia. The findings indicate that our self-experience is not neutral with respect to the metaphysical status of the self and that it is important to attend carefully to the experience of the subject in order to understand schizophrenia. The results also suggest that the variable disruptions in the sense of self-presence, first-person perspective, and the phenomenality of experience in schizophrenics directly affect the minimal self and it may also have implications (...) for the narrative self. (shrink)

We argue for teleology as a description of the way in which we ordinarily understand others’ intentional actions. Teleology starts from the close resemblance between the reasoning involved in understanding others’ actions and one’s own practical reasoning involved in deciding what to do. We carve out teleology’s distinctive features more sharply by comparing it to its three main competitors: theory theory, simulation theory, and rationality theory. The plausibility of teleology as our way of understanding others is underlined by developmental data (...) in its favour. (shrink)

We develop a criterion for telling when integrating two pieces of information, e.g. two pictures or statements requires an understanding of perspective. Problems that require such an understanding are perspective problems. With this criterion we can show that understanding false beliefs vis-à-vis reality pose a perspective problem, so does understanding spatial descriptions given from different viewing points (a classical example of what is commonly seen as a problem of perspective) and individuating objects with different sortals (naming objects). We use the (...) result that understanding false belief as well as alternative naming of objects are both perspective problems to explain the otherwise inexplicable developmental finding that children master these two tasks at about the same time, around the age of 4 years. (shrink)

In The Mind Doesn’t Work that Way, Jerry Fodor argues that mental representations have context sensitive features relevant to cognition, and that, therefore, the Classical Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) is mistaken. We call this the Globality Argument. This is an in principle argument against CTM. We argue that it is self-defeating. We consider an alternative argument constructed from materials in the discussion, which avoids the pitfalls of the official argument. We argue that it is also unsound and that, while (...) it is an empirical issue whether context sensitive features of mental representations are relevant to cognition, it is empirically implausible. (shrink)

In this response to Wiggins and Schwartz, Ratcliffe, and Stanghellini, we first wish to express our gratitude to Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology for providing us the space to clarify our views and to overcome certain misunderstandings. Ratcliffe notes that our critique is "harsh," whereas Wiggins and Schwartz lament the fact that the debate "has taken the form of sometimes acid formulations and rejoinders . . . that lack the tone of mutual appreciation" (2011, 31). We deplore the fact that this (...) exchange was at all necessary, and we share Wiggins and Schwartz's concerns. However, we need to recall here and emphasize that our article originated as a response. It originated as a response to an article that was .. (shrink)

Theories of mind draw on processes that represent mental states and their computational connections; simulation, in addition, draws on processes that replicate (Heal 1986 ) a sequence of mental states. Moreover, mental simulation can be triggered by input from imagination instead of real perceptions. To avoid confusion between mental states concerning reality and those created in simulation, imagined contents must be quarantined. Goldman bypasses this problem by giving pretend states a special role to play in simulation (Goldman 2006 ). We (...) argue that this path leads to the resurgence of the threat of collapse (Davies 1994 ), diluting the principled distinction between simulation and theory use. Exploration of a related method of real-mental states operating in a pretend mode leads to a factually untenable model. Our main goal here is to raise this problem as a challenge for Goldman’s reconfigured simulation theory. Only at the end we will briefly sketch a possible alternative way of quarantine that preserves the replicative element of simulation and avoids collapse. Figure 1 provides a guide to our argument. (shrink)