Gricean theories analyse meaning in terms of certain complex intentions on the part of the speaker—the intention to produce an effect on the addressee, and the intention to have that intention recognized by the addressee. By drawing an analogy with cases widely discussed in action theory, we propose a novel counterexample where the speaker lacks these intentions, but nonetheless means something, and successfully performs a speech act.

Intentionalism about demonstratives is the view that the referent of a demonstrative is determined solely by the speaker's intentions. Intentionalists can disagree about the nature of these intentions, but are united in rejecting the relevance of other factors, such as the speaker's gestures, her gaze, and any facts about the addressee or the audience. In this paper, I formulate a particular version of this view, and I defend it against six objections, old and new.

We review the hypothesis that the brain uses a generative model to explain the causes of sensory inputs, using prediction schemes that operate based upon assimilation of time-series sensory data. We put this hypothesis in the context of psychopathology, in particular, schizophrenia's positive symptoms. Building upon work of Helmholtz and upon theories in computational cognitive processing, we hypothesize that delusions in schizophrenia can be explained in terms of false inference. An impairment in inferring appropriate information from the sensory input reflects (...) upon the ability to assess the environment and predict outcomes. Although the inference mechanism likely involves both conscious and unconscious processes, we hypothesize that the trigger of delusions may lie within the unconscious neural pathways. A collection of computational predictive codes have been proposed for modeling perception. We discuss two examples, which may be eligible as substrates for intuitive coding. We argue that failure of the psychotic patient to choose the correct computational scheme, or the optimal range of parameters, may readily lead to an altered reconstruction of the object and false inference, feeding into the delusion mechanism. We finally propose using these models in conjunction with cognitive and imaging data, in order to obtain more testable predictions. (shrink)

Since Kaplan : 81–98, 1979) first provided a logic for context-sensitive expressions, it has been thought that the only way to construct a logic for indexicals is to restrict it to arguments which take place in a single context— that is, instantaneous arguments, uttered by a single speaker, in a single place, etc. In this paper, I propose a logic which does away with these restrictions, and thus places arguments where they belong, in real world conversations. The central innovation is (...) that validity depends not just on the sentences in the argument, but also on certain abstract relations between contexts. This enrichment of the notion of logical form leads to some seemingly counter-intuitive results: a sequence of sentences may make up a valid argument in one sequence of contexts, and an invalid one in another such sequence. I argue that this is an unavoidable result of context sensitivity in general, and of the nature of indexicals in particular, and that reflection on such examples will lead us to a better understanding of the idea of applying logic to context sensitive expressions, and thus to natural language in general. (shrink)

The classical rule of Repetition says that if you take any sentence as a premise, and repeat it as a conclusion, you have a valid argument. It's a very basic rule of logic, and many other rules depend on the guarantee that repeating a sentence, or really, any expression, guarantees sameness of referent, or semantic value. However, Repetition fails for token-reflexive expressions. In this paper, I offer three ways that one might replace Repetition, and still keep an interesting notion of (...) validity. Each is a fine way to go for certain purposes, but I argue that one in particular is to be preferred by the semanticist who thinks that there are token-reflexive expressions in natural languages. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a new way to distinguish between indexicals, like “I” and “today”, and demonstratives, like “she” and “this”. The main test case is the second person singular pronoun “you”. The tradition would generally count it as a demonstrative, because the speaker’s intentions play a role in providing it with a semantic value. I present cross-linguistic data and explanations offered of the data in typology and semantics to show that “you” belongs on the indexical side, and argue (...) that they can be generalized to a novel criterion for distinguishing between indexicals and demonstratives. The central theoretical claim is that the semantic values of indexicals are objects which play certain utterance-related roles, which are fixed independently of the words being used in the utterance. For instance, the speaker plays the speaker role whether or not she uses the word “I”, and the addressee plays that role whether or not the speaker uses the word “you”. Demonstratives, on the other hand, pick out objects that play no such role, and are instead helped by the speaker’s word-specific intentions. (shrink)

Synonymy, at its most basic, is sameness of meaning. A token-reflexive expression is an expression whose meaning assigns a referent to its tokens by relating each particular token of that particular expression to its referent. In doing so, the formulation of its meaning mentions the particular expression whose meaning it is. This seems to entail that no two token-reflexive expressions are synonymous, which would constitute a strong objection against token-reflexive semantics. In this paper, I propose and defend a notion of (...) synonymy for token-reflexive expressions that allows such expressions to be synonymous, while being a fairly conservative extension of the customary notion of synonymy. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the interactive effects of positive affect and perspective-taking on workplace incivility and family incivility, through moral disengagement. We draw from broaden-and-build and moral disengagement theories to suggest a potential negative consequence of positive affect. Specifically, we argue that positive affect increases incivility toward coworkers and spouses through moral disengagement among employees with low, but not high perspective-taking. Data from two time-lagged field studies and one online experiment provide support for our hypotheses. These findings suggest that (...) the beneficial effects of positive feelings are not universal, and the fostering of positive feelings at work might have unintended negative consequences, namely moral disengagement, and increased incivility at work and at home. Implications for theory and research are discussed. (shrink)

v. 1. Paradigma structural-generativă în ontologie.

This study aims to propose a rational reconstruction of the theory-core ofWittgenstein's Tractatus, in order to bring into prominence its theoreticaland philosophical sources, its epistemological nature and metaphysical significance.The main idea of my approach is that when we take due account of the scientific andphilosophical context of the Tractatus, we see that its central philosophicalinnovation is a new form of metaphysics, namely a structural theory of representation.``I am not interested in constructing a building,so much as in having a perspicuous view (...) of the foundation of possible buildings.''. (shrink)

The paper proposes a typology of the scientific theories based on the modality of mathematizing (relying on the kind of mathematics which participates to the theory edification and the level of mathematical organizing of the theoretical frame). This gives us, like the classification of the geometries from the famous -Erlagen Program- initiated by Felix Klein, an internal principle for the connection of the different forms or levels of the theorizing, a constructive basis for the understanding of the complex structural nets (...) of the mature scientific disciplines. (shrink)

À partir du moment où le chasseur-cueilleur préhistorique devenait agriculteur, une nouvelle société et une culture originale créées par et créatrices de l'organisation sociale de la production marquaient le début d'un monde inédit, le début de l'histoire.À partir du dix-neuvième siècle le déterminant historique du comportement et de l'évolution de l'homme, l'organisation sociale de la production, devenait, dans un intervalle extrêmement court, le subalterne d'un facteur décisif inhabituel, de l'organisation sociale de l'invention. Le monde généré par et générateur de toujours (...) autres inventions qui bouleversent à un rythme soutenu l'humanité et la nature est essentiellement différent du monde historique. C'est un monde posthistorique.Tout en se transformant sans cesse, la société et la culture posthistoriques ont poussé si loin la transformation de leur univers qu'on assiste déjà à l'implantation dans la nature terrestre de deux macro-créations artificielles: d'un nouveau règne, le règne technique, dû à l'invention physique, et d'une nouvelle forme de vie, la paravie, produite par l'invention biologique. Les menaces inquiétantes à l'adresse de l'homme et de la nature multipliées par ces deux systèmes insolites ont leur origine dans le caractère sauvage de l'actuelle organisation sociale de l'invention. (shrink)

Intentionalism is the view that a demonstrative refers to something partly in virtue of the speaker intending it to refer to that thing. In recent work, Una Stojnić has argued that the natural interpretation of demonstratives in some discourses is that they do not refer to the objects intended by the speaker, and instead refer to other things. In this paper, I defend intentionalism against this charge. In particular, I argue that the data presented by Stojnić can be explained from (...) an intentionalist point of view. The explanations take two forms: either the audience’s reaction to the discourse does not concern reference, or the natural interpretation is wrong. This latter claim has been defended by Stojnić in other work as applied to word identifi cation and is neutral between intentionalism and Stojnić’s objectivism. It is also very plausible. But it takes away the import of the argument from natural interpretation, at least in the form discussed here. (shrink)

This study aims to propose a rational reconstruction of the theory-core ofWittgenstein's Tractatus, in order to bring into prominence its theoreticaland philosophical sources, its epistemological nature and metaphysical significance.The main idea of my approach is that when we take due account of the scientific andphilosophical context of the Tractatus, we see that its central philosophicalinnovation is a new form of metaphysics, namely a structural theory of representation.``I am not interested in constructing a building,so much as in having a perspicuous view (...) of the foundation of possible buildings.''``Und nun sehen wir die gegenseitige Stellung von Logik und Mechanik.''. (shrink)

Normal 0 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-ansi-language:#0400; mso-fareast-language:#0400; mso-bidi-language:#0400;} Review of Sandu Frunză , God and the Holocaust in Elie Wiesel´s work. An ethics of responsibility (Dumnezeu și Holocaustul la Elie Wiesel. O etică a responsabilității), (Contemporanul Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010).

Review of Nicu Gavriluţă’s The Fools’ Mother is Always Pregnant. A Sociology of Everyday Pathologies. (Mama proştilor e mereu gravidă. Sociologia patologiilor cotidiene.) Foreword by Ştefan Afloroaei (Iaşi: European Institute, 2010).

One lists the distinct pairs of categorical premises formulable via only the positive terms, S,P,M, by constructing a six by six matrix obtained by pairing the six categorical P-premises, A, O, A, O, where P* ∈ {P,P′}, with the six, similar, categorical S-premises. One shows how five rules of valid syllogism, select only 15 distinct PCPs that entail logical consequences belonging to the set L+: = {A, O, A, E, O, I}. The choice of admissible LCs can be regarded as (...) a condition separated from the conditions contained in the RofVS: the usual eight PCPs that generate valid syllogisms are obtained when the only admissible LCs belong to the set L: = {A, E, O, I} and no existential imports are addressed. A 64 PCP-matrix obtains when both PCPs and LCs may contain indefinite terms—the positive, S,P,M, terms, and their complementary sets, S′,P′, M′, in the universe of discourse, U, called the negative terms. Now one can accept eight LCs: A, I, where P* ∈ {P,P′}, S* ∈ {S,S′}, and there are 32 conclusive PCPs, entailing precise, “one partitioning subset of U” LCs. The four rules of conclusive syllogisms predict the less precise LCs, left after eliminating the middle term from the exact LCs. The RofCS also predict that the other 32 PCPs of the 64 PCP-matrix are non-conclusive. The RofVS and the RofCS are generalized, and arguments are given, for also accepting as valid syllogisms the conclusive syllogisms formulable via positive terms which entail the LCs A and O. (shrink)