Distributional fairness of corporate distributions is an important social issue linked to accounting for equality. Value added and the information contained in the value added statement can conceptually be regarded as a reflection of how the company is managed for all stakeholders. We investigate value added information published in sustainability reports to determine if the information provided is useful for assessing distributional fairness between stakeholders. We find that the value added information disclosed lack conciseness, comparability and understandability. The divergence is (...) considerable and the explanations of the disclosed information so limited that the usefulness of the value added disclosures must be questioned. Our results suggest several obfuscating techniques in the disclosure of value added information, including disclosing information that is conceptually compromised, resulting in comparability issues and disclosing information that can’t be verified by reconciling back to the financial statements. Our findings have clear ethical and moral implications as they stress the societal issue of distributional fairness. It seems that companies are either reluctant to provide value added information that is useful, or deliberately use value added disclosures to obfuscate. Information reflecting distributional fairness is therefore compromised. (shrink)

Probability theory developed in history from problems concerning the fairness of games. The historical development of the associated theory of stochastic fairness is described using concepts embodied in the structuralist meta‐theory. The justification of the theory is discussed using an approach derived from J. Rawls.

Die Grundlagen der Erfahrung können auf zwei Arten "begründet" werden, entweder durch Rechtfertigung einer Begründungskette, deren Anfangs- und Endglieder nicht-abgeleitete Urteüe sind, also fundamentalistisch oder antifundamentalistisch, z.B. durch Kohärenz der Urteile. Der dezisionistische Standpunkt Neuraths verschiebt allerdings nur die Begründung und hebt sie nicht auf.

Enlightenment thought and its contemporary followers usually support two contradictory principles simultaneously. The first is universality. Truth is universal because it is truth for all. Claims to universality are made in logic and science, but also in areas that are culturally or politically controversial. Recently, universalism has become a key term to express a fundamental critique of identity politics. For much of European history, Christianity provided such a universal truth. But with the decline of its cultural hegemony and the rise (...) of particular nation-states, conflicting truth claims became weapons in violent conflicts, leading Hobbes to argue that dangerous truth claims must be neutralized by robust political power. In the eighteenth century, rationalism became more optimistic, interpreting universalism as cosmopolitanism based on universal reason and progress through history. The second principle is historicism, which is the self-reflexive look at the historical origins of universal claims and theories. Historicism emerged in the nineteenth century as a response to the application of rationalism to history. It challenged the universal claims of the French Revolution, emphasizing instead the unique value of each historical entity. This revealed a fundamental paradox: when universalism becomes self-reflexive, it recognizes that it has non-universal historical origins, thereby undermining itself. After the devastation of World War II and the Holocaust, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) represented a significant effort toward a new universalism. It sought to establish human rights as universal principles for the emerging world order. But history repeated itself: Historicism once again weakened confidence in human rights. The enemies of human rights take advantage of this weakness. We therefore have to live with the paradox that universalism is necessary because humanity shares a single world, but that historical self-reflection is also unavoidable. In other words, the Enlightenment principle of universalism must accept historicism as an integral part of itself. (shrink)

Vermutlich durch Stumpf und eigene Mitarbeiter wie Mally angeregt, wählt Meinong erstmals 1909 Wissenschaftstheorie zum Thema einer Vorlesung (die Typoskriptunterlage dieses Kollegs ist im Ergänzungsband zur Gesamtausgabe wiedergegeben). Den Hauptteil der so dargelegten Theorie nimmt die Klärung der Begriffe der beiden Arten von Wissenschaften ein, die es überhaupt geben kann: Daseinsfreie und Wirklichkeits- oder Daseinswissenschaften. Alle Wissenschaften, mit Ausnahme der daseinsfreien Gegenstandstheorie, sind auf vollständige Gegenstände gerichtet, beziehen sich auf sie. Das Gebiet des Wirklichen wird erfüllt von physischen und psychischen (...) Gegenständen. Es gibt aber das Gebiet der heimatlosen Gegenstände, die von keiner „beglaubigten Wissenschaft aufgenommen sind". Diese fallen in das Gebiet der Gegenstandstheorie, während sie in den etablierten Wissenschaften nur als Erfassungsmittel von Wirklichem involviert sind. Daseinsfreie Wissenschaften sind nach dem Prinzip der Unabhängigkeit des Soseins vom Sein (Mally 1903) Soseins Wissenschaften. Entscheidend ist angesichts der neuen Aufgabe der Wiederentdeckung unmöglicher und unvollständiger Gegenstände die daseinsfreie Betrachtungsweise der Gegenstandstheorie in bezug auf alle Arten von Gegenständen. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn der Antike wie in der zeitgenassischen Philosophie wird die Frage diskutiert, ob sprachli‐che Bedeutungen auf Übereinkunft beruhen. In unserer Zeit heisst die Frage, inwieweit sprachliche Verständigung durch Konventionen bestimmt ist. Ich versuche zu zeigen, dass in den Regelbrauch, der sprachliches Verhalten teitet, zwar übereinkünfte eingehen können, ihn aber nicht wesentlich auszeichnen. Von da her erhält auch die Behandlung der Frage im Kratylos neue Aspekte: Der Regelbrauch, in den die ursprüngliche Übereinkunft zwar einge‐gangen ist, garantiert den Bezug der Narnen, aber (...) nicht auch die Bedeutung der Wörter.SummaryIn Antiquity, just as in contemporary philosophy, it was asked whether linguistic meaning is a matter of convention. Nowadays the question takes the following form: “to what extent is linguistic communication determined by convention?” I attempt to show that although there may be conventions among the rules governing linguistic behavior, they are not in any essential way distinctive of those rules. As a result of this view there are also new aspects to be considered in the treatment of the question in the Cratylus: the rules, which the initial convention indeed concerns, guarantee the reference of names but not the meaning of other kinds of words.RésuméDans ľAntiquité tout comme dans la philosophie contemporaine, on s'est demandé si Ies significations linguistiques reposent sur une convention. Aujourd'hui, la question se pose sous la forme suivante: dans quelle mesure la communication linguistique est‐elle déterminée par convention? J'essaye de montrer que, parmi les régies qui gouvernent le comportement linguistique, il peut y avoir des conventions, mais que le caractère conventionnel n'en est pas un critère distinctif. De ce point de vue, le traitement de la question dans le Cratyle révèle de nouveaux aspects: les règies, qui tiennent certes compte de la convention primitive, garantissent la référence des noms mais ne garantis‐sent pas celle des autres mots. (shrink)

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The Brentano-Meinong concept of self-presentation is discussed and defined. A property P is said to be self-presenting, i f and only if, P is necessarily such that, for every x, i f x has P and considers the question whether he has P, then it is evident to x that he has P. A definition of the purely psychological is propojsed. Then the following material epistemic principle is discussed and defended: A property P is self-presenting to a person x, i (...) f and only if, P is entailed by a purely psychological property of x. (shrink)

The Brentano-Meinong concept of self-presentation is discussed and defined. A property P is said to be self-presenting, i f and only if, P is necessarily such that, for every x, i f x has P and considers the question whether he has P, then it is evident to x that he has P. A definition of the purely psychological is propojsed. Then the following material epistemic principle is discussed and defended: A property P is self-presenting to a person x, i (...) f and only if, P is entailed by a purely psychological property of x. (shrink)

The paper attempts to give an outline of the main doctrines of the Brentano-School and to mark the place of Bergman's contributions to descriptive Psychology. The idea of an immanent object is rejected by Marty and Bergman and was critized by Bergman in the framework of the 'concept-intuition'-distinction. It is shown that Bergman's critic leads to an interesting defense of the thesis of the privacy of mental contents.

The paper attempts to give an outline of the main doctrines of the Brentano-School and to mark the place of Bergman's contributions to descriptive Psychology. The idea of an immanent object is rejected by Marty and Bergman and was critized by Bergman in the framework of the 'concept-intuition'-distinction. It is shown that Bergman's critic leads to an interesting defense of the thesis of the privacy of mental contents.

The paper attempts to give an outline of the main doctrines of the Brentano-School and to mark the place of Bergman's contributions to descriptive Psychology. The idea of an immanent object is rejected by Marty and Bergman and was critized by Bergman in the framework of the 'concept-intuition'-distinction. It is shown that Bergman's critic leads to an interesting defense of the thesis of the privacy of mental contents.

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Wittgenstein's attitude toward philosophy and philosophical problems is examined with the result that - in spite of his own strong criticism of his earlier work - the aim of philosophy remains the same throughout his life: clarity for its own sake. Wittgenstein's concept of philosophy is sketched as non-naturalistic and anti-systematic with the recommendation of being unbiased as the only remedy for falling again into the old traps. The criticism of the Russell-Frege view of existential quantification and generalization included in (...) the "Big Typescript" is outlined as well as the position toward verification Wittgenstein maintained in between his beginning to work in philosophy anew and his first attempt of systematizing the results in the "Big Typescript". (shrink)

Wittgenstein's attitude toward philosophy and philosophical problems is examined with the result that - in spite of his own strong criticism of his earlier work - the aim of philosophy remains the same throughout his life: clarity for its own sake. Wittgenstein's concept of philosophy is sketched as non-naturalistic and anti-systematic with the recommendation of being unbiased as the only remedy for falling again into the old traps. The criticism of the Russell-Frege view of existential quantification and generalization included in (...) the "Big Typescript" is outlined as well as the position toward verification Wittgenstein maintained in between his beginning to work in philosophy anew and his first attempt of systematizing the results in the "Big Typescript". (shrink)

Ausgehend vom Gegensatz ^absolut-relativ' wird im ersten Abschnitt sprachliche Relativität versus Absolutheit anhand von P. Ungers Analyse semantischer Relativität und der Unterscheidung invariantischer und kontextualer Analyse behandelt. Im zweiten Abschnitt wird das Relativismusproblem in bezug auf psychologische (und soziologische) Relativität diskutiert und in der Gruppe der ersteren Wittgenstein, Kripke und Putnam erwähnt und deren Argumente über die Unmöglichkeit privater innerer Gegenstände zur Widerlegung subjektiver Relativität herangezogen. Sodann wird gezeigt, daß das analoge Argument zugunsten eines Relativismus auf soziokulturellem Gebiet auftritt. Rahmenrelativität (...) scheint demnach unvermeidbar. Ein Absolutheitsanspruch des Relativismus selbst bleibt unerfüllbar. (shrink)

Ausgehend vom Gegensatz ^absolut-relativ' wird im ersten Abschnitt sprachliche Relativität versus Absolutheit anhand von P. Ungers Analyse semantischer Relativität und der Unterscheidung invariantischer und kontextualer Analyse behandelt. Im zweiten Abschnitt wird das Relativismusproblem in bezug auf psychologische (und soziologische) Relativität diskutiert und in der Gruppe der ersteren Wittgenstein, Kripke und Putnam erwähnt und deren Argumente über die Unmöglichkeit privater innerer Gegenstände zur Widerlegung subjektiver Relativität herangezogen. Sodann wird gezeigt, daß das analoge Argument zugunsten eines Relativismus auf soziokulturellem Gebiet auftritt. Rahmenrelativität (...) scheint demnach unvermeidbar. Ein Absolutheitsanspruch des Relativismus selbst bleibt unerfüllbar. (shrink)

The traditional vision of the role science should play in policy making is of a two stage process of scientists first finding out the facts, and then policy makers making a decision about what to do about them. We argue that this two stage process is a fiction and that a distinction must be drawn between pure science and science in the service of public policy. When science is transferred into the policy realm, its claims to truth get undermined because (...) we must abandon the open-ended nature of scientific inquiry. When we move from the sphere of science to the sphere of policy, we pick an arbitrary point in the open-ended scientific process, and ask our experts to give us the answer. The choice of the endpoint, however, must always be arbitrary and determined by non-scientific factors. Thus, the two stages in the model of first finding the facts, and then making a decision about what to do, cannot be clearly separated. The second stage clearly affects the first. This conclusion will have implications about existing scientific policy institutions. For example, we advocate that the environmental assessment process be radically overhauled, or perhaps even let go. It will be our position that ultimately a better model for the involvement of scientists in public policy debates is that of being participants in particular interest groups, rather than as supposedly unbiased consultants to decision-makers. (shrink)

In this carefully argued critique, Steven Horst pronounces the theory deficient.