In a thought experiment we want to test how the emergence of adult neural stem cells could constitute an example for a scientific revolution in the sense of Thomas Kuhn. In his major work, The structure of scientific revolutions, 3rd edn, University of Chicago Press, Chicago (Kuhn 1996), the philosopher of science, Thomas Kuhn, states that scientific progress is not a cumulative process, but new theories appear by a rather revolutionary sequence of events. Kuhn built his theory on landmark events (...) taken from chemistry and physics, lacking examples from biology. Beginning with Ramon y Cajal’s famous quote, no new neurons after birth , from the early years of the twentieth century, and Reynolds and Weiss’s conflicting finding in 1992 of adult neural stem cells giving rise to new neurons, we will test how the finding of neural stem cells in the adult brain matches with Kuhn’s theory. The pivotal problem of defining a paradigm will be our main focus, since the emergence of adult neural stem cells has been acclaimed by the scientific community as the rebuttal of Ramon y Cajal’s paradigm. (shrink)

The author exemplifies the congruency of essential foundations between the critical realism of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology (Gestalt theory) and Nicolai Hartmann`s Critical Ontology. For instance, this congruency manifests in the importance given to critical-realistic epistemology - purified from idealistic prejudices, not least prejudices such as production-theoretical ones - connected with an unconditional phenomenology. Altogether, it results in a shared critical distance from scholars of Brentano, such as Husserl and Meinong, as well as from Neo-Kantianism.

The author exemplifies the congruency of essential foundations between the critical realism of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology (Gestalt theory) and Nicolai Hartmann`s Critical Ontology. For instance, this congruency manifests in the importance given to critical-realistic epistemology - purified from idealistic prejudices, not least prejudices such as production-theoretical ones - connected with an unconditional phenomenology. Altogether, it results in a shared critical distance from scholars of Brentano, such as Husserl and Meinong, as well as from Neo-Kantianism.

Summary The author exemplifies the congruency of essential foundations between the critical realism of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology (Gestalt theory) and Nicolai Hartmann’s Critical Ontology. For instance, this congruency manifests in the importance given to critical-realistic epistemology – purified from idealistic prejudices, not least prejudices such as production-theoretical ones – connected with an unconditional phenomenology. Altogether, it results in a shared critical distance from scholars of Brentano, such as Husserl and Meinong, as well as from Neo-Kantianism.

Summary In 1919 Nicolai Hartmann convincingly justified that there cannot exist a “general law of causation” as A. Meinong had in mind. For him Meinong’s understanding of causation was bound on the region of the physical layer of being, simultaneously postulating it as the only possible causation there. This is the starting point of the comparison between N. Hartmann‘s understanding of causation and that of the Gestalt Theory, for which neither in psychic nor in natural context linear-successive causality plays a (...) part. Therefore NH’s conception of 1919 was still completely incompatible with that of the Gestalt Theory despite the fact that he was distancing himself from the “general law of causation” sensu Meinong. 20 years later he changed this by adding the “Wechselwirkung” to the linear successive causation in the physical layer. In doing so he approached the Gestalt theoretical position but failed it insofar as for it his linear-successive understanding of causation generally has had its day with regard to natural processes, also consequently for the physical. Thus the term “causation“ had become free for a dynamic concept of causation which is equally appropriate for the physical and the psychic. NH makes this move not until 1949, shortly before his death, by writing:.... It is the opinion of the author of this work that the ingenious systematics of NH‘s Critical Ontology should make it possible to execute the necessary corrections in some details of his theory of layers without questioning the structure of his systematics, thus carrying out what NH was not able to do himself due to his death. (shrink)

Most of the reports on synthetic biology include not only familiar topics like biosafety and biosecurity but also a chapter on ‘ethical concerns’; a variety of diffuse topics that are interrelated in some way or another. This article deals with these ‘ethical concerns’. In particular it addresses issues such as the intrinsic value of life and how to deal with ‘artificial life’, and the fear that synthetic biologists are tampering with nature or playing God. Its aim is to analyse what (...) exactly is the nature of the concerns and what rationale may lie behind them. The analysis concludes that the above-mentioned worries do not give genuine cause for serious concern. In the best possible way they are interpreted as slippery slope arguments, yet arguments of this type need to be handled with care. It is argued that although we are urged to be especially vigilant we do not have sufficiently cogent reasons to assume that synthetic biology will cause such fundamental hazards as to warrant restricting or refraining from research in this field. (shrink)

Quasi-equational logic concerns with a completeness theorem, i. e. a list of general syntactical rules such that, being given a set of graded quasi-equations Q, the closure Cl Q = Qeq Fun Q can be derived from by the given rules. Those rules do exist, because our consideration could be embedded into the logic of first order language. But, we look for special (quasi-equational) rules. Suitable rules were already established for the (non-functorial) case of partial algebras in Definition 3.1.2 of (...) [27], p. 108, and [28], p. 102. (For the case of total algebras, see [35].) So, one has to translate these rules to the (functorial) language of partial theories .Surprisingly enough, partial theories can be replaced up to isomorphisms by partial Dale monoids (cf. Section 3), which, in the total case are ordinary monoids. (shrink)

Radical Constructivism and Constructionism. Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, (...) constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself. (shrink)

Karl Popper versucht, das Problem zu lösen, wie erfahrungswissenschaftliche Aussagenzusammenhänge durch ein ihnen eigenes charakteristisches Merkmal von anderen Aussagenzusammenhängen, die dieses Merkmal nicht aufweisen, abgegrenzt werden können, ohne dass dabei für die Erfahrungswissenschaft wesentliche Teile mit ausgegrenzt werden. Als ein hierfür geeignetes Kriterium sieht er die Eigenschaft der empirischen Widerlegbarkeit, der Falsifizierbarkeit wissenschaftlicher Aussagen an. Sie könne als Kriterium dienen, diese von metaphysischen und pseudowissenschaftlichen Aussagen zu unterscheiden, ohne sie zugleich für sinnlos zu erklären. Genauer besehen weist das Abgrenzungskriterium jedoch (...) eine komplexere, zweidimensionale Struktur auf, die als Reformulierung und zugleich als Reform der Kantischen Unterscheidung zwischen dem Erkenntniswert von Aussagen und deren Geltungsgrundlage angesehen werden kann und es aufgrund dieser Zweidimensionalität ermöglicht, auch die Eigenart metaphysischer und pseudowissenschaftlicher Behauptungen verständlich zu machen. (shrink)

Radical Constructivism and Constructionism. Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, (...) constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself. (shrink)

Ce texte reprend une conférence faite par H.-J. Wirth à Washington (États-Unis) en octobre 2005. Ces réflexions pourraient facilement se transposer sur la relation entre le thérapeute et le patient ; de la même façon, elle se caractérise par des positions de pouvoir différentes. Jurg Willy, se référant à Dicks et à son concept de collusion dans le cadre de la thérapie de couple, en a élargi la formulation dans la mesure où il a placé les attentes inconscientes, réciproques et (...) le jeu inconscient des deux partenaires, au centre de sa réflexion. (shrink)

This paper considers the concept of freedom in behavioural terms, defining it in relation to freedom of action. This notion is applied to psychiatric abnormalities, and it is suggested that this new way of looking at the problem may go some way to surmount the philosophical difficulties normally attaching to the notion of freedom.

Werturteile über Musik - lassen sie sich begründen, sind sie verbindlich, welche Geltung haben sie? Das Buch untersucht philosophische, soziologische und pädagogische Aspekte. Dabei werden insbesondere die wichtigsten Urteilsformen und Argumentationsmöglichkeiten sowohl mit kulturabhängigem als auch mit universalem Geltungsanspruch dargestellt und diskutiert. Den theoretischen Erörterungen folgen mit zahlreichen Noten- und Textbeispielen Hinweise und methodische Vorschläge zur Beurteilung von Musik in unterschiedlichen kulturellen Milieus.

The commercialization of ‘big science’ is in full swing, leading to situations in which the ethical principles of academia are beginning to be compromised. This is exemplified by the profitable business of genetic ancestry testing. The goals of this sort of ‘big science’ are not necessarily in any way novel, however. In particular, large genotyping projects have a certain start‐up time when their design is frozen in, so that the projects often lag behind the development of genetic knowledge. On the (...) other hand, extremely provisional knowledge about potential disease markers is being rapidly turned into questionable ‘tests’, purporting to determine risk factors for complex disorders, by private companies that are eager to get their share of a profitable market of the future. The flow of money generated by such concerns looks likely to erode traditional research operations and small‐scale projects, which risk becoming pebbles on the ‘big science’ landscape. BioEssays 30:1246–1251, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A propositional temporal logic is introduced whose operators quantify over intervals of a reference time line. The intervals are specified symbolically, for example ?next week's weekend?. The specification language for the intervals takes into account all the features of real calendar systems. A simple statement which can be expressed in this language is for example: ?yesterday I worked for eight hours with one hour lunch break at noon?. Calendar Logic can be translated into propositional logic. Satisfiability is therefore decidable. (...) Since the translation is exponential, a tableau decision procedure for checking decidability is presented as an alternative. (shrink)

The generally covariant Lagrangian densityG = ℛ + 2K ℒmatter of the Hamiltonian principle in general relativity, formulated by Einstein and Hilbert, can be interpreted as a functional of the potentialsg ikand φ of the gravitational and matter fields. In this general relativistic interpretation, the Riemann-Christoffel form Γ kl i = kl i for the coefficients г kl i of the affine connections is postulated a priori. Alternatively, we can interpret the LagrangianG as a functional of φ, gik, and the (...) coefficients г kl i . Then the г kl i are determined by the Palatini equations. From these equations and from the symmetry г kl i = г lk i for all matter fields with δℒ/δΓ=0 the Christoffel symbols again result. However, for Dirac's bispinor fields, δℒ/δΓ becomes dependent on the Dirac current, essentially with a coupling factor ∼Khc. In this case, the Palatini equations define a new transport rule for the spinor fields, according to which a second universal interaction results for the Dirac spinors, besides Einstein's gravitation. The generally covariant Dirac wave equations become the general relativistic nonlinear Heisenberg wave equations, and the second universal interaction is given by a Fermi-like interaction term of the V-A type. The geometrically induced Fermi constant is, however, very small and of the order 10−81erg cm3. (shrink)

The Galilei invariance of classical dynamics does not automatically imply the third Newtonian axiom and the center of mass theorem. For the deduction of these theorems from Galilei invariance we must have, generally, a “kinematical potential” (Helmholtz) and a “potential function” (Clausius), respectively. In celestial mechanics it is possible to have conservation of the motion of the center of gravity but not of the mass center. In this case, the active and the passive masses are different quantities.

Reminiscing on the fact that E. Schrödinger was rooted in the same physical tradition as M. Planck and A. Einstein, some aspects of his attitude to quantum mechanics are discussed. In particular, it is demonstrated that the quantum-mechanical paradoxes assumed by Einstein and Schrödinger should not exist, but that otherwise the epistemological problem of physical reality raised in this context by Einstein and Schrödinger is fundamental for our understanding of quantum theory. The nonexistence of such paradoxes just shows that quantum-mechanical (...) effects are due to interference and not to interaction. This line of argument leads consequently to quantum field theories with second quantization, and accordingly quantum theory based both on Planck's constant h and on Democritus's atomism. (shrink)

The gauge-invariant relativistic wave mechanics corresponds to relativistic magneto-hydrodynamics according to Planck's version of the correspondence principle.

The fundamental open questions of general relativity theory are the unification of the gravitational field with other fields, aiming at a unified geometrization of physics, as well as the renormalization of relativistic gravitational theory in order to obtain their self-consistent solutions. These solutions are to furnish field-theoretic particle models—a problem first discussed by Einstein. In addition, we are confronted with the issue of a coupling between gravitational and matter fields determined (not only) by Einstein's principle of equivalence, and also with (...) the question of the geometric meaning of a gravitational quantum theory. In our view, all these problems are so closely related that they warrant a general solution. We treat mainly the concepts suggested by Einstein and Weyl. (shrink)

We discuss the possibility of “fifth forces” in relativistic gravitation theories of fourth order. The fifth force may be an analog to the “weak forces” in the theories of electroweak interactions.

The physical meaning of gauge groups in bimetrical, Riemannian, and Hermitian theories of gravitation is discussed. In Hermitian relativity, Einstein's A-invariance means a super-gauge group which characterizes the Einstein-Schrödinger equations as the only nondegenerate general-relativistic field theory.

Analogical thinking, relations between microcosm and macrocosm, polarity and intensification, inspiration, magical, alchemistic, and magnetic/sympathetic concepts: key terms like these indicate the importance of the traditions of pansophist and holistic interpretation of the world in Goethe's literary and scientific works. Of equal significance is his engagement with 'universal wisdom' (Weltweisheit), as embodied in the philosophical and scientific tendencies of the age he lived in. The Geneva conference of the Swiss Goethe Society documented here casts light on Goethe's position in the (...) rivalries tensions between old and new in his day. (shrink)