"First published by Oxford University Press, 1916."--Title page verso.

First published in 1938. The aim of this book is to expound Kant’s _Critique of Judgement _by interpreting all the details in the light of what Kant himself declares to be his fundamental problem. _A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Judgement _provides an excellent introduction to Kant’s third critique, and will be of interest to students of philosophy.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The Hellenistic temple of Apollo at Didyma presents several unique features in its plan. In its exterior it resembles the typical large Ionic temple of Asia Minor with a double colonnade surrounding it, no opisthodomus, and a pronaos containing three rows of four columns each. But at this point the plan of the temple was modified in the strangest manner. For the pronaos does not lead by a great central doorway into the cella, but where the doorway should come, the (...) worshipper entering the building found himself faced with a blank wall 1·495 rn high with above it a colossal opening 5·63 m wide. Consequently the worshipper in the pronaos could not even look directly into the sanctuary. Instead, just above his eye-level beyond the embrasure of this ‘window’ stretched the floor of a large room, 14·04 m by 6·73 m with its roof supported on two columns. Through this room's central door the spectator on ground level outside could catch a glimpse of the upper part of the naiskos in the inner court. (shrink)

In Plutarch's two narratives of the recapture of the Cadmea by the Thebans, 379/8 B.C. , he speaks of three harmosts as in command of the Spartan garrison. This is the only instance in Spartan history where more than one harmost is mentioned as exercising authority in the same city, and it suggests the question: Was Thebes for some reason receiving different treatment from the other cities where we hear of harmosts in residence ?

This paper defends the view of continuants as 'four-dimensional worms' against an argument of Geach's. This is to the effect that if continuants are four-dimensional worms then their stages either do, or do not, fall under the very general terms satisfied by the continuants themselves (a stage of a man either is, or is not, a man); but that either alternative is untenable. I try to show how the former alternative may be defended by appealing to some of Geach's own (...) ideas about identity; then go on to defend the four-dimensionalist view from a criticism of it by Mellor, and finish with an account of the intuitive distinction between process and continuant terms. (shrink)