The article presents the conceptual groundwork for an understanding of the essentially improvisational dimension of human rationality. It aims to clarify how we should think about important concepts pertinent to central aspects of human practices, namely, the concepts of improvisation, normativity, habit, and freedom. In order to understand the sense in which human practices are essentially improvisational, it is first necessary to criticize misconceptions about improvisation as lack of preparation and creatio ex nihilo. Second, it is necessary to solve the (...) theoretical problems that derive from misunderstandings concerning the notions of normativity, habit, and freedom – misunderstandings that revolve around the idea that rationality is a form that is developed out of itself and thus works in a way similar to algorithms. One can only make sense of normativity, habit, and freedom if one understands that they all involve conflictual relationships with the world and with others, which in turn enables one to adequately take into account their constitutive connection to improvisation, properly understood. In outlining these conceptual connections, we want to prepare the foundations for an explanation of rational practices as improvisational practices. The article concludes by stating that human rational life is improvisatory because the conditions of human practice arise out of practice itself. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop an understanding of recognition in terms of individuals’ capacity for conflict. Our goal is to overcome various shortcomings that can be found in both the positive and negative conceptions of recognition. We start by analyzing paradigmatic instances of such conceptions—namely, those put forward by Axel Honneth and Judith Butler. We do so in order to show how both positions are inadequate in their elaborations of recognition in an analogous way: Both fail to make intelligible the (...) fundamental nexus between relations of recognition and individuals’ capacity for conflict. We then move on to reconsider aspects of Hegel's view of recognition—ones that, from our viewpoint, have been unjustly neglected in the debate about recognition: his focus on the constitution of relations of recognition in conflict and on the status of being an author of acts of recognition. On this basis, we then spell out in a more systematic way what we take to be a more convincing conception of recognition. This puts us in the position to gesture at some consequences of this conception in practical contexts, above all with regard to the justification, role and structure of political institutions. (shrink)

The concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled. But the concept is laden with ambiguity. On the one hand, second nature is understood as that which binds together all cognitive activities. On the other hand, second nature is conceived of as a kind of nature that can be changed by cognitive activities. The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception. (...) It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken. The Hegelian conception demonstrates that the transformation in question takes place within second nature itself. Thus, the Hegelian conception allows us to understand the way in which second nature is not structurally isomorphic with first nature: It is a process of ongoing selftransformation that is not primarily determined by how the world is, but rather by commitments out of which human beings are bound to the open future. (shrink)

How is art both distinct and different from the rest of human life, while also mattering in and for it? This central yet overlooked question in contemporary philosophy of art is at the heart of Georg Bertram's new aesthetic. Drawing on the resources of diverse philosophical traditions – analytic philosophy, French philosophy, and German post-Kantian philosophy – his book offers a systematic account of art as a human practice. One that remains connected to the whole of life.

Since Kant, many philosophers have struggled to overcome the problems of an empiricist conception of the self. In this paper I argue that Heidegger’s philosophy in Being and Time has to be considered as one of the most powerful attempts to gain an anti-empiricist conception of the self and its unity. I highlight the power of Heidegger’s conception by contrasting it with contemporary empiricist conceptions, namely those of Dennett and Velleman. The basic aspect of Heidegger’s conception can be captured by (...) the claim that the unity of the subject is constituted by relations to an open future. (shrink)

This paper aims to offer a new and alternative perspective on the basic idea of Levinas’s philosophy. My claim is that the latter can be more appropriately understood not as a contribution to a new way of thinking about ethics or the realm of the ethical as such, but rather toward the theory of normativity. The goal of Levinas’s reflections on alterity is to exhibit the normativity that is in play in all modes of understanding. Levinas tries to understand how (...) intentional beings are normatively bound by one another. This paper tries to give answers to the questions of why Levinas addresses questions of alterity, what is distinctive about these questions according to his way of thinking, and why one should consider Levinas’ thought from the perspective of the articulation of a theory of normativity. (shrink)

Cet article propose une réinterprétation du système des arts de Hegel. Il montre que ce système contient deux affirmations apparemment contradictoires. D’une part, Hegel soutient que les différents arts ont leurs propres potentialités et accomplissements, irréductibles les uns aux autres. D’autre part, il affirme que ces potentialités et accomplissements ne peuvent être compris que dans le cadre d’une conception d’ensemble de l’art pris en totalité. Loin de d’intégrer l’art comme un tout dans son système, Hegel combine une conception des différents (...) arts comme pratiques autonomes avec l’idée que les différents arts (en tant qu’accomplissements de ce qu’est l’art) sont des contributions au sein de contextes historico-culturels dans lesquels individus et groupes interagissent avec eux. Selon Hegel, les différents arts entrent dans des échanges dynamiques les uns avec les autres sur la base de leur enjeu commun, à savoir de fournir des impulsions productives au mouvement autonome des pratiques historico-culturelles. Les réflexions de Hegel sur l’art offrent ainsi une perspective sur l’unité hétérogène des arts. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz unternimmt den Versuch, die grundlegenden Strukturen von Hegels Modell der Intersubjektivität zu explizieren, wie er es in der Phänomenologie des Geistes zeichnet. Dieses Modell antwortet auf die Frage, wie Anerkennung in intersubjektiven Beziehungen verwirklicht ist. Ich vollziehe nach, dass Hegels komplexe Antwort auf diese Frage weder in den Überlegungen zum Selbstbewusstsein noch in denen zur sittlichen Substanz vollständig ist. Sie komplettiert sich erst in seinen Ausführungen zum Gewissen.

Usually, the ontology of art is executed as an ontology of artworks. This has the consequence that the answer to the question what art is says nothing about why art is valuable. But it is, I argue, necessary to determine the value of art if one wants to say what art is. In order to account for the value of art, I start with the claim that art is a practice of transformation. Thus, I propose to develop the ontology of (...) art as the ontology of a practice of transformation. The practice in question has four elements: first artworks, second interpretive activities through which recipients and producers follow the constellations realized in artworks, third ordinary practices which are reflected through interpretive activities, and fourth practices of art criticism. By way of these four elements art is realized. According to the proposed conception, art is a profoundly unstable practice which challenges human beings and their self-understandings in such a way that they and their self-understandings develop further. (shrink)

El concepto de segunda naturaleza promete proporcionar una explicación de cómo la naturaleza y la razón se pueden reconciliar. Pero dicho concepto está cargado de ambigüedad: se entiende como aquello que une todas las actividades cognitivas y se concibe como un tipo de naturaleza que puede ser modificada por actividades cognitivas. Se intenta investigar esta ambigüedad distinguiendo una concepción kantiana de otra hegeliana. Se sostiene que la idea de una transformación de un ser de prim- era naturaleza en un ser (...) de segunda naturaleza, que se encuentra en el corazón de la concepción kantiana, es errónea. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz verfolgt die Frage, welche Bedeutung Literatur im Sinne von künstlerischem Sprachgebrauch für Sprache überhaupt zukommt. Inwiefern ist für Sprache und sprachliches Verstehen künstlerischer Sprachgebrauch konstitutiv? Ich mache den Vorschlag, diese Frage durch die Unterscheidung von sprachlicher Artikulation (von Strukturen der Welt) und sprachlicher Explikation (der sprachlichen Thematisierung von Sprache) zu beantworten. Diese Unterscheidung versetzt uns in die Lage, die Irreduzibilität von Explikation für Sprache zu begreifen. Auf dieser Grundlage kann dann künstlerischer Sprachgebrauch als eine spezifische Form von Explikation (...) verstanden werden, der eine besondere Relevanz für Sprache insgesamt zukommt. Diese besondere Relevanz lässt sich mit der These umreißen, dass literarische Texte eine Distanzierung von artikulativen Zusammenhängen in der Sprache eröffnen. So erweist sich Literatur als eine dem Medium der Sprache eingeschriebene Form der Freiheit. The paper addresses the question of how to determine the significance of literature – i.e. the artistic use of language – for language. Is the artistic use of language constitutive for language and linguistic understanding more generally? I seek to answer these questions by, first, distinguishing between linguistic articulation (of structures in the world) and linguistic explication (understood as the linguistic thematization of language itself). This makes it possible to, second, view linguistic explication as an irreducible dimension of language. Against this background, we can conceive the artistic use of language as a specific type of explication that has genuine relevance for the use of language more generally, because literary texts enable us to distance ourselves from the structures of articulating language. In this sense, literature has to be understood as a means of realizing freedom that is inscribed into language as such. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss Adorno’s critique of jazz to develop a metacritique. I explain the basic objection of Adorno against jazz which states that jazz performances do not realize a law of form and therefore are not able to challenge subjects. According to my diagnosis, Adorno’s assessment of jazz is based on his conception of art for, firstly, Adorno excludes interactions of contributing to a law of form and, secondly, has a one-sided account of how art reflects subjectivity. If (...) one works out a conception of art that avoids these shortcomings it is possible to conceive of jazz as a paradigmatic form of art. (shrink)

How is aesthetic autonomy to be conceived if one does not want to lose an explanation of the connection between art and human practice in general? The starting point of the present paper is the claim that Hegel overlooks aesthetic autonomy because he wants to explain how art is operative within human practice. He does not conceive the sensuous-material aspects of art- works in their independence. Goodman’s notion of exemplification corrects this shortcoming. But his explanation of the relevance of independent (...) sensuous-material aspects of artworks fails to give us an understanding of aesthetic autonomy, too. I argue that it is possible to avoid such a negative conclusion if one understands the self-referential constitution of sensuous-material shapings in an artwork as the basis of aesthetic autonomy. At the same time, such an under- standing allows for a conception of the potency of art within human practice. (shrink)

Humans have developed various practices to confront the indeterminacy of their existence. Roughly speaking, there are two types of such practices. On the one hand are those through which humans control the uncertainty that permeates their actions and choices. These are practices of self-reassurance and risk reduc- tion. On the other hand are practices in which humans welcome or search out uncertainty, practices that are explicitly open to the risk of failure. One particu- larly remarkable example of the latter set (...) is art. Art is a practice that embraces the uncertainty of human existence in a special way. Generally speaking, art- works do not aim to reassure. Rather, they are open to uncertainty. Thus, art represents a special mode of reflecting on a constitutive feature of human exis- tence, namely, the possibility of failure. What does it mean that art is, in princi- ple, always susceptible to failure? The present article explores this question. (shrink)

"Übergangsholismus" entwickelt Ansätze zu einer begrifflichen Rekonstruktion des semantischen Holismus nach Davidson und Derrida. Ich argumentiere dafür, dass eine solche Rekonstruktion ohne den Begriff des Ganzen auskommt. Den Ausgangspunkt bildet Derridas Konzept der différance, das als Konzept für die Beziehungen in holistischen Strukturen vorgestellt wird. Die Elemente einer holistischen Struktur werden demnach durch die Beziehungen, in denen sie stehen, bestimmt. Solche Bestimmung aber ist, wie ich im Anschluss diskutiere, an Praktiken mit sprachlichen Ausdrücken gebunden. Mit Derrida wird so ein unauftrennbarer (...) Zusammenhang von bedeutungsstiftenden Strukturen und Praktiken nachvollzogen. Davidsons Konzeption der Übergangstheorie stützt auch dieses Modell. In Anlehnung an Davidsons Thesen zu dieser Konzeption behaupte ich des weiteren, dass der Übergangsholismus die Konstitution sprachlicher Bedeutung in einer Weise beschreibt, dass sie stets die Veränderung von Sprache impliziert. Gegen Davidson lässt sich wiederum aus Derridas Perspektive ergänzen, dass dieser Mechanismus sowohl die Veränderung als auch die Kontinuität von Sprache zu rekonstruieren erlaubt. (shrink)

The paper puts forward a criticism of two interdependent aspects of Donald Davidson’s and John McDowell’s respective philosophies of language. On the one hand, I criticize the notion that successful communication can be treated as the starting point for explaining the social dimension of linguistic meaning. On the other hand, I deal with the problematic way in which the authors seem to claim that language’s openness to the world, which for them explains its relationship to the world in general, can (...) be taken for granted. As for the social dimension of language, I argue that conflict – and not instances of successful communication – should be seen as the rule in the constitution of linguistic meaning. This revised understanding of language’s irreducible sociality lays the groundwork for a reconception of language’s relation to the world: in linguistic practices, we always have to engage in a struggle to open up linguistic structures to the world, such that language’s relation to the world cannot be taken for granted when thinking about the significance of the fact that language has any meaning at all. (shrink)

Le présent livre a pour objet la "renaissance du pragmatisme" dans la philosophie contemporaine, qu'il tente d'éclairer en analysant les relations systématiques entre le concept de pratique et celui d'intersubjectivité. Il est le résultat de l'effort collectif de chercheurs issus de plusieurs pays, formés dans des traditions philosophiques différentes, et désireux de surmonter par le dialogue l'opposition entre philosophie anglo-américaine et philosophie continentale..

Are works of art to be conceived as thought experiments? To answer this question one has to explain what thought experiments are. I argue that thought experiments consist of contrafactual scenarios which are conceptually articulated, whereby the scenarios in question are developed in a concise way. In the case of works of art this is not so. If works of art consist of contrafactual scenarios these scenarios are not developed concisely, even if works of art present a constellation of just (...) a few elements. The reason for this is that each work of art establishes a specific language. Such a language cannot be simply grasped, like a scenario in a thought experiment – it has to be followed mimetically by the recipients. So works of art function differently from thought experiments and are – even though closely related – not to be conceived as thought experiments. (shrink)

The paper aims at reevaluating a conception of the aesthetic that was developed by Kant and Hegel but that has been widely neglected due to the fact that their positions in aesthetics have been wrongly considered to be antagonistic to one another. The conception states that the aesthetic is a practice of reflecting on other human practices. Kant was the first to articulate this conception, but nevertheless falls short of giving a satisfying account of it, as he doesn’t succeed in (...) explaining its objective aspect. I claim that Hegel resolves this problem by understanding works of art as objects that thermalize essential orientations of historical-cultural practices. But his explanation fails to grasp the specificity of art as a reflective practice. However, Hegel’s position gives us a hint for how to deal with this problem: Reflection has to be understood in a practical, and not in a cognitive sense. (shrink)

If one wants to determine the relationship between ordinary life and art one has to start with the groundbreaking Kantian insight that the beautiful reflects the working of the human faculties of the understanding. However, I argue that the Kantian conception of aesthetic reflection is not satisfying, for Kant doesn’t succeed in explaining the objective purport of the aesthetic reflection. I resort to Hegel to resolve this problem. But his explanation, too, falls short of grasping the multiplicity of ways in (...) which works of art make a contribution to a self- determined way of life. However, in Hegel there is a hint how to deal with this problem: Re- flection has to be understood as practical and not as cognitive. A conception of aesthetic reflexivity in terms of practical self-determination allows grasping that there is no gap between ordinary life and art. (shrink)

Les diverses formes de vie en commun appellent des modalités de reconnaissance très différentes. Mais il s'agit toujours de combats pour une insertion sociale réussie. Voici une tentative de déclinaison de la nature sociale de l'homme de façon à saisir les grammaires de l'humain comme les grammaires de la reconnaissance. Plusieurs articles en allemand et en anglais.

Neuere Sprachphilosophien schenken dem Unterschied von gesprochener und geschriebener Sprache keine große Rücksicht. Ich behaupte allerdings, dass die Schrift einen Einblick in die irreduzible Verbindung von Sprache und Selbstbewusstsein erlaubt. Sprachliches Verstehen weist, so wird dargelegt, grundsätzlich eine explikative Dimension auf. Vor diesem Hintergrund lässt Schrift sich als eine Form der Explikation von Sprache begreifen.

The thesis that art has ended is widespread in modernist philosophical aesthetics. Hegel and Arthur Danto are not the only ones to have claimed that art came to an end at some specific moment in history. The thesis of the end of art is intrinsic to the question of what art is. Danto is one of the most prominent proponents of the end‐of‐art thesis in recent debates in the philosophy of art. This chapter shows that both Hegel's and Danto's explanations (...) of what comes after the end of art allow us better to grasp some attributes essential to what art is. As for the highest vocation of art, Danto relies on a historical narrative according to which art is the first practice through which absolute spirit comes into existence. A key aspect of Danto's reading of Hegel's end‐of‐art thesis is that he understands it as a claim about a historical development. (shrink)

The paper argues that the concept of second nature has two aspects that are inherently bound up with one another. Firstly, second nature has to be conceived of as a concept that has a critical force. Secondly, art has to be understood as an essential part of what second nature is. The paper explains these two dimensions of the concept by drawing on Hegel’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of second nature as the nature of essentially incomplete beings. Since the incompleteness in (...) question always has to be reproduced, human beings have to develop and constantly engage in practices of self-criticism. As a practice of self-criticism, art is constitutive of second nature understood in this way. Thus, the specificity of art is to be found in its form of self-criticism as articulated through objects, which for their part give orientation to beings that realize their second nature through their practices. In the end, art prompts them to revise and enliven these practices. (shrink)

Relying on Heidegger’s ›Being and Time‹, the paper discusses music as a discrete form of thinking. It argues that music should be understood as the future-oriented articulation of humans’ fundamentally affective relatedness to the world. Conceiving of music as the articulation of fundamental affectivity allows us to combine formalist and expressivist approaches to music: Music must have form in order to articulate, but has significance only insofar as it articulates humans’ fundamentally affective relatedness to the world. By taking this approach (...) we are able to account for the discreteness of music as a form of thinking without limiting ourselves to art music. (shrink)

This book collects essays from the 2006 and 2007 International Philosophy Colloquia Evian, centred around a central problem in the philosophy of mind: the relationship between the human faculty of sensory experience and the faculty of conceptual reflection, that is self-consciousness. Containing articles by philosophers of eight nationalities, in three languages (English, French, German), and of "analytical" as well as "continental" provenance, it beautifully represents the spirit of the colloquia. Authors include Joshua Andresen (AU Beirut), Valérie Aucouturier (Kent U / (...) U Paris I), Karin de Boer (KU Leuven), Santiago Echeverri (U Genève), Roberto Farneti (LU Bolzano), Tim Henning (JLU Giessen), Felix Koch (Columbia U), Christophe Laudou (Madrid), David Lauer (FU Berlin), Jason Leddington (Bucknell U), Nicolas Monseu (UC Louvain), Soraya Nour (HU Berlin), Hans Bernhard Schmid (U Wien), Henning Tegtmeyer (U Leipzig). (shrink)

This book attempts to give a systematic account of the development of semantic holism within the philosophy of language in the 20th century. One of the things that might make it interesting is that it covers philosophers from the analytic tradition (Hilbert, Schlick, Sellars, Davidson, McDowell) as well as structuralist and post-structuralist philosophers (Saussure, Jakobson, Hjelmslev, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida). It is not only claimed that these philosophers address what can intelligibly be recognized as the same systematic questions concerning the constitution of (...) linguistic meaning, but also that the development of holistic approaches in the two traditions follows the same course, leading from formalist to post-formalist varieties of holism. This course implies the rejection of the myth of a pure or autonomous structure of language in favour of a view of language which sees linguistic practice as necessarily interwoven with the natural and social world. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 66 Heft: 6 Seiten: 901-907.