Dewey’s formulation of a naturalistic account of experience has been criticized from time to time on the grounds that it is anthropomorphic, subjectivistic and idealistic. In this paper I wish to examine some of the issues associated with these charges in the light of two recent discussions of Dewey’s thought.

In this paper I advance an interpretation of Nietzsche's notions of amor fati and eternal recurrence in which they are taken to delimit the project of becoming well-disposed to life and oneself. I argue that interpreted in this way these notions do not have the problematic implications which stand in the way of our adopting them and, in fact, cast light on how we may theoretically understand and practically live our lives.

In two early and famous papers, “The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make our Ideas Clear”, devoted to describing the “method of scientific investigation”, we are presented with some of the most basic and problematic features of Peirce’s thought. In the former paper Peirce surveys four ‘methods’ of arriving at beliefs and argues that the scientific method is superior to its alternatives because in it the concept of reality is operative. It alone contains as a “fundamental hypothesis” the belief (...) that there are real things and it alone has the prerogative of bringing about the coincidence of our beliefs and the facts. But curiously enough, the survey introducing these contentions is conducted from a rather different vantage point. For in it Peirce departs from the thesis that we human beings face the problem of replacing disturbing and irritating doubts with beliefs, and appears to argue that because we are social animals the only genuinely effective means of achieving this end is by employing the scientific method. In the latter paper Peirce formulates his maxim for clarifying ideas and proceeds to apply it to the ideas of truth and reality. As a result of this ‘clarification’, the meanings of these ideas are seen to be logically implicated with the methodology of scientific inquiry. In this paper I shall examine Peirce’s views on these obviously questionable points and I will try to show that when properly understood they are not vulnerable to some, at least, of the criticisms brought against them. While the matter cannot be argued here, it is my conviction that the positions we are dealing with are very basic both to Peirce’s philosophy and to any philosophical scheme warranting the label “pragmatism”. (shrink)

This lively, well-written book is an account of Nietzsche's philosophy of education, an interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole, a critique of the view that education should primarily be devoted to initiating students into the liberal arts and sciences as forms of knowledge, and an attack upon "the technological and vocational obsessions of those who manage our school system". Cooper argues that the goal of authenticity is central to Nietzsche's philosophy of education and thus attempts to spell out the (...) goal and show how education might realize it. (shrink)

There are many loose ends in this study and I shall make no effort to tie them together in some neat summary. I trust that my basic sympathies with Dewey have been clear throughout. What I have discovered in the course of writing this is that reflecting upon Dewey's work in the light of contemporary problems and schools of philosophy not only casts light on these problems and schools but enhances one's appreciation for the distinctiveness, coherence and value of his (...) work. (shrink)

Since virtually all aspects of Marx's thought have been competently scrutinized during the past decade or so, it is not surprising that most of what Love says about it is familiar and uncontroversial. The one obvious exception is Love's view that Marx does not explain history teleologically. Only those who construe teleological explanations in a naive, quasi-positivistic manner will find this unexceptionable. Fortunately, neither this point nor the familiarity of Love's views of Marx obscures what is worthwhile in this seriously (...) flawed work, its treatment of the political content and ramifications of Nietzsche's philosophy. (shrink)

The latter point is clearly illustrated by Ayer's study which is composed of two long essays, one devoted to Peirce and the other to James. Ayer says much that is stimulating and enlightening about Peirce's theory of science, signs and categories and about James' radical empiricism. But he makes virtually no effort to relate these topics to one another or to integrate them in some over-view of pragmatism. He does point out.