This accessible book gives a new, detailed and elementary explanation of the Gödel incompleteness theorems and presents the Chaitin results and their relation to the da Costa-Doria results, which are given in full, but with no ...

In the paper some applications of Gödel's incompleteness theorems to discussions of problems of computer science are presented. In particular the problem of relations between the mind and machine (arguments by J.J.C. Smart and J.R. Lucas) is discussed. Next Gödel's opinion on this issue is studied. Finally some interpretations of Gödel's incompleteness theorems from the point of view of the information theory are presented.

Gödel's two incompleteness theorems are among the most important results in modern logic, and have deep implications for various issues. They concern the limits of provability in formal axiomatic theories. The first incompleteness theorem states that in any consistent formal system F within which a certain amount of arithmetic can be carried out, there are statements of the language of F which can neither be proved nor disproved in F. According to the second incompleteness (...) class='Hi'>theorem, such a formal system cannot prove that the system itself is consistent (assuming it is indeed consistent). These results have had a great impact on the philosophy of mathematics and logic. There have been attempts to apply the results also in other areas of philosophy such as the philosophy of mind, but these attempted applications are more controversial. The present entry surveys the two incompleteness theorems and various issues surrounding them. (shrink)

Kurt Godel, the greatest logician of our time, startled the world of mathematics in 1931 with his Theorem of Undecidability, which showed that some statements in mathematics are inherently "undecidable." His work on the completeness of logic, the incompleteness of number theory, and the consistency of the axiom of choice and the continuum theory brought him further worldwide fame. In this introductory volume, Raymond Smullyan, himself a well-known logician, guides the reader through the fascinating world of Godel's (...) class='Hi'>incompleteness theorems. The level of presentation is suitable for anyone with a basic acquaintance with mathematical logic. As a clear, concise introduction to a difficult but essential subject, the book will appeal to mathematicians, philosophers, and computer scientists. (shrink)

In “Minds, Machines, and Gödel”, J. R. Lucas claims that Goedel's incompleteness theorem constitutes a proof “that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained as machines”. He claims further that “if the proof of the falsity of mechanism is valid, it is of the greatest consequence for the whole of philosophy”. It seems to me that both of these claims are exaggerated. It is true that no minds can be explained as machines. But it is (...) not true that Goedel's theorem proves this. At most, Goedel's theorem proves that not all minds can be explained as machines. Since this is so, Goedel's theorem cannot be expected to throw much light on why minds are different from machines. Lucas overestimates the importance of Goedel's theorem for the topic of mechanism, I believe, because he presumes falsely that being unable to follow any but mechanical procedures in mathematics makes something a machine. (shrink)

This paper is a summary of a lecture in which I presented some remarks on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and their meaning for the foundations of physics. The entire lecture will appear elsewhere.

The determinism-free will debate is perhaps as old as philosophy itself and has been engaged in from a great variety of points of view including those of scientific, theological, and logical character. This chapter focuses on two arguments from logic. First, there is an argument in support of determinism that dates back to Aristotle, if not farther. It rests on acceptance of the Law of Excluded Middle, according to which every proposition is either true or false, no matter whether the (...) proposition is about the past, present or future. In particular, the argument goes, whatever one does or does not do in the future is determined in the present by the truth or falsity of the corresponding proposition. The second argument coming from logic is much more modern and appeals to Gödel's incompleteness theorems to make the case against determinism and in favour of free will, insofar as that applies to the mathematical potentialities of human beings. The claim more precisely is that as a consequence of the incompleteness theorems, those potentialities cannot be exactly circumscribed by the output of any computing machine even allowing unlimited time and space for its work. The chapter concludes with some new considerations that may be in favour of a partial mechanist account of the mathematical mind. (shrink)

This paper is a summary of a lecture in which I presented some remarks on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and their meaning for the foundations of physics. The entire lecture will appear elsewhere.

Dialetheism is the view that there exists a true contradiction. This paper ventures to suggest that Priest’s argument for Dialetheism from Gödel’s theorem is unconvincing as the lesson of Gödel’s proof (or Rosser’s proof) is that any sufficiently strong theories of arithmetic cannot be both complete and consistent. In addition, a contradiction is derivable in Priest’s inconsistent and complete arithmetic. An alternative argument for Dialetheism is given by applying Gödel sentence to the inconsistent and complete theory of arithmetic. We (...) argue, however, that the alternative argument raises a circularity problem. In sum, Gödel’s and its related theorem merely show the relation between a complete and a consistent theory. A contradiction derived by the application of Gödel sentence has the value of true sentences, i.e. the both-value, only under the inconsistent models for arithmetic. Without having the assumption of inconsistency or completeness, a true contradiction is not derivable from the application of Gödel sentence. Hence, Gödel’s and its related theorem never can be a ground for Dialetheism. (shrink)

According to several commentators, Kurt Godel's incompleteness discoveries were assimilated promptly and almost without objection by his contemporaries - - a circumstance remarkable enough to call for explanation. Careful examination reveals, however, that there were doubters and critics, as well as defenders and rival claimants to priority. In particular, the reactions of Carnap, Bernays, Zermelo, Post, Finsler, and Russell, among others, are considered in detail. Documentary sources include unpublished correspondence from Godel's Nachlass.

This paper is a summary of a lecture in which I presented some remarks on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and their meaning for the foundations of physics. The entire lecture will appear elsewhere. doi: http://dx.doi.org/ 10.5007 / 1808-1711.2011v15n3p453.

Although written in Japanese, this article handles historical and technical survey of Gödel's incompleteness theorem thoroughly.

At the turn of the century, there appeared two comprehensive mathematical systems, which were indeed so vast that it was taken for granted that all mathematics could be decided on the basis of them. However, in 1931, Kurt Gödel surprised the entire mathematical world with his epoch‐making paper which begins with the following startling words: The development of mathematics in the direction of greater precision has led to large areas of it being formalized, so that proofs can be carried out (...) according to a few mechanical rules. The most comprehensive formal systems to date are, on the one hand, the Principia Mathematica of Whitehead and Russell, and, on the other hand the Zermelo‐Fraenkel system of axiomatic set theory. Both systems are so extensive that all methods of proof used in mathematics today can be formalized in them‐i.e., can be reduced to a few axioms and rules of inference. It would seem reasonable, therefore, to surmise that these axioms and rules of inference are sufficient to decide all mathematical questions which can be formulated in the system concerned. In what follows it will be shown that this is not the case, but rather that, in both of the cited systems, there exist relatively simple problems of the theory of ordinary whole numbers which cannot be decided on the basis of the axioms. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss whether Gödel's incompleteness theorems have any implications for studies in Artificial Life (AL). Since Gödel's incompleteness theorems have been used to argue against certain mechanistic theories of the mind, it seems natural to attempt to apply the theorems to certain strong mechanistic arguments postulated by some AL theorists. -/- We find that an argument using the incompleteness theorems can not be constructed that will block the hard AL claim, specifically in (...) the field of robotics. However, we will see that the beginnings of an argument casting doubt on our ability to create living systems entirely resident in a computer environment might be suggested by looking at the incompleteness theorems from the point of view of Gödel's belief in mathematical realism. (shrink)

We give a survey of current research on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems from the following three aspects: classifications of different proofs of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, the limit of the applicability of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, and the limit of the applicability of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem.

The aim of this paper is to comprehensively question the validity of the standard way of interpreting Chaitin's famous incompleteness theorem, which says that for every formalized theory of arithmetic there is a finite constant c such that the theory in question cannot prove any particular number to have Kolmogorov complexity larger than c. The received interpretation of theorem claims that the limiting constant is determined by the complexity of the theory itself, which is assumed to be (...) good measure of the strength of the theory. I exhibit certain strong counterexamples and establish conclusively that the received view is false. Moreover, I show that the limiting constants provided by the theorem do not in any way reflect the power of formalized theories, but that the values of these constants are actually determined by the chosen coding of Turing machines, and are thus quite accidental. (shrink)

This Element takes a deep dive into Gödel's 1931 paper giving the first presentation of the Incompleteness Theorems, opening up completely passages in it that might possibly puzzle the student, such as the mysterious footnote 48a. It considers the main ingredients of Gödel's proof: arithmetization, strong representability, and the Fixed Point Theorem in a layered fashion, returning to their various aspects: semantic, syntactic, computational, philosophical and mathematical, as the topic arises. It samples some of the most (...) important proofs of the Incompleteness Theorems, e.g. due to Kuratowski, Smullyan and Robinson, as well as newer proofs, also of other independent statements, due to H. Friedman, Weiermann and Paris-Harrington. It examines the question whether the incompleteness of e.g. Peano Arithmetic gives immediately the undecidability of the Entscheidungsproblem, as Kripke has recently argued. It considers set-theoretical incompleteness, and finally considers some of the philosophical consequences considered in the literature. (shrink)

Given any simply consistent formal theory F of the state complexity L(S) of finite binary sequences S as computed by 3-tape-symbol Turing machines, there exists a natural number L(F ) such that L(S) > n is provable in F only if n L(F ). The proof resembles Berry’s..

This fourth edition of one of the classic logic textbooks has been thoroughly revised by John Burgess. The aim is to increase the pedagogical value of the book for the core market of students of philosophy and for students of mathematics and computer science as well. This book has become a classic because of its accessibility to students without a mathematical background, and because it covers not simply the staple topics of an intermediate logic course such as Godel's Incompleteness (...) Theorems, but also a large number of optional topics from Turing's theory of computability to Ramsey's theorem. John Burgess has now enhanced the book by adding a selection of problems at the end of each chapter, and by reorganising and rewriting chapters to make them more independent of each other and thus to increase the range of options available to instructors as to what to cover and what to defer. (shrink)

It is well known that Gödel’s incompleteness theorems hold for ∑1-definable theories containing Peano arithmetic. We generalize Gödel’s incompleteness theorems for arithmetically definable theories. First, we prove that every ∑n+1-definable ∑n-sound theory is incomplete. Secondly, we generalize and improve Jeroslow and Hájek’s results. That is, we prove that every consistent theory having ∏n+1set of theorems has a true but unprovable ∏nsentence. Lastly, we prove that no ∑n+1-definable ∑n-sound theory can prove its own ∑n-soundness. These three results are generalizations (...) of Rosser’s improvement of the first incompleteness theorem, Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, and the second incompleteness theorem, respectively. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that it is more difficult to see how Godel's incompleteness theorems and related consistency proofs for formal systems are consistent with the views of formalists, mechanists and traditional intuitionists than it is to see how they are consistent with a particular form of mathematical realism. If the incompleteness theorems and consistency proofs are better explained by this form of realism then we can also see how there is room for skepticism about Church's Thesis (...) and the claim that minds are machines. (shrink)

The paper examines Husserl’s interactions with logicians in the 1930s in order to assess Husserl’s awareness of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. While there is no mention about the results in Husserl’s known exchanges with Hilbert, Weyl, or Zermelo, the most likely source about them for Husserl is Felix Kaufmann (1895–1949). Husserl’s interactions with Kaufmann show that Husserl may have learned about the results from him, but not necessarily so. Ultimately Husserl’s reading marks on Friedrich Waismann’s Einführung in das mathematische Denken: (...) die Begriffsbildung der modernen Mathematik, 1936, show that he knew about them before his death in 1938. (shrink)

We prove the following three theorems on the enumeration degrees of ∑20 sets. Theorem A: There exists a nonzero noncuppable ∑20 enumeration degree. Theorem B: Every nonzero Δ20enumeration degree is cuppable to 0′e by an incomplete total enumeration degree. Theorem C: There exists a nonzero low Δ20 enumeration degree with the anticupping property.

This is a critical analysis of the first part of Go¨del’s 1951 Gibbs lecture on certain philosophical consequences of the incompleteness theorems. Go¨del’s discussion is framed in terms of a distinction between objective mathematics and subjective mathematics, according to which the former consists of the truths of mathematics in an absolute sense, and the latter consists of all humanly demonstrable truths. The question is whether these coincide; if they do, no formal axiomatic system (or Turing machine) can comprehend the (...) mathematizing potentialities of human thought, and, if not, there are absolutely unsolvable mathematical problems of diophantine form. (shrink)

A survey of more philosophical applications of Gödel's incompleteness results.

Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems have the same scientific status as Einstein's principle of relativity, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, and Watson and Crick's double helix model of DNA. Our aim is to discuss some new faces of the incompleteness phenomenon unveiled by an information-theoretic approach to randomness and recent developments in quantum computing.

Following F. William Lawvere, we show that many self-referential paradoxes, incompleteness theorems and fixed point theorems fall out of the same simple scheme. We demonstrate these similarities by showing how this simple scheme encompasses the semantic paradoxes, and how they arise as diagonal arguments and fixed point theorems in logic, computability theory, complexity theory and formal language theory.

This short book has two main purposes. The first is to explain Kurt Gödel's first and second incompleteness theorems in informal terms accessible to a layperson, or at least a non-logician. The author claims that, to follow this part of the book, a reader need only be familiar with the mathematics taught in secondary school. I am not sure if this is sufficient. A grasp of the incompleteness theorems, even at the level of ‘the big picture’, might (...) require some experience with the rigor of mathematical proof. Moreover, since the incompleteness theorems concern formal deductive systems, it would help for a potential reader of this book to have some familiarity with at least elementary logic.There are, of course, a number of informal expositions of the incompleteness theorems. I do not see the need to engage in a comparative study. The second, and more important, goal of the present book is to discuss some alleged consequences of the incompleteness theorems and, in particular, to debunk thoroughly claims in philosophy, religion, and literary criticism that are supposed to be established, or at least bolstered, by incompleteness. The execution of this part of the book is masterly. The arguments are clear and compelling.The book has eight chapters, each between eight and twenty-eight pages. The opening chapter gives a very brief account of the incompleteness theorems and a sketch of Gödel's life and work. Chapter 2 gives the main overview of the incompleteness theorems, plus …. (shrink)

This paper reassesses the criticism of the Lucas-Penrose anti-mechanist argument, based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, as formulated by Krajewski : this argument only works with the additional extra-formal assumption that “the human mind is consistent”. Krajewski argues that this assumption cannot be formalized, and therefore that the anti-mechanist argument – which requires the formalization of the whole reasoning process – fails to establish that the human mind is not mechanistic. A similar situation occurs with a corollary to the argument, (...) that the human mind allegedly outperforms machines, because although there is no exhaustive formal definition of natural numbers, mathematicians can successfully work with natural numbers. Again, the corollary requires an extra-formal assumption: “PA is complete” or “the set of all natural numbers exists”. I agree that extra-formal assumptions are necessary in order to validate the anti-mechanist argument and its corollary, and that those assumptions are problematic. However, I argue that formalization is possible and the problem is instead the circularity of reasoning that they cause. The human mind does not prove its own consistency, and outperforms the machine, simply by making the assumption “I am consistent”. Starting from the analysis of circularity, I propose a way of thinking about the interplay between informal and formal in mathematics. (shrink)

"The Emperor's New Mind" by Roger Penrose has received a great deal of both praise and criticism. This review discusses philosophical aspects of the book that form an attack on the "strong" AI thesis. Eight different versions of this thesis are distinguished, and sources of ambiguity diagnosed, including different requirements for relationships between program and behaviour. Excessively strong versions attacked by Penrose (and Searle) are not worth defending or attacking, whereas weaker versions remain problematic. Penrose (like Searle) regards the notion (...) of an algorithm as central to AI, whereas it is argued here that for the purpose of explaining mental capabilities the architecture of an intelligent system is more important than the concept of an algorithm, using the premise that what makes something intelligent is not what it does but how it does it. What needs to be explained is also unclear: Penrose thinks we all know what consciousness is and claims that the ability to judge Go "del's formula to be true depends on it. He also suggests that quantum phenomena underly consciousness. This is rebutted by arguing that our existing concept of "consciousness" is too vague and muddled to be of use in science. This and related concepts will gradually be replaced by a more powerful theory-based taxonomy of types of mental states and processes. The central argument offered by Penrose against the strong AI thesis depends on a tempting but unjustified interpretation of Goedel's incompleteness theorem. Some critics are shown to have missed the point of his argument. A stronger criticism is mounted, and the relevance of mathematical Platonism analysed. Architectural requirements for intelligence are discussed and differences between serial and parallel implementations analysed. (shrink)

What were the earliest reactions to Gödel's incompleteness theorems? After a brief summary of previous work in this area I analyse, by means of unpublished archival material, the first reactions in Vienna and Berlin to Gödel's groundbreaking results. In particular, I look at how Carnap, Hempel, von Neumann, Kaufmann, and Chwistek, among others, dealt with the new results.

The authors' novel approach to some interesting mathematical concepts - not normally taught in other courses - places them in a historical and philosophical setting. Although primarily intended for mathematics undergraduates, the book will also appeal to students in the sciences, humanities and education with a strong interest in this subject. The first part proceeds from about 1800 BC to 1800 AD, discussing, for example, the Renaissance method for solving cubic and quartic equations and providing rigorous elementary proof that certain (...) geometrical problems posed by the ancient Greeks cannot be solved by ruler and compass alone. The second part presents some fundamental topics of interest from the past two centuries, including proof of G del's incompleteness theorem, together with a discussion of its implications. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We use Gödel’s incompleteness theorems as a case study for investigating mathematical depth. We examine the philosophical question of what the depth of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems consists in. We focus on the methodological study of the depth of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, and propose three criteria to account for the depth of the incompleteness theorems: influence, fruitfulness, and unity. Finally, we give some explanations for our account of the depth of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.

We present an abstract framework in which we give simple proofs for Gödel’s First and Second Incompleteness Theorems and obtain, as consequences, Davis’, Chaitin’s and Kritchman-Raz’s Theorems.

This article shows that in two respects, Gödel's incompleteness theorem strongly supports the arguments of Edgar Morin's complexity paradigm. First, from the viewpoint of the content of Gödel's theorem, the latter justifies the basic view of complexity paradigm according to which knowledge is a dynamic, unfinished process, and develops by way of self-criticism and self-transcendence. Second, from the viewpoint of the proof procedure of Gödel's theorem, the latter confirms the complexity paradigm's circular line (...) of inference through which is formed the all-round knowledge of a concrete object. (shrink)

Whether it was John Searle’s Chinese Room argument (Searle, 1980) or Roger Penrose’s argument of the non-computable nature of a mathematician’s insight – an argument that was based on Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem (Penrose, 1989), we have always had skeptics that questioned the possibility of realizing strong Artificial Intelligence (AI), or what has become known by Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). But this new book by Landgrebe and Smith (henceforth, L&S) is perhaps the strongest argument ever made against strong AI. (...) It is a very extensive review of what building a mind essentially amounts to drawing on insights and results from biology, physics, linguistics, computability, philosophy, and mathematics. (shrink)