Mathematical realism and gödel's incompleteness theorems

Philosophia Mathematica 2 (3):177-201 (1994)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that it is more difficult to see how Godel's incompleteness theorems and related consistency proofs for formal systems are consistent with the views of formalists, mechanists and traditional intuitionists than it is to see how they are consistent with a particular form of mathematical realism. If the incompleteness theorems and consistency proofs are better explained by this form of realism then we can also see how there is room for skepticism about Church's Thesis and the claim that minds are machines.

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Citations of this work

Gödel And The Intuition Of Concepts.Richard Tieszen - 2002 - Synthese 133 (3):363-391.
Gödel and the intuition of concepts.Richard Tieszen - 2002 - Synthese 133 (3):363 - 391.
Gödel's ‘Disproof’ of the Syntactical Viewpoint.Victor Rodych - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):527-555.

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References found in this work

On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem.Alan Turing - 1936 - Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 42 (1):230-265.
Minds, Machines and Gödel.John R. Lucas - 1961 - Philosophy 36 (137):112-127.
Minds, Machines and Gödel.J. R. Lucas - 1961 - Etica E Politica 5 (1):1.
From Mathematics to Philosophy.Hao Wang - 1974 - London and Boston: Routledge.
From Mathematics to Philosophy.Hao Wang - 1975 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (2):170-174.

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