We give a survey of current research on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems from the following three aspects: classifications of different proofs of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, the limit of the applicability of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, and the limit of the applicability of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem.

In this paper, we examine the limit of applicability of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. We first define the notion “$\textsf {G1}$ holds for the theory $T$”. This paper is motivated by the following question: can we find a theory with a minimal degree of interpretation for which $\textsf {G1}$ holds. To approach this question, we first examine the following question: is there a theory T such that Robinson’s $\mathbf {R}$ interprets T but T does not interpret $\mathbf {R}$ and $\textsf (...) {G1}$ holds for T? In this paper, we show that there are many such theories based on Jeřábek’s work using some model theory. We prove that for each recursively inseparable pair $\langle A,B\rangle $, we can construct a r.e. theory $U_{\langle A,B\rangle }$ such that $U_{\langle A,B\rangle }$ is weaker than $\mathbf {R}$ w.r.t. interpretation and $\textsf {G1}$ holds for $U_{\langle A,B\rangle }$. As a corollary, we answer a question from Albert Visser. Moreover, we prove that for any Turing degree $\mathbf {0}< \mathbf {d}<\mathbf {0}^{\prime }$, there is a theory T with Turing degree $\mathbf {d}$ such that $\textsf {G1}$ holds for T and T is weaker than $\mathbf {R}$ w.r.t. Turing reducibility. As a corollary, based on Shoenfield’s work using some recursion theory, we show that there is no theory with a minimal degree of Turing reducibility for which $\textsf {G1}$ holds. (shrink)

LetZ2,Z3, andZ4denote 2nd, 3rd, and 4thorder arithmetic, respectively. We let Harrington’s Principle, HP, denote the statement that there is a realxsuch that everyx-admissible ordinal is a cardinal inL. The known proofs of Harrington’s theorem “$Det\left$implies 0♯exists” are done in two steps: first show that$Det\left$implies HP, and then show that HP implies 0♯exists. The first step is provable inZ2. In this paper we show thatZ2+ HP is equiconsistent with ZFC and thatZ3+ HP is equiconsistent with ZFC + there exists a remarkable (...) cardinal. As a corollary,Z3+ HP does not imply 0♯exists, whereas Z4+ HP does. We also study strengthenings of Harrington’s Principle over 2ndand 3rdorder arithmetic. (shrink)

In this work, we aim at understanding incompleteness in an abstract way via metamathematical properties of formal theories. We systematically examine the relationships between the following twelve important metamathematical properties of arithmetical theories: Rosser, EI (effectively inseparable), RI (recursively inseparable), TP (Turing persistent), EHU (essentially hereditarily undecidable), EU (essentially undecidable), Creative, |$\textbf{0}^{\prime }$| (theories with Turing degree |$\textbf{0}^{\prime }$|⁠), REW (all RE sets are weakly representable), RFD (all recursive functions are definable), RSS (all recursive sets are strongly representable), RSW (all (...) recursive sets are weakly representable). Given any two properties |$P$| and |$Q$| in the above list, we examine whether |$P$| implies |$Q$|⁠. (shrink)

In this paper, we prove that: if κ is supercompact and the math formula Hypothesis holds, then there is a proper class of regular cardinals in math formula which are measurable in math formula. Woodin also proved this result independently [11]. As a corollary, we prove Woodin's Local Universality Theorem. This work shows that under the assumption of the math formula Hypothesis and supercompact cardinals, large cardinals in math formula are reflected to be large cardinals in math formula in a (...) local way, and reveals the huge difference between math formula-supercompact cardinals and supercompact cardinals under the math formula Hypothesis. (shrink)

Remarkable cardinals were introduced by Schindler, who showed that the existence of a remarkable cardinal is equiconsistent with the assertion that the theory of L\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${L}$$\end{document} is absolute for proper forcing :176–184, 2000). Here, we study the indestructibility properties of remarkable cardinals. We show that if κ is remarkable, then there is a forcing extension in which the remarkability of κ becomes indestructible by all <κ-closed ≤κ-distributive forcing and all two-step iterations of (...) the form Add∗R˙\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${Add*\dot{\mathbb R}}$$\end{document}, where R˙\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\dot{\mathbb R}}$$\end{document} is forced to be <κ-closed and ≤κ-distributive. In the process, we introduce the notion of a remarkable Laver function and show that every remarkable cardinal carries such a function. We also show that remarkability is preserved by the canonical forcing of the GCH. (shrink)

This paper belongs to the research on the limit of the first incompleteness theorem. Effectively inseparable (EI) theories can be viewed as an effective version of essentially undecidable (EU) theories, and EI is stronger than EU. We examine this question: Are there minimal effectively inseparable theories with respect to interpretability? We propose tEI, the theory version of EI. We first prove that there are no minimal tEI theories with respect to interpretability (i.e., for any tEI theory T, we can effectively (...) find a theory which is tEI and strictly weaker than T with respect to interpretability). By a theorem due to Pour-EI, we have that tEI is equivalent with EI. Thus, there are no minimal EI theories with respect to interpretability. Also, we prove that there are no minimal finitely axiomatizable EI theories with respect to interpretability. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We use Gödel’s incompleteness theorems as a case study for investigating mathematical depth. We examine the philosophical question of what the depth of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems consists in. We focus on the methodological study of the depth of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, and propose three criteria to account for the depth of the incompleteness theorems: influence, fruitfulness, and unity. Finally, we give some explanations for our account of the depth of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.