Viruses have been virtually absent from philosophy of biology. In this editorial introduction, we explain why we think viruses are philosophically important. We focus on six issues, and we show how they relate to classic questions of philosophy of biology and even general philosophy.

This article argues that Karl Rahner’s theme of “eschatological ignorance” should be retrieved to facilitate and to fortify the enactment of Catholic theology’s prophetic commitments in a U.S. context. First, the article presents and defends Rahner’s famous distinction between eschatology and apocalyptic. Second, it characterizes Rahner’s distinction as representative of his conviction of a need for docta ignorantia futuri, which stems from his theology of God as Absolute Mystery, and which, though Rahner recommends it to twentieth-century Europeans, seems particularly well (...) suited for theological application in the twenty-first-century United States. Third, it suggests how Rahner’s eschatological ignorance might make a prophetic impact on the American socio-religio-political climate. (shrink)

When people retell stories, what guides their retelling? Most previous research on story retelling and story comprehension has focused on information accuracy as the key measure of stability in transmission. This paper suggests that there is a second, affective, dimension that provides stability for retellings, namely the audience affect of surprise. In a large-sample study with multiple iterations of retellings, we found evidence that people are quite accurate in preserving all degrees of surprisingness in serial reproduction – even when the (...) event that produced the surprisingness in the original story is dropped or changed. Thus, we propose that the preservation of affect is an implicit goal of retelling: not merely do retellers recall highly surprising events better, but rather they register all levels of surprisingness precisely and aim to surprise their implied audience to same degree. This study used 2,389 participants. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Die guten Sitten in der arbeitsrechtlichen Rechtsprechung nach dem Kriege" verfügbar.

SummaryWhat does our analysis mean for moral education? Let's take the first of our four aims mentioned above, the development of moral judgement abilities. With regard to the subject matter, the method, the teacher as person, and the community, we might follow from a postmodern point of view:second, that there is not just one valid method to de‐equilibrate children's moral cognitive schemata, but, again, that the chosen method is believed to be effective–knowing that it is just one option;third, that there (...) is a multitude of positions within the same approach. For instance, the just‐community approach might go along with different social, political and moral reasons, intentions, and meanings. Nevertheless, teachers can stick to ‘their model’, even if they know that their choice is also a pragmatic one.In concluding, I should probably give an answer to the question of the title of my presentation: Can a curriculum of moral education be postmodern? I think to have shown that it can and that it is a necessity if we think about postmodernism not as an attempt to pour out the baby of moral education with the metaphysical bath water of modern dreams. Moral education will exist as long as education does, and conceptions of moral education have to react reflectively to changes of and critiques of modern belief systems. A ring is still a ring, even if it is a just copy of something we do not believe in anymore. (shrink)

Public school as a constitutional condition of modern democracy can not deal with absolutistic and fundamentalistic claims of public morality in a neutral way. The problems resulting from this for a laicistic school are discussed in the context of liberal tradition in France and the “école laïque” as it originated in the 19th century.