We effectively construct the finitely generated free equivalential algebras corresponding to the equivalential fragment of intuitionistic propositional logic.

We construct the finitely generated free algebras and determine the free spectra of varieties of linear equivalential algebras and linear equivalential algebras of finite height corresponding. respectively, to the equivalential fragments of intermediate Gödel-Dummett logic and intermediate finite-valued logics of Gödel. Thus we compute the number of purely equivalential propositional formulas in these logics in n variables for an arbitrary n ∈ N.

We show that the variety of equivalential algebras with regularization gives the algebraic semantics for the -fragment of intuitionistic propositional logic. We also prove that this fragment is hereditarily structurally complete.

Important positive as well as negative results on interpolation property in fragments of the intuitionistic propositional logic (INT) were obtained by J. I. Zucker in [6]. He proved that the interpolation theorem holds in purely implicational fragment of INT. He also gave an example of a fragment of INT for which interpolation fails. This fragment is determined by the constant falsum (), well known connectives: implication () and conjunction (), and by a ternary connective defined as follows: (...) (p, q, r)= df (pq)(pr).Extending this result of J. I. Zucker, G. R. Renardel de Lavalette proved in [5] that there are continuously many fragments of INT without the interpolation property. (shrink)

We study the variety of equivalential algebras with zero and its subquasivariety that gives the equivalent algebraic semantics for the ‐fragment of intuitionistic propositional logic. We prove that this fragment is hereditarily structurally complete. Moreover, we effectively construct the finitely generated free equivalential algebras with zero.

A new structure, called equality algebras, will be introduced. It has two connectives, a meet operation and an equivalence, and a constant. A closure operator will be defined in the class of equality algebras, and we call the closed algebras equivalential. We show that equivalential equality algebras are term equivalent with BCK-algebras with meet. As a by-product, we obtain a quite general result, which is analogous to a result of Kabziński and Wroński: we provide an equational characterization for (...) the equivalential fragment of BCK-algebras with meet. (shrink)

A new structure, called pseudo equality algebras, will be introduced. It has a constant and three connectives: a meet operation and two equivalences. A closure operator will be introduced in the class of pseudo equality algebras; we call the closed algebras equivalential. We show that equivalential pseudo equality algebras are term equivalent with pseudo BCK-meet-semilattices. As a by-product we obtain a general result, which is analogous to a result of Kabziński and Wroński: we provide an equational characterization for (...) the equivalence operations of pseudo BCK-meet-semilattices. Our result treats a much more general algebraic structure, namely, pseudo BCK-meet-semilattice instead of Heyting algebras, on the other hand, we also need to use the meet operation. Finally, we prove that the variety of pseudo equality algebras is a subtractive, 1-regular, arithmetical variety. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate some basic semantic and syntactic conditions characterizing the equivalence connective. In particular we define three basic classes of algebras: the class of weak equivalential algebras, the class of equivalential algebras and the class of regular equivalential algebras.Weak equivalential algebras can be used to study purely equivalential fragments of relevant logics and strict equivalential fragments of some modal logics. Equivalential algebras are suitable to study purely equivalential fragment (...) of BCI and BCK logic. A subclass of the class of regular equivalential algebras is suitable to study equivalential fragments of ukasiewicz logics. Some subvarieties of the class of regular equivalential algebras provide natural semantics for equivalential fragments of the intuitionistic prepositional logic and various intermediate logics. (shrink)

This book stands at the intersection of two topics: the decidability and computational complexity of hybrid logics, and the deductive systems designed for them. Hybrid logics are here divided into two groups: standard hybrid logics involving nominals as expressions of a separate sort, and non-standard hybrid logics, which do not involve nominals but whose expressive power matches the expressive power of binder-free standard hybrid logics.The original results of this book are split into two parts. This division reflects the division of (...) the book itself. The first type of results concern model-theoretic and complexity properties of hybrid logics. Since hybrid logics which we call standard are quite well investigated, the efforts focused on hybrid logics referred to as non-standard in this book. Non-standard hybrid logics are understood as modal logics with global counting operators ) whose expressive power matches the expressive power of binder-free standard hybrid logics. The relevant results comprise: 1. Establishing a sound and complete axiomatization for the modal logic K with global counting operators ), which can be easily extended onto other frame classes, 2. Establishing tight complexity bounds, namely NExpTime-completeness for the modal logic with global counting operators defined over the classes of arbitrary, reflexive, symmetric, serial and transitive frames ), MT), MD), MB), MK4) with numerical subscripts coded in binary. Establishing the exponential-size model property for this logic defined over the classes of Euclidean and equivalential frames ), MS5).Results of the second type consist of designing concrete deductive systems for standard and non-standard hybrid logics. More precisely, they include: 1. Devising a prefixed and an internalized tableau calculi which are sound, complete and terminating for a rich class of binder-free standard hybrid logics. An interesting feature of indicated calculi is the nonbranching character of the rule, 2. Devising a prefixed and an internalized tableau calculi which are sound, complete and terminating for non-standard hybrid logics. The internalization technique applied to a tableau calculus for the modal logic with global counting operators is novel in the literature, 3. Devising the first hybrid algorithm involving an inequality solver for modal logics with global counting operators. Transferring the arithmetical part of reasoning to an inequality solver turned out to be sufficient in ensuring termination.The book is directed to philosophers and logicians working with modal and hybrid logics, as well as to computer scientists interested in deductive systems and decision procedures for logics. Extensive fragments of the first part of the book can also serve as an introduction to hybrid logics for wider audience interested in logic.The content of the book is situated in the areas of formal logic and theoretical computer science with some elements of the theory of computational complexity. (shrink)

In [14] we used the term finitely algebraizable for algebraizable logics in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi [2] and we introduced possibly infinitely algebraizable, for short, p.i.-algebraizable logics. In the present paper, we characterize the hierarchy of protoalgebraic, equivalential, finitely equivalential, p.i.-algebraizable, and finitely algebraizable logics by properties of the Leibniz operator. A Beth-style definability result yields that finitely equivalential and finitely algebraizable as well as equivalential and p.i.-algebraizable logics can be distinguished by injectivity of (...) the Leibniz operator. Thus, from a characterization of equivalential logics we obtain a new short proof of the main result of [2] that a finitary logic is finitely algebraizable iff the Leibniz operator is injective and preserves unions of directed systems. It is generalized to nonfinitary logics. We characterize equivalential and, by adding injectivity, p.i.-algebraizable logics. (shrink)

The notion of an algebraizable logic in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi [3] is generalized to that of a possibly infinitely algebraizable, for short, p.i.-algebraizable logic by admitting infinite sets of equivalence formulas and defining equations. An example of the new class is given. Many ideas of this paper have been present in [3] and [4]. By a consequent matrix semantics approach the theory of algebraizable and p.i.-algebraizable logics is developed in a different way. It is related to the (...) theory of equivalential logics in the sense of Prucnal and Wroski [18], and it is extended to nonfinitary logics. The main result states that a logic is algebraizable (p.i.-algebraizable) iff it is finitely equivalential (equivalential) and the truth predicate in the reduced matrix models is equationally definable. (shrink)

The class of equivalential logics comprises all implicative logics in the sense of Rasiowa [9], Suszko's logic SCI and many others. Roughly speaking, a logic is equivalential iff the greatest strict congruences in its matrices are determined by polynomials. The present paper is the first part of the survey in which systematic investigations into this class of logics are undertaken. Using results given in [3] and general theorems from the theory of quasi-varieties of models [5] we give a (...) characterization of all simple C-matrices for any equivalential logic C. In corollaries we give necessary and sufficient conditions for the class of all simple models for a given equivalential logic to be closed under free products. (shrink)

The class of equivalential logics comprises all implicative logics in the sense of Rasiowa [9], Suszko's logicSCI and many Others. Roughly speaking, a logic is equivalential iff the greatest strict congruences in its matrices (models) are determined by polynomials. The present paper is the first part of the survey in which systematic investigations into this class of logics are undertaken. Using results given in [3] and general theorems from the theory of quasi-varieties of models [5] we give a (...) characterization of all simpleC-matrices for any equivalential logicC (Theorem I.14). In corollaries we give necessary and sufficient conditions for the class of all simple models for a given equivalential logic to be closed under free products (Theorem I.18). (shrink)

We study the variety generated by the three-element equivalential algebra with conjunction on the dense elements. We prove the representation theorem which let us construct the free algebras in this variety.

In the first section logics with an algebraic semantics are investigated. Section 2 is devoted to subdirect products of matrices. There, among others we give the matrix counterpart of a theorem of Jónsson from universal algebra. Some positive results concerning logics with, finite degrees of maximality are presented in Section 3.

In the present note we continue the investigations undertaken in [2]. A full version of the paper has been submitted to Studia Logica. x1 Our goal is to give a characterization of the so called factorial matrices for a logic. A matrix M = is factorial i the greatest congruence M of M coincides with the diagonal of A. Recall that is a congruence of a matrix M = i is a congruence of the algebra A and for any a; (...) b 2 A, if ab then a 2 D i b 2 D. (shrink)

By an algebraic semantics we shall mean a class K of matrices M = for a propositional language L such that D is a singleton, D = fdg. A logic has an algebraic semantics i C =6 ; and there exists an algebraic semantics K strongly adequate for C, i.e., C = CnK. Proposition. If a logic has an algebraic semantics, then every factorial matrix M 2 M atr has the following properties: M is of the form, where 1A 2 (...) A each formula 2 C denes the constant 1A in A, that is, A[a1; : : : ; an] = 1A for any a1; : : : ; an 2 A. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a contribution to the natural logic program which explores logics in natural language. The paper offers two logics called \ \) and \ \) for dealing with inference involving simple sentences with transitive verbs and ditransitive verbs and quantified noun phrases in subject and object position. With this purpose, the relational logics are introduced and a model-theoretic proof of decidability for they are presented. In the present paper we develop algebraic semantics of (...) the logics using congruence theory. (shrink)

It is shown that there are precisely two pretabular varieties of equivalential algebras.

In order to predict and explain behavior, one cannot specify the mental state of an agent merely by saying what information she possesses. Instead one must specify what information is available to an agent relative to various purposes. Specifying mental states in this way allows us to accommodate cases of imperfect recall, cognitive accomplishments involved in logical deduction, the mental states of confused or fragmented subjects, and the difference between propositional knowledge and know-how .

It would be good to have a Bayesian decision theory that assesses our decisions and thinking according to everyday standards of rationality — standards that do not require logical omniscience (Garber 1983, Hacking 1967). To that end we develop a “fragmented” decision theory in which a single state of mind is represented by a family of credence functions, each associated with a distinct choice condition (Lewis 1982, Stalnaker 1984). The theory imposes a local coherence assumption guaranteeing that as an agent's (...) attention shifts, successive batches of "obvious" logical information become available to her. A rule of expected utility maximization can then be applied to the decision of what to attend to next during a train of thought. On the resulting theory, rationality requires ordinary agents to be logically competent and to often engage in trains of thought that increase the unification of their states of mind. But rationality does not require ordinary agents to be logically omniscient. (shrink)

Posthumous Fragments: Spring–Autumn 1881 [Excerpts].

The growing interest in fragmentalism is one of the most exciting trends in philosophy of time and is gradually reshaping the contemporary debate. Providing an extensive interpretation of this view, Samuele Iaquinto and Giuliano Torrengo articulate a novel theory of the passage of time and argue that it is the most effective in vindicating the inherent dynamism of reality. Iaquinto and Torrengo offer the first full-range application of fragmentalism to a number of metaphysical topics, including the open future, causation, the (...) A-theoretic interpretation of special relativity and time travel. The resulting picture, they argue, conveys the potential of a radically new understanding of time. (shrink)

In this paper, we articulate a version of non-standard A-theory—which we call Flow Fragmentalism—in relation to its take on the issue of supervenience of truth on being. According to the Truth Supervenes on Being (TSB) Principle, the truth of past- and future-tensed propositions supervenes, respectively, on past and future facts. Since the standard presentist denies the existence of past and future entities and facts concerning them that do not obtain in the present, she seems to lack the resources to accept (...) both past and future-tensed truths and the TSB Principle. Contrariwise, positions in philosophy of time that accept an eternalist ontology (e.g., B-theory, moving spotlight, and Fine’s and Lipman’s versions of fragmentalism) allow for a “direct” supervenience base for past- and future-tensed truths. We argue that Flow Fragmentalism constitutes a middle ground, which retains most of the advantages of both views, and allows us to articulate a novel account of the passage of time. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that there is a version of possibilism—inspired by the modal analogue of Kit Fine’s fragmentalism—that can be combined with a weakening of actualism. The reasons for analysing this view, which I call Modal Fragmentalism, are twofold. Firstly, it can enrich our understanding of the actualism/possibilism divide, by showing that, at least in principle, the adoption of possibilia does not correspond to an outright rejection of the actualist intuitions. Secondly, and more specifically, it can enrich (...) our understanding of concretism, by proving that, at least in principle, the idea that objects have properties in an absolute manner is compatible with transworld identity. (shrink)

By a consequence relation on a set L of formulas we understand a relation I — c p(L) x L satisfying the conditions called 'Overlap', 'Dilution', and 'Cut for Sets' at p.15 of [25]; we do not repeat the conditions here since we are simply fixing notation and the concept of a consequence relation is well known in any case. (The characterization in [25] amounts to that familiar from Tarski's work, except that there is no 'finitariness' restriction to the effect (...) that when I I — A, for I c L, A c L, we must have I o I — A for some finite I o c I . The presence or absence of this condition makes no difference to anything that follows.) Each language L to be considered will be a sentential language whose formulas are built in the usual way by application of it-ary (primitive) connectives to it simpler formulas, starting with the simplest formulas — the propositional variables (or 'sentence letters') — not constructed with the aid of connectives. We assume, as usual, that there are countably many such variables, and they will be denoted by p, q, r, ... possibly with numerical subscripts. A consequence relation I- on such an L has the Unrestricted Interpolation Property when for any A, C c L with A I — C, there exists B c L with A I — B and B I — C, such that C is constructed only out of such propositional variables as occur both in A and in C. (Such a B is called an interpolant for A and C.) Note that we take the usual notational liberties here, writing "A I — C" (and the like) for "iAi I — C", "I, A I — C" to mean "I u iAi I — C", and "I — C" to mean "8 I — C". Further, we sometimes abbreviate the claim that A I — B and B I — C to "A I — B I — C", and when C is A itself, we always write this simply as "A — II— B".. (shrink)

Fragmentalism allows incompatible facts to constitute reality in an absolute manner, provided that they fail to obtain together. In recent years, the view has been extensively discussed, with a focus on its formalisation in model-theoretic terms. This paper focuses on three formalisations: Lipman’s approach, the subvaluationist interpretation, and a novel view that has been so far overlooked. The aim of the paper is to explore the application of these formalisations to the alethic modal case. This logical exploration will allow us (...) to study (i) cases of metaphysical incompatibility between modal facts and (ii) cases of modal dialetheias. In turn, this will enrich our understanding of the role of impossibility in the fragmentalist framework. (shrink)

This paper explores taste fragmentalism, a novel approach to matters of taste and faultless disagreement. The view is inspired by Kit Fine’s fragmentalism about time, according to which the temporal dimension can be constituted—in an absolute manner—by states that are pairwise incompatible, provided that they do not obtain together. In the present paper, we will apply this metaphysical framework to taste states. In our proposal, two incompatible taste states (such as the state of rhubarb’s being tasty and the state of (...) rhubarb’s being distasteful) can both constitute reality in an absolute manner, although no agent can have joint access to both states. We will then develop a formalised version of our view by means of an exact truthmaker semantics for taste assertions. Within this framework—we argue—our linguistic and inferential practices concerning cases of faultless disagreement are elegantly vindicated, thus suggesting that taste fragmentalism is worth of further consideration. (shrink)

Belief storage is often modeled as having the structure of a single, unified web. This model of belief storage is attractive and widely assumed because it appears to provide an explanation of the flexibility of cognition and the complicated dynamics of belief revision. However, when one scrutinizes human cognition, one finds strong evidence against a unified web of belief and for a fragmented model of belief storage. Using the best available evidence from cognitive science, we develop this fragmented model into (...) a nascent theory of the cognitive architecture of belief storage. (shrink)

Bayesian confirmation theory is our best formal framework for describing inductive reasoning. The problem of old evidence is a particularly difficult one for confirmation theory, because it suggests that this framework fails to account for central and important cases of inductive reasoning and scientific inference. I show that we can appeal to the fragmentation of doxastic states to solve this problem for confirmation theory. This fragmentation solution is independently well-motivated because of the success of fragmentation in solving other problems. I (...) also argue that the fragmentation solution is preferable to other solutions to the problem of old evidence. These other solutions are already committed to something like fragmentation, but suffer from difficulties due to their additional commitments. If these arguments are successful, Bayesian confirmation theory is saved from the problem of old evidence, and the argument for fragmentation is bolstered by its ability to solve yet another problem. (shrink)

From Descartes to Popper, philosophers have criticized and tried to improve the strategies of reasoning invoked in science and in everyday life. In recent years leading cognitive psychologists have painted a detailed, controversial, and highly critical portrait of common sense reasoning. Stephen Stich begins with a spirited defense of this work and a critique of those writers who argue that widespread irrationality is a biological or conceptual impossibility.Stich then explores the nature of rationality and irrationality: What is it that distinguishes (...) good reasoning from bad? He rejects the most widely accepted approaches to this question approaches which unpack rationality by appeal to truth, to reflective equilibrium or conceptual analysis. The alternative he defends grows out of the pragmatic tradition in which reasoning is viewed as a cognitive tool. Stich's version of pragmatism leads to a radical epistemic relativism and he argues that the widespread abhorrence of relativism is ill founded. (shrink)

The thesis of mental fragmentation has recently attracted increased attention as a way of explaining facts about mind and language. This volume provides an accessible introduction and essays on foundations and applications of fragmentation.

In PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS, Søren Kierkegaard (writing under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus), seeks to explain the nature of Christianity in such as way as to bring out its demands on the individual, and to emphasize its incompatibility with the theology based on the work of Hegel that was becoming progressively more influential in Denmark. If one were to read only two or three of Kierkegaard's works, this is unquestionably one of the ones to read. One cannot understand Kierkegaard's thought without reading (...) this book, and along with its sequel represents the heart of what he was trying to achieve in what he called his "Authorship." Through PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS, Kierkegaard purports to present the logic of Christianity. (shrink)

I criticize the idea that theories of ‘fragmented’ or ‘compartmentalized’ belief (as found in, e.g., Lewis 1982, Egan 2008) can help to account for the puzzling phenomena they are often taken to account for. After introducing fragmentationalism and a paradigm case that purportedly motivates it, I criticize the view primarily on the grounds that the models and explanations it offers are at best trivial—as witnessed by examples of over-generation—and should be seen as merely re-describing in figurative terms the phenomena it (...) is designed to account for. I also point out that fragments, as used in these theories, are not likely to be psychologically real in any robust sense and so cannot be appealed to on such grounds. (shrink)

This paper discusses the fragmentation of psychology and proposals for unification hitherto proffered. It is argued that unity will not be achieved until competing ideas regarding morality, ontology, epistemology, and so forth are critically examined and evaluated. Ideas that pass theoretical muster and that cohere with human moral interests will provide a theoretical starting point for unification efforts. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

Kris McDaniel argues that there are different ways in which things exist. For instance, past things don't exist in the same way as present things. Numbers don't exist in the same way as physical objects; nor do holes, which are real, but less real than what they are in. McDaniel's theory of being illuminates a wide range of metaphysical topics.

We show that large fragments of MM, e. g. the tree property and stationary reflection, are preserved by strongly -game-closed forcings. PFA can be destroyed by a strongly -game-closed forcing but not by an ω2-closed.

We establish by elementary proof-theoretic means the conservativeness of two subsystems of analysis over primitive recursive arithmetic. The one subsystem was introduced by Friedman [6], the other is a strengthened version of a theory of Minc [14]; each has been shown to be of considerable interest for both mathematical practice and metamathematical investigations. The foundational significance of such conservation results is clear: they provide a direct finitist justification of the part of mathematical practice formalizable in these subsystems. The results are (...) generalized to relate a hierarchy of subsystems, all contained in the theory of arithmetic properties, to a corresponding hierarchy of fragments of arithmetic. The proof theoretic tools employed there are used to re-establish in a uniform, elementary way relationships between various fragments of arithmetic due to Parsons, Paris and Kirby, and Friedman. (shrink)