Theoria 85 (3):185-201 (2019)

Authors
Giuliano Torrengo
Università degli Studi di Milano
Samuele Iaquinto
University of Turin
Abstract
In this paper, we articulate a version of non-standard A-theory – which we call Flow Fragmentalism – in relation to its take on the issue of supervenience of truth on being. According to the Truth Supervenes on Being (TSB) Principle, the truth of past- and future-tensed propositions supervenes, respectively, on past and future facts. Since the standard presentist denies the existence of past and future entities and facts concerning them that do not obtain in the present, she seems to lack the resources to accept both past and future-tensed truths and the TSB Principle. Contrariwise, positions in philosophy of time that accept an eternalist ontology (e.g., B-theory, moving spotlight, and Fine’s and Lipman’s versions of fragmentalism) allow for a “direct” supervenience base for past- and future-tensed truths. We argue that Flow Fragmentalism constitutes a middle ground, which retains most of the advantages of both views, and allows us to articulate a novel account of the passage of time.
Keywords Fragmentalism  Presentism  Temporal Passage  Tense Realism  Supervenience
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/theo.12182
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Aboutness.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - Princeton University Press.
The Unreality of Time.John Ellis McTaggart - 1908 - Mind 17 (68):457-474.
Truth and Ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.

View all 38 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Is the world a heap of quantum fragments?Samuele Iaquinto & Claudio Calosi - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2009-2019.
The Invisible Thin Red Line.Giuliano Torrengo & Samuele Iaquinto - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):354-382.
Modal Fragmentalism.Samuele Iaquinto - 2020 - The Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):570-587.
The Rotten Core of Presentism.Jonathan Tallant & David Ingram - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3969-3991.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Fine’s Fragmentalism.Martin A. Lipman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3119-3133.
Kit Fine on Tense and Reality.Steven Savitt - 2016 - Manuscrito 39 (4):75-99.
Tensed Supervenience: A No‐Go for Presentism.Sam Baron - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):383-401.
Fine’s McTaggart: Reloaded.Roberto Loss - 2017 - Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 40 (1):209-239.
Fine's Trilemma and the Reality of Tensed Facts.Roberto Loss - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):209-217.
Fragmentalist Presentist Perdurantism.Samuele Iaquinto - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):693-703.
Presentism and the Objection From Being-Supervenience.Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):485-497.
Presentism and the Grounding of Truth.Alex Baia - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):341-356.
Presentism, Tense, and Truthmaker.Tora Koyama - 2007 - Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 34 (2):49-59.
Eternal Facts in an Ageing Universe.Fabrice Correia & Sven Rosenkranz - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):307 - 320.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-01-09

Total views
202 ( #57,444 of 2,508,046 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
36 ( #24,329 of 2,508,046 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes