La multitemporalidad cumple una función importante en la novela “Condiciones Extremas” (1998, 2000 y 2005) del colombiano Juan B. Gutiérrez. Este texto es una hipernovela que presenta una organización narrativa temporal desfamiliarizadora anclada en las tendencias temáticas y estrategias textuales generales de las obras de ciencia ficción. La dispersión de la subjetividad de los personajes se observa en la narrativa y en la representación del texto como un hipermedia adaptable en donde la manipulación del elemento temporal es un aspecto esencial (...) en la interpretación de la narrativa digital. En la presentación y estructuración de su narrativa, “Condiciones Extremas” utiliza Literatrónica en su última versión. Éste es un motor de inteligencia artificial que preselecciona vínculos para que el lector-usuario siga en la construcción de la(s) historia(s) de la obra. Literatrónica trata de evitar la posible dispersión del sujeto-lector que se asocia con las múltiples alternativas de navegación de un hipertexto, proporcionándole a su lector-usuario una narrativa coherente, al estilo de las narrativas no-virtuales, presente desde el principio. De tal forma que cualquiera que sea la ruta de navegación por la que el lector-usuario opte, no se va a impedir una experiencia narrativa “completa” de la novela. (shrink)

In this article, we will present a number of technical results concerning Classical Logic, ST and related systems. Our main contribution consists in offering a novel identity criterion for logics in general and, therefore, for Classical Logic. In particular, we will firstly generalize the ST phenomenon, thereby obtaining a recursively defined hierarchy of strict-tolerant systems. Secondly, we will prove that the logics in this hierarchy are progressively more classical, although not entirely classical. We will claim that a logic is to (...) be identified with an infinite sequence of consequence relations holding between increasingly complex relata: formulae, inferences, metainferences, and so on. As a result, the present proposal allows not only to differentiate Classical Logic from ST, but also from other systems sharing with it their valid metainferences. Finally, we show how these results have interesting consequences for some topics in the philosophical logic literature, among them for the debate around Logical Pluralism. The reason being that the discussion concerning this topic is usually carried out employing a rivalry criterion for logics that will need to be modified in light of the present investigation, according to which two logics can be non-identical even if they share the same valid inferences. (shrink)

In some recent articles, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley, & van Rooij have defended the idea that abandoning transitivity may lead to a solution to the trouble caused by semantic paradoxes. For that purpose, they develop the Strict-Tolerant approach, which leads them to entertain a nontransitive theory of truth, where the structural rule of Cut is not generally valid. However, that Cut fails in general in the target theory of truth does not mean that there are not certain safe instances of Cut (...) involving semantic notions. In this article we intend to meet the challenge of answering how to regain all the safe instances of Cut, in the language of the theory, making essential use of a unary recovery operator. To fulfill this goal, we will work within the so-called Goodship Project, which suggests that in order to have nontrivial naïve theories it is sufficient to formulate the corresponding self-referential sentences with suitable biconditionals. Nevertheless, a secondary aim of this article is to propose a novel way to carry this project out, showing that the biconditionals in question can be totally classical. In the context of this article, these biconditionals will be essentially used in expressing the self-referential sentences and, thus, as a collateral result of our work we will prove that none of the recoveries expected of the target theory can be nontrivially achieved if self-reference is expressed through identities. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the extent to which the very existence of substructural logics puts the Tarskian conception of logical systems in jeopardy. In order to do this, we highlight the importance of the presence of different levels of entailment in a given logic, looking not only at inferences between collections of formulae but also at inferences between collections of inferences—and more. We discuss appropriate refinements or modifications of the usual Tarskian identity criterion for logical systems, and propose an (...) alternative of our own. After that, we consider a number of objections to our account and evaluate a substantially different approach to the same problem. (shrink)

Adding a transparent truth predicate to a language completely governed by classical logic is not possible. The trouble, as is well-known, comes from paradoxes such as the Liar and Curry. Recently, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij have put forward an approach based on a non-transitive notion of consequence which is suitable to deal with semantic paradoxes while having a transparent truth predicate together with classical logic. Nevertheless, there are some interesting issues concerning the set of metainferences validated by this (...) logic. In this paper, we show that this logic, once it is adequately understood, is weaker than classical logic. Moreover, the logic is in a way similar to the paraconsistent logic LP. (shrink)

When discussing Logical Pluralism several critics argue that such an open-minded position is untenable. The key to this conclusion is that, given a number of widely accepted assumptions, the pluralist view collapses into Logical Monism. In this paper we show that the arguments usually employed to arrive at this conclusion do not work. The main reason for this is the existence of certain substructural logics which have the same set of valid inferences as Classical Logic—although they are, in a clear (...) sense, non-identical to it. We argue that this phenomenon can be generalized, given the existence of logics which coincide with Classical Logic regarding a number of metainferential levels—although they are, again, clearly different systems. We claim this highlights the need to arrive at a more refined version of the Collapse Argument, which we discuss at the end of the paper. (shrink)

Many authors have considered that the notions of paraconsistency and dialetheism are intrinsically connected, in many cases, to the extent of confusing both phenomena. However, paraconsistency is a formal feature of some logics that consists in invalidating the rule of explosion, whereas dialetheism is a semantical/ontological position consisting in accepting true contradictions. In this paper, we argue against this connection and show that it is perfectly possible to adopt a paraconsistent logic and reject dialetheism, and, moreover, that there are examples (...) of non-paraconsistent logics that can be interpreted in a dialetheic way. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a non-trivial and expressively complete paraconsistent naïve theory of truth, as a step in the route towards semantic closure. We achieve this goal by expressing self-reference with a weak procedure, that uses equivalences between expressions of the language, as opposed to a strong procedure, that uses identities. Finally, we make some remarks regarding the sense in which the theory of truth discussed has a property closely related to functional completeness, and we present a sound and (...) complete three-sided sequent calculus for this expressively rich theory. (shrink)

Rejecting the Cut rule has been proposed as a strategy to avoid both the usual semantic paradoxes and the so-called v-Curry paradox. In this paper we consider if a Cut-free theory is capable of accurately representing its own notion of validity. We claim that the standard rules governing the validity predicate are too weak for this purpose and we show that although it is possible to strengthen these rules, the most obvious way of doing so brings with it a serious (...) problem: an internalized version of Cut can be proved for a Curry-like sentence. We also evaluate a number of possible ways of escaping this difficulty. (shrink)

Anti-exceptionalism about logic states that logical theories have no special epistemological status. Such theories are continuous with scientific theories. Contemporary anti-exceptionalists include the semantic paradoxes as a part of the elements to accept a logical theory. Exploring the Buenos Aires Plan, the recent development of the metainferential hierarchy of ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-logics shows that there are multiple options to deal with such paradoxes. There is a whole ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} (...) \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-based hierarchy, of which LP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {LP}}$$\end{document} and ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document} themselves are only the first steps. This means that the logics in this hierarchy are also options to analyze the inferential patterns allowed in a language that contains its own truth predicate. This paper explores these responses analyzing some reasons to go beyond the first steps. We show that LP\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {LP}}$$\end{document}, ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document} and the logics of the ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-hierarchy offer different diagnoses for the same evidence: the inferences and metainferences the agents endorse in the presence of the truth-predicate. But even if the data are not enough to adopt one of these logics, there are other elements to evaluate the revision of classical logic. Which is the best explanation for the logical principles to deal with semantic paradoxes? How close should we be to classical logic? And mainly, how could a logic obey the validities it contains? From an anti-exceptionalist perspective, we argue that ST\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {ST}}$$\end{document}-metainferential logics in general—and STTω\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbf {STT}}_{\omega }$$\end{document} in particular—are the best available options to explain the inferential principles involved with the notion of truth. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that classical logic is trivialized in the presence of a transparent truth-predicate. In this paper, we will explain why this point of view must be given up. The hierarchy of metainferential logics defined in Barrio et al. and Pailos recovers classical logic, either in the sense that every classical inferential validity is valid at some point in the hierarchy ), or because a logic of a transfinite level defined in terms of the hierarchy shares its validities (...) with classical logic. Each of these logics is consistent with transparent truth—as is shown in Pailos —, and this suggests that, contrary to standard opinions, transparent truth is after all consistent with classical logic. However, Scambler presents a major challenge to this approach. He argues that this hierarchy cannot be identified with classical logic in any way, because it recovers no classical antivalidities. We embrace Scambler’s challenge and develop a new logic based on these hierarchies. This logic recovers both every classical validity and every classical antivalidity. Moreover, we will follow the same strategy and show that contingencies need also be taken into account, and that none of the logics so far presented is enough to capture classical contingencies. Then, we will develop a multi-standard approach to elaborate a new logic that captures not only every classical validity, but also every classical antivalidity and contingency. As a€truth-predicate can be added to this logic, this result can be interpreted as showing that, despite the claims that are extremely widely accepted, classical logic does not trivialize in the context of transparent truth. (shrink)

Recently, it has been proposed to understand a logic as containing not only a validity canon for inferences but also a validity canon for metainferences of any finite level. Then, it has been shown that it is possible to construct infinite hierarchies of "increasingly classical" logics—that is, logics that are classical at the level of inferences and of increasingly higher metainferences—all of which admit a transparent truth predicate. In this paper, we extend this line of investigation by taking a somehow (...) different route. We explore logics that are different from classical logic at the level of inferences, but recover some important aspects of classical logic at every metainferential level. We dub such systems meta-classical non-classical logics. We argue that the systems presented deserve to be regarded as logics in their own right and, moreover, are potentially useful for the non-classical logician. (shrink)

In different papers, Carnielli, W. & Rodrigues, A., Carnielli, W. Coniglio, M. & Rodrigues, A. and Rodrigues & Carnielli, present two logics motivated by the idea of capturing contradictions as conflicting evidence. The first logic is called BLE and the second—that is a conservative extension of BLE—is named LETJ. Roughly, BLE and LETJ are two non-classical logics in which the Laws of Explosion and Excluded Middle are not admissible. LETJ is built on top of BLE. Moreover, LETJ is a Logic (...) of Formal Inconsistency. This means that there is an operator that, roughly speaking, identifies a formula as having classical behavior. Both systems are motivated by the idea that there are different conditions for accepting or rejecting a sentence of our natural language. So, there are some special introduction and elimination rules in the theory that are capturing different conditions of use. Rodrigues & Carnielli’s paper has an interesting and challenging idea. According to them, BLE and LETJ are incompatible with dialetheia. It seems to show that these paraconsistent logics cannot be interpreted using truth-conditions that allow true contradictions. In short, BLE and LETJ talk about conflicting evidence avoiding to talk about gluts. I am going to argue against this point of view. Basically, I will firstly offer a new interpretation of BLE and LETJ that is compatible with dialetheia. The background of my position is to reject the one canonical interpretation thesis: the idea according to which a logical system has one standard interpretation. Then, I will secondly show that there is no logical basis to fix that Rodrigues & Carnielli’s interpretation is the canonical way to establish the content of logical notions of BLE and LETJ. Furthermore, the system LETJ captures inside classical logic. Then, I am also going to use this technical result to offer some further doubts about the one canonical interpretation thesis. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that it’s not a good idea to have a theory of truth that is consistent but ω-inconsistent. In order to bring out this point, it is useful to consider a particular case: Yablo’s Paradox. In theories of truth without standard models, the introduction of the truth-predicate to a first order theory does not maintain the standard ontology. Firstly, I exhibit some conceptual problems that follow from so introducing it. Secondly, I show that (...) in second order theories with standard semantics the same procedure yields a theory that doesn’t have models. So, while having an ω- inconsistent theory is a bad thing, having an unsatisfiable theory of truth is actually worse. This casts doubts on whether the predicate in question is, after all, a truthpredicate for that language. Finally, I present some alternatives to prove an inconsistency adding plausible principles to certain theories of truth. (shrink)

A theory of truth is usually demanded to be consistent, but -consistency is less frequently requested. Recently, Yatabe has argued in favour of -inconsistent first-order theories of truth, minimising their odd consequences. In view of this fact, in this paper, we present five arguments against -inconsistent theories of truth. In order to bring out this point, we will focus on two very well-known -inconsistent theories of truth: the classical theory of symmetric truth FS and the non-classical theory of naïve truth (...) based on ᴌukasiewicz infinitely valued logic: PAᴌT. (shrink)

The concept of _substructural logic_ was originally introduced in relation to limitations of Gentzen’s structural rules of Contraction, Weakening and Exchange. Recent years have witnessed the development of substructural logics also challenging the Tarskian properties of Reflexivity and Transitivity of logical consequence. In this introduction we explain this recent development and two aspects in which it leads to a reassessment of the bounds of classical logic. On the one hand, standard ways of defining the notion of logical consequence in classical (...) logic naturally induce substructural logics when admitting more than two truth values; on the other hand, these substructural logics give rise to hierarchies of _metainferences_ that can be used to approximate classical logic at different levels. (shrink)

The main idea that we want to defend in this paper is that the question of what a logic is should be addressed differently when structural properties enter the game. In particular, we want to support the idea according to which it is not enough to identify the set of valid inferences to characterize a logic. In other words, we will argue that two logical theories could identify the same set of validities, but not be the same logic.

Resumen: La tolerancia es un privilegio de los poderosos. Una persona puede tolerar sólo si tiene el poder para interferir con aquello que objeta. En este artículo analizaré las circunstancias en las que alguien tiene el poder para tolerar. Argumentaré que la respuesta debe incorporar consideraciones tanto prácticas como metafísicas. Específicamente, defenderé que alguien tiene el poder para tolerar cuando sus propiedades fundan tal poder en la situación práctica en que ella se encuentra, según es caracterizada por sus intereses prácticos. (...) Al hacerlo criticaré el análisis del mencionado poder realizado por Glen Newey. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that a theory of truth for arithmetic should be consistent, but -consistency is a highly desirable feature for such theories. The point has already been made for first-order languages, though the evidence is not entirely conclusive. We show that in the second-order case the consequence of adopting -inconsistent theories of truth are considered: the revision theory of nearly stable truth T # and the classical theory of symmetric truth FS. Briefly, we present some conceptual problems with (...) ω-inconsistent theories, and demonstrate some technical results that support our criticisms of such theories. (shrink)

Opinionated state of the art paper on scientific explanation. Analysis and discussion of the most relevant models and theories in the contemporary literature, namely, the deductive-nomological model, the models of inductive-statistical and statistical relevance, the pragmatic theory of why questions, the unifying theory of standard arguments, and the causal/non-causal counterfactual theory.

This paper is a reply to Benjamin Smart’s : 319–332, 2013) recent objections to David Armstrong’s solution to the problem of induction : 503–511, 1991). To solve the problem of induction, Armstrong contends that laws of nature are the best explanation of our observed regularities, where laws of nature are dyadic relations of necessitation holding between first-order universals. Smart raises three objections against Armstrong’s pattern of inference. First, regularities can explain our observed regularities; that is, universally quantified conditionals are required (...) for explanations. Second, if Humean’s pattern of inference is irrational, then Armstrong’s pattern of inference is also irrational. Third, universal regularities are the best explanation of our observed regularities. I defend Armstrong’s solution of induction, arguing against these three claims. (shrink)

This article tries to delineate the proposition that to Feuerbach nature is an autonomous and independent being that comes first in comparison to the spirit. To him, material nature, that exists in its qualitative differentness, independent from thinking, is the original source, the immediate, not deductible, uncreated fundament of all real existence, that exists and consists in itself, when put vis-a-vis the spirit. Feuerbach sets nature against the spirit, for it is his understanding that nature is not a pure other (...) that only through the spirit was set as nature, but as the first source, the objective material reality that exists outside reason and is given to man by means of his senses as fundament and essence of his life. Therefore, one is dealing first with that essence (light, air, water, fire, plants, animals etc) without which man does not exist or could be thought of as existing. To Feuerbach nature is all objects and essences put together. Under this condition it is possible to conceive nature as guarantor of externality itself as if it could exist independently from us, an entity that is unaware of itself and which exists in itself and by itself; for this reason it shall not be seen as something which it is not, i.e., neither divine nor human. Nature always existed, i.e., it exists in itself and has only meaning in itself; it is itself, i.e., it has no mystical essence, it does not hide behind it any absolute being whether human, divine, transcendental or ideal. (shrink)

I propose a deductive-nomological model for mathematical scientific explanation. In this regard, I modify Hempel’s deductive-nomological model and test it against some of the following recent paradigmatic examples of the mathematical explanation of empirical facts: the seven bridges of Königsberg, the North American synchronized cicadas, and Hénon-Heiles Hamiltonian systems. I argue that mathematical scientific explanations that invoke laws of nature are qualitative explanations, and ordinary scientific explanations that employ mathematics are quantitative explanations. I analyse the repercussions of this deductivenomological model (...) on causal explanations. (shrink)

Mathematical proofs aim to establish the truth of mathematical propositions by means of logical rules. Some recent literature in philosophy of mathematics alleges that some mathematical proofs also reveal why the proved mathematical propositions are true. These mathematical proofs are called explanatory mathematical proofs. In this paper, I present and discuss some salient problems around mathematical explanation: the existence problem, the normative problem, the explanandum problems of truth value and psychological value, the logical structure problem, the regress problem and the (...) modelling problem. At the end, I sum up two contemporary models for mathematical explanation – the deductive-nomological model and the model of Steiner. I analyse these models against the previous problems. (shrink)

This paper defends the Quine-Putnam mathematical indispensability argument against two objections raised by Penelope Maddy. The objections concern scientific practices regarding the development of the atomic theory and the role of applied mathematics in the continuum and infinity. I present two alternative accounts by Stephen Brush and Alan Chalmers on the atomic theory. I argue that these two theories are consistent with Quine’s theory of scientific confirmation. I advance some novel versions of the indispensability argument. I argue that these new (...) versions accommodate Maddy’s history of the atomic theory. Counter-examples are provided regarding the role of the mathematical continuum and mathematical infinity in science. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper defends David Armstrong’s solution to the problem of inductionb against Helen Beebee’s attack on that solution. To solve theproblem of induction, Armstrong contends that the timeless necessity explanation is the best explanation of our observed regularities, whereas Beebee attempts to demonstrate that the time-limited necessity explanation is an equally good explanation. Allegedly, this explanation blocks Armstrong’s solution. I demonstrate that even if the time-limited ecessity explanation were an equally good explanation of our observed regularities, this explanation does (...) not block Armstrong’s solution. I argue that, in fact, the timeless necessity explanation is a better explanation of our observed regularities than is the time-limited necessity explanation. (shrink)

The logics of formal inconsistency are logics tolerant to some amount of contradiction, but in which some versions of explosion still hold. The main result of this paper is a reconstruction of two such logics in the dialogical framework. By doing so, we achieve two things. On the one hand, we provide a formal approach to argumentative situations where some contradictions may occur while keeping the idea that there may still be situations in which some propositions are ‘safe’ in the (...) sense of immunity to the contradictions. On the other hand, we open a new line of study on these logics, in the context of the game-theoretical approach to semantics born in the 1960s, with various interesting perspectives, some of which are discussed at the end of this article. (shrink)

Mi objetivo en este artículo es examinar la génesis y el desarrollo de la noción de derecho de gentes en el pensamiento de Kant. Para este propósito, reconstruyo, en un primer momento, las líneas principales del pensamiento de Gottfried Achenwall en su obra Elementa Iuris Naturae. En un segundo paso, analizo la Lección de derecho natural de 1784 en la cual Kant – sin todavía contar con su propia teoría legal de madurez – expone pero también discute de manera sumamente (...) crítica varias de las tesis de Achenwall concernientes al ius belli. Lo que pretendo con esto es mostrar en la última parte del presente artículo que muchas de las ideas de Kant en sus trabajos maduros de filosofía político-jurídica de la década de 1790 pueden rastrearse a la lección que dictó con base en el tratado de Achenwall, y que bajo esta perspectiva dichas ideas pueden ser comprendidas de mucho mejor manera. Por último, subrayo que las continuidades y las rupturas entre Achenwall y Kant revelan un profundo vínculo entre los dos autores susceptible de seguir siendo explorado. (shrink)

Semantic paradoxes pose a real threat to logics that attempt to be capable of expressing their own semantic concepts. Particularly, Curry paradoxes seem to show that many solutions must change our intuitive concepts of truth or validity or impose limits on certain inferences that are intuitively valid. In this way, the logic of a universal language would have serious problems. In this paper, we explore a different solution that tries to avoid both limitations as much as possible. Thus, we argue (...) that it is possible to capture the naive concepts of truth and validity without losing any of the valid inferences of classical logic. This approach is called the Buenos Aires plan. We present the logic of truth and validity, $$\mathsf {STTV}_{\omega }$$ based on the hierarchy of logics $$\textsf{ST}_{\omega }$$, whose validity predicate has the same semantic conditions as the material conditional. We argue that $$\mathsf {STTV}_{\omega }$$ is capable of blocking the problematic results while keeping the deductive power of classical logic as much as possible and offering an adequate semantic theory. On the other hand, one could object that it is not possible to reason with $$\mathsf {STTV}_{\omega }$$ because it is not closed under its logical principles. We respond to this objection and argue that the local characterization of validity shows how to make inferences using the logic $$\textsf{ST}_{\omega }$$. (shrink)

In this paper, I start by describing and examining the main results about the option of formalizing the Yablo Paradox in arithmetic. As it is known, although it is natural to assume that there is a right representation of that paradox in first order arithmetic, there are some technical results that give rise to doubts about this possibility. Then, I present some arguments that have challenged that Yablo’s construction is non-circular. Just like that, Priest (1997) has argued that such formalization (...) shows that Yablo’s Paradox involves implicit circularity. In the same direction, Beall (2001) has introduced epistemic factors in this discussion. Even more, Priest has also argued that the introduction of infinitary reasoning would be of little help. Finally, one could reject definitions of circularity in term of fixed-point adopting non-well-founded set theory. Then, one could hold that the Yablo paradox and the Liar paradox share the same non-well-founded structure. So, if the latter is circular, the first is too. In all such cases, I survey Cook’s approach (2006, forthcoming) on those arguments for the charge of circularity. In the end, I present my position and summarize the discussion involved in this volume. En este artículo, describo y examino los principales resultados vinculados a la formalización de la paradoja de Yablo en la aritmética. Aunque es natural suponer que hay una representación correcta de la paradoja en la aritmética de primer orden, hay algunos resultados técnicos que hacen surgir dudas acerca de esta posibilidad. Más aún, presento algunos argumentos que han cuestionado que la construcción de Yablo no sea circular. Así, Priest (1997) ha argumentado que la formalización de la paradoja de Yablo en la aritmética de primer orden muestra que la misma involucra implícitamente circularidad. En la misma dirección, Beall (2001) ha introducido factores epistémicos en esta discusión. Más aún, Priest ha también argumentado que la introducción de razonamiento infinitario como complemento de la formalización en la aritmética sería de poca ayuda. Finalmente, se podría rechazar todo intento de dar definiciones de circularidad en términos de puntos fijos adoptando teoría de conjuntos infundados. Entonces, se podría sostener que la paradoja de Yablo y la del mentiroso comparten la misma estructura infundada. Por eso, si la última es circular, también lo es la primera. En todos los casos, presento el enfoque de Roy Cook (2006, en prensa) sobre estos argumentos que atribuyen circularidad a la construcción de Yablo. En el final, presento mi posición y un breve resumen de la discusión involucrada en este volumen. (shrink)

RESUMO Este estudo tem por objetivo compreender o processo criativo durante a gênese textual de títulos em histórias inventadas por alunos recém-alfabetizados. A partir da perspectiva teórico-metodológica oferecida pela Genética Textual, dentro de uma abordagem linguístico-enunciativa, analisamos as relações associativas constituídas na recuperação de informações advindas das memórias semântica e episódica desses alunos. Tomamos como unidade de análise o diálogo face a face, estabelecido durante um processo de produção textual colaborativa, no contexto ecológico da sala de aula. Nossa análise, qualitativa (...) e microgenética, permitiu mapear o modo como ideias e elementos linguísticos são articulados de forma imprevisível e inusitada, formando redes associativas, tanto por semelhanças semânticas, quanto por semelhanças sonoras. As redes associativas indicam que a criatividade se dá entre o reconhecimento do jogo de linguagem e, ao mesmo tempo, preservação das propriedades do gênero textual e da unidade de sentido do manuscrito escolar em construção. ABSTRACT This study aims to understand the creative process during the textual genesis of titles in stories invented by newly literate students. Based on the theoretical-methodological perspective offered by Textual Genetics, within a linguistic-enunciative approach, we analyze the associative relations constituted in the retrieval of information from the semantic and episodic memories of these students. We take as a unit of analysis the face to face dialogue, established during a collaborative textual production process, in the ecological context of the classroom. Our qualitative and microgenetic analysis allowed us to map the way ideas and linguistic elements are articulated in an unpredictable and unusual way, forming associative networks, both by semantic and sound similarities. The associative networks indicate that creativity occurs between the recognition of the language set while preserving the properties of the textual genre and the unity of meaning of the school manuscript under construction. (shrink)

O sentido da paciência costuma ser assumido imediatamente como aquilo que é preciso ter para se alcançar uma meta. Ela seria, então, o meio para um fim. De outro modo, no discurso edificante de Kierkegaard de 1843, a paciência aparece como um caminho que se encaminha para si mesmo como forma de aquisição da alma em detrimento do mundo. Para o autor, a paciência é o pressuposto da vida, e a alma é o que precisa ser adquirido a cada vez (...) através do exercício desse pressuposto elementar. (shrink)

The most common definition of belief is taken from analytical philosophy, which understands it as a proposition that is considered as true. Such a broad definition is ambiguous for some fields of empirical research, like psychology, which deals with the mental state of the believer when holding the belief. This article aims to reach an operationalization of beliefs to pinpoint their distinctive features with respect to similar concepts. We summarize the most influential interpretations of belief in psychology and psychiatry, which (...) are mainly based on Immanuel Kant and analytical philosophy. We also expose the problem that arises from putting the mental states of beliefs, knowledge, opinions and preferences in the same bag. Our proposal is that a belief is: a proposition that is taken to be true; and which the subject is willing to hold even if irrefutable evidence were hypothetically argued against it. We introduce a narrower interpretation to reliably discriminate the mental state of believing, which is intended to be applied to empirical psychology, neuroscience, behavioral economics, sociology and related sciences. (shrink)

Cognition is meant as the process of acquiring knowledge from the world. This process is supposed to happen within agents, which build such knowledge with the purpose to use it to determine their actions on the world. Following Peircean ideas, we postulate that such knowledge is encoded by means of signs. According to Peirce, signs are anything that can be used to represent anything else. Also, for Peirce, to represent means to be able to generate another sign, called the interpretant (...) of the original sign, which still holds the same power of interpretability, I.e, its power to be transformed into a new sign, holding this same power. This happens through a process called semiosis, the process by which a sign is transformed into an interpretant. This whole process is performed with the aim of subsidizing the agent in deciding its behavior. So, even though the semiosis process has the power to continue infinitely, it usually stops whenever the generated interpretant brings enough information in order for the agent to effectively act in the world. We take signals to be the substract of signs. Signals are any physical property, which can be measured and captured by the agent, by means of its sensors. This includes any kind of internal memory the agent is able to have access, in order to operate. In this sense, signs can be both in the world and within the own agent’s mind. We understand an agent’s mind as the agents’ control system. In either case, signals can be abstracted as numbers. Not simply numbers, but numbers coming from specific sensors or specific memories. Using ideas from Peircean philosophy, in this work we postulate a pathway, in which signals, collected by either sensors or memory, can be organized in such a way that they can be effectively used as knowledge, in order for an agent to be able to decide its actions on the world, on the pursuit of its internal motivations. We postulate that agents identify and create a model of the world based on possibilities, existents, and laws, and based on this model, they are able to decide an action that maximizes the chance for the world to gain a shape, which the agents intend for it to be. This theory is postulated particularly for the case of artificial autonomous agents, meant to be constructed by engineering artifacts. (shrink)

Cognition is meant as the process of acquiring knowledge from the world. This process is supposed to happen within agents, which build such knowledge with the purpose to use it to determine their actions on the world. Following Peircean ideas, we postulate that such knowledge is encoded by means of signs. According to Peirce, signs are anything that can be used to represent anything else. Also, for Peirce, to represent means to be able to generate another sign, called the interpretant (...) of the original sign, which still holds the same power of interpretability, I.e, its power to be transformed into a new sign, holding this same power. This happens through a process called semiosis, the process by which a sign is transformed into an interpretant. This whole process is performed with the aim of subsidizing the agent in deciding its behavior. So, even though the semiosis process has the power to continue infinitely, it usually stops whenever the generated interpretant brings enough information in order for the agent to effectively act in the world. We take signals to be the substract of signs. Signals are any physical property, which can be measured and captured by the agent, by means of its sensors. This includes any kind of internal memory the agent is able to have access, in order to operate. In this sense, signs can be both in the world and within the own agent’s mind. We understand an agent’s mind as the agents’ control system. In either case, signals can be abstracted as numbers. Not simply numbers, but numbers coming from specific sensors or specific memories. Using ideas from Peircean philosophy, in this work we postulate a pathway, in which signals, collected by either sensors or memory, can be organized in such a way that they can be effectively used as knowledge, in order for an agent to be able to decide its actions on the world, on the pursuit of its internal motivations. We postulate that agents identify and create a model of the world based on possibilities, existents, and laws, and based on this model, they are able to decide an action that maximizes the chance for the world to gain a shape, which the agents intend for it to be. This theory is postulated particularly for the case of artificial autonomous agents, meant to be constructed by engineering artifacts. (shrink)

Al final de la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar, Kant aborda el problema de las pruebas de la existencia de Dios y revisa en detalle el argumento que a él le parece el único capaz de provocar verdadero asentimiento: la prueba moral. Se revisa el camino que sigue Kant para llegar, a través de su anál..

Uno de los problemas que se le presentan a Kant en la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar es el de la aptitud de la naturaleza en su diversidad particular para ser conformada por las leyes del entendimiento. En este contexto, Kant defi ne los conceptos de naturaleza, materia y fi nalidad de una manera que antes no había tenido cabida en su sistema, y postula la idea de una técnica o arte de la naturaleza. En este artículo se analiza (...) y discute cómo Kant aborda esto, haciendo hincapié en el papel que juega el principio de la conformidad a fi n en el marco de una naciente ciencia de los seres vivos.One of the problems for Kant in the Critique of Judgment is the suitability of nature's particular diversity to the laws of the understanding. In this context, Kant characterizes the concepts of nature, matter and purposiveness in a novel fashion, putting forward the idea of an art or technique of nature. This article considers this new Kantian approach emphasizing the role played by the principle of purposiveness in a context in which a new science of living beings is emerging. (shrink)

State of the art paper on the problem of induction: how to justify the conclusion that ‘all Fs are Gs’ from the premise that ‘all observed Fs are Gs’. The most prominent theories of contemporary philosophical literature are discussed and analysed, such as: inductivism, reliabilism, perspective of laws of nature, rationalism, falsificationism, the material theory of induction and probabilistic approaches, according to Carnap, Reichenbach and Bayesianism. In the end, we discuss the new problem of induction of Goodman, raised by the (...) grue predicate. (shrink)

: O presente artigo evidencia, por um lado, o mérito da filosofia de Espinosa, pelo fato de haver submetido a oposição das partes e do todo, do corpo e da alma, da matéria e do espírito, à unidade da substância, já que toda parte singular da substância pertence à sua natureza. Por outro lado, destaca a crítica de Feuerbach a Espinosa, porque a filosofia deste é, na verdade, uma filosofia da identidade, que não reconhece, como Hegel também assinala, a substância (...) como espírito e o espírito como substância, e não determina suficientemente a unidade da matéria e do espírito, já que falta a ela a realidade da diferença, da determinidade. Enquanto Espinosa identifica Deus com a natureza (Deus sive natura) e, mediante a natureza divina (a substância), supera a contradição de Descartes entre matéria (res extensa) e espírito (res cogitans), Feuerbach quer, em oposição ao panteísmo, a diferença entre natureza e Deus (aut Deus aut natura). (shrink)

State of the art paper on the topic realism/anti-realism. The first part of the paper elucidates the notions of existence and independence of the metaphysical characterization of the realism/anti-realism dispute. The second part of the paper presents a critical taxonomy of the most important positions and doctrines in the contemporary literature on the domains of science and mathematics: scientific realism, scientific anti-realism, constructive empiricism, structural realism, mathematical Platonism, mathematical indispensability, mathematical empiricism, intuitionism, mathematical fictionalism and second philosophy.

My aim in this paper is to examine some of the distinctive facets of human action in Spinoza’s philosophy and show their intrinsic connection with each other. By analyzing in detail how Spinoza addresses different aspects of human action in his main work, the Ethics, it is possible to notice that for him free human agency implies two interrelated features: on the one hand, the adequate knowledge of the causes that determine it, and, on the other hand, a growing capacity (...) to impact with greater power the scenarios in which it takes place. Thus, in contrast with quietist and passive readings, I show in the following that the two aforementioned characteristics are part of the Spinozian philosophical conception of agency as such. By pursuing this line of thought, it is also possible to establish a link—not always noticed in the secondary literature—with some of the central lines of thought contained in the Theological-Political Treatise. In discussing these theses, I advance the idea that the Spinozian conception of human agency involves a serious readjustment of the metaphysical vision of the agent, a change in her conduct and ethical practices, and an altogether different conception of politics and religion. (shrink)

Some recent literature [Hicks, M. T. and van Elswyk. P., (2015) pp. 433-443, 2015; Bhogal, H. (2017), pp. 447-460] has argued that the non-Humean conceptions of laws of nature have a same weakness as the Humean conceptions of laws of nature. That is, both conceptions face an explanatory circularity problem. The argument is as follows: the Humean and the non-Humean conceptions of laws of nature agree that the law statements are universal generalisations; thus, both conceptions are vulnerable to an explanatory (...) circularity problem between the laws of nature and their instances. In this paper, I argue that Armstrong’s necessitarian view of laws of nature is invulnerable to this explanatory circularity problem. (shrink)

RESUMO: Não há, no pensamento de Marx, uma elaboração sistemática acerca da religião, embora haja uma crítica a ela enquanto crítica social das condições materiais de existência, que é o fundamento dela. Para Marx, a religião, entendida especificamente como superstição, idolatria, “ópio”, a qual conforma o homem e embaraça a sua consciência, deve ser negada, mas não se trata pura e simplesmente de um desprezo, de uma proibição ou perseguição à religião, nem tampouco de uma negação em geral a ela, (...) uma vez que ela é uma questão privada e deve ser respeitada, mas de desvelar o véu religioso presente na sociedade e no seu ordenamento político, no Estado, que oculta a exploração e a opressão humana. A crítica à religião como crítica da realidade social, da qual ela nasce e é expressão ideal, contribui, de certa forma, para a emancipação social do homem. ABSTRACT: it is not to be found in Marx’s thought a systematic elaboration concerning religion, although there is indeed a critical appraisal of it as a result from his social critique of material conditions of human existence which is its foundation. In Marx’s perception, religion is understood specifically as superstition, idolatry, “opiate”, something that pushes man to accommodation and twists his conscience, and as such should be dismissed, this act being not, however, a mere refusal, prohibition or persecution, or a wide negation of it, considering that it is a private issue and as such should be respected, but as an effort to cast off the religious veil covering society and its political ordainment commanded by the State, and hides exploitation and oppression of human beings. Critique of religion as an evaluation of social reality, from which religion derives, is an ideal proposition that to a certain extension contributes to the social emancipation of men. (shrink)

State of art paper on the topic causation, around the problem of the nature of causation. Central theories of contemporary philosophical literature are discussed and analysed, namely, regularity theories of Hume and Mackie, counterfactual theories of Lewis, probabilistic theories of Reichenbach, Lewis and Menzies and causal processes theories of Salmon and Dowe.