O artigo interpreta o pensamento de Heidegger como transformação da filosofia transcendental que conduz à sua radicalização e, ultimamente, destruição. A este projecto contrapõe Apel a sua tentativa de estabelecer uma filosofia transcendental linguístico-pragmática que procura estabelecer um compromisso entre as temáticas da constituição antepredicativa do sentido e da exigência de validade intersubjectiva. /// L'article interprète la pensée de Heidegger comme transformation de la philosophie transcendantale qui conduit à sa radicalisation et, en dernier lieu, à sa destruction. A ce (...) projet, Apel oppose sa tentative d'établir une philosophie transcendantale linguistique pragmatique qui cherche à faire un compromis entre les thématiques de la constitution anteprédicative du sens et de l'exigence de validité intersubjective. /// The author interprets Heidegger's thought in terms of a transformation of transcendental philosophy, leading to its radicalization and finally its destruction. In the place of this project, the author proposes a transcendental philosophy of a linguistic and pragmatic kind, wich seeks to establish a compromise between the thematics of ante-predicative constitution of sense and the demand for intersubjective validity. (shrink)

There are several paradigms of 'first philosophy' (e.g. Aristotle, Descartes). A third paradigm of first philosophy is transcendental pragmatics or transcendental semiotics (exemplified by Peirce and Wittgenstein). Husserl correctly grasped that Descartes inaugurated first philosophy in the sense of a transcendental inquiry into the foundations of absolute knowledge. But Husserl's retrieval of Descartes remains within the second paradigm in that it ignores the role of language as a condition of the possibility of objectively constituted knowledge. I propose to re-examine Descartes's (...) conception of first philosophy to see if it can be read in the light of the third paradigm of transcendental philosophy, namely transcendental semiotics. I argue that Cartesian methodic doubt can be rehabilitated (against Wittgenstein's critique) as a kind of 'fallibilistic' approach to knowledge of a Peircean kind, and that the Cartesian cogito can be read (following Hintikka) as recognition of performative contradiction and of the necessity of speech acts, and hence of the transcendental communication community. (shrink)

Le besoin d'une ethique globale a son origine dans la situation humaine comme telle (l'hominisation nous a en effet eloignes de la securite naturelle des instincts animaux et nous a jetes dans l'etat de liberte) et specialement dans la situation presente de l'humanite. Celle-ci se caracterise par un accroissement extreme des defis externes a notre co-responsabilite. Ces defis sont poses par les resultats de la science naturelle, de la technologie, de la politique et de l'economie tandis que semblent bien marquer (...) les ressources internes de la raison ethique. Le present livre tente de montrer que l'approche pragmatico-transcendantale de l'ethique de la discussion est en mesure de reconstruire la genese de cette situation et de fournir une reponse rationnelle tant aux defis externes qu'aux defis internes auxquels une ethique globale est confrontee. (shrink)

The paper tries first to show that P. Strawson’s and J. Searle’s proposal of explicating the illocutionary meaning of speech-acts in terms of the conditions of fulfilment or satisfaction is unsatisfactory. It provides no full understanding of the meaning of speech-acts, at least not of non-constative acts, as e.g. orders, requests, demands, confessions, promisses, etc.; for, through its quasi-verificationist horizon, it provides no unterstanding of the illocutionary force in terms of the conditions of accepting the validity-claims that are connected with (...) the performance of the act. Thus far the paper complies with Habermas’ approach. There remains however an ambiguity with regard to the good reasons for accepting a speech-act, since on the level of life-world communication and interaction not only validity-claims and pertinent arguments but also threats and offers are functioning as socially binding illocutionary forces. How is it possible to show by a cogent argument that openly strategical acts as offers and threats cannot fulfill the role of providing good reasons for accepting speech-acts in the sense of unrestricted Verständigung but are parasitic upon non-strategical ways of consensual communication by understanding and accepting validity-claims?The paper argues that this suggestive contention cannot be proved, i.e. grounded by a descriptive analysis of the normal function of communicative actions in the life-world but only - indeed - by transcendental pragmatic reflection on the normative conditions of argumentative discourse which cannot be denied without committing a performative self-contradiction. (shrink)

In what follows I wish to raise and eventually to suggest an answer to the following question: What is the rationality of human communication? Why should we ask this question? By way of a first approach I would place the problem within the context of the so called “pragmatic turn” of analytic philosophy, i.e. within a context in which the concept of the rationality of logical syntactics and logical semantics of language systems has been integrated into, or superseded by, the (...) rationality concept of the human use of language—say, e.g., of arguments. (shrink)

RESUMO O artigo pretende mostrar o sentido da noção de transcendental no interior do método reconstrutivo de Jürgen Habermas. Para isso, ele procura apresentar em primeiro lugar a diferença entre a argumentação transcendental como argumentação anticética e a prova transcendental em Kant e, em seguida, a diferença entre Habermas e Apel sobre a possibilidade de uma fundamentação última da racionalidade comunicativa. Segundo minha interpretação, há razões de ordem lógica para a recusa da fundamentação última em Habermas, mas também razões (...) ligados à historicidade da compreensão da razão. ABSTRACT The article aims to show the meaning of the notion of "transcendental" inside the reconstructive method of Jürgen Habermas. For such, first of all, it attempts to present the difference between the transcendental argumentation as anti-skeptical argumentation and the transcendental proof in Kant and, then, the difference between Habermas and Apel about the possibility of an ultimate foundation of communicative rationality. According to my interpretation, there are reasons of logical order for the refusal of the ultimate foundation in Habermas, but also reasons related to the historicity of understanding of reason. (shrink)

This paper examines two contemporary answers to the question of whether moral values and norms are apt for rational criticism and justification: Richard Rorty’s radically contextualist approach—which is centered around the notion of contingency and is characterized by a dismissal of all claims to philosophical justification—and Karl-Otto Apel’s transcendental-pragmatic version of discourse ethics—which encompasses highly ambitious claims to justification and universal validity. Contrasting the key theses of Rorty’s contextualism with those of Apel’s universalist discourse ethics and reconstructing their (...) respective conceptions of moral progress we argue that neither Rorty’s nor Apel’s position is convincing. (shrink)

[E.H. Gombrich wrote on May 13, 1975:] . . . I recently was invited to talk about "Art" at the Institution for Education of our University. There was a well-intentioned teacher there who put forward the view that we had no right whatever to influence the likes and dislikes of our pupils because every generation had a different outlook and we could not possibly tell what theirs would be. It is the same extreme relativism, which has invaded our art schools (...) and resulted in the doctrine that art could not possibly be taught because only what has been done already can be taught, and since art is creativity it is not possible to teach it. Q.E.D.—I recently asked my history finalists what "Quod erat demonstrandum" means and they did not know. . . . [Quentin Bell responded on May 15, 1975:] . . . Your teacher at the Institute, is he really a relativist? Isn't he a kind of religious zealot? I used to teach school children. With me there was a much better teacher . One day she came into the room where I had been teaching and found a series of the most surprising and beautiful water colours. "What are these?" said she. I explained that they were copies of Raphael made by eleven and twelve year old children. I would have gone on to explain how interested I was by their resemblance, not to Raphael but rather to Simone Martini, for they had all the shapes beautifully right but none of the internal drawing or the sentiment, but I was checked by her look of horror. "You've made them copy from Raphael?" she said. Her expression was exactly that of someone who had been casually informed that that I had committed a series of indecent assaults upon the brats. And in fact in subsequent conversation it appeared that this was very nearly what she did feel. For her, what she called "self expression" was as precious as virginity. E.H. Gombrich was director of the Warburg Institute and Professor of the History of the Classical Tradition at the University of London from 1959 to 1976. His books include The Story of Art, Art and Illusion, Meditations on a Hobby Horse, Norm and Form, Symbolic Images, The Heritage of Apelles, and In Search of Cultural History. He became a Fellow of the British Academy in 1960, a Commander of the British Empire in 1966, and was knighted in 1972. He is also a trustee of the British Museum and a foreign member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and of the American Philosophical Society. His contributions to Critical Inquiry include "Notes and Exchanges" ,"Standards of Truth: The Arrested Image and the Moving Eye" , and, with Quentin Bell, "Canons and Values in the Visual Arts: A Correspondence" . Quentin Bell is professor of the history and theory of art, Sussex University. He has written Virginia Woolf: A Biography, Of Human Finery, Ruskin, Victorian Artists and Bloomsbury. Other contributions to Critical Inquiry are "The Art Critic and the Art Historian" , "Notes and Exchanges" , and "Bloomsbury and 'the Vulgar Passions'". (shrink)

Metaphysics, understood as the first philosophy, that is, the science of the ultimate foundations and principles of being, has long been declared an anachronism in the postmodern period.1 The pluralistic character of being, the heterogeneity of types of philosophical discourse and their mutual irreducibility, the spatiotemporal discreteness of various ontologies and epistemologies, the understanding of tradition as a given that needs to be overcome rather than continued—all these indicators point to the paradigm of new thinking within which flows the mainstream (...) of twentieth-century philosophical thought. Outside this stream stands the figure of K.-O. Apel, who is devoted to the idea of a single philosophy and continues to uphold it in the face of criticism from all sides. Apel's quixotic unwillingness to relinquish his stance is demonstrated by his new book, published in 1998, in which he continues to develop his ideas, which constitute a complete conception of transcendental pragmatism.2 Inasmuch as a theory that had apparently been relegated to books on the history of philosophy has become topical again, my task is to return to its sources and to reconstruct3 and analyze its basic propositions. (shrink)

I hope you will agree, however, that the purpose of the museum should ultimately be to teach the difference between pencils and works of art. What I have called the shrine was set up and visited by people who thought that they knew this difference. You approached the exhibits with an almost religious awe, an awe which certainly was sometimes misplaced but which secured concentration. Our egalitarian age wants to take the awe out of the museum. It should be a (...) friendly place, welcoming to everyone. Of course it should be. Nobody should feel afraid to enter it or for that matter be kept away by his inability to pay. But as far as I can see the real psychological problem here is how to lift the burden of fear, which is the fear of the outsider who feels he does not belong, without also killing what for want of a better word I must still call respect. Such respect seems to me inseparable from the thrill of genuine admiration which belongs to our enjoyment of art. This admiration is a precious heritage which is in danger of being killed with kindness. E. H. Gombrich was director of the Warburg Institute and Professor of the History of the Classical Tradition at the University of London from 1959 to 1976. His books include The Story of Art, Art and Illusion, Meditations on a Hobby Horse, Norm and Form, Symbolic Images, The Heritage of Apelles, and In Search of Cultural History. He became a Fellow of the British Academy in 1960, a Commander of the British Empire in 1966, and was knighted in 1972. He is also a trustee of the British Museum and a foreign member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and of the American Philosophical Society. His contributions to Critical Inquiry include "Notes and Exchanges", "Standards of Truth: The Arrested Image and the Moving Eye", and, with Quentin Bell, "Canons and Values in the Visual Arts: A Correspondence". (shrink)

El filósofo argentino Ricardo Maliandi destinó su larga trayectoria a elaborar una propuesta ética original que denominó «ética convergente» y que rebautizamos «convergética». La misma ha suscitado una serie de debates entre los especialistas en ética del mundo de habla hispana. En el marco de esas críticas es que se desarrolla nuestro trabajo, pero busca ofrecer una perspectiva desde dentro de la teoría convergente. Para ello se reconstruye la teoría de Maliandi en tres convergencias: la de teorías éticas precedentes (ética (...) axiológica de N. Hartmann y ética del discurso de K. O. Apel), la de principios éticos (los cuatro principios cardinales enunciados por Maliandi) y las dos esferas del ser humano (la esfera racional o lógos y la emocional o páthos). A partir de la elaboración de un experimento mental que llamamos «la nave letona» se ponen en cuestión las ideas nucleares de las dos primeras formas de convergencia en pos de sostener la primacía de la tercera convergencia. Nuestra hipótesis es que si la convergética abandona la aprioricidad de dos de los principios, que ligamos a la dimensión emocional y práctica del ser humano, salvaría así su coherencia interna y ofrecería una mejor guía para los agentes morales. (shrink)

_Critical Heidegger_ brings together a selection of the best work on Martin Heidegger from a number of key commentators working in Europe. These new and classic essays, for the most part translated from German and French originals, are an essential guide to the current European reception of Heidegger and make available essays that have had considerable impact on English-language Heidegger studies. Essays in this collection: * Marlene Zarader, `The mirror with the triple reflection' * Franco Volpi, `Dasein and Praxis: Aristotle' (...) * Jean-Luc Marion, `Heidegger on Descartes' * Christopher Macann, `Heidegger's Kant Interpretation' * Michel Haar, `Critical Remarks on the Heideggerian Reading of Nietzsche' * Maria Villela-Petit, `Heidegger's Conception of Space' * Francoise Dastur, `The ekstatico-horizontal constitution of temporality' * F-W von Herrmann, `Way and Method in Philosophy' * Samuel Ijsseling, `The End of Philosophy as the Commencement of Thinking' * Otto Poggler, `Does the saving power also grow? Heidegger's last paths' * Ernst Tugendhat, `Heidegger's Idea of Truth' * Karl-Otto Apel, `Wittgenstein and Heidegger'. (shrink)

A filosofia, sendo um discurso antípoda ao discurso das ciências, no sentido de que não produz um conhecimento sobre particularidades, situa-se a priori no espaço interno de uma clivagem, de uma diferença e de uma dobra onde este discurso e este saber são produzidos e apresentados. Na cena contemporânea três pensadores, Lacan, Apel e Gadamer, tematizam a experiência do humano como ligada estritamente à linguagem enquanto elemento estruturador do humano, na medida em que este é situado no interior do (...) espaço de uma dobra e de uma clivagem. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Apel. A priori. Gadamer. Lacan. Linguagem. Ser humano. ABSTRACT Philosophy as a speech opposite to the speech of sciences as long as it does not pursue a knwoledge on specialities, it is situated a priori at the internal space of a fold where this knowledge is produced and presented. At the contemporary scene there are three thinkers, Lacan, Apel and Gadamer which think human experience as deeply linked towards language as the structural frame of the human being, hence he is situated within the space of this fold. KEY WORDS – Apel. A priori. Gadamer. Human being. Lacan. Language. (shrink)

Is transcendental pragmatics a matter of ultimate foundation or a matter of holism? Transcendental pragmatics as developed by Karl-Otto Apel has been the object of various criticisms. Against the fallibilists' claim (Albert) that argumentation is at last either dogmatic, axiomatic or circular, the transcendental pragmatists have given an argument that ultimate foundation ('Letztbegründung') cannot be proved to be impossible. But this clarification of their claims leaves open the questions whether their method can establish universal statements, and whether they prove (...) statements which are synthetic a priori. Against the claim of the reconstructive scientist (Habermas) they have to restate their view, and take into account an element of fallibilism. Here we encounter a first element of holism. With regard to the question whether there can be ultimate foundation without ultimate foundation of the method of ultimate foundation holism breaks in. The distinction between a vicious and a transcendental circle, used against Albert, is of no use in the establishment of the transcendental circle. (shrink)

Neste trabalho, investiga-se a reconstrução apeliana da controvérsia, entre Habermas e o próprio Apel, acerca da fundamentação e relação entre a moral e o direito, enquanto concepção procedimental discursiva da filosofia prática. Assim, objetiva-se mostrar a relação – metodologicamente importante – do discurso filosófico no trato específico para a arquitetônica da ética do discurso. Defende-se a hipótese de que o debate e controvérsia entre ambos os programas da ética do discurso decorrem fundamentalmente do modo diferenciado de tematizar a relação (...) metodológica entre enunciados filosóficos e enunciados das ciências sócio-reconstrutivas, empíricas, e que essa diferença de abordagem é relevante na forma distinta de tratarem a moral e conceberem o conceito de razão prática, que culmina na compreensão desta como razão prática moral ou não prescritiva, bem como, o problema da sua unidade e/ou quanto de sua especificação. Para Apel, é importante a determinação dessa relação metodológica, pois a partir dessa reflexão efetivar-se-á, na teoria discursiva, uma cisão entre dois modos fundamentais de pensar a fundamentação e relação entre a moral, o direito e a política. (shrink)

Os tempos contemporâneos evidenciamu ma a s s i n c r o n i a e n t r e a s c u l t u r a spart i cul ares e a nova const i t ui ção deestado global que se instaurou com as oci edade do conheci ment o. Quant omai or a e xpans ão de pos s i bi l i dade stécnico-científicas, menor a influênciaque as concepções morais dos gruposparticulares desempenham no (...) cenáriog l o b a l . To da s a s i nt ui ç õ e s na t ur a i sdo homo f aber são afetadas pel o fazertecnológico que responde muito maisrápida e satisfatoriamente aos anseiose necessi dades dos i ndi ví duos, t ant obi ol ógi c a quant o s oc i al ment e. Des t emodo, a atenção ao fator tecnol ógi coparece suplantar mandamentos moraisque desde outros tempos guiavam a açãoe a convivência social das pessoasContemporary ages showed an asynchronybe t we e n par t i c ul ar c ul t ur e s and t henew constitution of the global state thathas t aken pl ace wi t hi n t he soci et y ofknowledge. The more is the expansion oftechnical and scientific possibilities theless is the influence that moral conceptionsof particular groups play in the globalscene. All natural intuitions of homo faberare affected by technological making thatanswers most rapidly and satisfactorily tothe desires and needs of individuals, bothbiologically and sociologically. Thus, theattention to the technological feature seemsto supplant the moral commandments thatsince ancient times oriented the action andthe social life of persons. (shrink)

El trabajo comienza desarrollando la postura del filósofo Karl-Otto Apel, desde su propuesta pragmático-trascendental, frente al estructuralismo lingüístico de Saussure. A partir de aquí, se presentarán los conceptos de lenguaje y sujeto desde el psicoanálisis de Jacques Lacan, heredero y crítico del pensamiento saussureano, con el objetivo de realizar una confrontación entre ambas teorías, además del esclarecimiento inicial necesario para futuras discusiones. The following paper starts by developing philosopher Karl-Otto Apel’s transcendental-pragmatic position towards Saussure’s linguistic structuralism. At this (...) point, from Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalysis, heir and critic to the saussurean line of thought, concepts of language and subject will be presented. The main goal is to confront both theories and start initial clarifications necessary for further discussions. (shrink)

On the basis of Karl-Otto Apels’ diagnosis of the shortcomings of philosophical ethics in general, and any ethics of individual accountability in particular, I give an outline how these shortcoming are currently to be articulated in the context of ecological crisis and socio-technical change. This will be followed with three interpretations of Karl-Otto Apels’ proposal for an ethics of collective coresponsibility. In conclusion, I will advocate that only a further social evolution of the systems of science, economy and law will (...) enable a possible institutionalization of collective co-responsibility by means of a new innovation paradigm: responsible innovation. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es poner de manifiesto la relevancia del legado filosófico de Karl-Otto Apel a la luz del diálogo con la ética de Charles Taylor. Nos detenemos en los últimos libros publicados de Charles Taylor y ensayamos una interpretación crítica de sus tesis a partir de la pragmática trascendental de Apel. Hundiendo sus raíces en la matriz hermenéutica y crítica, la ética del discurso de Karl-Otto Apel sigue ofreciendo una dialéctica fecunda entre realidad e (...) idealidad que resulta insoslayable para afrontar con garantías el futuro de la humanidad. The aim of this paper is to highlight the relevance of the philosophical legacy of Karl-Otto Apel in light of the dialogue with the philosophy of Charles Taylor. The paper is focused on the last published books of Charles Taylor and a critical interpretation of some of his main ideas from the Apel’s transcendental pragmatics is addressed. Plunging its roots in the hermeneutic and critical matrix, Karl-Otto Apel's ethic of discourse continues to offer a fruitful dialectic between reality and ideality that is unavoidable to face the future of humanity with guarantees. (shrink)

A la hora de describir aquellos elementos que intervienen en la situación hermenéutica desde la cual comprendemos e interpretamos la realidad, es posible poner el acento en unos aspectos u otros. Mientras que la interpretación tradicional de la propuesta hermenéutica de Heidegger ha hecho hincapié en el modo previo de ver, el lenguaje de la comunidad o incluso las cosas mismas objeto de interpretación son puestas de relieve en el modelo hermenéutico de la antropología del conocimiento de Apel. A (...) comparar críticamente ambas propuestas está dedicado el presente trabajo, con el objetivo de señalar las ventajas que la transformación gnoseo-antropológica de la situación hermenéutica presenta en el panorama filosófico actual. When it comes to describe the ingredients of the hermeneutic situation from which reality is understood and interpreted, it is possible to emphasize some of them or others. Whereas the traditional interpretation of Heidegger's hermeneutic proposal has highlighted the previous way of seeing, the community language or even the things themselves subject of interpretation are emphasized in the hermeneutic model of Apel's anthropology of knowledge. The main aim of this paper is to compare and evaluate both proposals, showing the advantages of the gnoseo-anthropological transformation of the hermeneutic situation within the contemporary philosophical framework. (shrink)

O autor discute o desenvolvimento recebido pela responsabilidade moral em Apel, tornando como ponto de partida a questão da possibilidade e dificuldade de uma fundamentação racional da ética na era da ciência. Isso remete para a análise da responsabilidade moral no âmbito da teoria dos tipos de racionalidade e do seu vínculo com a fundamentação última. A ideia de que uma ética da intenção não dá conta de tal problema leva Apel a abordá-lo a partir da transformação do (...) princípio de universalização de Kant e da introdução de um segundo princípio, o de complementação. (shrink)

A situação atual do ser humano é deuma crise global na qual as ameaças de guerranuclear, de desastre ecológico e de colapsoeconômico apontam para o extermínio da biosferahumana. A racionalidade técnico-cientifica tornoupossível esta situação de crise, entretanto, elaprópria torna impossível a fundamentação racionalde uma ética que nos leve, em face do perigocomum, a assumir coletivamente a responsabilidade.Apel, porém, contesta a racionalidadetécnico-científica e defende a fundamentaçãoracional, intersubjetiva, de uma necessária orientaçãoético-politica capaz de lidar com os grandesdesafios que põem em risco (...) a civilizaçãohumana no final do século XX. (shrink)

la obra del recientemente fallecido filósofo Karl-Otto Apel ha pasado por diferentes etapas a lo largo de su desarrollo. Sin embargo, una tarea común a todas ellas ha sido la de reflexionar acerca de aquellas condiciones que a priori son necesarias para conocer. También estas condiciones, así como el modo de concebirlas, han sufrido variaciones a lo largo de sus escritos. Si en su programa temprano de una antropología del conocimiento aspectos como la reflexión, el cuerpo y el lenguaje (...) tienen un mayor protagonismo, en su posterior pragmática trascendental del lenguaje estos, sin llegar a desaparecer, pasan a reinterpretarse desde la perspectiva de la comunidad de comunicación. Este artículo reconstruye la problemática de los a priori del conocimiento en la filosofía de Apel, y al hacerlo contribuye a una integración, que Apel había planeado llevar a cabo, de esos dos programas. (shrink)