Although Descartes’ natural philosophy marked an important advance in the development of modern science, many of his specific concepts of science have been largely discarded, and consequently neglected, since their introduction in the seventeenth century. Many critics over the years, such as Newton (in his early paper De gravitatione), have presented a series of apparently devastating arguments against Descartes' theory of space and motion; a generally negative historical verdict which, moreover, most contemporary scholars accept. Nevertheless, it is also true that (...) most historians and philosophers of science have not sufficiently investigated the viability and effectiveness of the case against Cartesian space and motion. This book explores the success of the arguments against Descartes’ theory of space and motion by determining if it is possible to formulate a Cartesian theory of science that can avoid the problems raised by Newton, as well as by a host of other past and contemporary philosophers either sympathetic or hostile to the overall design of Cartesian science. In particular, if Descartes' theory of motion can be reconciled with his hypotheses on dynamics, then a Cartesian can successfully resolve the difficulties imposed by his critics. This book comprises, therefore, a sustained attempt to construct a consistent “Cartesian” spacetime theory: i.e., a theory of space and time that incorporates Descartes’ various theories of physics and nature without falling into the kinds of problems and contradictions as charged by, for example, Newton. (shrink)

It is common to assume that Descartes did not have a conception of an object's matter density independently of its size, but this is a rather incomplete assessment of the early modern natural philosopher's theory. Key to our understanding of Descartes's physics is a consideration of the ratios between the quantities of the different types of matter in which an object consists. As these ratios determine the degree of an object's porosity and elasticity, they also affect in Descartes's theory the (...) phenomena of gravity and weight. (shrink)

Descartes' Discourse marks a watershed in European thought; in it, the author sets out in brief his radical new philosophy, which begins with a proof of the existence of the self (the famous "cogito ergo sum"). Next he deduces from it the existence and nature of God, and ends by offering a radical new account of the physical world and of human and animal nature. Written in everyday language and meant to be read by common people of the day, (...) it swept away all previous philosophical traditions. This new translation is an ideal introduction to Descartes for the general reader. It is accompanied by a substantial introductory essay from Renaissance scholar Ian Maclean that is designed to provide in-depth historical and philosophical context. The essay draws on Descartes' correspondence to examine what brought him to write his great work, and the impact it had on his contemporaries. A detailed section of notes explain Descartes' philosophical terminology and ideas, as well as historical references and allusions. Any reader can feel comfortable diving in to this classic work of Renaissance philosophical thought. (shrink)

'I concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature resides only in thinking, and which, in order to exist, has no need of place and is not dependent on any material thing.' Descartes's A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences marks a watershed in European thought; in it, the author provides an informal intellectual autobiography in the vernacular for a non-specialist readership, sweeps away all previous philosophical traditions, and (...) sets out in brief his radical new philosophy, which begins with a proof of the existence of the self, next deduces from it the existence and nature of God, and ends by offering a radical new account of the physical world and of human and animal nature. This new translation is accompanied by a substantial introductory essay which draws on Descartes's correspondence to examine his motivation and the impact of his great work on his contemporaries. Detailed notes explain his philosophical terminology and ideas. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more. (shrink)

In this chapter, the author presents some Cartesian thought experiments by reproducing an excerpt from The Meditations on First Philosophy. The author asks us to imagine that the physical world around us is an elaborate illusion. He imagines that the world was merely a dream or, worse yet, a hoax orchestrated by an evil demon bent on deceiving us. The author asks us to suppose that we are dreaming, and that some particulars ‐ namely, the opening of the eyes, (...) the motion of the head, the forth‐putting of the hands ‐ are merely illusions; and even that we really possess neither an entire body nor hands such as we see. Nevertheless, he says that, it must be admitted at least that the objects which appear to us in sleep are, as it were, painted representations which could not have been formed unless in the likeness of realities. (shrink)

Like many other staple metaphysical concepts, “determination” acquires its own special flavor when translated into the Spinozistic framework. This process is even more pronounced when applied to finite modes. This chapter explains what the necessary conditions are for finite modes to be determined, and furthermore in what this determination consists. It looks at a couple of key texts where Spinoza discusses determination and highlight what might initially seem puzzling. One consequence of adhering to a plenum physics for (...) both Spinoza and Descartes is that all motion is relative, and consequently, the proportion of motion and rest of a given body involves the proportion of motion and rest of surrounding bodies. The chapter concludes by highlighting the connection between determination and activity and the metaphysical consequences of this connection. (shrink)

Aristotelian metaphysics is a change in the form of metaphysics, which seems to be extraneous to it but in reality co‐determines it in the most intimate way. Descartes’ Meditations are intellectual exercises that extend over six days. On almost every new day, a reference is made to the results or intermediary results of the previous day, or the spiritual experiences of the last days. This division into days, as well as the physical back‐references, mentioned in the First Meditation and (...) repeated in the Third, the repetitions, the monologue form, and other elements, point to the fact that Descartes’ Meditations must be understood within the tradition of philosophy in the sense of spiritual exercises. The knowledge of God must be considered as the highest stage of freedom. Descartes himself described the true path to the truth as the path a facilioribus ad difficiliora [from easier to more difficult things]. (shrink)

Purpose of this work is to find the key to understanding the paradox of Descartes’ way of philosophizing during the recourse to the text of "early writings". Realization of the set purpose involves the consistent solving of such tasks: by referring to the research literature, to outline the forms of transition to modern methodology; to explicate the main reasons for philosophy anthropologization by Descartes; to analyze the role of art as the main form of expressing Descartes’ worldview in the "early (...) writings". Theoretical basis. Studies by Descartes experts and the phenomenological tradition. Originality. The analysis of the "early writings" allows to determine the origins of the main doctrine of Descartes’ philosophizing. Its role is manifested in the course of clarifying the main motives of the anthropological approach of the French philosopher. That entails their rootedness in the Copernican-based scientific revolution of the New Age. A prerequisite for the authentic comprehension of the radical change carried out by Descartes is the attention to the paradigmatic significance of art, which is most fully asserted in the "early writings". It is substantiated that the appeal of young Descartes to the experience of art influences his understanding of science, as well as the awareness of human presence in the development of the scientific picture of the world and the distinction of the main components of human nature – mind and will. Conclusions. During the analysis of the contemporary literature devoted to Descartes, there is outlined the tendency to go beyond the notions of naivety and simplicity of his position, one of the manifestations of which is the increased attention to anthropology. The main motives for its actualization are rooted in the scientific revolution of the New Age, which are the form of completion of the radical worldview change initiated by Copernicus. It is about the vision of man as the main component of the universe, attention thereto in the search for the source point and the decisive authority for the world development, reflection of the thinker’s desire to build his own ethical doctrine based on human nature. While comprehending the "early wri-tings", the author focuses on the interpretation by young Descartes of art as a form of expression of truth, which enables the authentic comprehension of human nature. These ideas became the basis for the further work of the thinker, and today they open up new perspectives of exploring the anthropological foundation for later works. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 440-442 [Access article in PDF] Reinhard Lauth. Descartes ' Konzeption des Systems der Philosophie. Stuttgart (Bad Cannstatt): Frommann-Holzboog, 1998. Pp. x + 227 pp. Cloth, DM 64.00. Reinhard Lauth's Descartes ' Konzeption des Systems der Philosophie is an interesting addition to the literature on Descartes. Written by a renowned scholar of German Idealism, it does not represent an attempt to respond (...) to scholars of Descartes, to take part in the debate regarding aspects of Descartes's philosophy, nor to explain the role of Descartes's thought in the tumultuous seventeenth century, but rather to explain to scholars of German Idealism why Descartes should be considered the first and one of the greatest transcendental philosophers. It is no accident that in the index we find close to 50 references each to Kant and Fichte, while Descartes's important "rationalist" comrades, Spinoza and Leibniz, receive half as much attention; nor is it an accident that the first and last philosopher mentioned in the book is Fichte.Lauth's book is in the tradition of Gueroult's monumental Descartes selon l ' ordre des raisons (Paris, 1968, 2nd edition) and, as the title indicates, the subject of the book is Descartes's philosophy as a system, not as a collection of independent theses about various philosophical problems. However, unlike Gueroult, who concentrated on an [End Page 440] analysis of the Meditations, Lauth draws extensively on the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Discourse on Method, Meditations, and Descartes's correspondence. That Descartes viewed philosophy as ideally constituting a system of human knowledge should not come as news to anyone who recalls Descartes's claim in the Preface to the Principles of Philosophy that all of philosophy is like a tree whose roots are metaphysics, trunk physics, and branches medicine, mechanics, and morals, or his claim in the Preface to the Meditations that there is a clear order of argumentation or reasons and that his goal is to lay bare the foundations of philosophy. How exactly Descartes's philosophy is to constitute a system is the trickier question that is Lauth's concern.According to Lauth, the order of reasons that one finds expressed in Descartes's first philosophy is not simply a series of biographical events, filling a psychological need in Descartes (cf. Alquié, La Découverte métaphysique de l ' homme chez Descartes [Paris, 1966]), but rather the "systematic path of the cogito itself" (X). And Lauth attempts to show that there is something inexorable in the way that conclusions about the world from the point of view of the thinking subject are made and follow from one another. This takes him along the well-known path of the Meditations: from the existence of the self, to the nature of the self, to the existence and nature of God, to the external world, and finally to the relation of mind and body. And here two interesting observations on Lauth's part should be singled out. First, Lauth does an admirable job in intimating the tension regarding the places of the thinking subject and God as the supreme principles in Descartes's system. On the one hand, it would seem that the thinking subject should be the highest principle in Descartes's philosophy insofar as its existence is the first thing known; but, according to Lauth, it cannot be the highest principle because it does not contain the principle of its own existence (76). On the other hand, if we claim that God is the highest principle then we must recognize that a system following from this principle must fail insofar as genuine knowledge of God surpasses the bounds of our finite, human knowledge (99-100). Second, in claiming that Descartes was a "transcendental philosopher," Lauth reminds us of the extent to which Descartes is concerned with the bounds of human knowledge as determinable from the thinking subject itself.While this work contains many useful insights—especially for those scholars of German Idealism who are looking for new ways of reflecting on their subject—it has... (shrink)

: In this paper I address the vexed question of secondary causation in René Descartes' physics, and examine several influential interpretations, especially the one recently proposed by Dennis Des Chene. I argue that interpreters who regard Cartesian bodies as real secondary causes, on the grounds that the modes of body include real forces, contradict Descartes' account of modes. On the other hand, those who deny that Descartes affirms secondary causation, on the grounds that forces cannot be modes of extension, commit (...) Descartes to the problematic view that the undetermined and immutable will of God is the sole cause of determinate and variable motions. Des Chene's contextualist approach to Descartes' texts leads him to an intermediate position that combines elements of both interpretations. However, in my view, Des Chene's interpretation likewise fails to resolve apparent tensions in Descartes' claims. I thus propose to separate the issue of secondary causation from what Des Chene dubs 'the problem of force'. On the basis of this approach, and a study of Jesuit commentaries familiar to Descartes, I develop a new interpretation which takes seriously Descartes' claim that the laws of nature are the secondary and particular causes of particular motions and changes in motion. (shrink)

This volume reflects a reawakened interest in the scientific writings of Descartes, at least partly inspired by recent research by historians and philosophers of science. The editor has gathered ten essays, all of which relate to what he believes is "perhaps Descartes' primary concern... the attempt to provide a philosophical foundation for mathematical physics". Three of the essays study Descartes' scientific writings, especially the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, with a view toward the later, metaphysical writings, which are (...) understood by the authors as theoretical justification for the mathematical science of nature. Stephen Gaukroger recognizes that in the Rules Descartes yokes mathematics to physics, and attempts to explain why this project to establish a mathematical science of nature failed. The author maintains that in order to establish such a science, Descartes unites the objects of mathematics and physics by means of a two-fold reduction. First, the procedures of the two sciences are joined and assimilated to the general reasoning procedure, the method, advocated in Rule IV. Unfortunately, Gaukroger makes sweeping and unsubstantiated claims here. He imports Descartes' distinction between analysis and synthesis as modes of proof and applies it to the more technical uses in algebra and geometry, the "analysis" of the "geometricians" referred to in Rule IV. This hybrid notion he then identifies with the method announced in Rule IV; but Gaukroger interprets this method on the model of resolution and composition in the logical tradition. The second step of the reduction takes place when Descartes identifies the objects of the two sciences through his account of imagination in Rules XII and XIV. According to these passages, the imagination has a double function: since it is a corporeal organ, it receives and embodies real extended magnitudes; but since it is also the locus for images, it can represent "pure extended magnitudes," i.e., the objects of mathematics. Gaukroger acknowledges his debt to Jacob Klein for these insights. He fails to appreciate Klein's central point, however, that through his doctrine of imagination Descartes, either mistakenly or by conscious design, identifies a first intention with a second intention, and that this identification is at the heart of the modern conception of number. In conclusion Gaukroger attributes the demise of the mathematical project to Descartes' "essentialism". Metaphysical considerations, e.g., that the essence of body is extension, determine the scope of inquiry so narrowly that properly physical properties of bodies, such as hardness, are excluded from science. This claim is not only trivial, it is erroneous. In Rules VIII-XII Descartes sets limits upon human inquiry prior to and independently of any metaphysical considerations or claims about essence. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:468 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY explanation of this in terms of "Aristotelian" categories is not Plotinus at his most convincing. Certainly Aristotle could not possibly have accepted the use of the categories of potentiality and actuality that O'Daly finds at VI. 2.20.20ff., and it is difficult to see how anyone could regard as seriously illuminatinga solution in which there is a "reciprocal" relationship between part (or particular) and whole such (...) that the whole is potentially the part, which is, actually, while simultaneously the part is potentially the whole, which is, actually. Throughout, O'Daly strives to avoid obscurantistic appeals in explicating Plotinus's thought. As typical of his approach I would cite his philological solution of the puzzling passage at V. 1.7.4-6 where Plotinus seems either to claim that the One produces intelligence by intelligence's acting in a certain way, or uncharacteristicallyto attribute thought to the One. Plotinus is not asking, O'Daly claims, how the One produces nous, but rather how it is that what is produced is nous. The solution is both neat and clear. I was disappointed, for this reason, with the concluding lines of the book. O'Daly is determined, as we have seen, to find the self preserved in the mystical union with the One. Unable to find this in Plotinus's characterization of the self in terms of nous orpsych~ he turns to the One itself to find a clue, for the One is an egregious instance of self. The move renders "selfhood, for Plotinus... in strict contrast to individuality" (p. 91), which is perplexing enough in view of O'Daly's previous stress on the identity of the self at its various levels. But it also provides him with the concept of epibol~, the "simple intuitive approach to Itself" (p. 93) that characterizes the One at VI. 7. 38. 10-39ff. and is used to characterize the approach to the One at III. 8.9. 20ff. O'Daly seizes on this concept to provide a perfectly obscure solution to his problem in these mysterious concluding words: "The term epibol~ links the two passages [III. 8.9 and VI. 7. 38]: both seem to corroborate the assertions that, on the one hand, the One is a Self, and, on the other, that, of the faculty experiencing unio, we can say no more than that it is--'the self'"(p. 94). O'Daly is forced to this pass, 1 believe, by his taking the mystical experience as too central in Plotinus's thought, as the cornerstone of his system, while, in reality, the heart of this system lies in the intelligible realm and its ties to the phenomenal. The union with the super-real, I suggest, serves only to indicate to the individual that he has overreached himself and needs, in good Platonic fashion, to return to the realm of intelligibility,that realm of nous and soul that O'Daly has spent the bulk of his time usefully examining. JEROME P. SCHILLER Washington University Descartes. By Jonathon R6e. (New YOrk: Pica Press, 1975. Pp. 204) Like the Discours de la m~thode, this is an "elegant essay," clear, condensed, and orderly. It analyzes in brief the Cartesian system of philosophy, pointing out that Descartes's approach to science was philosophical, although his philosophy was an attempt to discover the most scientific forms of description. And science for this "nouveau philosophe" was not qualitative but quantitative. The book furnishes an antidote to the myth popularized by Voltaire that misrepresents Descartes as an unscientific rationalizer whose fantastic physics was entirely superseded by Newton's. "The habit of classifying thinkers into warring schools," warns the author, "has resulted in a completely mistaken image of Descartes" (p. 13). Newtonian physics R6e sees as in the Cartesian tradition. After an analytical table of contents, ~t la Descartes, the book starts with a one-page chronological table, from which one regrettably misses the Cogitationes privatae, the Recherche de la v~rit~ par la lumi~re naturelle, the Primae cogitationes circa generationem animalium, and the Trait6 des passions de l'ame. A brief introduction is followed by sixteen short chapters and two appendices. The first appendix... (shrink)

The second chapter is devoted to the analysis of the first introduction of and quarrels over Cartesianism at the University of Utrecht, as determined by the teaching of a Cartesian natural philosophy and physiology by Henricus Regius. First, it is shown how his teaching gave rise to the querelle d’Utrecht (1641), in which two main issues were debated: the rejection of substantial forms, and the characterisation of man as ens per accidens. During the quarrel, questions were raised about the consistency (...) of the new philosophy with theology and – insofar as it raised the problem of the individuation of bodies and species by substantial forms – of the unity of man. Secondly, it is shown how Regius’s peculiar approach to natural philosophy (and physiology) led him to quarrel with Descartes himself in 1645–1648, with regard to two main questions: the nature of mind, and the method of natural philosophy, which Regius interprets in both cases from an empirical standpoint, as he maintains that the nature of mind may consist in matter (according to medical evidence), and that all knowledge has a sensory origin. Accordingly, he paved the way for ‘radical’ interpretations of Descartes which rejected his metaphysics, but also for an approach to a natural philosophy more open to the use of experience. In this chapter, I scrutinise the reasons behind Regius’s approach to physics and metaphysics by paying attention, on the one hand, to his quarrel with Descartes, and on the other to the sources of his methodology, which he largely borrows from medical authors. In conclusion, I show that Cartesianism, in the hands of Regius, might serve as the basis for medicine but could not yet become a full-fledged alternative to Aristotelianism. (shrink)

This major work by Laurence Lampert provides a new interpretation of modern philosophy by developing Nietzsche's view that genuine philosophers set out to determine the direction of culture through their ideas and that they conceal the radical nature of their thought by their esoteric style. From this Nietzschean perspective, Francis Bacon and René Descartes can be considered the founders of modernity. Lampert argues that Bacon's positive claims for science aimed to destroy the dominance of Christianity. Descartes continued Bacon's radical program (...) while providing it with the mathematical physics required for its success. Far from being solely an epistemological and metaphysical thinker, says Lampert, Descartes was a master writer whose comic ridicule helped bring down the Church to which he paid lip service. Both Bacon and Descartes used the Platonic art of dissimulation to achieve their ends by making their revolutionary aims appear compatible with Christianity. Once we recognize Bacon and Descartes as legislators of modern times in a specifically Nietzschean sense, we can also see Nietzsche in a new way—as the first thinker to have understood modern times and transcended it in a postmodern worldview. According to Lampert, Nietzsche provides a new foundation for culture, a joyous science that reveals the grandeur and purposeless play of the cosmic whole and yet avoids enervating despair or destructive, dogmatic belief. (shrink)

In the modern Continental tradition the word "subjectivity" is used to denote all that refers to a subject, its psychological-physical integrity represented by its mind, all that determines the unique mentality, mental state, and reactions of this subject. Subjectivity in this perspective has become on the Continent the central principle of philosophy.Modern Continental philosophy not only maintains the value of the subject and awakens an interest in genuine subjectivity. It evolves from the subject and subjective self-consciousness as Jundamento inconcusso. (...) Thus modern Continental philosophy should be understood and discussed as a philosophy of subjectivity. This paper deals, on the one hand, with the philosophical-historical reconstruction of modern philosophy of subjectivity from Descartes to Hegel, and, on the other hand, with an analysis and evaluation of Hegel's systematic approach to subjectivity in terms of philosophical tradition, especially from the viewpoint of the realization of the idealistic program of selfconsciousness represented by German idealists.Focusing on the major lines of development of the theory of subjectivity in Continental philosophy from Descartes to Hegel, 1(1) discuss the quandaries of early modern philosophers concerning subject and subjectivity and their attempts to resolve these quandaries by developing the fundamentally new (in contrast to previous tradition) understanding of subjectivity; (2) show that the issue of subjectivity was the basic topic of transcendental idealism; and (3) introduce Hegel's approach to subjectivity and briefly define its novel character. (shrink)

This dissertation presents a new interpretation of Rene Descartes' views on body/body causation by examining them within their historical context. Although Descartes gives the impression that his views constitute a complete break with those of his predecessors, he draws on both Scholastic Aristotelian concepts of the efficient cause and existing anti-Aristotelian views. ;The combination of Aristotelian and anti-Aristotelian elements in Descartes' theory of causation creates a tension in his claims about the relationship between the first cause, God, and the secondary (...) causes, created things. To make sense of Descartes' position on secondary causation I study the 16th and 17th century debates on secondary causation, God's concurrence, and the action of efficient causes. I examine the Aristotelian commentaries of the Jesuit philosophers Francisco Suarez, Francisco Toledo, Antonio Rubio and the Coimbran Commentators. I also analyze the anti-Aristotelian views on nature and causation found in Sebastian Basson's textbook on natural philosophy. ;The Jesuit philosophers, like Descartes, deny that the extendedness and impenetrability of matter requires the existence of occult forces to penetrate the matter and exercise causality. Rather they argue that causality is exercised by a thing's form and that causal interaction requires only contiguity not penetration. They also downplay the importance of the final cause, making the efficient cause prior in the study of nature. While Descartes rejects their hylomorphism, he agrees with the Jesuits that there are secondary efficient causes which determine God's action, causing a specific kind of effect. However, for Descartes the secondary causes are the laws of nature, not individual substances. ;Descartes' reduction of all natural change to the local motion of material particles is reminiscent of Basson's anti-Aristotelian natural philosophy. Basson reacts against the Jesuit view of secondary causation, arguing that it commits them to attributing cognition to physical causes. His own account of natural causation contains both mechanistic elements, which we find in a more developed form in Descartes' philosophy, and Neoplatonic and Stoic elements which Descartes rejects. (shrink)

In the modern Continental tradition the word "subjectivity" is used to denote all that refers to a subject, its psychological-physical integrity represented by its mind, all that determines the unique mentality, mental state, and reactions of this subject. Subjectivity in this perspective has become on the Continent the central principle of philosophy.Modern Continental philosophy not only maintains the value of the subject and awakens an interest in genuine subjectivity. It evolves from the subject and subjective self-consciousness as Jundamento inconcusso. (...) Thus modern Continental philosophy should be understood and discussed as a philosophy of subjectivity. This paper deals, on the one hand, with the philosophical-historical reconstruction of modern philosophy of subjectivity from Descartes to Hegel, and, on the other hand, with an analysis and evaluation of Hegel's systematic approach to subjectivity in terms of philosophical tradition, especially from the viewpoint of the realization of the idealistic program of selfconsciousness represented by German idealists.Focusing on the major lines of development of the theory of subjectivity in Continental philosophy from Descartes to Hegel, 1(1) discuss the quandaries of early modern philosophers concerning subject and subjectivity and their attempts to resolve these quandaries by developing the fundamentally new (in contrast to previous tradition) understanding of subjectivity; (2) show that the issue of subjectivity was the basic topic of transcendental idealism; and (3) introduce Hegel's approach to subjectivity and briefly define its novel character. (shrink)

This is the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry for Descartes' physics.

We argue that the physics of complex materials and self-organizing processes should be made central to the biology of form. Rather than being encoded in genes, form emerges when cells and certain of their molecules mobilize physical forces, effects, and processes in a multicellular context. What is inherited from one generation to the next are not genetic programs for constructing organisms, but generative mechanisms of morphogenesis and pattern formation and the initial and boundary conditions for reproducing the specific traits (...) of a taxon. There is no inherent antagonism between this “physicalist” perspective and genetics, since physics acts on matter, and gene products are essential material components of living systems whose variability affects the systems’ parameters. We make this notion concrete by summarizing the concept of “dynamical patterning modules” (DPMs; Newman and Bhat, Phys Biol 5:1–14, 2008; Int J Dev Biol 53:693–705, 2009), an explicit physico-genetic framework for the origin and evolution of multicellular form in animals, as well as (when differences in interaction toolkit genes and applicable physical processes are taken into account) in multicellular plants (Hernández-Hernández et al., Int J Dev Biol 56:661–674, 2012). DPMs provide the missing link between development and evolution by revealing how genes acting in concert with physics can generate and transform morphology in a heritable fashion. (shrink)

I defend a dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance, according to which mental events are not causes in the physical domain, but are causally relevant in this domain because they enable — or, in other words, provide the appropriate structure for — physical events to be caused. More specifically, I defend the claim that mental events are ‘double preventers’ within the physical domain, where double preventers are a type of enabling event. The distinction that I make between (...) causes and enabling events and the dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance that I defend has emerged from my acceptance of the powers theory of causation. In this paper, I explore how this dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance offers a response to Papineau’s defence of the causal completeness principle via the conservation laws. (shrink)

It is difficult to evaluate the role of activity - of force or of that which has causal efficacy - in Descartes’ natural philosophy. On the one hand, Descartes claims to include in his natural philosophy only that which can be described geometrically, which amounts to matter (extended substance) in motion (where this motion is described kinematically).’ Yet on the other hand, rigorous adherence to a purely geometrical description of matter in motion would make it difficult to account for the (...) interactions among the particles that constitute Descartes’ universe, since the notions of extension and kinematical motion do not in themselves imply any causal agency. There is, after all, no reason to expect that a particle whose single essence is extension, even if we suppose it to be moving, should impart motion to another particle, while conversely, there is no reason to expect a resting particle to hinder the motion of an impinging one. Descartes' hankering for an austere ontology of matter in motion is in danger of excluding causal agency (force, conceived dynmically) from matter. To the modern reader it may seem obvious that Descartes did not get himself into such a fix, since matter in motion so readily reminds us of kinetic energy or of some more primitive notion of force. Yet by no means is it obvious that Descartes attributed causal efficacy to matter in motion per se. Serious scholars have held opposite positions on this issue. Westfall, Gabbey, and others’ have argued that although on the metaphysical plane Descartes attempted to eliminate force from his mechanical universe, nonetheless ‘force is a real feature’ of his mechanical world. The thrust of this view is that Descartes conceived of force as ‘the capacity of a body in motion to act’, by means of impact, upon other bodies. An opposing interpretation, defended here, is that Descartes did in fact deny causal agency to moving matter per se, restricting agency to immaterial substances such as the human mind, angels, and God. The intention of this interpretation is not to de-emphasize the role of matter in motion in Descartes’ explanation of nature, but rather to stress the fact that Descartes did not conceive of this moving matter dynamically. -/- Reprinted in Descartes, ed. by J. Cottingham, Oxford Readings in Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 281–310. (shrink)

Reprint of: Gary Hatfield, Force (God) in Descartes' physics, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 10 (2):113-140 (1979) -/- Abstract. It is difficult to evaluate the role of activity - of force or of that which has causal efficacy - in Descartes’ natural philosophy. On the one hand, Descartes claims to include in his natural philosophy only that which can be described geometrically, which amounts to matter (extended substance) in motion (where this motion is described kinematically).’ Yet (...) on the other hand, rigorous adherence to a purely geometrical description of matter in motion would make it difficult to account for the interactions among the particles that constitute Descartes’ universe, since the notions of extension and kinematical motion do not in themselves imply any causal agency. There is, after all, no reason to expect that a particle whose single essence is extension, even if we suppose it to be moving, should impart motion to another particle, while conversely, there is no reason to expect a resting particle to hinder the motion of an impinging one. Descartes' hankering for an austere ontology of matter in motion is in danger of excluding causal agency (force, conceived dynmically) from matter. To the modern reader it may seem obvious that Descartes did not get himself into such a fix, since matter in motion so readily reminds us of kinetic energy or of some more primitive notion of force. Yet by no means is it obvious that Descartes attributed causal efficacy to matter in motion per se. Serious scholars have held opposite positions on this issue. Westfall, Gabbey, and others’ have argued that although on the metaphysical plane Descartes attempted to eliminate force from his mechanical universe, nonetheless ‘force is a real feature’ of his mechanical world. The thrust of this view is that Descartes conceived of force as ‘the capacity of a body in motion to act’, by means of impact, upon other bodies. An opposing interpretation, defended here, is that Descartes did in fact deny causal agency to moving matter per se, restricting agency to immaterial substances such as the human mind, angels, and God. The intention of this interpretation is not to de-emphasize the role of matter in motion in Descartes’ explanation of nature, but rather to stress the fact that Descartes did not conceive of this moving matter dynamically. (shrink)

After reconstructing some features of the Scholastic treatment of contingency in natural philosophy, this paper draws a comparison between Descartes’ treatments of the issue of the laws of nature in Le Monde and in the Principles of Philosophy. On the basis of this comparison, it argues that elements of the Scholastic understanding of contingency as due to the impediment provided by matter are still present in the former. While in the Principles Descartes appears to equate contingency with an epistemological limitation (...) in our understanding of the complexity of natural phenomena, in conclusion I argue that some elements of his previous approach to the issue remains in his treatment of curvilinear motion. (shrink)

In this paper I address Descartes’ use of analogy in physics. First, I introduce Descartes’ hypothetical reasoning, distinguishing between analogy and hypothesis. Second, I examine in detail Descartes’ use of analogy to both discover causes and add plausibility to his hypotheses—even though not always explicitly stated, Descartes’ practice assumes a unified view of the subject matter of physics as the extension of bodies in terms of their size, shape and the motion of their parts. Third, I present Descartes’ unique “philosophy (...) of analogy”, where the absence of analogy serves as a criterion for falsifying proposed explanations in physics. I conclude by defending Descartes’ philosophy of analogy by appeal to the value scientists assign to simplicity in their explanations. (shrink)

The ontological status of forces and their causal role in Descartes’ physical world is debated among Descartes scholars. The question of forces is embedded in another more general question, namely to determine which causal activity should be attributed to God, and which causal activity should be attributed to physical bodies. Three distinct positions were attributed to Descartes: 1. he was an occasionalist and he attributed no causal power to forces, 2. he was a pure conservationist and he conceived (...) forces as entities distinct from matter and motion, 3. he was a concurrentist who attributed causal activity both to God and to second causes, especially to forces and laws. These three interpretations seem to exhaust the possibilities. In this chapter however, I defend another interpretation of Descartes’ position, according to which God intervenes in this world only to conserve it by his ordinary concurrence (in this I agree with the conservationist interpretation), without, for all that, forces or laws being specific entities (in this I agree with the occasionalist interpretation). My interpretation leads to downplaying the strong relationship which is assumed to exist between Descartes’ physics and his metaphysics. (shrink)

이 글은 데카르트의 수동적 물체론과 운동학에서의 힘 개념을 웨스트폴과 하트필드의 대립적인 해석과 함께 논구해보고자 한다. 웨스트폴은 데카르트의 물체론에 동역학적인 요소가 있다고 보았으며, 그로 인해 데카르트의 물체론이 모순에 빠진다고 비판하였다. 이에 대해 하트필드는 데카르트의 물체론은 그의 형이상학과 함께 이해되어야 한다고 보았으며, 이러한 관점을 가지지 못한 웨스트폴을 비판하였다. 하트필드에 따르면, 웨스트폴은 데카르트의 형이상학보다 자연학과 운동 법칙 자체를 더 중점적으로 생각했고, 그럼으로써 데카르트의 물체론을 데카르트의 전체 체계 내에서 통합적으로 사유하지 못했다. 이 글은 하트필드의 입장을 지지하며 데카르트의 수동적 물체론이 내포한 형이상학적 기초를 확인함으로써, 데카르트의 (...) 물체론과 형이상학을 함께 사유하는 것의 의의를 확인하고자 한다. 이는 갈등론적 관점에서 한 이론에 대한 두 대립적인 해석이 빚는 갈등이 갖는 가치 또한 시사할 것이다. (shrink)

Descartes is notorious for holding a strong anti-vacuist position. On his view, according to the standard reading, empty space not only does not exist in nature, but it is logically impossible. The very notion of a void or vacuum is an incoherent one. Recently Eric Palmer has proposed a revisionist reading of Descartes on empty space, arguing that he is more sanguine about its possibility. Palmer makes use of Descartes’ early correspondence with Marin Mersenne, including his commentary on Galileo’s Two (...) New Sciences. I argue that Palmer’s reading is mistaken, and that it relies on an understandable but faulty inference—i.e., that if Descartes considers the implications of an opposing view, he must find it at least coherent. Descartes, as I show from his correspondence and other texts, uses a variety of persuasive strategies, and levels charges of different logical strength, against positions which he takes to be incoherent. Thus we cannot infer from the fact that Descartes argues, e.g., that something is a superfluous theoretical entity, that he admits that entity’s coherence. He often chooses to argue a weaker thesis against an opponent so that he can use an argument to which the opponent is more likely to agree. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 109 Heft: 1 Seiten: 9-46.

_René Descartes proposed an interactive dualism that posits an interaction between the_ _mind of a human being and some of the matter located in his or her brain. Isaac Newton_ _subsequently formulated a physical theory based exclusively on the material/physical_ _part of Descartes’ ontology. Newton’s theory enforced the principle of the causal closure_ _of the physical, and the classical physics that grew out of it enforces this same principle._ _This classical theory purports to give, in principle, a complete (...) deterministic account of the_ _physically described properties of nature, expressed exclusively in terms of these_ _physically described properties themselves. Orthodox contemporary physical theory_ _violates this principle in two separate ways. First, it injects random elements into the_ _dynamics. Second, it allows, and also requires, abrupt probing actions that disrupt the_ _mechanistically described evolution of the physically described systems. These probing_ _actions are called Process 1 interventions by von Neumann. They are psycho-physical_ _events. Neither the content nor the timing of these events is determined either by any_ _known law, or by the afore-mentioned random elements. Orthodox quantum mechanics_ _considers these events to be instigated by choices made by conscious agents. In von_ _Neumann’s formulation of quantum theory each such intervention acts upon the state of_ _the brain of some conscious agent. Thus orthodox von Neumann contemporary physics_ _posits an interactive dualism similar to that of Descartes. But in this quantum version the_ _effects of the conscious choices upon our brains are controlled, in part, by the known_ _basic rules of quantum physics. This theoretically specified mind-brain connection allows_ _many basic psychological and neuropsychological findings associated with the apparent_ _physical effectiveness of our conscious volitional efforts to be explained in a causal and_ _practically useful way.. (shrink)

This book argues that Descartes’ physics was a milestone on the road to modern mathematical physics. After Newton introduced a completely different approach to mathematical description of motion, Descartes’ physics became obsolete and even difficult to comprehend. This text follows the language of Descartes and the means of which motion can be described. It argues that Descartes achieved almost everything that later Newton was able to do—to describe the motion of interacting bodies- by different (i.e. algebraic) means. This volume completely (...) refutes the received view according to which Descartes’ physics was merely a kind of discursive natural philosophy. To make this interpretation more plausible the book follows Descartes’ ideas from his early work in mathematics, through his invention of the analytic method towards his mature physics. It shows that Descartes followed a similar heuristic pattern. The volume appeals to students and researchers; it invites the reader equippedwith minimal understanding of college mathematics to follow Descartes on his intellectual journey through the Scientific Revolution. The reader will gain a deeper understanding of the role of mathematical language in the creation of modern physics and a glimpse into the fascinating world of Descartes’ scientific thought. Several of Descartes’ philosophical ideas can be traced back to his scientific interests and thus the book elucidates the motivation behind some of Descartes’ key positions in the area of epistemology and method. In the penultimate chapter the book presents four arguments in favor of seeing Descartes as a physicist on par with Galileo and Newton. (shrink)

It's currently fashionable to take Putnamian model theoretic worries seriously for mathematics, but not for discussions of ordinary physical objects and the sciences. But I will argue that (under certain mild assumptions) merely securing determinate reference to physical possibility suffices to rule out nonstandard models of our talk of numbers. So anyone who accepts realist reference to physical possibility should not reject reference to the standard model of the natural numbers on Putnamian model theoretic grounds.

This volume explores the relationship between physics and metaphysics in Descartes’ philosophy. According to the standard account, Descartes modified the objects of metaphysics and physics and inverted the order in which these two disciplines were traditionally studied. This book challenges the standard account in which Descartes prioritizes metaphysics over physics. It does so by taking into consideration the historical reception of Descartes and the ways in which Descartes himself reacted to these receptions in his own lifetime. The book stresses the (...) diversity of these receptions by taking into account not only Cartesianisms but also anti-Cartesianisms, and by showing how they retroactively highlighted different aspects of Descartes’ works and theoretical choices. The historical aspect of the volume is unique in that it not only analyzes different constructions of Descartes that emerged in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, but also reflects on how his work was first read by philosophers across Europe. Taken together, the essays in this volume offer a fresh and up-to-date contribution to this important debate in early modern philosophy. (shrink)

This volume explores the relationship between physics and metaphysics in Descartes' philosophy. According to the standard account, Descartes modified the objects of metaphysics and physics and inverted the order in which these two disciplines were traditionally studied. This book challenges the standard account in which Descartes prioritizes metaphysics over physics. It does so by taking into consideration the historical reception of Descartes and the ways in which Descartes himself reacted to these receptions in his own lifetime. The book stresses the (...) diversity of these receptions by taking into account not only Cartesianisms but also anti-Cartesianisms, and by showing how they retroactively highlighted different aspects of Descartes' works and theoretical choices. The historical aspect of the volume is unique in that it not only analyzes different constructions of Descartes that emerged in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, but also reflects on how his work was first read by philosophers across Europe. Taken together, the essays in this volume offer a fresh and up-to-date contribution to this important debate in early modern philosophy. (shrink)

Descartes is often identified as having fired one of the opening shots of the scientific revolution: rejecting the four Aristotelian causes in favor of the efficient causes characteristic of mechanistic science. Scholars often write as if Cartesian science and corporeal metaphysics is best understood as a rejection of all causal notions other than the efficient. I argue that this is a mistake. On the contrary, Descartes endorses an avowedly Aristotelian notion of formal causality, inherited from Suárez, and this notion is (...) central to his physics and corporeal metaphysics. -/- I begin by tracing the history of the formal cause from Aristotle to Aquinas and Suárez. My main thesis here is that the Aristotelian notion of formal causation picks out two distinct explanatory modes. The first is linked to hylomorphic ontology, and so by rejecting hylomorphism Descartes rejects one sort of formal causation. Crucially, however, the Aristotelians also identify explanations from essence as a species of formal causality. Now, Descartes’s entire philosophical project is built upon the intellectual perception of the essences of God, mind, and matter; the uncovering and exercise of this broadly Platonic intellectual capacity is, as Descartes explained to Hobbes, a key raison d’être for project of the Meditations. So we might expect Descartes to embrace formal causal explanations from essence, which harmonize so thoroughly with his philosophical project. And indeed, this is what we find. This is most obvious in the case of the ontological argument. In the course of defending the claim that God is causa sui, Descartes explicitly appeals to formal causation and claims to be only be “following in the footsteps” of Aristotle. Thus, there is a Cartesian notion of formal causation that is both continuous with and distinct from its Aristotelian predecessors. -/- Other cases are less obvious, but no less important. For example, one of the most strikingly “modern” aspects of Cartesian physics is its emphasis on quantitative laws. Yet Descartes’s official account of how these laws explain particular phenomena is puzzling: He claims that the laws are causes. This, however, is prima facie absurd; Descartes seems to claim that the law of inertia is literally pushing the moon forward along its orbital path. I argue that this is not and cannot be what Descartes means. On the contrary, he clearly takes the laws of physics to follow from the divine essence, especially immutability and simplicity. The laws are true and epistemically accessible to us because they follow from the divine essence. In other words, Descartes thinks nomological explanation in physics is formal causal explanation from (the divine) essence. -/- Another central issue is the impenetrability, or solidity, of matter. I offer a close reading and reconstruction of Descartes’s argument that matter is necessarily but not essentially impenetrable, and I show how Descartes accounts for impenetrability without compromising his mathematical conception of the corporeal. Descartes argues that impenetrability follows from the nature of matter as geometrical extension, thereby reducing a paradigmatic quality of matter (its solidity) to quantity (extension). Note that the explanatory bite throughout is from essence. Thus, while solidity is not a genuine corporeal causal power, it does give bodies an ineliminable causal role in Cartesian physics and corporeal metaphysics. This role is as a formal cause, since every explanation from impenetrability is ipso facto an explanation from the corporeal essence, geometrical extension. This, in turn, shows that Descartes has a principled response to idealists, like Berkeley, who claim that matter’s lack of efficient causal power implies idealism; Berkeley’s mistake, Descartes would argue, lies in equating efficient causality with causality simpliciter. -/- Thus, I argue that formal causal explanation from essence is both well-attested textually in Descartes and is consonant with some of his deepest projects and commitments, including his Platonic intellectualism and mathematization of the corporeal. All this in mind, it is shocking how little attention has been paid to formal causation in Descartes’s metaphysics. If I am right, a thorough re-thinking of Descartes’s physics and metaphysics is long overdue. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: The Crime of Galileo A Discourse on Method The Metaphysical Foundations of Physics References and Further Reading.

The literature on affective determinants of physical activity is growing rapidly. The present paper aims to provide greater clarity regarding the definition and distinctions among the various affect-related constructs that have been examined in relation to PA. Affective constructs are organized according to the Affect and Health Behavior Framework, including: affective response to PA; incidental affect; affect processing; and affectively charged motivational states. After defining each category of affective construct, we provide examples of relevant research showing how each construct (...) may relate to PA behavior. We conclude each section with a discussion of future directions for research. (shrink)