Physical Determinability

Humana Mente 8 (29) (2015)
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I defend a dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance, according to which mental events are not causes in the physical domain, but are causally relevant in this domain because they enable — or, in other words, provide the appropriate structure for — physical events to be caused. More specifically, I defend the claim that mental events are ‘double preventers’ within the physical domain, where double preventers are a type of enabling event. The distinction that I make between causes and enabling events and the dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance that I defend has emerged from my acceptance of the powers theory of causation. In this paper, I explore how this dualist model of psychophysical causal relevance offers a response to Papineau’s defence of the causal completeness principle via the conservation laws.



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Sophie Gibb
Durham University

Citations of this work

The Causal Closure Principle.Sophie Gibb - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):626-647.

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References found in this work

From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
The Mind in Nature.C. B. Martin - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Causality and Properties.Sydney Shoemaker - 1980 - In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause. D. Reidel. pp. 109-35.
The Mind and its Place in Nature.Charlie Dunbar Broad - 1925 - London, England: Routledge.

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