This chapter offers a reinterpretation of Heidegger’s conception of the social world (das Man) in order to overcome the tension between its conflicting positive and negative characterisations in Being and Time. Rejecting a purely positive or a purely negative reading of das Man, the chapter follows Stephen Mulhall in carving out a middle ground between the two. The chapter takes seriously Heidegger’s claim that it is possible for das Man to undergo an authentic transformation, exploring how best to conceive of (...) this idea. It is argued that the authentic transformation of das Man and the everyday way of being it engenders, is most productively understood with reference to Dasein’s relation to das Man and the way Dasein grasps the world as meaningful. Through this reading it is shown how both an authentic and an inauthentic mode of everydayness can be accommodated. The chapter concludes with an examination of the consequences of this interpretation, arguing for the critical and political potential of authenticity as an attentive and engaged mode of being-in-the-world. (shrink)

Heidegger's discussion of das Man (often translated as "the 'They'") in Being and Time is notoriously inconsistent, and raises a number of interpretative issues that have been debated in the secondary literature. This paper offers two arguments that aim to make for a consistent and charitable reading of das Man. First, unlike Dasein, das Man's way of being is not existence: das Man lacks Dasein's particularity (it offers only general norms, and cannot address Dasein's unique situation), unity (das Man is (...) not a unified set of norms, but rather an often inconsistent one) and distinctness (the boundary that fixes the concept of das Man is fuzzy). Second, this paper proposes that we read das Man as standing in contrast with Abständigkeit, or distantiality. Das Man is the socially constituted set of norms that we necessarily belong to, and distantiality is the equally inescapable difference that sets us apart from others. Together, they provide a framework within which Dasein is constituted by norms without inhibiting the possibility of authentic existence. (shrink)

Contributed articles on the life and works of K. Satchidananda Murty,, Indic philosopher and teacher.

This chapter offers a reinterpretation of Heidegger’s conception of the social world in order to overcome the tension between its conflicting positive and negative characterisations in Being and Time. Rejecting a purely positive or a purely negative reading of das Man, the chapter follows Stephen Mulhall in carving out a middle ground between the two. The chapter takes seriously Heidegger’s claim that it is possible for das Man to undergo an authentic transformation, exploring how best to conceive of this idea. (...) It is argued that the authentic transformation of das Man and the everyday way of being it engenders, is most productively understood with reference to Dasein’s relation to das Man and the way Dasein grasps the world as meaningful. Through this reading it is shown how both an authentic and an inauthentic mode of everydayness can be accommodated. The chapter concludes with an examination of the consequences of this interpretation, arguing for the critical and political potential of authenticity as an attentive and engaged mode of being-in-the-world. (shrink)

The research is devoted to the historical and philosophical analysis of the work of the Kyrgyz humanist writer of the Soviet period, Chingiz Aitmatov, whose early work is characterised as a fascination with the “Soul of Faust.” (Spirit of Faust) The result of this was the writer's earlier works, where he fervently perceives the ideas of progress, socialism, and enlightenment, in other words, the main ideas of the modern era. Later, under the huge influence of Russian classical literature, as well (...) as active study of traditional Kyrgyz culture, epic “Manas”, he spoke on such fundamental metaphysical topics as people, personality, fate, morality, humanism, etc., thereby trying to get rid of the “Soul of Faust” (Spirit of Faust) with its straightforwardness, its propensity for the infinite settlement of everything. So the writer gradually asserted himself more and more as a traditional humanist. But despite these attempts, the writer still retained some ambivalence: on the one hand, he acted as a staunch critic of modernity, faceless technology and on the other, he perceived the modernization process as an objective development of history that needs to be perceived and comprehended. The results of the writer's later ideas are new concepts such as “Mankurt” and “Ixrod” usually used to describe the consciousness of a person who became possible at the junction of modernity with tradition. To a certain extent, these concepts are identical to the idea of “Das Man” by M. Heidegger. (shrink)

In their debate over my interpretation of Heidegger's account of das Man in Being and Time, Frederick Olafson and Taylor Carman agree that Heidegger's various characterizations of das Man are inconsistent. Olafson champions an existentialist/ontic account of das Man as a distorted mode of being?with. Carman defends a Wittgensteinian/ontological account of das Man as Heidegger's name for the social norms that make possible everyday intelligibility. For Olafson, then, das Man is a privative mode of Dasein, while for Carman it makes (...) up an important aspect of Dasein's positive constitution. Neither interpreter takes seriously the other's account, though both acknowledge both readings are possible. How should one choose between these two interpretations? I suggest that we choose the interpretation that identifies the phenomenon the work is examining, gives the most internally consistent account of that phenomenon, and shows the compatibility of this account with the rest of the work. (shrink)

Articles on spiritual philosophy and various aspects of Bhāgavatapurāṇa, Hindu mythological text; previously published in various newspapers and magazines.

Comparative study of the philosophies of Advaita and Mādhyamika.

The idea of reality as construction maybe one of the most recurrent themes cutting across Modern and Contemporary thinking. Objectivist realism has professed reality to be external and independent of subjectivity and maintained that experience was the capacity of being affected by things through the senses and of reproducing them as representative mental contents. As a reaction, Modernity will establish: a) that consciousness is not merely receptive passivity but a configurant activity; b) that reality is not reflected by consciousness but, (...) rather, is somehow constructed by it. Our time rescues such heritage in a particularly fecund manner in the semiological discourse. Intersubjectively constructed reality is a web of meanings and values which man institutes around himself in the world. Reality sediments in systems of sign vehiculation and becomes fixed m codes. Therefore the question: if reality, as construction, has the limits and scope of code, how does consciousness behave concerning the non-codified, the non-constructed, in the absence of a code? This article deals with some views of this other of consciousness, presented as declensions of metaphor of absence.Talvez o tema mais recorrente do discurso filosófico que atravessa o pensamento moderno e a contemporaneidade seja a idéia da realidade como construção. Como reação ao realismo objetivista, que acreditava ser a realidade exterior e independente da subjetividade e para quem a experiência é a capacidade de ser afetado pelas coisas através dos sentidos e de reproduzi-las em conteúdos mentais representativos, a modernidade vai estabelecer que: a) a consciência não é uma mera passividade receptiva, mas atividade configurante; b) a realidade não é refletida pela consciência, mas por ela, de certa forma, construída. A nossa época recolhe esta herança de maneira fecunda particularmente no discurso semiológico: a realidade construída intersubjetivamente é uma teia de significados e valores que o homem institui ao redor de si no mundo. Ela sedimenta-se em sistemas de veiculação sêmicos e se fixa em códigos. Daí emerge a questão: tendo a realidade, enquanto construção, os limites e alcance do código, como se comporta a consciência e seus registros perante o não-codificado, o não-construído, a sua ausência? Algumas abordagens desse outro da consciência, apresentadas como declinações de metáforas da ausência, é aquilo que esse artigo pretende apresentar. (shrink)

Current interpretations of Heidegger's notion of das Man are caught in a dilemma: either they cannot accommodate the ontological status Heidegger accords it or they cannot explain his negative evaluation of it, in which it is treated as ontic. This paper uses Simmel's agonistic account of human sociality to integrate the ontological and the ontic, indeed perjorative aspects of Heidegger's account. Section I introduces the general problem, breaks the exclusive link of Heidegger's account to Kierkegaard and delineates the general form (...) of a solution. Section II then sketches Simmel's conception of sociology and sociality. Section III determines what Heidegger is trying to do in Chapter Four of Division I in Being and Time in order to formulate a strictly ontological account of das Man. Section IV uses Simmel's account of sociality to build into this ontological account an inherent tendency to display the negative features Heidegger ascribes to das Man. In conclusion, section V points to how the proposed account of das Man intimates the character of fundamental ontology as nascently a form of critical theory. It also explains the extent to which Heidegger's perjorative characterisations of das Man and the Man-selbst are legitimate. (shrink)

The article is about the freedom in Rousseau splitting of two basic ideas. The first is that the freedom existed markedly in the natural man and the second is this man came to lose it along his history, when by far historical processes constituted in society. The text proposes a discussion – from the reading of two works of Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men and The Social Contract – of the possibility of a return (...) to freedom in civil society, where perceives the opportunity of this rescue. For Rousseau, the man in the state of nature lived happy and in peace, whereas in the state of society there is a predominance of the inequality between the men: the moral inequality. The social pact is guarantee of the life in society and of the convergence of interests of his members. A pact by the freedom of the individual and by the democratic society. (shrink)

Resumo: Tomando o pensamento lukacsiano, podemos afirmar que as distorções que se apresentam no trabalho refletem diretamente nos atos reprodutivos do homem, na sua sociabilidade. Portanto, todas as categorias da superestrutura ficam comprometidas, inclusive a educação, visto que o espelhamento da realidade estará fundamentado na exploração promovida pelo capital. Partindo dessas considerações o presente artigo objetiva mostrar como o duplo aspecto da reprodução também se reflete na educação. Para tanto tomamos o pensamento do filósofo György Lukács, a partir da sua (...) obra Ontologia do Ser Social, demonstrando ainda que essa dupla face pode ser relacionada à tematização de Saviani em relação às Teorias Não-Críticas, Teorias Crítico-Reprodutivistas e à Pedagogia Histórico-Crítica. Em nossas conclusões afirmamos que a educação no sentido omnilateral, correspondente à face positiva da reprodução, sendo uma das alternativas viáveis para a mudança do estado atual de coisas. Palavras-chave: Trabalho; Reprodução; Educação. The double aspect of reproduction and its influence on education: Taking lukacsian thought, we can say that the distortions that appear at work reflect directly on the reproductive acts of man, on his sociability. Therefore, all categories of the superstructure are compromised, including the education, since the mirroring of reality will be based on the exploration promoted by capital. From these considerations the present article aims to show how the double aspect of reproduction is also reflected in education. For this we take the thought of the philosopher György Lukács, from his work Ontology of the Social Being, further demonstrating that this double face can be related to Saviani's thematization in relation to Non-Critical Theories, Critical-Reproductive Theories and Pedagogy Historical-Criticism. In our conclusions we affirm state that education in the omnilateral sense, corresponding to the positive face of reproduction, is one of the viable alternatives for changing the current state of things. Key-words: Work; Reproduction; Education. Le double aspect de la reproduction et son influence en education Résumé: Selon la pensée lukacsienne, nous pouvons affirmer que les distorsions existantes dans le travail influent directement sur les actes de reproduction de l’homme, sur sa sociabilité. Par conséquent, toutes les catégories de la superstructure sont compromises, notamment l’éducation, puisque le reflet de la réalité sera fondé sur l’exploitation promue par le capital. A partir de ces considérations, le présent article cherche à montrer comment le double aspect de la reproduction se reflète également en éducation. Pour ce faire, nous nous référons à la pensée du philosophe György Lukács, dans son œuvre L’ontologie de l’être social, en démontrant de même que cette double face peut être mise en relation avec la conceptualisation de Saviani, à propos des Théories non critiques, des Théories reproductivistes critiques et de sa Pédagogie historique-critique. Nous affirmons, pour conclure, que l’éducation en un sens omnilatéral correspond à la face positive de la reproduction, ce qui en fait une des alternatives viables en vue du changement de l’état actuel des choses. Mots clés: Travail; Reproduction; Education. Data de registro: 07/09/2021 Data de aceite: 19/01/2022. (shrink)

The definition of the technique as the mediation between man and nature raises some philosophical problems. Such mediation was established based on imperatives, among which we can highlight efficiency and domination, both exercised over nature. In order to expand the possibilities for improving the human condition, the notion of technical progress has become an emerging need for the consolidation of ancient and modern civilizations. However, it is necessary to establish the criteria for a critique of the limits of unrestrained progress (...) in order to be able to highlight the ambiguity of this process. The development of reality goes through a series of increasingly sophisticated domains without which the objective achievements that structure human life would not be possible. As it oscillates more and more rapidly between production and destruction, technology - understood as the applied discourse of technique - accuses its own limit when submitted to the imperative of efficiency and domination. The purpose of this paper is to show that the ambiguous consequences of technical progress work as an instinctive mechanism for both the welfare state and the state of war. The methodology used to address these issues will be the clash of ideas present in the studies of thinkers who reflected the theme of the technique. Our conclusion, in addition to pointing to a reflection on the limits of technique in human life, intends to rethink the unfolding of the imperatives of a civilization guided by the notion of technical progress and its inevitable contradiction with the notion of human progress. (shrink)

In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger claims that (1) das Man is an 'existential' i.e. a necessary feature of Dasein's Being; and (2) Dasein need not always exist in the mode of the Man-self, but can also be eigentlich, which I translate as 'self-owningly'. These apparently contradictory statements have prompted a debate between Hubert Dreyfus, who recommends abandoning (2), and Frederick Olafson, who favors jettisoning (1). I offer an interpretation of the structure of Dasein's Being compatible with both (1) and (2), (...) thus resolving the Dreyfus-Olafson debate. Central to this resolution is the distinction between das Man and the Man-self. Das Man is one of three existential 'horizons', or fields of possibilities; the other two horizons are the world and death. At any time, Dasein encounters entities in one of two basic modes: either by 'expressly seizing' possibilities of the horizon, or by occluding these possibilities. These modes are 'existentiell', i.e. features of Dasein's Being that are possible, but not essential. Self-ownership and the Man-self are the two basic existentiell modes of being oneself, i.e. projecting everyday possibilities of oneself appropriated from the horizon of das Man. What differentiates these two modes is the stance one takes to the possibility of death, the existential horizon of being oneself. (shrink)

In Sein und Zeit , Heidegger claims that (1) das Man is an 'existential' i.e. a necessary feature of Dasein's Being; and (2) Dasein need not always exist in the mode of the Man -self, but can also be eigentlich , which I translate as 'self-owningly'. These apparently contradictory statements have prompted a debate between Hubert Dreyfus, who recommends abandoning (2), and Frederick Olafson, who favors jettisoning (1). I offer an interpretation of the structure of Dasein's Being compatible with both (...) (1) and (2), thus resolving the Dreyfus-Olafson debate. Central to this resolution is the distinction between das Man and the Man -self. Das Man is one of three existential 'horizons', or fields of possibilities; the other two horizons are the world and death. At any time, Dasein encounters entities in one of two basic modes: either by 'expressly seizing' possibilities of the horizon, or by occluding these possibilities. These modes are 'existenti ell ', i.e. features of Dasein's Being that are possible, but not essential. Self-ownership and the Man -self are the two basic existentiell modes of being oneself, i.e. projecting everyday possibilities of oneself appropriated from the horizon of das Man . What differentiates these two modes is the stance one takes to the possibility of death, the existential horizon of being oneself. (shrink)

Resumo O argumento do Terceiro Homem presente no “Parmênides” constitui uma formidável objeção à teoria das Ideias, à qual Platão não apresentou resposta explícita. A despeito disso, cremos ser possível haurir da filosofia platônica uma solução para a referida objeção, solução esta que estaria verossimilmente à disposição do filósofo. Sendo assim, compreende-se que Platão não tenha sido forçado a renunciar à teoria das Ideias, ao menos no que se refere às dificuldades que o Terceiro Homem lhe opõe.The Third Man Argument (...) presented in the “Parmenides” is a formidable objection to the Theory of Forms, one which Plato did not provide an explicit answer to. In spite of that we believe it is possible to draw from Plato’s philosophy a solution to the referred objection, and one which likely would be available to the philosopher. Thus, it becomes clear that Plato was not forced to renounce his Theory of Forms, at least with regard to the difficulties that the Third Man Argument raises to it. (shrink)

To address the question of the nature and function of conventions, this essay explores a possible systematic link between Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology and Foucault’s historical ontology. It argues that these analyses establish, contra to the cognitivist interpretation, dominant then and now, that conventions are properly understood not as “common knowledge” nor even as “jointly accepted beliefs” —that they are not, at least at their most fundamental layer, cognitive states at all—but are instead bodily dispositions that are forged by historically shifting (...) entwinements of practices of power and forms of knowledge. (shrink)

Resumo: A filosofia é um sistema que analisa as crenças, os conceitos mais básicos e a calma de temperamento e julgamento próprios de um filósofo. Os filmes de animação chineses fizeram grandes incursões nos mercados mundiais, nos últimos anos, apesar do fato de o setor de animação da China ser apenas um adolescente em comparação com o seu homólogo de décadas, na filosofia japonesa. Embora alguns estúdios de animação criem conteúdos especificamente para o público internacional, a indústria de animação chinesa (...) está principalmente preocupada com o mercado interno, porque acredita que a animação chinesa de alta qualidade tem potencial para se expandir. Artistas, filósofos e aqueles que trabalham nas indústrias criativas diretamente ligadas a isto têm um incentivo e um desafio para descobrir as histórias que podem ter sucesso nos mercados chinês e internacional. Neste artigo, analisam-se e se contrastam as características das filosofias de animação cinematográfica chinesas. Examinam-se tanto o contexto social quanto o cultural, o desenvolvimento econômico do mercado e o avanço tecnológico que moldaram o design filosófico da animação chinesa. As abordagens filosóficas avaliadas neste estudo são Donghua e Manhua, além da filosofia taoísta, exemplificada em Zhuangzi. (shrink)

Resumo: Partindo do pressuposto que o Ser é notavelmente o escopo de toda a filosofia de Heidegger, este artigo procura indicar traços pontuais daquela que foi considerada o maior labor intelectual de sua vida: Ser e Tempo. Com o intuito de explorar o projeto da analítica existencial, Heidegger lança mão de dois conceitos, o de manualidade e circunvisão . Trata-se de explicitar, a partir desses conceitos contidos na obra Ser e Tempo a contribuição original do filósofo para o diagnóstico crítico (...) da modernidade e para posteriores aprofundamentos filosóficos sobre a técnica moderna. Por fim, a comunicação indicará à luz da discussão realizada a partir das reflexões de Heidegger, uma alternativa possível para outro modo de lidar com a técnica, não desprezando sua importância para as modificações e desenvolvimento do homem e da natureza, mas tampouco absolutizando o modo como a técnica modifica a interação do homem com o mundo em que habita.: Based on the assumption that Being is notably the scope of the whole philosophy of Heidegger, this article seeks to show occasional traces of what was considered the greatest intellectual labor of his life: Being and Time. In order to exploit the project's existential analytic, Heidegger makes use of two concepts, and to manualidade circumvision. It is explicit from these concepts contained in the book Being and Time the original contribution of the philosopher to the critical diagnosis of modernity and subsequent philosophical insights about the modern technique. Finally, the Notice indicates in the light of the discussion held from the reflections of Heidegger, a possible alternative to otherwise deal with the technique, not disregarding its importance to the changes and development of man and nature, but neither the absolutizando how the technique modifies the interaction of man and the world he inhabits. Keywords : Heidegger; being; modern technique. (shrink)

Članek nudi kratek opis zanimive zgodovine slikarstva in slikarskih teorij v hitro razvijajočem se Hong Kongu od l. 1940 do l. 1980, tako da poudari delo in estetiko večih reprezentativnih lokalnih kitajskih slikarjev in umetniških smeri. Ta oris zgodovine prikazuje iskanje kulturne identitete in različne drže med kitajskimi slikarji, ki so bíli boj med moderniziranimi in zahodnimi vplivi v umetnosti ter svojim kitajskim izročilom. Avtorica primerja to slikarstvo z držami mlajše generacije osemdesetih let, ki odseva kapitalistične vplive pri iskanju umetniške (...) identitete. Zaključni del vsebuje kritično primerjavo umetnosti in teorij kulture v sodobnem postkolonialnem diskurzu glede na njihovo aplikacijo na razmere v Hong Kongu. (shrink)

RESUMO: Fruto de longa maturação filosófica desde a sua estada em Jena, e instado a isso pelas influências de Karl L. Reinhold e Johann G. Fichte, o poeta Novalis produz, a partir do outono de 1795, um conjunto de anotações fragmentárias sobre a filosofia de Fichte, hoje conhecidas como Fichte-Studien. De entre os importantes temas aí abordados, um revela-se particularmente interessante: o tema do estatuto da Filosofia no seio do problema da autocompreensão do Eu -, e mais concretamente, o necessário (...) pensar da filosofia sobre si própria, as alterações que no processo têm de sobrevir à própria filosofia e a repercussão disto na compreensão de si próprio do Eu. Nesta senda, o seguinte ensaio propõe-se mostrar como, para Novalis, a filosofia é o natural pensar do homem, e como para além disto é a própria filosofia, com o decorrer do seu pensamento sobre si própria, que molda o curso da compreensão de si próprio do Eu: quer tendo com o Eu uma origem comum, nascendo com ele, lançando-o para o mundo e cindindo a união originária em que ele de outro modo sempre estaria, quer, por fim, afirmando-se como carência deste, ou como algo por que o Eu e a própria filosofia têm de passar no seu curso, para que possam experienciar a perda, e almejar à recuperação dessa origem. ABSTRACT: Fruit of a long philosophical maturation that began with his stay in Jena, and encouraged by the influence of Karl L. Reinhold and Johann G. Fichte, the poet Novalis produced, from autumn 1795 on, a set of fragmentary notes on the philosophy of Fichte. These are now known as Fichte-Studien. Among the important issues treated in the notes, one appears particularly interesting: the treatment of the theme of philosophy within the problem of the self-understanding of the "I" - and, more specifically, the need for philosophy to think about itself, about the changes that must come upon philosophy during this process, and about the impact of these on the self-understanding of the "I". The present article aims to show how, for Novalis, philosophy is the natural thought of man. Furthermore, it aims to show how philosophy, in the course of its thought on itself, shapes the course of the self-understanding of the "I", having with the "I" a common origin, being born with it, launching it into the world, cleaving the original union in which it otherwise would always be, and finally asserting itself as a lack of this union, something through which the "I" and philosophy itself must pass in their course so they can experience this loss and aim to recover its source. (shrink)

Freud relates to the notion of beyond-the-man through a double movement, if we consider the direct satisfaction of the Triebe in contrast to the possibility of refining the targets of the drives. On the one hand, the analyst accepts the idea of Nietzsche that sublimation is precisely the means by which occurs the refinement of the targets of the impulses, but simultaneously reaffirms Schopenhauer's idea that suffering is the background of all life, has the constant voltage of the drive is (...) precisely the phenomenon that strains us and propels us forward: it is the difference between the actual pleasure obtained by satisfaction with the expected pleasure that comes the factor that drives. This does not allow the body to park in any of the previously established forms of satisfaction, but instead will cause this organism in their psychic context, claim a state of profound satisfaction, which is, however, hampered by the force of resistances that the process of repression still keeps active and by the difficulties inherent in human interaction and conflict between desires and capabilities. (shrink)

Charles Darwin's curiosity had a remarkable childlike enthusiasm driven by an almost compulsive appetite for a constant process of discovery, which he never satiated despite his many voyages. He would puzzle about the smallest things, from the wonders of barnacles to the different shapes, colours and textures of the beetles which he obsessively collected, from flowers and stems to birds, music and language, and would dedicate years to understanding the potential significance of everything he saw. Darwin's findings and theories relied (...) heavily on that same curiosity, on seeking and answering questions, however long these would take to clarify. His son Francis Darwin often recalls how "he would ask himself 'now what do you want to say' and his answer written down would often disentangle the confusion". In fact, "disentangling confusions" seems to have been the driving force behind Darwin's scientific pursuits, as he was struck with bewilderment when contemplating the luxuriousness of life. It was also the impetus for this book. The true implications of Darwin's legacy remain as controversial to the critics of our time as they were to his contemporaries. Darwin's impact within and beyond the biological sciences is both daunting and exhilarating, and attests to the need for an interdisciplinary approach by remaining a challenge to many scholars in the most diverse fields. The recent revival of his theories has opened a Pandora's box of different theoretical studies that are particularly receptive to exploring new and exciting angles of research. (shrink)

This research deals with the records and memories of aging that are presented as modes of existence excluded under the tutelage of a society massified by technology and language as a constructor of social reality. In this way, we observe the legacies and experiences lived by the elderly, inferring the phenomenologicalhermeneutic thinking as another paradigm of experience of rooting the relationship between man, world and technique. From the qualitative and descriptive bibliographic methodology, we discuss, at first, some of the possible (...) effects of technological and aesthetic massification in the impersonalization of aged Dasein. Then, we infer the point of view that language and language establish worlds, influencing the social conception of the elderly. With this, the objective is to glimpse other possible ways of announcing the relationship of the elderly, and understanding of their existence, with contemporary time strongly constituted by the relations hegemonically guided by the technique. (shrink)

Entre Mead e Heidegger: a interioridade desdobrada e a formaçâo humana Resumo: O artigo visa aproximar a abordagem da psicologia social de Mead e a perspectiva fenomenológico-existencial de Martin Heidegger da noção de interioridade desdobrada. Tal aproximação permite sustentar que há uma radical e inseparável reciprocidade entre homem/mulher e mundo. A radicalidade de tal reciprocidade suplanta a dicotomia interioridade e exterioridade, reaproximando o corpo do tempo, lugar mesmo da abertura existencial humana. Apresenta-se a noção de “self” como processo e a (...) mente como resposta comportamental interativa com vistas a relacioná-la ao modo de ser-no-mundo. Também, uma breve incursão à psicologia de viés fenomenológico-existencial, buscando articular o interacionismo de Mead e a analítica existencial de Heidegger e suas implicações para o campo da formação humana.Palavras-chave: Self. Dasein. Interioridade desdobrada. Formação humana Between Mead and Heidegger: the unfolded interiority and the human formation: The article aims to approximate Mead's approach to social psychology and Martin Heidegger's phenomenological-existential perspective to the notion of unfolded interiority. Such an approach allows us to maintain that there is a radical and inseparable reciprocity between man / woman and the world. The radicality of such reciprocity supersedes the dichotomy interiority and exteriority, bringing the body of time closer together, the very place of human existential openness. The notion of “self” as a process and the mind as an interactive behavioral response is presented in order to relate it to the way of being in the world. Also, a brief foray into existential-phenomenological psychology, seeking to articulate Mead's interactionism and Heidegger's existential analytics and their implications for the field of human formationKeywords: Self. Dasein. Unfolded interiority. Human Formation. Entre Mead y Heidegger: la interioridad desarrollada y la formación humana Resumen: El artículo tiene como objetivo aproximar el enfoque de Mead a la psicología social y la perspectiva fenomenológica-existencial de Martin Heidegger a la noción desplegada de interioridad. Tal enfoque nos permite mantener que existe una reciprocidad radical e inseparable entre el hombre / mujer y el mundo. La radicalidad de tal reciprocidad suplanta la dicotomía de interioridad y exterioridad, devolviendo al cuerpo al tiempo, el lugar de la apertura existencial humana. La noción de "yo" se presenta como un proceso y la mente como una respuesta interactiva de comportamiento para relacionarlo con la forma de ser-en-el-mundo. Además, una breve incursión en la psicología del sesgo fenomenológico-existencial, buscando articular el interaccionismo de Mead y el análisis existencial de Heidegger y sus implicaciones para el campo de la formación humana.Palabras clave: auto. Dasein Interioridad desplegada. Formación humana Data de registro: 27/07/2020Data de aceite: 08/12/2020. (shrink)

On an exemplary life according to Islamic teachings and principals.

The idea of reality as construction maybe one of the most recurrent themes cutting across Modern and Contemporary thinking. Objectivist realism has professed reality to be external and independent of subjectivity and maintained that experience was the capacity of being affected by things through the senses and of reproducing them as representative mental contents. As a reaction, Modernity will establish: a) that consciousness is not merely receptive passivity but a configurant activity; b) that reality is not reflected by consciousness but, (...) rather, is somehow constructed by it. Our time rescues such heritage in a particularly fecund manner in the semiological discourse. Intersubjectively constructed reality is a web of meanings and values which man institutes around himself in the world. Reality sediments in systems of sign vehiculation and becomes fixed m codes. Therefore the question: if reality, as construction, has the limits and scope of code, how does consciousness behave concerning the non-codified, the non-constructed, in the absence of a code? This article deals with some views of this other of consciousness, presented as declensions of metaphor of absence.Talvez o tema mais recorrente do discurso filosófico que atravessa o pensamento moderno e a contemporaneidade seja a idéia da realidade como construção. Como reação ao realismo objetivista, que acreditava ser a realidade exterior e independente da subjetividade e para quem a experiência é a capacidade de ser afetado pelas coisas através dos sentidos e de reproduzi-las em conteúdos mentais representativos, a modernidade vai estabelecer que: a) a consciência não é uma mera passividade receptiva, mas atividade configurante; b) a realidade não é refletida pela consciência, mas por ela, de certa forma, construída. A nossa época recolhe esta herança de maneira fecunda particularmente no discurso semiológico: a realidade construída intersubjetivamente é uma teia de significados e valores que o homem institui ao redor de si no mundo. Ela sedimenta-se em sistemas de veiculação sêmicos e se fixa em códigos. Daí emerge a questão: tendo a realidade, enquanto construção, os limites e alcance do código, como se comporta a consciência e seus registros perante o não-codificado, o não-construído, a sua ausência? Algumas abordagens desse outro da consciência, apresentadas como declinações de metáforas da ausência, é aquilo que esse artigo pretende apresentar. (shrink)

Para Heidegger, a filosofia até então fora metafísica e enquanto tal chega a seu acabamento na era tecnológica, ou seja, a modernidade atinge seu auge com a inauguração da autonomia das ciências particulares pela linguagem cibernética. O filósofo chama a atenção para um pensamento capaz de pensar além da metafisica e da essência da técnica que tem dominado a compreensão do habitar humano no mundo. Redescobrir um pensar que não seja nem metafísico nem técnico é o que Heidegger chama de (...) a tarefa do pensamento. Vejamos que tanto a metafísica quanto a técnica estão acentuadas em um mesmo fundamento, consequentemente em uma mesma noção de verdade, a verdade enquanto concordância, enunciativa e enquanto ente. Nesta concepção de verdade também a filosofia habita enquanto metafísica, por isso na tarefa do pensamento a filosofia deve superar-se e buscar uma nova compreensão para o que é verdadeiro, deve ir às origens do pensamento grego e resgatar o significado de alétheia, desvelamento. Pensar é desvelar o que está velado. A tarefa do pensamento passa a ser encaminhada à hermenêutica, não por mera arbitrariedade, mas sim pela própria necessidade de se pensar originariamente. Só a hermenêutica pode ainda pensar o que é digno de ser pensado, o que ainda não foi alcançado pelo pensamento metafísico e pelo enquadramento técnico que move a habitação do homem no mundo, pois é a abertura que possibilita todo apresentar-se, essa abertura é a clareira do Ser.: For Heidegger philosophy had been hitherto metaphysics and it reaches its finishing process in the technological era, i.e., modernity reaches its peak with the unveiling of the autonomy of the special sciences through cyber language. The philosopher draws attention to a thought able of thinking beyond metaphysics and the essence of the technique that has dominated the understanding of human dwelling in the world. Rediscover a thinking that is neither metaphysical nor technique is what Heidegger calls the task of thought. Considering that both metaphysics and technique are pronounced in the same basis, thus in the same notion of truth, the truth as agreement, expository and as beings. In this conception of truth philosophy inhabits as metaphysical as well as. For this reason, in the task of thought, philosophy should surpass itself and seek a new understanding for what is true, it shall go to the origins of Greek thought and redeem the meaning of aletheia, unveiling. Thinking is to unveil what is veiled. The task of thought becomes forwarded to hermeneutics, not for mere arbitrariness, rather for the need of thinking originally. Only hermeneutics might still think what is worthy of being thought, what has not yet been reached by metaphysical thought and by the technical framework that moves the habitation of man in the world, then it is the opening that allows all “coming forwards”, this opening is the clearing of Being. Keywords: Philosophy. Metaphysics. Technique. Hermeneutics. Modernity. (shrink)

Two commentaries by Kamalpaşazade and Birgivi Efendi on Samarqandī's Risālah fī ādāb al-baḥth which is also included.

al-Ḥifnī's Muqaddimah fī al-ādāb followed by al-Bishrī's commentary.

Resumo: O Livro II da República de Platão se inicia com um desafio de Gláucon para Sócrates, onde este deve provar que o homem justo é, de toda maneira, melhor do que o injusto. Para isso, pedirá que Sócrates defenda a justiça por si mesma e censure a injustiça. O discurso de Gláucon pode ser dividido em três partes, sendo a primeira dedicada à origem e à natureza da justiça; a segunda irá indicar a justiça como algo necessário, mas não (...) como um bem; e a terceira, na qual ele irá tentar provar que a vida do injusto é melhor do que a do justo. Neste trabalho, iremos nos centrar em seu primeiro argumento e de que maneira Gláucon defende a justiça através de um contrato.: Book II of Plato's Republic opens with Glaucon's challenge to Socrates, where the latter must prove that the just man is in all ways possible better than the unjust one. Glaucon asks Socrates to advocate justice for it's own sake and to censor injustice. Glaucon's discourse can be divided into three parts. The first is dedicated to the origin and nature of justice; the second argues that justice is something necessary, but is not a good. In the third part, he tries to prove that the unjust life is better than the just one. This work focuses on the first speech and on how Glaucon defends justice by means of a contract. (shrink)

“Tell me," Wittgenstein once asked a friend, "why do people always say, it was natural for man to assume that the sun went round the earth rather than that the earth was rotating?" His friend replied, "Well, obviously because it just looks as though the Sun is going round the Earth." Wittgenstein replied, "Well, what would it have looked like if it had looked as though the Earth was rotating?” What would it have looked like if we looked at all (...) sciences from the viewpoint of Wittgenstein’s philosophy? Wittgenstein is undoubtedly one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. His complex body of work has been analysed by numerous scholars, from mathematicians and physicists, to philosophers, linguists, and beyond. This volume brings together some of his central perspectives as applied to the modern sciences and studies the influence they may have on the thought processes underlying science and on the world view it engenders. The contributions stem from leading scholars in philosophy, mathematics, physics, economics, psychology and human sciences; all of them have written in an accessible style that demands little specialist knowledge, whilst clearly portraying and discussing the deep issues at hand. (shrink)