Filial Piety and Business Ethics: A Confucian Reflection.

옛 거상들을 통해 한국인의 상술을 분석하고, 자본금 마련, 소자본 상술 등 실제 상술 운영예를 수록했다.

스무살 젊은이들, 인문학의 다양한 모습을 만나다! 서울대학교 인문대학 교수들이 이제 막 인문학에 발을 들여 놓는 스무살 청년들을 위해 직접 쓴 인문학 입문서『스무살, 인문학을 만나다』. 인문학을 둘러싼 사회의 담론들을 보면서 인문학의 성격 및 사회적 역할에 대해 고민해 온 서울대학교 인문대학의 성찰이 낳은 결과물이다. 실제 인문학을 연구하고 교육하고 있는 인문학자들의 다양한 연구 사례와 성과를 알기 쉽게 풀어내, 인문학에 관심을 가진 스무살 전후의 젊은이들이 인문학의 다양한 모습을 직접 접하고 스스로 답을 찾아갈 수 있도록 도와준다. ☞ 북소믈리에 한마디! 총 3부로 구성된 본문은 24편의 글을 (...) 통해 '사람과 인문'에 대해서 논한다. 1부 생성하는 만남에 실린 8개의 글들은 아직 낯설거나 이름만 들었을 뿐 잘 알지 못했던 타인들과의 만남을 통해 인문학에 친숙해지는 장을 제공한다. 2부 너머의 만남에 실린 8개의 글들에서는 정해진 분과학문의 경계를 넘어 확장되는 인문학의 오늘을, 마지막 3부 공명하는 만남에 실린 8편의 글에서는 함께 소통하며 때론 어우러지기도 하고 때론 부딪치기도 하면서 궁극적으로 새로운 고민과 사유를 낳는 인문학의 모습을 만날 수 있다. (shrink)

In a much-revised version of his 1980 doctoral dissertation in the history of science for Princeton University, Kim (history and philosophy of science, Seoul National U.) examines the knowledge about the natural world that informed Chu Hsi's renowned neo-Confucian synthesis. He sets out his basic concepts, reviews his understanding of the world, and examines the relationship between the two. He includes an extensive glossary with the English meaning and the Chinese characters. Annotation copyrighted by Book News Inc., Portland, OR.

1. Hyŏndae munmyŏng i majuhan saengmyŏng wigi -- 2. Sarang kwa konggam ŭi Kongja Yuhak -- 3. Tolbom kwa haengbok ŭi Maengja Yuhak -- 4. Sangsaeng kwa kongsaeng ŭi Yugyo -- 5. Wang Yang-myŏng ŭi tolbom kwa kongsaeng ŭi sam, 1 -- 6. Wang Yang-myŏng ŭi tolbom kwa kongsaeng ŭi sam, 2 -- 7. Ch'ŏnji manmul kwa in'gan i han mom in segye -- 8. Tolbom kwa kongsaeng ŭi ch'amdaun in'gan -- 9. Kamŭng kwa t'onggak ŭi chuch'e in yangji -- (...) 10. Tolbom kwa kongsaeng ŭi yangji sirhyŏn ŭi kil -- 11. Yangji sirhyŏn kwa ch'amdoen chŭlgŏum -- 12. Tolbom kwa kongsaeng ŭi ch'inmin chŏngch'i -- 13. Paeryŏ wa tolbom ŭi ch'amdoen chaa sirhyŏn ŭi kyoyuk -- 14. Paeryŏ wa tolbom ŭi ch'amdoen chaa sirhyŏn ŭi kyoyuk -- 15. Che 4-ch'a sanŏp hyŏngmyŏng sidae, tolbom kwa kongsaeng ŭi kil. (shrink)

Yung Sik Kim's new book is a welcome addition to the large number of studies of the thought of Chu Hsi, arguably the most important literati thinker in China since the Southern Song dynasty . Chu's ideas became orthodox empire‐wide during the early Ming dynasty , and during the Ming and Qing dynasties millions of candidates for the imperial civil service examinations mastered the “Learning of the Way” associated with Chu and his followers. With the exception of the pioneering study (...) by Yamada Keiji in 1978, nearly all previous accounts of Chu's ideas written by students of Chinese philosophy have emphasized the metaphysical, moral, and epistemological concerns in Chu's writings. Those more concerned with imperial dogma and state power in China since 1400 have tended to paint Chu Hsi's “Learning of the Way” as a monolithic, authoritarian ideology that legitimated the Ming and Qing dynasty rulers politically, socially, and culturally among gentry elites.Kim acknowledges that the core of Chu Hsi's grand intellectual synthesis was focused on moral and social philosophy, but in this book Kim provides compelling information that Chu was also concerned with natural knowledge about the three levels of reality: heaven and earth, the myriad things in the world, and the human realm. Humans thus formed a triad with heaven and earth as the most numinous living thing because they were endowed with the psycho‐physical stuff of ch'i that was most clear and complete. Recognizing no boundary between the physical and the spiritual, Chu Hsi equated human nature with the universe. The basic concepts that informed Chu's natural world were yin‐yang, the five evolutive phases, and the dualism of li and ch'i .Chu Hsi advocated a scholarly agenda that would explain why things and events were as they were. Through the “investigation of things,” the heavenly principle that inscribed the ch'i of each object and event could be discovered. Normally historians of Chinese philosophy stress the place of universal heavenly li in Chu's thought, but Kim makes a concerted effort not to overlook the important place of ch'i as the aggregated collection of stuff in the universe, some dense and falling like the earth, some airy and rising like heaven. Indeed, as important as li was for Chu Hsi's moral philosophy, ch'i was the most important concept he employed to explain natural phenomena, material changes, and earthly events. With no discontinuity between matter and life, or between materiality and mind, Chu's philosophy made no allowance for the Western distinctions between the material and spiritual spheres or between the physical and mental realms.It was precisely such views that troubled the Jesuits such as Matteo Ricci who came to China in the late sixteenth century. Ricci and his European cohort would be condemned in the early eighteenth century by French Jansenists and Spanish Franciscans for their overly accommodational compromises with traditional Chinese religious practices such as ancestor worship, which Ricci interpreted as a civil rite. Nonetheless, when Ricci studied Chu Hsi's moral philosophy and natural thought, he was appalled at its materialism and atheism, which he considered the fault of Buddhism and its impact on Song literati such as Chu Hsi.The “noninertness” of ch'i carried over from the dynamic materiality of all things, including the human mind, to the formless and unfathomable spirits and ghosts that existed in a border area outside the natural realm between heaven and human beings. The dispersion of ch'i upon death could take many forms but, according to Chu Hsi, in the end all such ch'i disaggregated, leaving no ongoing or abiding spiritual form for humans, plants, or animals. The ch'i of the ancestors could be prayed to because the materiality of their descendants was the same ch'i, but even this continuity could not survive more than a few generations. Again, the Jesuits were shocked at this atheistic view of the human soul and its eventual demise materially with no possible eternal life after death.Accordingly, Kim's careful study of what Chu Hsi thought about the natural world makes it evident that most modern studies have elided an essential aspect of traditional Chinese thought, particularly the centrality of ch'i in the dynamic processes of collection and dispersion that produce all things, whether living or inanimate. Students of Chinese philosophy have tended to prioritize those aspects of Chu Hsi's views on universal li and its instantiated forms that are more amenable to a Western, Judeo‐Christian‐Islamic reading drawn ultimately from the debate between Plato and Aristotle over the universal forms of particular things.Modern presentations, in other words, have failed to grasp why a generation of Jesuit scholars who spent their adulthood in China during the seventeenth century found Chu Hsi's views alien and dangerous. Kim deserves credit for going against the tide of twentieth‐century scholarly interpretation and restoring to Chu Hsi those aspects of his natural philosophy that have been conveniently repressed to make his views more palatable. Rather than just the builder of the orthodox brick wall of traditional Chinese moralism, we can see that Chu Hsi's natural philosphy challenged any view of the world that assumed theological differences between life and death, mind and body, or the spiritual and physical. (shrink)

This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind...

Direction of fit theories usually claim that beliefs are such that they “aim at truth” or “ought to fit” the world and desires are such that they “aim at realization” or the world “ought to fit” them. This essay argues that no theory of direction of fit is correct. The two directions of fit are supposed to be determinations of one and the same determinable two-place relation, differing only in the ordering of favored terms. But there is no such determinable (...) because of ineliminable asymmetries between the way that beliefs “aim at truth” and the way that desires “aim at realization.” This essay traces the ills of direction of fit theory to a misunderstanding of Anscombe and proposes a cure that distinguishes theoretical and practical thought by appeal to a distinction between thought in the form of a state and thought in the form of an event. (shrink)