Despite initiating the discussion and introducing the first definition examined in Plato’s Republic, Cephalus is quickly compelled to leave the discussion. Many scholars read the dramatic action of this opening exchange as a coup d’ tat in which Socrates overthrows Cephalus’ reign over the community and usurps his ancestral command over the conversation. In contrast, I contend that Cephalus presents a competing moral claim as a representative of the class of moneymakers.

Through a reading of the Myth of Er and Socrates' conversation with Cephalus, I will argue that merely conventional virtue is highly unstable and unreliable. Virtue acquired by convention proves foundationless outside the confines of the political regime that establishes those conventions, and a tendency toward an unreflective moral complacency on the part of the conventionally virtuous leaves them in particular danger of committing unjust actions. Socrates recommends the study of philosophy because it can ground conventionally acquired virtue and, (...) even more importantly, because it is capable of shaking the moral complacency that afflicts the conventionally virtuous. (shrink)

I argue that Cephalus introduces the argumentative paradigm of the entire Republic, the Challenge of Glaucon and Adeimantus, through his comments on wealth and his story about Themistocles.

In this article I seek to come to some understanding of the interlocutors in the first book of Plato’s Republic, particularly Cephalus. A more complete view of Cephalus not only provides some interesting ways to think about Plato and the Republic, but also suggests an interesting alternative to Plato’s view of justice. The article will progress as follows: First, I discuss Plato’s allegory of the cave. I, then, critique the cave allegory by applying the same kind of reasoning (...) that O. K. Bouwsma used to criticize Descartes’ evil genius. Next, I present what I think is a fruitful way to understand Cephalus. Finally, I draw some important conclusions regarding justice and offer some interesting critiques of Plato and Platonism. (shrink)

Despite student interest and engagement in Platonic dialogues, by the time introductory courses reach serious discussion of Plato’s relationship to Socrates, students are so befuddled by the notion of Socrates’ character espousing a “Platonic” position that they become disheartened and lose interest in the study of Plato. This paper focuses on how the persona of Cephalus affords a special opportunity to address the relationship between Plato and Socrates in the classroom and to thereby reduce student confusion. Drawing on Plato’s (...) Meno and the Republic, the author argues that Cephalus represents a Socratic position on virtue and justice. Tracking how arguments surrounding virtue and justice develop through these two dialogues, the author concludes that the figure of Cephalus allows Plato to pay homage to Socrates while also signaling his philosophical departure from his teacher. Lending concreteness to the relationship between Plato and Socrates, this way of interpreting Cephalus opens students up at a general level to the richness of Plato’s philosophy. (shrink)

This paper discusses Socrates’ conversation with Cephalus in Book I of Plato’s “Republic”, arguing that the passage expresses Plato’s view that the activity of reminisce in old age can be a source of moral insight. To motivate this thesis, the author devotes a class session to explaining the theory of “life review”, which consists of an aging person’s final, retrospective articulation of the important components of their life. Finally, the paper points to three pedagogical implications for teaching the meaning (...) of Socrates’ conversation with Cephalus and several suggestions on how to help students develop their ideas about the Cephalus passage. (shrink)

Plato imputes an important form of understanding to Cephalus in Book I of the Republic and revisits it at the end of Book X. Plato's astute observations of mental life in old age tie Cephalus’ conversation to the concept of “life review” in contemporary geriatric psychology. This provides the basis for an argument that Cephalus exemplifies the indispensable teacher described in Book X, and this raises interesting new epistemological and ethical issues. Finally, I ask why commentaries on (...) the Republic have overlooked this theme, and argue that an ageist bias against Cephalus has distorted commentators’ reading of the text. (shrink)

Plato imputes an important form of understanding to Cephalus in Book I of the Republic and revisits it at the end of Book X. Plato's astute observations of mental life in old age tie Cephalus’ conversation to the concept of “life review” in contemporary geriatric psychology. This provides the basis for an argument that Cephalus exemplifies the indispensable teacher described in Book X, and this raises interesting new epistemological and ethical issues. Finally, I ask why commentaries on (...) the Republic have overlooked this theme, and argue that an ageist bias against Cephalus has distorted commentators’ reading of the text. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Cephalus and Socratic Piety Plato's New Gods Platonic Piety Forms and Gods Gods and Souls.

Este artículo ofrece una exégesis de la conversación que Sócrates conduce con Céfalo y Polemarco en el libro I de la República en torno a la adecuada definición de la justicia. En el curso de esta conversación emergen gradualmente algunos ingredientes definitorios que por su básico carácter estructural se insinúan como constituyentes de obligatoria inclusión en cualquier tentativa auspiciosa de definición de la justicia. La aparición de estos ingredientes en el curso de la conversación se encuentra entreverada con la de (...) otros componentes más notorios para el lector cuanto más controvertibles. El artículo se propone un escrutinio de los primeros más que un análisis de estos últimos. No se concentra en el correspondiente estudio de las refutaciones a las que Sócrates somete finalmente la definición de la justicia de Polemarco. La interpretación que aquí se ofrece opta, así, por un énfasis algo inusual en las interpretaciones de esta primera parte del libro I de la República. Palabras clave: República; Justicia; Poder; Céfalo; PolemarcoThis paper offers an exegesis on the conversation led by Socrates with Cephalus and Polemarchus in Republic’s book I, on the adequate definition of justice. In the course of that conversation some defining elements gradually emerge. Because of their structural character, they display themselves as constituents which cannot be overlooked in any auspicious attempt to define justice. The emergence of these ingredients in the course of the conversation is intertwined with that of other components, the more controversial they are, the more noteworthy they turn out to be. The paper intends to scrutinize the former rather than analyze the latter. It does not focus on the corresponding study of Socrates’ refutations on Polemarchus’ definition of justice. The interpretationoffered here opts, thus, for a somewhat unusual emphasis on the interpretations of this first part of Republic’s book I. Keywords: Republic; Justice; Power; Cephalus; Polemarchus. (shrink)

We argue that there are three norms of critical discussion in stark relief in Republic I. The first we see in the exchange with Cephalus---that we interpret each other and contribute to discussions in a maximally argumentative fashion. The second we seein the exchange with Polemarchus---that in order to cooperate in dialectic, interlocutors must maintain a distance between themselves and the theses they espouse. This way they can subject the views to serious scrutiny without the risk of personal loss. (...) Third, and finally, from Socrates’ exchange with Thrasymachus, it is clear that uncooperative discussants must be handled in a fashion that reinforces the goals of dialectic. So Thrasymachus is refuted and silenced not just for the sake of correcting his definition of justice, but also for the sake of those listening. (shrink)

This article applies Russon's principles of reading Plato's dialogues to solve a problem arising from both the dramatic and philosophical aspects of Plato's Republic: persuasive speech seems effective only when its audience is already willing to listen and be convinced. Yet if so, then either persuasive speech is powerless to persuade anybody truly, or it is unclear how it differs from simple manipulation or brainwashing. This article resolves this dilemma by using Russon’s insights about the kind of rationality Plato invites (...) us to assume, namely a “concrete rationality,” and by analyzing the ????irst three interlocutors of Socrates in the Republic: Polemarchus, Cephalus, and, of course, Thrasymachus. This approach enables us to differentiate these three interlocutors, explain Thrasymachus’s persistence in listening to the conversation until the end despite his unwillingness to listen, as well as the therapeutic function of theōria for providing him some momentary relief from his “hatred of speech” (misologia). (shrink)

Chapter 11 considers book I of the Republic and mainly treats the role book I plays in the dialogue. It is argued that book I is written to illustrate how the Socrates of the early dialogues would have tried to find a definition of justice. Hence, the goal of this book appears to show the limits of a certain way of searching for definitions and to dismiss it. The role of the other characters of book I--Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus-- (...) is relevant in order to describe fully the aporetic character of this approach. (shrink)

Contents 1 Introduction / 2 The Timaeus on dignity: the Demiurge’s speech / 3 Justice as a virtue / 4 The content of just actions / 5 Justice of the law and justice of the state / 6 Equality / 7 Some key issues in Plato’s conception of justice / 7.1 What is more excellent—justice of the soul or justice of action? / 7.2 Which activity is best and what is its best object? / 7.2. Just actions over contemplation / (...) 7.2. The Timaeus and Plato’s teaching on justice / 7.2. The elderly Cephalus on justice: foreword as epilogue / 7.3 The sharing of wives: testing the interpretation on a ‘hard case’ / 8 Conclusions. (shrink)

pt. 2: The domain of the Dialogues ; What Socratic dialogue is not ; The examined life ; Tragedy in the philosophic age of the Greeks ; Republic I, Justice, power, knowledge ; Republic II-V, Soul and city ; Republic VI-X, The architecture of reality ; Laws, The legacy of Cephalus -- pt. 2: Protagoras, The dialectic of the many and the one ; Gorgias, The temptation to speak ; Parmenides, Most true ; Sophist & statesman, The formal disintegration (...) of justice ; Phaedrus, Hymn to love ; Symposium, The pride of love ; The platonic achievement ; The living voice. (shrink)

PiATO. I. The Nature of Philosophy When Socrates, in the immortal conversation at the house of Cephalus, defined the philosopher as lover of the vision of ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:just Men and Just Acts in Plato's Republic JEROME SCHILLER I. Introduction Too MUCHhas already been written about Plato's Republic. But this, strangely enough, is why a little more needs to be written. For the book has been worked over so often that an obvious sign of fatigue has set in: critics are beginning to find such elementary flaws in the Republic that one wonders why he should waste (...) time on such a philosophically embarrassing work at all. It is to counter one of these recent criticisms and thus, hopefully, to help offset the fatigue, that this study is written. It purports not only to show the criticism mistaken, but also to sketch a way of looking at the Republic which should send the reader back for a further look at this incredibly rich work. The richness of the Republic is, indeed, a source of embarrassment for anyone writing on it. For because of its structure it is at least misleading to isolate one topic from the myriad others treated there, and because of its complexity, impossible to document interpretations of more than a few topics. I shall follow the time-honored practices here of merely expressing my bias on some topics (such as my non-political interpretation) and leaving it up to the reader to follow up hints of my interpretations of other topics (such as that of the Sun, Line, and Cave). II. Plato's Alleged Fallacy in the Republic David Sachs and A. W. H. Adkins have recently claimed that Plato commits the fallacy of equivocation in the Republic, not in the course of some minor argument, but in answering what is probably the central problem posed by the work: Why be just?1 Simply put, their objection goes like this: In the first book of the Republic, Socrates attempts to prove to Thrasymachus why justice is preferable to injustice. But even Socrates is dissatisfied with this answer and early in the second book, after a brilliantly fashioned defense of the Thrasymachean position by Glaucon and Adeimantus, the brothers ask for a more convincing demonstration from "You, [who have] passed your entire life in the consideration of this very matter." e Socrates seems to accept the challenge and proceeds to a search for the concept of justice writ large in the state. Now, claim Adkins and Sachs, Plato never does answer Glaucon's and AdeiDavid Sachs, A Fallacy in Plato s Republic, Philosophical Review, LX(XII (1963),141158 ;A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, A Study in Greek Values (Oxford,1960),p. 289. Adkins,in developingapolitical interpretation ofthe Republic, doesnot elaborate the criticism as does Sachs; hence I refer in this study primarily to the latter's article. sPlato, Republic 376e 2-3,trans. P. Shorey (2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb Classical Library, 1937-42).All subsequent quotations are from this translation. [1] HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY mantus' request. For though he does eventually purport to show that justice is preferable to injustice, the justice he attempts to prove this of is not at all the same justice that Glaucon and Adeimantus have in mind. Plato has simply equivocated on the term "iustice," meaning at one time the set of acts generally considered just,s but at another time a certain order in the individual's soul. He has purported to show that an individual with a well-ordered soul reaps advantages, but unless he can show a clear relation between this "Platonic" notion of justice and the "vulgar" notion of justice, the notion which Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus have in mind, he will not have answered the brothers' question, and will thus have avoided the central problem of the Republic. The relation he has to establish is, Sachs claims, that Platonic justice is a necessary and a sufficient condition for vulgar justice. Then he could argue that since he has shown that a man reaps advantages just to the extent that he is Platonically just, (1) a vulgarly unjust individual will not reap more advantages than a vulgarly just one (on the grounds that Platonic justice entails vulgar justice), and (2) a vulgarly just man will reap more advantages than a vulgarly... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:just Men and Just Acts in Plato's Republic JEROME SCHILLER I. Introduction Too MUCHhas already been written about Plato's Republic. But this, strangely enough, is why a little more needs to be written. For the book has been worked over so often that an obvious sign of fatigue has set in: critics are beginning to find such elementary flaws in the Republic that one wonders why he should waste (...) time on such a philosophically embarrassing work at all. It is to counter one of these recent criticisms and thus, hopefully, to help offset the fatigue, that this study is written. It purports not only to show the criticism mistaken, but also to sketch a way of looking at the Republic which should send the reader back for a further look at this incredibly rich work. The richness of the Republic is, indeed, a source of embarrassment for anyone writing on it. For because of its structure it is at least misleading to isolate one topic from the myriad others treated there, and because of its complexity, impossible to document interpretations of more than a few topics. I shall follow the time-honored practices here of merely expressing my bias on some topics (such as my non-political interpretation) and leaving it up to the reader to follow up hints of my interpretations of other topics (such as that of the Sun, Line, and Cave). II. Plato's Alleged Fallacy in the Republic David Sachs and A. W. H. Adkins have recently claimed that Plato commits the fallacy of equivocation in the Republic, not in the course of some minor argument, but in answering what is probably the central problem posed by the work: Why be just?1 Simply put, their objection goes like this: In the first book of the Republic, Socrates attempts to prove to Thrasymachus why justice is preferable to injustice. But even Socrates is dissatisfied with this answer and early in the second book, after a brilliantly fashioned defense of the Thrasymachean position by Glaucon and Adeimantus, the brothers ask for a more convincing demonstration from "You, [who have] passed your entire life in the consideration of this very matter." e Socrates seems to accept the challenge and proceeds to a search for the concept of justice writ large in the state. Now, claim Adkins and Sachs, Plato never does answer Glaucon's and AdeiDavid Sachs, A Fallacy in Plato s Republic, Philosophical Review, LX(XII (1963),141158 ;A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, A Study in Greek Values (Oxford,1960),p. 289. Adkins,in developingapolitical interpretation ofthe Republic, doesnot elaborate the criticism as does Sachs; hence I refer in this study primarily to the latter's article. sPlato, Republic 376e 2-3,trans. P. Shorey (2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb Classical Library, 1937-42).All subsequent quotations are from this translation. [1] HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY mantus' request. For though he does eventually purport to show that justice is preferable to injustice, the justice he attempts to prove this of is not at all the same justice that Glaucon and Adeimantus have in mind. Plato has simply equivocated on the term "iustice," meaning at one time the set of acts generally considered just,s but at another time a certain order in the individual's soul. He has purported to show that an individual with a well-ordered soul reaps advantages, but unless he can show a clear relation between this "Platonic" notion of justice and the "vulgar" notion of justice, the notion which Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus have in mind, he will not have answered the brothers' question, and will thus have avoided the central problem of the Republic. The relation he has to establish is, Sachs claims, that Platonic justice is a necessary and a sufficient condition for vulgar justice. Then he could argue that since he has shown that a man reaps advantages just to the extent that he is Platonically just, (1) a vulgarly unjust individual will not reap more advantages than a vulgarly just one (on the grounds that Platonic justice entails vulgar justice), and (2) a vulgarly just man will reap more advantages than a vulgarly... (shrink)

It is well known to readers of the Republic that, according to Plato's representation, a casual meeting of several friends develops into a sederunt for the express purpose of finding a solution to the question, what is justice? The question has its origin in the remark of the aged Cephalus, quoting Pindar, that whoever lives a life of justice and holiness, Sweet hope, the nourisher of age, his heart Delighting, with him lives; which most of all Governs the many (...) veering thoughts of man. (shrink)

The present study aims at giving factual support to the thesis that the Parmenides is serious in intention, rigorous in logical demonstration, and stylistically meticulous in its original composition. While this consideration may be tedious, still it is useful. Against a past history which has claimed to find the tone hilarious, the logic fallacious, the work inauthentic, the text in need of bracketing by divination, the whole incoherent— against these eccentricities a certain firm sobriety seems called for. I hope that (...) my conclusions find support and persist through fluctuations of philosophic and philological styles.The main difficulty with my thesis is that the text as we now have it (in Burnet's and Dies' editions) shows exceptions to every rule that might apply to style and even to logical structure. Thus it is almost but not quite uniformly true that each theorem opens with a theorem statement; that each is marked by a "questioning" response; that each deduction is valid when formalized in propositional calculus; and so on. Are the exceptions the result of careless composition; are they deliberate warnings not to take the proofs too seriously; or are they the result of errors in transmission? One way to test this is to reconstruct early versions of the text: if these show more logical rigor than the later versions the notion of a wholly valid original is supported; if they do not, the result may point toward the need for a less serious interpretation. A second thing to look for is the possibility that, here and there, parts of a coherent original text are uniquely conserved in sources other than the principal mss, B,T, and W. This assumes, of course, that the "original" text in question is the one with the best logical form, and that assumption seems justified. As a matter of fact, later copyings almost universally show deterioration, not improvement in style and logic.My textual findings are more compatible with some lines of interpretation than with others. Thus I offer some reasons for not accepting treatments of the work as a joke, mystical revelation, or abrupt metaphysical revision. The structure of the dialogue is best explained, I think, by reading it as an indirect proof that some non-Platonic interpretations of the theory of forms are unsatisfactory. In particular, these are the Megarian version (represented in the first part of the dialogue by Zeno, in the second by the First Hypothesis), and the Anaxagorean version put forward by Eudoxus (represented in the first part by Cephalus and his friends from Clazomenae, in the second by the Second Hypothesis). At the same time, the dialogue shows the need for a philosophic method other than the "hypothetical— deductive" way of dianoia; presumably this other method is the "dialectic" discussed in Republic VII. It also follows that any interpretation of the Phaedo which falls into either the Eudoxian or Megarian difficulties was not— at least at the date of the Parmenides—Plato's intended reading.Findings concerning the relations and reliability of the manuscripts of this dialogue also apply to the texts of the other Platonic dialogues which these mss contain.Further, the Parmenides is such an important work both historically and intrinsically that any insight which textual study can bring to its interpretation is a contribution to Western philosophy. (shrink)

In Books One and Two of The Republic presents a discussion of the nature of justice by Socrates, the aging Cephalus, his son Polemarchus, and the sophist Thrasymachus. Plato's brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantus, take over in Book Two, challenging Socrates to convince them that a just life is preferable to an unjust life with power, fame, and riches. They imagine and evaluate different ways of creating the best possible human life. First, they consider a republic based on health and (...) simplicity. When Glaucon dismisses that kind of life as fit only for pigs, they construct a republic based on wealth and luxury. Their analysis of economic and political reality introduces the division of labor, the origin of war, a common currency, and basic principles for educating the young. The goal of this quest is to reveal the foundations of justice and injustice and evaluate their merits. This dramatized version is an adaptation of the Benjamin Jowett translation. (shrink)

In Books One and Two of The Republic presents a discussion of the nature of justice by Socrates, the aging Cephalus, his son Polemarchus, and the sophist Thrasymachus. Plato's brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantus, take over in Book Two, challenging Socrates to convince them that a just life is preferable to an unjust life with power, fame, and riches. They imagine and evaluate different ways of creating the best possible human life. First, they consider a republic based on health and (...) simplicity. When Glaucon dismisses that kind of life as fit only for pigs, they construct a republic based on wealth and luxury. Their analysis of economic and political reality introduces the division of labor, the origin of war, a common currency, and basic principles for educating the young. The goal of this quest is to reveal the foundations of justice and injustice and evaluate their merits. This dramatized version is an adaptation of the Benjamin Jowett translation. (shrink)

What should political theorists do when they travel beyond the West and find that ordinary people do not want to reflect upon their political commitments? One option is to do rehabilitative political theory and argue that China and Egypt, say, already possess deliberative cultures. A second option is to maintain that China and Egypt favor different, and better, ideals than democratic deliberation. A third option, and the one that I endorse, is to promote Socratic ideals in universities around the world. (...) As Plato recognized in the Republic, it is easier to teach students to love political debate than to change the habits of pious people such as Cephalus. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction New Beginnings, or Continuity? Contrasting Readings of the Republic Plato and his Audience, Plato and Socrates.

The discussion between Thrasymachus and Socrates in Book I of Plato's Republic instead the question about justice started with Cephalus. Thrasymachus is an important character, who relates justice to the city government. This causes justice to leave individual sphere and enter public sphere. In our article, we want to verify how Thrasymachus' theses on justice and whether they are consistent with each other. The problem of consistency of theses is old among commentators and presents different solutions. Our intention is (...) to propose a solution to the problem and to relate this to art of government proposed by Thrasymachus. This allows us to verify the manner in which Socrates and Thrasymachus differ in their proposals for government and types of ruler. In this way, our work intends to contribute with literature on the role played by Thrasymachus in Plato’s work. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Cross-Examining Socrates. A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato’s Early DialoguesMark L. McPherranJohn Beversluis. Cross-Examining Socrates. A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato’s Early Dialogues. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xii + 416. Cloth, $69.95.This book is a valuable and thoroughly-researched contribution to the study of Plato's Socratic dialogues. Its fine qualities stem in part from its cathartic motivations: for years Beversluis suppressed his ever-growing reservations concerning (...) the "standard picture" of Socrates's interaction with his various interlocutors (16). On Beversluis's account, this position naively takes Socrates's own apologia at face-value, portraying him as a self-sacrificing soul-therapist who treats his corrupt, one-dimensional interlocutors fairly, despite their many carefully drawn faults (e.g., stupidity, vanity, and violence, followed by face-saving exits). Beversluis aims to rectify this picture by retrying Socrates in a class-action suit on behalf of Socrates's interlocutors—who, he thinks, the standard account has quite unfairly maligned (while it has simultaneously ignored Socrates's "dark side"; e.g., his unscrupulous, hypocritical, and harmful tactics [esp. his conscious use of fallacy]).Beversluis's book contains a Preface, Introduction, and seventeen chapters, finishing with a very good bibliography, general index, and indexes of passages cited, names, and modern authors. Chapter 1, "The Socratic Interlocutor," examines the structure of Plato's Socratic dialogues and the role of their interlocutors. Beversluis contrasts Plato's dialogues with those produced by Augustine, Anselm, Hume, and Berkeley, arguing that a key difference between them lies in the fact that Socrates is presented as having no system to expound, championing instead the intrinsic value of philosophizing. Also, Socrates's interlocutors are drawn from a "narrow sociological group," (29) and are unprepared for their (unpleasant) encounters with Socrates (31).Chapter 2, "Elenchus and sincere assent," cogently argues that the "say what you believe" constraint on Socrates's use of the elenchus represents a consensus in need of critical reappraisal. In particular, Beversluis contends that Socrates often relies on qualified or uncomprehending assent, and that our texts do not support the idea that Socrates never argues with the soul-ignoring intention to win an argument using faulty argumentation and willful misrepresentation of the interlocutor's statements.The next fourteen chapters closely assess Socrates's encounters with Crito, Ion, Hippias, Laches and Nicias, Charmides and Critias, Euthyphro, Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Hippocrates, Protagoras, Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles. The book ends with a chapter on "The last days of the Socratic interlocutor," outlining the view that Plato's later work features non-elenctic spokesmen who are sensitive to the moral dangers of careless (i.e., Socrates's) elenchus-wielding.In his central chapters, Beversluis argues that "Saint Socrates" is in fact a philosophical [End Page 583] Jekyl and Hyde. Although scholars have celebrated the former philanthropic figure as a model philosopher, that has obscured his Hyde-like, predatory behavior towards innocents such as Euthyphro and Crito. However, here readers are themselves given a mixed bag: while Beversluis offers, for example, a detailed and smart defense of Cephalus against those who portray him as a petty-minded, superstitious, moral fraud (Chapter 9)—as well as sensitive, careful analyses of Socrates's less-than-clear arguments throughout—other chapters occasionally go overboard in their apologetic efforts. One example will have to suffice here.According to Beversluis, Euthyphro's typical characterization as a pretentious, dense, father-bashing, religious zealot who "would have done well in the Nazi Youth Movement," (R. F. Holland; 163), has drawn attention away from the fact that Socrates's treatment of Euthyphro is abusive and ineffectual. But although Beversluis rightly sees that the figure of Euthyphro is being used in a complex fashion by Plato, his account is marred in several ways. For example, although it is likely that Socrates does not himself possess complete definitions of virtue-concepts such as justice (164-169), unlike Euthyphro, Socrates can presumably provide elenchus-proof defenses of his own non-traditionalist claims. Again, while Socrates may overwhelm Euthyphro with his principles of proper definition (Eu. 5c-d, 6d-e), proceeding on uncomprehending, merely verbal agreement (169-177), Plato surely did not intend... (shrink)