This paper critically examines the relation between problems and the formation and development of concepts in Bergson’s work, as well as in Bachelard, Canguilhem and Deleuze. Building on work by Elie During, I argue that it is not only Bergson but also Deleuze who shares with the French epistemological tradition an “anti-positivist” conception of concept formation, founded upon the posing and solving of novel problems as opposed to the acquisition and verification of empirical facts. Contrary to During, however, I (...) argue that it is not Bergson but Deleuze who furnishes us with an “anti-positivist” conception of problems that is adequate to this anti-positivist conception of concept formation. Deleuze’s anti-positivist view of problems holds, firstly, that genuine problems require the creation of novel terms in which to state and solve them. He shares this view with Bergson, Bachelard and Canguilhem. Secondly, however, Deleuze holds that a problem’s “truth” is not to be evaluated with reference to its eventual solutions, nor with reference to some privileged and contentful experience of reality, but is rather a matter of its purely intrinsic productivity. (shrink)

This article analyzes the repercussions of G. Politzer’s thought on the philosophy of life elaborated by G. Canguilhem. During the first thirty years of the twentieth century, Politzer’s texts provide important material for the construction of the philosophy that Canguilhem builds on human individuality and its autonomy. The reading of Politzer constitutes for Canguilhem a motive of inspiration for his axiological, moral and political proposals. By associating the ideas of the concrete psychology that encapsulates the existence of (...) man-actor, Canguilhem reconciles two series of arguments: a). the philosophy of life cannot do without an approach to human action; b). the presence of human action becomes inseparable from the assumptions that debate its existence between the singularity of its productions, and the apprehension that can be made of it by means of the universals that are proposed by science. (shrink)

El presente artículo analiza el periodo de conformación de la filosofía de Georges Canguilhem (1926-1939). Se concentra en la elaboración temprana de sus ideas relativas a la teoría del valor y de la autonomía de la acción humana. Dos aspectos de esta filosofía son tomados en consideración. En primer lugar, el vinculo que mantiene el entendimiento con los hechos que forman parte de la realidad, observando la incidencia de esta filosofía del valor y de la acción en el dominio (...) de tres disciplinas pertenecientes a las ciencias sociales (psicología, sociología, historia). Un segundo momento del texto analiza el espacio asignado por estas elaboraciones al psicoanálisis, teoría que Canguilhem asocia a los fundamentos de la dimensión política y ética de esta filosofía. (shrink)

Si son œuvre commence aujourd’hui à faire l’objet d’études d’ensemble, il nous semble aussi possible de saisir toute l’ampleur et la richesse de la philosophie de Georges Canguilhem en s’attachant à l’interprétation qu’il propose des différentes facettes de la pensée de Descartes. Thématique de la liberté créatrice, statut de la technique, fonction du « sentiment », problématique de l’individualité biologique, interrogation sur la pertinence de l’opposition mécanisme-finalité, questionnement sur l’historique de la notion de réflexe, réflexion sur la méthode et (...) prise de position sur l’importance philosophique et morale du Cogito : autant de moments d’un panorama qui permettra de mieux comprendre le Descartes de Canguilhem, et donc, on l’espère, Canguilhem lui-même. (shrink)

Este trabajo se propone analizar y confrontar las perspectivas teóricas divergentes de G. Canguilhem y de M. Foucault en torno al estatus pistemológico de las ciencias modernas del cuerpo humano. Ambos filósofos investigaron factores extracientíficos determinantes en la constitución del objeto mismo de la fisiología: aquel cuerpo humano calificado como «normal» que la técnica médica adopta como ideal terapéutico. Sin embargo, Canguilhem apeló en sus análisis a fundamentos subjetivos y biológicos (tales como el padecimiento humano y la «normatividad (...) vital»), mientras que su discípulo otorgó mayor relevancia a los factores políticos de normalización social. (shrink)

This paper does not intend to provide an exhaustive account of Canguilhem's thinking. It will focus on his philosophical approach to the biological sciences.

Background Biomedicine, i.e. the application of basic sciences to medicine, has become the cornerstone for the study of etiopathogenesis and treatment of diseases. Biomedicine has enormously contributed to the progress of medicine and healthcare and has become the preferred approach to medical problems in the West. The developments in statistical inference and machine learning techniques have provided the foundation for personalised medicine where clinical management can be fully informed by biomedicine. The deployment of precision medicine may impact the autonomy and (...) self-normativity of the patients. Understanding the relationship between biomedicine and medical practice can help navigate the benefits and challenges offered by precision medicine. Methods Conventional content analysis was applied to “Le Normal and le Pathologique” (Canguilhem G. The Normal and the Pathological. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1991) and further investigated with respect to its relationship with techne and precision medicine using PubMed and Google Scholar and the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy to search for the following keywords singularly or in combination: “Canguilhem”, “techne”, “episteme”, “precision medicine”, “machine learning AND medicine”. Results The Hippocratic concept of techne accounts for many characteristics of medical knowledge and practice. The advances of biomedicine, experimental medicine and, more recently, machine learning offer, in contrast, the model of a medicine based purely on episteme. I argue that Canguilhem medical epistemology establishes a framework where episteme and data-driven medicine is compatible with the promotion of patient’s autonomy and self-normativity. Conclusions Canguilhem’s medical epistemology orders the relationship of applied medicine with experimental sciences, ethics and social sciences. It provides guidance to define the scope of medicine and the boundaries of medicalization of healthy life. Finally, it sets an agenda for a safe implementation of machine learning in medicine. (shrink)

En este artículo se establece un análisis histórico, axiológico y epistemológico de las condiciones de advenimiento de una filosofía médica abocada al estudio de la enfermedad. El examen de estas condiciones toma en cuenta los estudios clásicos y contemporáneos de la filosofía de la medicina, analizando sus distintas perspectivas y enunciados. La reflexión en torno de los supuestos y conceptos asociados a tal tipo de filosofía, localiza la enfermedad en sus distintas dimensiones: en el ámbito del acontecimiento biológico (disease), del (...) orden social (sickness), y de la experiencia vivida (illness). Tres puntos de deliberación presentan el cuerpo nodular de estos análisis: a) la constitución disciplinaria y conceptual de la enfermedad como un hecho total: variantes epistemológicas de la medicina y la filosofía antigua; b) la psicopatología en la constitución de una filosofía de la enfermedad, el análisis epistemológico de dos conceptos: normal-patológico; y c) la filosofía de la vida de G. Canguilhem, su curso antropológico y normativo en la definición de la enfermedad. (shrink)

RésuméCette étude essaie de réunir quelques éléments en vue d'une interprétation plus complète du programme épistémologique contenu de façon extrêmement elliptique dans l'ouvrage post‐hume de Jean Cavaillès, publié en 1947 par G. Canguilhem et C. Ehresmann sous le titre Sur la logique et la théorie de la science . Afin d'arriver, plus particulière‐texte, où la «nécessité génératrice» d'une dialectique conceptuelle est évoquée, il faudra rappeler quelques aspects connus ainsi que quelques aspects moins connus du cheminement philosophique de Cavaillès.Cette reconstruction (...) est mise en œuvre de façon détaillée dans un travail de commentaire textuel qui devait permettre de dégager le sens des formules denses et souvent allusives de Cavaillés dans son dernier ouvrage1. Il n'est pas possible de résumer ici en quelques lignes le contenu d'un tel travail. Toutefois on peut indiquer quelques conclusions qui s'en dégagent pour l'interprétation globale de l'ouvrage en question. En premier lieu il faut reconnaître la nature même du problème traité ici par Cavaillès. En second lieu on caractérise le type de position prise envers ce problème ainsi défini et en tant qu'on peut le restreindre dans un premier moment à la philosophie des mathématiques. En troisième lieu on montre que se problème subit un changement d'éclairage par le fait que cette restriction doit être levée en prenant en considération le rapport entre expérience mathématique et expiérience physique. que nous serons obligés d'entrer un peu plus, et à titre d'exemple, dam le détail de l'exégèse). Finalement on peut essayer de préciser le programme d'une dialectique conceptuelle en quelques thèses ou titres schématiques qui concement les questions majeures de la théorie de la science selon Cavaillès2. (shrink)

Outside France the epistemology of G. Bachelard is unknown ; in France his influence is considerable, especially on philosophers like L. Althusser, M. Foucault, G. Canguilhem, J. Hyppolite, M. Serres, G. G. Granger, D. Lecourt and many others. Bachelard occupies a strategic point on the crossroads of all theoretical debates concerning science. The fact that he seems to give satisfactory answers on the problems which have risen after the breakdown of the logical-positivistic philosophy of science, justifies an exposition and (...) evaluation of his original contribution to philosophy. The author distinguishes the following items. 1. The determination of Bachelards philosophy as a scientific philosophy which is wedded to a history of the sciences, especially the natural sciences. 2. The 'systematicity' as the criterium of science against other, traditional, criteria like empiricalness, logical deducibility, correspondence with reality and so on. 3. The rectification-principle : the formation of a scientific system cannot be conceived otherwise than as the restructuring or reorganisation of the ruling system or system-sets. 4. The transformation of scientific knowledge shows many discontinuities in all its phases and branches. Bachelard calls them ruptures. 5. The translation of a theory into another, more coherent and comprehensive one, is baptised as a 'dialectisation' of the concept. By a dialectisation a system is both generalised and specified. Formal logic, which is based on identity and the principle of the excluded middle, is not able to interprete this dynamic aspect of scientific thinking. 6. Central in Bachelards philosophy is also the concept of recurrence. Each new organisation of the scientific system (global or partial) sheds new light on their history and their logical foundations. History has to be rewritten after each progress. Recurrence, however, also has systematic implications. Science always desimplifies its own evidences. 7. The scientist has to demolish the obstacles which he made himself by surcharging the content of the concepts not in use and by not assimilating them in the system. 8. Bachelards philosophy of science is both idealistic and realistic ; the phenomenology becomes phenomenotechnique under the hands and in the brains of the scientist. 9. He always denies (negativity) the earlier theories and objects by incorporating them in new relationships. 10. This constructive aspect of theory formation is the same in natural science and mathematics. Bachelard opposes the logical-positivistic idea that these are methodically dissimilar. In a critical commentary the author discusses the question of 'dialectical logic' in the sciences, in relation to some recent research in this field by I. Lakatos en Errol E. Harris. In his opinion the epistemology of Bachelard affords a creative renewal of the understanding of science, although further research is needed in many aspects. (shrink)

Examining the historical development of scientific concepts is important for understanding the structured routines within which these concepts are currently used as goal-directed tools in experiments. To illustrate this claim, I will outline how the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations each draw on an older interdependent set of associations that, although nominally-discarded, continues to structure their current independent uses for pursuing discrete experimental goals. In doing so, I will highlight how three strands of literature offer mutually instructive insights for (...) understanding how the uses of our current scientific concepts contribute to experimental practices. The first strand of literature includes recent scholarship examining how the uses of scientific concepts can enable scientific practices (e.g., Boon 2012; Brigandt 2012; Feest 2010; Steinle 2012). In this context, scientific concepts have been described as tools that function in ways that contribute to empirical knowledge; contributions that extend beyond their traditionally recognized roles in mental and linguistic representation. The second strand of literature can be glimpsed within the technoscientific studies focus on non-human agency; a focus that supports an account of the disciplined routines within which concepts are used as acting in analogous ways to the routinized participation of machines in experiments (Pickering 1995). The third strand of the literature draws attention to how the functions of concepts are grounded by the set of historically-contingent experimental practices (e.g., Canguilhem 2008; Tiles 1984). Although maintaining valuable differences, the focus of these three strands of literature are mutually instructive. Together, they offer a view of the uses of concepts as taken-for-granted tools that function within networks of subterranean associations; associations that are grounded by historically contingent experimental practices that structure how they act (in concert with human and material participants) within the temporally dynamic processes of scientific practice. Through examples drawn from a comparison of the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations, I aim to demonstrate the value that the converging insights of these three strands of literature offer for studying the role of scientific concepts in experimental practices. (shrink)

Ce texte, issu d’une conférence de 2018, est destiné à montrer l’intérêt d’une coopération entre le travail des historiens de la philosophie et les protagonistes de recherches et d’enseignements sur le travail et l’activité humaine. Il essaie de préciser la définition et l’impact de la notion de « matières étrangères », mise en avant par G. Canguilhem. Se laisser interpeller par elles serait pour le travail philosophique une garantie d’un usage sain de ses concepts. Une telle thèse est mise (...) à l’épreuve sur trois champs problématiques : la notion de compétence, le savoir entre la discipline du général et l’ascèse du singulier, la réflexion anthropologique sur l’activité. Dans les trois cas, le dialogue entre les textes du patrimoine philosophique et le souci d’un juste discours sur la vie du monde industrieux et social se révèle éclairant pour proposer des pistes de reconsidération dans l’un et l’autre domaine. (shrink)

À quelques rares exceptions près, la philosophie biologique de G. Canguilhem n’aborde jamais directement la question du vieillissement. Néanmoins, cet article vise à montrer que ses réflexions sur la santé et la maladie, le normal et le normatif, et plus généralement sur le vivant, constituent, dans leur ensemble, un cadre théorique pertinent pour appréhender ce phénomène. À la lumière d’un exemple, nous montrerons qu’elles permettent d’ouvrir un espace de dialogue entre réflexion philosophique et biologie contemporaine du vieillissement.

Well prior to the invention of the term ‘biology’ in the early 1800s by Lamarck and Treviranus (and lesser-known figures in the decades prior), and also prior to the appearance of terms such as ‘organism’ under the pen of Leibniz and Stahl in the early 1700s, the question of ‘Life’, that is, the status of living organisms within the broader physico-mechanical universe, agitated different corners of the European intellectual scene. From modern Epicureanism to medical Newtonianism, from Stahlian animism to the (...) discourse on the ‘animal economy’ in vitalist medicine, models of living being were constructed in opposition to ‘merely anatomical’, structural, mechanical models. It is therefore striking that the classic narratives of the Scientific Revolution conspicuously avoid any consideration of what status to grant living beings in a newly physicalized universe (I discuss this in Wolfe 2011, 2019 chapt. 1). Neither Harvey, nor Boyle, nor Locke (to name some likely candidates, the latter having studied with Willis and collaborated with Sydenham) ever ask what makes organisms unique, or conversely, what does not. In this chapter I seek to establish how something we might call ‘the knowledge of Life’, to use an expression of Georges Canguilhem’s, emerged as part of early modernity without being part of the mainstream history of life science. This leads to the question, can one can correlate early modern “knowledge of life” with the emergence of a science called ‘biology’? (see Zammito 2018, Wolfe 2019, Bognon-Küss and Wolfe eds. 2019). It was once fashionable to speak of, e.g. ‘precursors of Darwin’, and then Canguilhem and Foucault famously did away with the category of precursor. But how then do we account for the phase that precedes the constitution of a science? With the case of biology, how do we account for the increasing fascination with the ontology of Life during the decades prior to the ‘naming of biology’, as McLaughlin has called it, at the end of the eighteenth century? This increased focus on Life and the ontology of Life sits awkwardly, both with mainstream narratives of the Scientific Revolution and of the history of biology. In seeking to address this increased focus (in which vitalism plays a role but was by no means the only conceptual actor: Wolfe 2020), I critically examine Foucault’s notorious claim (Foucault 1966) that there was no such thing as ‘Life’ in the eighteenth century and thus no such thing as biology. (shrink)

A premise which seems to be preponderate in the philosophy of medical practice developed by Pellegrino and Thomasma is the medical prescription to save life whenever possible. This premise is confronted with a polemical vitalism and examined in the light of some reading principles derived from G. Canguilhem's philosophy of the life-sciences. It is argued that the primarity of life in the account given by Pellegrino and Thomasma of the foundations of medical practice is closely related to biological concepts (...) of life. This relation is shown to be problematic. The biological concept results in an ontology of the living body as the condition of possibility of medical practice, thus linking up this practice with an uncriticized biological value and finality. (shrink)

This article examines the normative structure of the concept of health and tries to suggest an account of it in a phenomenological-hermeneutic framework. It is argued that the concept of health has a logical priority to illness, though the latter has an experiential priority. The fundamental feature of the concept of health as discussed in the literature is initially recognized in the notion of ‘norm’, in both the bio-statistical and normative-ideal sense. An analysis of this body of literature reveals some (...) weaknesses in bio-statistical definitions of health as well as in those normative ones which endorse a value-relativity thesis. An approach based on the analogical structure of language is then advanced. In this framework, the notion of biological normativeness proposed by G. Canguilhem is connected with an analysis of the language of health through etymologies. It is argued that health can be characterized as an analogy of ‘plenitude’, which is the common ideal reference of the various health-concepts. The analogical structuring of language allows the recognition of different levels of meaning, and therefore of different kinds of normativeness (biological, mental, social, moral). Some hints of a theory of health deriving from this framework are then given. Keywords: analogy, health, hermeneutics, norm, plenitude CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Defining the concepts of health and disease has proved rather difficult and many philosophers of medicine have simply concluded that we would be better off giving up on such endeavors. I feel that this view is misguided mainly because it seems to rest on a rather inadequate understanding of how philosophers use biology to clarify medical concepts. While some philosophers appeal to biology so as to clarify what we mean by the concepts of health and disease, others attempt to use (...) biology to develop a theory thathelps to explain what health and disease are. In this dissertation, I examine the work of an often overlooked philosopher of medicine, Georges Canguilhem, who sought to understand medical concepts by starting from the biological properties of variation and variability. In other words, in order to define health and disease, Canguilhem first tried to establish how what is normal can vary between organisms and even within the same organism due to the dynamic relation between the organism and its environment. Simply put: what is normal for one organism could be pathological for another and what is normal in one environment could become pathological in another. Consequently, variation and variability need to be included in our understanding of health and disease. Throughout this dissertation, I explore how Canguilhem goes about developing the implications of these biological properties for medical concepts and this allows me to distinguish his approach from some popular ones in philosophy of medicine, e.g. those trying to develop an objective biological approach (naturalism) and those appealingto evolutionary principles. I establish the plausibility of definingmedical concepts relative to individual organisms and their environments, while showing some of its potential limitations, especially when it comes to human social environments. Ultimately, a more nuanced understanding of how the inseparability of organisms and environments canhelp to clarify health and disease provides an interesting way to get past the apparent stalemate in philosophy of medicine and firmly establishes the relevance of Canguilhem’s philosophy. (shrink)