This special issue aims to redress the balance and to open up Gaston Bachelard's work beyond a small in-crowd of experts and aficionado’s in France. It aims to stimulate the discovery of new and understudied aspects of Bachelard’s work, including aspects of the intellectual milieu he was working in. Fortunately, for this purpose we were able to rely both on renowned Bachelard specialists, such as Hans-Jörg Rheinberg-er, Cristina Chimisso and Dominique Lecourt, as well as on a number of younger scholars (...) who are discovering their work in a different intellectual context. At the same time we also want to reassess the value of this oeuvre, which also entails examining the reasons and causes of the relative neglect of Bachelard’s work in recent times. Has it exhausted its possibilities? Does it have intrinsic limitations that have contributed to the eclipse, as some influential, mainly French, philoso-phers have more or less explicitly suggested? (shrink)

This paper continues Israel Scheffler's investigation of rituals as autographic/allographic. It concludes that the autographic/allographic distinction is more fruitfully applied to rituals as a gradual distinction, distinguishing rituals in terms of their autographic/allographic elements or aspects.

RésuméCette étude essaie de réunir quelques éléments en vue d'une interprétation plus complète du programme épistémologique contenu de façon extrêmement elliptique dans l'ouvrage post‐hume de Jean Cavaillès, publié en 1947 par G. Canguilhem et C. Ehresmann sous le titre Sur la logique et la théorie de la science . Afin d'arriver, plus particulière‐texte, où la «nécessité génératrice» d'une dialectique conceptuelle est évoquée, il faudra rappeler quelques aspects connus ainsi que quelques aspects moins connus du cheminement philosophique de Cavaillès.Cette reconstruction est (...) mise en œuvre de façon détaillée dans un travail de commentaire textuel qui devait permettre de dégager le sens des formules denses et souvent allusives de Cavaillés dans son dernier ouvrage1. Il n'est pas possible de résumer ici en quelques lignes le contenu d'un tel travail. Toutefois on peut indiquer quelques conclusions qui s'en dégagent pour l'interprétation globale de l'ouvrage en question. En premier lieu il faut reconnaître la nature même du problème traité ici par Cavaillès. En second lieu on caractérise le type de position prise envers ce problème ainsi défini et en tant qu'on peut le restreindre dans un premier moment à la philosophie des mathématiques. En troisième lieu on montre que se problème subit un changement d'éclairage par le fait que cette restriction doit être levée en prenant en considération le rapport entre expérience mathématique et expiérience physique. que nous serons obligés d'entrer un peu plus, et à titre d'exemple, dam le détail de l'exégèse). Finalement on peut essayer de préciser le programme d'une dialectique conceptuelle en quelques thèses ou titres schématiques qui concement les questions majeures de la théorie de la science selon Cavaillès2. (shrink)

We are happy to present the proceedings of the international symposium on Rationality and Religious Trust which were held at the University of Antwerp in this volume of Bijdragen. Rationality and religious trust is of course a topic that falls within the scope of the epistemology of religion. Contemporary epistemology of religion has been the scene of a vigorous debate about the nature of religious belief, or more precisely about the role of rationality and rational argument with respect to religious (...) belief. What is at stake in the debate, is the very way the concept of belief applies to the religious life. More specifically, the issue is about the place to be reserved for belief within the religious life at large, and again, about the role played especially by rational arguments in holding or not holding those beliefs. (shrink)

In this commemorative article the significance of Paul Feyerabend's work for philosophy of science in general is reviewed. Its unifying perspective is identified as the fight against any possible constraint on imagination (i.e. on the capacity of generating alternatives). This alternative-maximizing search was already central in Feyerabend's 'pre-anarchistic' studies. In fact, I claim that the really significant theses and arguments, as far as the intrinsic debate within the philosophy of science is concerned, were present in these earlier studies (criticism of (...) the conditions of consistency and meaning invariance, pragmatic theory of observation, incommensurability thesis ...). The context of the 'historical turn' is sketched in which these arguments were developed as aresponse to current views on science. But these arguments do possess an independent normative significance. As Feyerabend construes them however, this independence is uncertain, because it is the value of proliferating imaginative alternatives as such which partly conditionalizes the significance of these arguments (as it conditionalizes the very value of science itself). In this way the philosophy of the critical imagination could eventually turn the critical values against the philosophy of rational criticism itself. And indeed, (1)a certain combination of the tenets concerning consistency and meaning variance undermines the idea of crucial test, and (2) in Against Method xht panegyric of the imagination (couched in a new narrative of the history of science) is used as the main weapon to override any methodological account. Philosophy of science is now convicted of what is the only deadly sin — the murder of imagination. But science itself is also accused of the same crime: it has become not merely an ideology — which is nothing to worry about — but a totalitarian ideology, monopolizing epistemic and educational claims. I argue that, although the reintroduction within philosophy of science of such questions belonging to a philosophy of culture is called for as a complement for intrinsic approaches, the Feyerabendean way of treating those questions makes it impossible to state anything about the specificity of science within culture. On the other hand two 'master ideas' still seem apt to stimulate further discussion: (1) the critique of the consistency condition, backed by the attack on the thesis of the 'relative autonomy of facts', and (2) the defence of meaning variance, backed by the pragmatic theory of observation, and leading in turn to the idea of incommensurability. At the same time this idea of incommensurability could also play a role in a philosophy of the relation between science and culture (which remains to be developed). (shrink)

Wittgenstein wordt wel beschouwd als een tegenstander van het ‘cognitivisme’ in de godsdienstfilosofie. Ik probeer hier aan te tonen dat Wittgenstein ook een tegenwicht biedt tegen hedendaagse benaderingen in de cultuurwetenschappen. De hedendaagse culturele antropologie is gestoeld op een combinatie van evolutionaire en cognitieve psychologie. ‘Betekenis’ wordt daarin opgevat als een cognitief proces dat zijn belichaming vindt in ons brein, en daarmee privé is. Wittgenstein wijst echter op het publieke karakter van betekenis, en op een andere notie van belichaming, die (...) te maken heeft met dat publieke karakter alsook met betekenis als relevantie. (shrink)

In this expository article, a presentation is given of A.C. Crombie's life work in the history of science, Styles of Scientific Thinking in the European Tradition. The History of Argument and Explanation in the Mathematical and Biomedical Sciences and Arts (1994). The importance of this work for the philosophy of science and epistemology is comparable to the more renowned work of the 1960's and '70s, but threatens to be paradoxically overlooked because of its gigantic proportions. (No thorough study of the (...) book appeared up to now.) Crombie's earlier work started from a provocative version of continuism in the debate about the rise of modern science, ascribing the origin of the experimental tradition to methodological forebears in the thirteenth century (Grosseteste). Rather than revivifying this quarrel now, Crombie has offered us an emergentist picture of the rise of six subsequent major styles of science (using grand units of analysis) from the Greeks up to Darwin. These styles of thinking are superimposed upon another in that the definite breakthrough of each next style is consequent upon the recognition of the proper limits of the full grown previous style. In a first group, Crombie assembles three major styles for revealing regularities in individual phenomena, i.e. where the consideration of the collective to which the phenomenon belongs is not required for recognizing the regularity. Here we have (S1) the ancient style of postulating principles and entities according to a more or less apriorical evidence type or in axiomatic fashion; (S2) the experimental tradition from Alhazen up to Newton, and (S3) the style of hypothetical modelling, combining the former two in the vein of the rational artist as an (ultimately, also cognitive) engineer. In a second group the styles dealing with regularities discoverable only in a collectivity of phenomena are dealt with. Here we have the (S4) probabilistic style superimposed on the classical picture of rationality made up by the achieved styles in the first group. Then (S5) the taxonomic style is ready to be combined, finally, with S4, in order to discover the statistical economy of living nature in (S6), the 'genetic' style, culminating in Darwin's history of nature (which was to be expected). On the other hand, the latter style is traced back to the 16th and 17th century project of a history of languages and culture, of knowledge, and of mankind (which is a more surprising connection made by Crombie). In a final section some philosophical remarks are made regarding Crombie's project; mainly with respect to the larger perspective, in Crombie's terms, of an 'intellectual anthropology', or alternatively, in terms of a 'comparative epistemology'. Also the absence of a real analysis of the very concept of style is noted. (shrink)

The arrow of time has been invoked to bridge all gaps between the 'two cultures'. Would time also help to mediate between the sphere of cognition (epistemic meaning) and the sphere of Bedeutsamkeit (meaning-as-relevance) when taking ritual to be a strongly idiosyncratic representative of the latter? What is the role of time in the modes of meaning in the realm of scientific concepts in their most rigorous shape (the mathematical) on the one hand, in ritual on the other hand? Taking (...) an external point of view, surprising connections can be laid, especially when focussing on the relations of form and materiality or content in the respective fields. Ritual can be considered — according toits formal structure — as an embodiment of the notion of an algorithm. When looking at the temporal structure of the respective symbolic practices from an internal point of view however, their contrasting modes of creating meaning become irreducible. In particular, the algorithmic-sequential mode in ritual is a shell for another time, constitutive of a proper Bedeutsamkeit. This is analyzed in terms of the role of the past in ritualized meaning (and illustrated via the art of time in the Japanese tea ceremony). Whereas a paradoxical creation of a past as something lost and nevertheless to be recollected is constitutive for the meaning of the ritual gesture, the proper element of the concept is time's arrow always pointing forward, to the next stage. Here the past, while embodied in the scientist's gesture as trace of epistemic styles and traditions, at the same time has to be suppressed in the interest of the creation of the new. (shrink)

In this expository article one of the contributions of Jean Cavailles to the philosophy of mathematics is presented: the analysis of ‘mathematical experience’. The place of Cavailles on the logico-philosophical scene of the 30s and 40s is sketched. I propose a partial interpretation of Cavailles's epistemological program of so-called ‘conceptual dialectics’: mathematical holism, duality principles, the notion of formal contents, and the specific temporal structure of conceptual dynamics. The structure of mathematical abstraction is analysed in terms of its complementary dimensions: (...) paradigmatic generalization (domain extension, descriptive definitions, creative role of the symbolism...) and thematic reflexivity of concepts (promotion of operations to objects of a higher type). (shrink)

Whatever the precise analysis of the notion of an `internal point of view', to talk about `religious traditions' is to imply that traditions of a certain kind primarily deploy an internal point of view. But what can be said about the notion of an intellectual tradition that would at the same time also be, or be connected to, a religious tradition? To some, such notions appear to border on contradiction. In accordance with the Cartesian criticism of coutume et exemple, we (...) tend to think of an intellectual stance as the correlate of a detached view, with the rational remaining the enemy of the traditional. In that case, every application whatsoever of the predicate `intellectual' to a tradition would be flawed. According to a certain Enlightenment view, inspired by science, is it not of the very essence of the intellectual stance in general that one stand back at a critical distance from any tradition, especially one's own?In fact, historically oriented philosophers of science like Crombie, Kuhn, Laudan have reminded us of the fact that there is nothing disturbingly paradoxical in speaking of `intellectual traditions': to quote one of Kuhn's book titles, there is the "essential tension" that characterizes science in its development just as much as any other cultural tradition. This tension between the old and the new is the mark of traditions, including the ones defining the rationality or rationalities of science. We could say that Kuhn's `paradigms' already outlined the borders of specific `catholicities' for the specialized fields of scientific research traditions. If Kuhn ever had a point, it must be that science too can develop only within the framework of styles of reasoning, which is to say that it demands viewpoints that cannot be characterized as `external', at least not in an absolute, metaphysical sense of the word. (shrink)