According to Bickerton, the behavioral sciences have failed to give an adequate account of human nature at least partly because of the conjunction and mutual reinforcement of two widespread beliefs: that language is simply a means of communication and that human intelligence is the result of the rapid growth and unusual size of human brains. Bickerton argues that each of the properties distinguishing human intelligence and consciousness from that of other animals can be shown to derive straightforwardly from (...) properties of language. In essence, language arose as a representational system, not a means of communication or a skill, and not a product of culture but an evolutionary adaptation. The author stresses the necessity of viewing intelligence in evolutionary terms, seeing it not as problem solving but as a way of maintaining homeostasis - the preservation of those conditions most favorable to an organism, the optimal achievable conditions for survival and well-being. The term protolanguage is used to describe the stringing together of symbols that prehuman hominids employed. "It did not allow them to turn today's imagination into tomorrow's fact. But it is just this power to transform imagination into fact that distinguishes human behavior from that of our ancestral species, and indeed from that of all other species. It is exactly what enables us to change our behavior, or invent vast ranges of new behavior, practically overnight, with no concomitant genetic changes." Language and Human Behavior should be of interest to anyone in the behavioral and evolutionary sciences and to all those concerned with the role of language in human behavior. (shrink)

Although Penn et al. make a good case for the existence of deep cognitive discontinuity between humans and animals, they fail to explain how such a discontinuity could have evolved. It is proposed that until the advent of words, no species had mental representations over which higher-order relations could be computed.

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction Fundamental Differences Between Language and ACSs Language as Adaptation The Protolinguistic Adaptation Modern Human Language — Innate or Learned? The Evolution of Syntax The “Cultural Evolution” of Language References Further Reading.

This target article's handling of theory and data and the range of evidence surveyed for its main contention fall short of normal BBS standards. However, the contention itself is reasonable and can be supported if one rejects the metaphor for linguistic competence and accepts that are no more than the way the brain does language.

Hurford's argument suffers from two major weaknesses. First, his account of neural mechanisms suggests no place in the brain where the two halves of a predicate-argument structure could come together. Second, his assumption that language and cognition must be based on logic is neither necessary nor particularly plausible, and leads him to some unlikely conclusions.

Müller misconstrues autonomy to mean strict locality of brain function, something quite different from the functional autonomy that linguists claim. Similarly, he misperceives the interaction of learned and innate components hypothesized in current generative models. Evidence from sign languages, Creole languages, and neurological studies of rare forms of aphasia also argues against his conclusions.

Despite problems with statistical significance, ancillary hypotheses, and integration into an overall view of cognition, Grodzinsky's demotion of Broca's area to a mechanism for tracking moved constituents is intrinsically plausible and fits a realistic picture of how syntax works.

In dealing with the nature of protolanguage, an important formative factor in its development, and one that would surely have influenced that nature, has too often been neglected: the precise circumstances under which protolanguage arose. Three factors are involved in this neglect: a failure to appreciate radical differences between the functions of language and animal communication, a failure to relate developments to the overall course of human evolution, and the supposition that protolanguage represents a package, rather than a series of (...) separate developments that sequentially impacted the communication of pre-humans. An approach that takes these factors into account is very briefly suggested. (shrink)

Mirror neurons form a poor basis for Arbib's account of language evolution, failing to explain the creativity that must precede imitation, and requiring capacities (improbable in hominids) for categorizing situations and unambiguously miming them. They also commit Arbib to an implausible holophrastic protolanguage. His model is further vitiated by failure to address the origins of symbolization and the real nature of syntax.

Constructivism is the most recent in a long line of failed attempts to discredit nativism. It seeks support from true (but irrelevant) facts, wastes its energy on straw men, and jumps logical gaps; but its greatest weakness lies in its failure to match nativism's explanation of a wide range of disparate phenomena, particularly in language acquisition.

Despite some sound basic assumptions, Wilkins & Wakefield portray a Homo habilis too linguistically sophisticated to fit in with the subsequent fossil record and thereby lose a reasoned explanation for human innovativeness. They err, too, in accepting a single-level model of conceptual structure and in deriving initial linguistic units from calls, a process far more dubious than the derivation of home-sign from naive gesture.

Jackendoff's major syntactic exemplar is deeply unrepresentative of most syntactic relations and operations. His treatment of language evolution is vulnerable to Occam's Razor, hypothesizing stages of dubious independence and unexplained adaptiveness, and effectively divorcing the evolution of language from other aspects of human evolution. In particular, it ignores connections between language and the massive discontinuities in human cognitive evolution.

Although Carruthers’ proposals avoid some of the more obvious pitfalls that face analysts of the language-cognition relationship, they are needlessly complex and vitiated by his uncritical acceptance of a highly modular variety of evolutionary psychology. He pays insufficient attention both to the neural substrate of the processes he hypothesizes and to the evolutionary developments that gave rise to both language and human cognition.

That both language and novel life-history stages are unique to humans is an interesting datum. But failure to distinguish between language and language use results in an exaggeration of the language acquisition period, which in turn vitiates claims that new developmental stages were causative factors in language evolution.

Falk has much of interest to say on the evolution of mothering, but she fails to address the core issue of language evolution: how symbolism or structure evolved. Control of infants does not require either, and Falk provides neither evidence nor arguments supporting referential symbolism as a component of mother-infant interactions.

Though Bloom makes a good case that learning content-word meanings requires no task-specific apparatus, he does not seriously address problems inherent in learning the meanings of functional items. Evidence from creole languages suggests that the latter process presupposes at least some task-specific mechanisms, perhaps including a list of the limited number of semantic distinctions that can be expressed via functional items, as well as default systems that may operate in cases of impoverished input.

Tomasello et al. give a good account of how shared intentionality develops in children, but a much weaker one of how it might have evolved. They are unduly hasty in dismissing the emergence of language as a triggering factor. An alternative account is suggested in which language provided the spark, but thereafter language and shared intentionality coevolved.

BASTARD TONGUES: A Trailblazing Linguist Finds Clues to Our Common Humanity in the World’s Lowliest Languages. Author: Derek Bickerton (270 pp. Hill & Wang. New York - 2008. $ 26.) Review by Leonardo Caffo.

This chapter argues that our language faculty can both be a peripheral module of the mind and be crucially implicated in a variety of central cognitive functions, including conscious propositional thinking and reasoning. I also sketch arguments for the view that natural language representations (e.g. of Chomsky's Logical Form, or LF) might serve as a lingua franca for interactions (both conscious and non-conscious) between a number of quasi-modular central systems. The ideas presented are compared and contrasted with the evolutionary proposals (...) made by Derek Bickerton (1990, 1995), who has also argued for the involvement of language in thought. Finally, I propose that it was the evolution of a mechanism responsible for pretend play, circa 40,000 years ago, which led to the explosion of creative culture visible in the fossil record from that time onwards. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Darwin Meets Literary TheoryEllen DissanayakeEvolution and Literary Theory, by Joseph Carroll; xi & 518 pp. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995, $44.95.In my experience, most literary theorists, even those who participate in conferences called “Literature and Science,” know little about evolution, and don’t want to know. For them, “science” means information theory, chaos or catastrophe theory, fractals, pataphysics, “autopoeisis” or self-organization, emergence, cyborgs, hypertext, virtual signs and other aspects (...) of sci-fi, or techno-politics. (I encountered these subjects at a comparative literature conference I attended in March 1995.) These “scientific” positions are used as trendy metaphors for talking about chance, uncertainty, accident, ideology, and multidimensionality in literary works or in the aims of their authors. In other words, the buzzwords of contemporary science become one more angle from which to view or project another facet onto the glassy, self-reflective edifice of contemporary literary theory, rather than a means from which to shatter it and build again from scratch with more earthy, substantial materials. Joseph Carroll’s book provides the view and the means for this genuinely new and constructive (if initially destructive) possibility.It is ironic that in the present critical climate the very virtues of the book might be seen by some as faults—e.g., the lucid, elegant writing and the erudition and interdisciplinarity of the work as a whole. Carroll [End Page 229] writes clearly, authoritatively, without jargon, and with frequent, delicious wit. His values, aims, explanations, evidence, and criticisms are concisely and plainly stated. This is in marked contrast to the enigmatic and idiosyncratic nature of much recent criticism, and might have the initially disorienting effect of returning to earth and breathing pure oxygen after one has become accustomed to the thin and rarefied atmosphere of remote, icy peaks.Carroll offers wide-ranging and illuminating discussions of standard literary and critical works from both the European and Anglo-American tradition over the past several centuries, and refers to dozens of writers from diverse periods and nationalities. Additionally he enlists, and criticizes where appropriate, ideas from such diverse nonliterary figures as Darwin himself and writers about Darwin, T. H. Huxley, Konrad Lorenz, John Bowlby, Sir John Eccles, the prominent sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists, S. J. Gould, Richard Lewontin, Derek Bickerton, Piaget, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Clifford Geertz, H. J. Eysenck, Cardinal Newman, Thorstein Veblen, Trotsky, Raymond Williams, and Richard Rorty, among others.One can be forgiven for wishing to forego an exploration of this demanding array of knowledge argued from the unfamiliar perspective of evolutionary biology. For in order seriously to consider Carroll’s new way of looking at human endeavor (including literature) one must also look critically at what was laboriously mastered during all those years of graduate school and tenure-driven writing for publication. No one wants to be persuaded to give up a view of the world that has been mastered with painstaking diligence. Still less does anyone want to spend time with something that according to conventional academic wisdom is downright wrong-headed. This is really the challenge of Carroll’s book—because such minor matters as the plain unfashionable title, clear writing, impressive erudition, and dated or forgotten thinkers can be overcome if the stakes are high enough.I wish to suggest that the stakes are high enough and that the time is right for this inevitable change of viewpoint. Along with others in diverse fields such as cognitive and developmental psychology, personality theory, neurology, medicine, sociology, political science, epistemology, cultural anthropology, ethics, and linguistics, I find the Darwinian perspective to offer the most comprehensive and viable possibility for an understanding of human behavior and culture, including the arts. Joseph Carroll admirably articulates this position and applies it to literary theory. I invite scholars who think that evolutionary explanations [End Page 230] are erroneous, dangerous, reductionist, simplistic, or irrelevant to read Carroll and deal seriously with his arguments. His book should be the central text for theory classes and seminars, as well as the subject of conferences. Those who would dismiss it should have the courage and curiosity to lay aside their misgivings and have a look. Especially those who are dissatisfied with the surfeit... (shrink)

At the end of the seminar, I suggested that most researchers on language and its evolution (including Derek Bickerton I suspect, though I've only read snippets of his work), mistakenly ignore a host of other competences that are present in far more species.

Matravers examines how emotions form the bridge between our experience of art and of life. We often find that a particular poem, painting, or piece of music carries an emotional charge; and we may experience emotions toward, or on behalf of, a particular fictional character. Matravers shows that what these experiences have in common, and what links them to the expression of emotion in non-artistic cases, is the role played by feeling. He carries out a critical survey of various accounts (...) of the nature of fiction, attacks contemporary cognitivist accounts of expression, and offers an uncompromising defense of a controversial view about musical expression: that music works by expressing the emotions it causes its listeners to feel. (shrink)

This article criticises existing solutions to the 'puzzle of imaginative resistance', reconstrues it, and offers a solution of its own. About the Book : Imagination, Philosophy and the Arts is the first comprehensive collection of papers by philosophers examining the nature of imagination and its role in understanding and making art. Imagination is a central concept in aesthetics with close ties to issues in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, yet it has not received the kind of (...) sustained, critical attention it deserves. This collection of seventeen brand new essays critically examines just how and in what form the notion of imagination illuminates fundamental problems in the philosophy of art. (shrink)