This paper analyzes an explicit instantiation of the program of “neurophenomenology” in a neuroscientific protocol. Neurophenomenology takes seriously the importance of linking the scientific study of consciousness to the careful examination of experience with a specific first-person methodology. My first claim is that such strategy is a fruitful heuristic because it produces new data and illuminates their relation to subjective experience. My second claim is that the approach could open the door to a natural account of the structure of human (...) experience as it is mobilized in itself in such methodology. In this view, generative passages define the type of circulation which explicitly roots the active and disciplined insight the subject has about his/her experience in a biological emergent process. (shrink)

Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole were philosophers and theologians associated with Port-Royal Abbey, a centre of the Catholic Jansenist movement in seventeenth-century France. Their enormously influential Logic or the Art of Thinking, which went through five editions in their lifetimes, treats topics in logic, language, theory of knowledge and metaphysics, and also articulates the response of 'heretical' Jansenist Catholicism to orthodox Catholic and Protestant views on grace, free will and the sacraments. In attempting to combine the categorical theory of (...) the proposition with a Cartesian account of knowledge, their Logic represents the classical view of judgment which inspired the modern transformation in logic and semantic theory by Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein and recent philosophers. This edition presents a new translation of the text, together with a historical introduction and suggestions for further reading. (shrink)

Christopher Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory of Health has been the main contender among naturalistic accounts of health for the last 40 years. Yet, a recent criticism of this theory, presented by Elselijn Kingma, identifies a dilemma resulting from the BST’s conceptual linking of health and statistical typicality. Kingma argues that the BST either cannot accommodate the situation- specificity of many normal functions or cannot account for many situation-specific diseases. In this article, we expand upon with Daniel Hausman’s response to Kingma’s dilemma. (...) We propose that recalling Boorse’s specification that health is an intrinsic property of its bearers and explicating this intrinsic property in relation to the concept of homeostasis can illuminate how proponents of naturalistic accounts of health should deal with the situation- specificity of normal functions. We argue that beyond what Boorse and Hausman have delineated, the situation- specificity of normal function cannot be fully captured in a simple dichotomy between normal and abnormal environment or between relevant and irrelevant situations. By bringing homeostasis to the fore of the analysis of health, we set out a richer picture of what the various situations that affect living organisms’ functional performance can be. Accordingly, we provide a broader classification of these various situations which, we contend, better accounts for the main intuitions that philosophers of medicine have sought to accommodate than previous naturalistic theories of health. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Dans un monde dominé par les conflits, il arrive qu’il faille se défendre. L’invention des armes a évolué en parallèle avec le savoir technique, puis scientifique, et il est même arrivé que la recherche d’applications militaires ait joué un rôle moteur dans la découverte scientifique. Lorsque les armes ne servent pas à attaquer d’autres nations, leur fabrication et leur commerce se justifient morale- ment. Il faut cependant qu’elles ne puissent échapper à ceux qui les construisent et doivent en contrôler la (...) diffusion. Facilement mise en œuvre, la guerre utilisant des organismes vivants ou ce qu’ils pro- duisent comme armes est très ancienne. Or l’originalité des êtres vivants est qu’ils se multiplient, qu’un seul individu suffit à recouvrir la Terre de ses descendants. La biologie ne se prête jamais à un usage militaire moralement défendable parce que le confinement au champ de bataille est impossible. De ce fait, les applications de la biologie ont été vite écartées du domaine de la Défense permise par les traités internationaux. La Convention de 1972 sur l’Interdiction des Armes Biologiques et à Toxines (CIABT), entrée en vigueur en 1975, est aujourd’hui signée par 183 pays (ratifiée par 175) sur un total de 193, sans compter Taïwan qui l’a ratifiée mais n’est pas reconnu par l’ONU. Elle interdit la mise au point, la fabrication, l’acquisition, le transfert, la conservation, le stockage et l’utilisation des armes bio- logiques et à toxines. Elle constitue un élément essentiel de la lutte contre la prolifération des armes de destruction massive. (shrink)

We develop a mathematical formalism that allows to study decoherence with a great level generality, so as to make it appear as a geometrical phenomenon between reservoirs of dimensions. It enables us to give quantitative estimates of the level of decoherence induced by a purely random environment on a system according to their respectives sizes, and to exhibit some links with entanglement entropy.

This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the original. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment for protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature in affordable, high quality, modern editions that are true to the original work.

Transmissible cancers are elusive and understudied parasitic life forms caused by malignant clonal cells (nine lineages are known so far). They emerge by completing sequential steps that include breaking cell cooperation, evade anti‐cancer defences and shedding cells to infect new hosts. Transmissible cancers impair host fitness, and their importance as selective force is likely largely underestimated. It is, therefore, crucial to determine how common they might be in the wild. Here, we draw a parallel between the steps required for a (...) transmissible cancer to emerge and the steps required for an intelligent civilisation to emerge in the Milky Way using a modified Drake equation. Using numerical analyses, we estimate the potential number of extant marine and bivalve species in which transmissible cancers might exist. Our results suggest that transmissible cancers are more common than expected, and that new lineages can be found by screening a large number of species. (shrink)

This paper discusses a challenge to the claims made by biocentrists and some ecocentrists that some nonsentient biological entities qualify as candidates for moral considerability. This challenge derives from Wayne Sumner’s critique of “objective theories of welfare” and, in particular, from his critique of biocentrists’ and ecocentrists’ biofunction-based accounts of the “good of their own” of nonsentient biological entities. Sumner’s critique lends support to animal ethicists’ typical skepticism regarding those accounts, by contending that they are more plausibly interpreted as accounts (...) of the perfectionist value than of the welfare of nonsentient biological entities. In response to this critique and its implication that those function-based accounts would fail to qualify nonsentient biological entities as candidates for moral considerability, it is argued that those accounts should be interpreted as ones of the health of biological entities rather than ones of their perfectionist value. It is suggested that their being bearers of health may be sufficient for nonsentient biological entities to qualify as candidates for moral considerability, such that biocentrists and ecocentrists could grant Sumner and animal ethicists’ contention that the function-based accounts of the good of their own of nonsentient biological entities are not accounts of their welfare, while not giving up on the project of defending those entities’ moral considerability. | : Cet article discute d’une objection à la thèse défendue par plusieurs biocentristes et écocentristes selon laquelle les entités biologiques non sentientes se qualifieraient comme candidates à la considérabilité morale. Cette objection découle de la critique des « théories objectives du bien-être » formulée par Wayne Sumner et, plus particulièrement, de sa critique des théories du « bien propre » défendues par les biocentristes et les écocentristes, lesquelles définissent ce bien en relation avec les concepts biologiques de fonction et de téléologie. La critique de Sumner offre un certain appui au scepticisme généralement suscité par ces théories chez les auteur-e-s oeuvrant dans le domaine de l’éthique animale, en ce qu’elle fait valoir que celles-ci sont plus plausiblement interprétées comme concernant une forme de valeur perfectionniste s’appliquant aux entités biologiques non sentientes que comme concernant leur bien-être. Cet article soutient que la manière la plus prometteuse de répondre à cette critique pour les biocentristes et les écocentristes consiste à faire valoir d’une part, que les théories du bien propre qu’elles et ils défendent doivent être interprétées comme des théories de la santé des entités biologiques plutôt que comme des théories de leur valeur perfectionniste, et d’autre part, que la possibilité pour les entités biologiques non sentientes d’être en plus ou moins bonne santé suffit à les rendre candidates à la considérabilité morale. (shrink)

According to portfolio managers, agriculture in general, and farmland in particular, can be considered an emerging asset class. Specialized financial vehicles, such as private equity and mutual funds, are emerging and competing to attract potential investment in this asset class. In recent years, there has been significant development of such vehicles targeting South Africa’s farming sector. These innovations are led by a group of market intermediaries who endeavour to “re-shape” South African farmland as an opportunity for institutional investors. These “pioneers” (...) engage in a multifaceted mediation process between global financial investors on one hand, and the South African agricultural sector on the other. Drawing upon an empirical study of such intermediaries in South Africa, this paper analyses the concrete mechanisms that facilitate this particular form of commodification. The paper presents and compares the intermediaries, giving particular attention to their structure, governance mechanisms and asset allocations within this “market in the making”. It describes how intermediaries develop different paths of asset valorization to unlock the “financial value” of South African farmlands. But, it also highlights some of the difficulties faced in the process of translating between international investors and local managers, questioning the “land-asset fiction” that is materializing through the subordination of farmland to the needs of financial society. (shrink)

La faiblesse de la pensée politique, qui caractérise notre époque, tend à isoler toujours plus la propriété intellectuelle de l'environnement et à la séparer du public et de l'intérêt général. Pourtant, c'est bien l'intérêt général, le public et l'espace public qui fondent la propriété intellectuelle en général et la propriété littéraire et artistique en particulier. Le monopole d'exploitation conféré à un auteur ne peut se justifier que par l'intérêt général que lui porte son public et qui le récompense ainsi de (...) son travail. Impraticable pour la vie de l'esprit, le champ de la nature s'est opposé au champ de la culture et nos sociétés démocratiques reposent sur ce postulat que l'état de nature précède l'état politique. Réconcilions environnement et culture, étendons le champ de la légitimité démocratique à l'espace naturel, concevons la « propriété » intellectuelle, non plus tant comme autant de collections de propriétés privées, mais comme la structure d'un espace public. Ainsi pourrions-nous étendre cette « propriété » intellectuelle refondée, en conférant des droits intellectuels au bénéfice de personnes privées ou publiques qui réaliseraient un travail particulier au bénéfice de l'espace naturel, à savoir l'espace du vivant, dans l'intérêt général. Il ne s'agit plus d'avoir ou de posséder, mais bien d'être en conscience dans un espace commun partagé par tous et respectant notre environnement. (shrink)

The lasting effects of the debate over canon-formation during the 1980s affected the whole field of Humanities, which became increasingly engaged in interrogating the origin and function of the Western canon. In philosophy, a great deal of criticism was, as a result, directed at the traditional narrative of seventeenth-and eighteenth-century philosophies—a critique informed by postcolonialism as well as feminist historiography. D. F. Norton, L. Loeb and many others1 attempted to demonstrate the weaknesses of the tripartite division between rationalism, empiricism and (...) critical philosophy.2 As time went on, symptoms of dissatisfaction with what has... (shrink)

For Van Rensselaer Potter (1911–2001), Global Bio-Ethics is about building on the legacy of Aldo Leopold (1887–1948), one of the most notable forest managers of the twentieth century who brought to light the importance of pragmatism in the sciences and showed us a new way to proceed with environmental ethics. Following Richard Huxtable and Jonathan Ives's methodological 'Framework for Empirical Bioethics Research Projects' called 'Mapping, framing, shaping,' published in BMC Medicine Ethics (2019)), we propose operationalizing a framework for Global Bio-Ethics (...) by hybridizing approaches in empirical bioethics and ecosystem management. We explain this framework using the metaphor of forest management. This mixed approach is articulated through three phases: (1) mapping the “landscape” to build a working theory, (2) framing the “scene” to prepare the fieldwork, and (3) shaping bioethics “tools” to stimulate cooperation. Applying this methodology, an adaptive management cycle is outlined to help ensure that political processes are sustainable and socially acceptable, still based on strategic and ethical thinking, but also capable of reshaping failing policies. (shrink)

The epistemology of models has to face a conundrum: models are often described as highly idealised, and yet they are considered to be vehicles for scientific explanations. Truth-oriented—veritist—conceptions of explanation seem thereby undermined by this contradiction. In this article, I will show how this apparent paradox can be avoided by appealing to the notion of fiction. If fictionalism is often thought to lead to various flavours of instrumentalism, thereby weakening the veritist hopes, the fiction view of models offers a framework (...) much richer than it seems at first sight. To do so, I will call upon the concepts of modality, counterfactual structure and credible worlds. In the end, veritism of explanation and fiction can indeed go hand in hand, but the scope of explanations we can hope to draw from models must be more precisely delineated. (shrink)

Spiritualism designates a philosophy that lays claim to the separation of mind and body and the ontological and epistemological primacy of the former. In France, it is associated with the names of Victor Cousin and René Descartes, or more precisely with what Cousin made of Descartes as the founding father of a brittle rational psychology, closed off from the positive sciences, and as a critic in respect to the empiricist legacy of the idéologues. Moreover, by considering merely the end result, (...) severed from its polemical genesis, we are prevented from understanding how the category of experience constituted a crucial question for spiritualism itself. Through returning to the origin of these discussions in the 1826 preface to Cousin’s Fragments philosophiques, this essay pursues a threefold path: to show that the public birth of Cousinian spiritualism coincides with the affirmation of applying the experimental method, issuing from Bacon, to the study of facts of consciousness; that Cousin’s later evolution follows a process of radicalization—that is, in this context, of ontologization and of reduction; and that by recovering this genesis, we can distinguish many forms of spiritualisms committed to the experimental method, both in alliance with the early Cousin and against the later Cousin. In this way, we can rediscover the interwoven philosophical links, lost in the process of institutionalization, between metaphysical demands and empiricist concerns, or between “French” philosophy and the legacy of Condillac. (shrink)

Understanding the emergence of a tangible 4-dimensional space-time from a quantum theory of gravity promises to be a tremendously difficult task. This article makes the case that this task may not have to be carried. Space-time as we know it may be fundamental to begin with. I recall the common arguments against this possibility and review a class of recently discovered models bypassing the most serious objection. The generic solution of the measurement problem that is tied to semiclassical gravity as (...) well as the difficulty of the alternative make it a reasonable default option in the absence of decisive experimental evidence. (shrink)

This paper criticizes Jerome Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder by arguing that the conceptual linkage it establishes between the medical concepts of health and disorder and the prudential notions of well-being and harm makes the account inapplicable to nonsentient organisms, such as plants, fungi, and many invertebrate animals. Drawing on a previous formulation of this criticism by Christopher Boorse, and noting that Wakefield could avoid it if he adopted a partly biofunction-based account of interests like that often advocated in (...) the field of environmental ethics, I argue that integrating such an account of interests into the HDA would generate serious concerns. Specifically, it would make dysfunction sufficient for disorder and so reestablish between dysfunction and disorder precisely the kind of sufficiency relation that harm-requiring accounts of disorder strive to avoid; blur the line between the HDA’s dysfunction and harm components and, in so doing, deprive the HDA of its alleged main advantage over monistic dysfunction-based accounts of disorders like Boorse’s; and tie the HDA to an understanding of harm that is in itself problematic. I argue that these three concerns, and the dilemmas they generate, rob the HDA of much of its prima facie appeal, ultimately indicating that a satisfactory account of disorder should most likely eschew all references to prudential notions of well-being and harm. (shrink)

This paper discusses Millstein’s criticism of the consensus view formed against selected-effects ecological functions. I argue that Millstein’s defense of coevolution-based selected-effects ecological functions applies to a notion of function as an activity, whereas proponents of the consensus view are concerned with a notion of ecological function as the contribution of an organism, population, species, or abiotic item to the maintenance of its community and/or the functioning of its ecosystem. Millstein’s arguments hence do not invalidate the consensus view but draw (...) attention to a notion of function that has been neglected in philosophical discussions and that deserves more attention. (shrink)

It is possible to draw upon Marx’s thinking without emphasizing an automatic relationship between an economic ‘base’ and a political ‘superstructure’. The development of capitalism must then be understood as resulting from the ‘conceptual separation’ of the economic and political issues. However, the research that favours this approach fails to provide the tools for a precise and systematic study of the political work which makes this separation possible. For his part, through the development of field theory and the emphasis on (...) the notion of symbolic power, Pierre Bourdieu offers the means to analyse the political work of multiple agents, but he does not formulate a theory of capitalism tailored to his findings. It seems worthwhile to take up and extend some of his proposals to open up avenues of thought in this direction. It is then about considering that different fields coexist, each of which lends itself to a political struggle based on the assertion of symbolic power; each field contributes to a ‘conceptual separation’ of the economic and political issues, which is itself constitutive of capitalism. As a result, production and trade operations seem to be part of a natural and autonomous process. Capital can thus be accumulated without necessitating the direct use of force. The combination of fields can lend itself to certain variations. It always shapes the political structures of accumulation. (shrink)

This article offers an analysis of ecologist Charles Elton’s “functional” concept of the niche and of the notion of function implicitly associated with it. It does so in part by situating Elton’s niche concept within the broader context of the “functionalist-interactionist” approach to ecology he introduced, and in relation to his views on the relationship between ecology and evolution. This involves criticizing the common claim that Elton’s idea of species as fulfilling functional roles within ecological communities committed him to an (...) idea of communities as units of selection. While such a claim implicitly attributes to Elton an understanding of function along the lines of the selected-effects theory of function advocated by many biologists and philosophers of biology, Elton’s use of the niche concept, I maintain, involves an understanding of function more along the lines of alternative nonselectionist theories such as the causal-role, goal-contribution, and organizational theories. I also briefly discuss how ecologists after Elton also tend to have typically adopted a nonselectionist understanding of the function concept, similar to his. (shrink)

Synthetic biology (SynBio) covers two main areas: application engineering, exemplified by metabolic engi- neering, and the design of life from artificial building blocks. As the general public is often reluctant to embrace synthetic approaches, preferring nature to artifice, its immediate future will depend very much on the public’s reaction to the unmet needs created by the pervasive demands of sustainability. On the other hand, this reluctance should not have a negative impact on research that will now take into account the (...) existence of the multiple transitions that cells face over time. The ages of life—birth, development, maturation, senescence and death—reflect specific key transitions and have, until now, rarely been taken into account in SynBio designs. This results in a mismatch between novelty and the very long evolutionary time that led to the existing chassis [remember that this is the common term used to describe the cellular framework as seen by synthetic biologists (de Lorenzo & Danchin, 2008)]. It also implies that, in general, transitions between growth stages will be taken into account with the appro- priate embodiment of highly specific processes. This is particularly important when adapting new models to their host, whether natural or artificial. Adaptation fol- lows two stages, short-term accommodation of new entities and long-term assimilation into the cell as a whole. This requires discrimination between classes of entities. We suggest that proteins playing the essential role of Maxwell’ demons, here named Maxwell’s dis- criminators (MxDs) to refer to their original function, will permit the assimilation and accommodation of artificial constructs. As a consequence, we can foresee that class discrimination, beyond mere recognition, will be implemented in SynBio 2.0, leading to an authentic par- adigm shift (Kuhn, 1996), based on conceptions that embody information as a genuine currency of reality. (shrink)

This paper reinforces the current consensus against the applicability of the selected effect theory of function in ecology. It does so by presenting an argument which, in contrast with the usual argument invoked in support of this consensus, is not based on claims about whether ecosystems are customary units of natural selection. Instead, the argument developed here is based on observations about the use of the function concept in functional ecology, and more specifically, research into the relationship between biodiversity and (...) ecosystem functioning. It is argued that a selected effect account of ecological functions is made implausible by the fact that it would conflict with important aspects of the understanding of function and ecosystem functional organization which underpins functional ecology’s research program. Specifically, it would conflict with (1) Functional ecology’s adoption of a context-based understanding of function and its aim to study the functional equivalence between phylogenetically-divergent organisms; (2) Functional ecology’s attribution to ecosystems of a lower degree of part-whole integration than the one found in paradigm individual organisms; and (3) Functional ecology’s adoption of a physiological or metabolic perspective on ecosystems rather than an evolutionary one. (shrink)

Social Work with The Black African Diaspora locates a complex and layered analysis of social work practice within the Western, precisely, the Republic of Ireland context. This work tells us that so...

"Comment faites-vous pour défendre l'assassin d'un enfant?" C'est souvent cette question que les avocats pénalistes entendent à propos de leur métier. L'avocat est représenté, dans la fiction, sous les traits d'un être ambigu, sans cesse sur le fil... La réalité est sans doute tout autre. C'est elle que ce livre tente d'approcher en comblant un manque dans les réflexions contemporaines de l'avocature. Rares sont, en effet, les travaux qui abordent l'éthique de l'avocat pénaliste. Quelles sont ses interrogations, ses incertitudes lorsqu'il (...) est confronté à des choix de défense? A travers une enquête menée auprès d'avocats, l'auteur s'intéresse aux intentions, aux pratiques quotidiennes effectives et aux enjeux de responsabilité du pénaliste. Comment les mutations juridiques et politiques de la défense pénale orientent-elles les valeurs de l'avocat et sa manière d'agir? Par-delà la dimension déontologique de son métier, quelles relations d'ordre éthique l'avocat entretient-il avec lui-même mais aussi avec l'autre : son client, qu'il soit prévenu, accusé ou victime, les jurés, les magistrats? Peut-on parler du rapport de l'avocat à la vérité? Cette vérité est-elle spécifique? Plurielle? Le procès équitable permet-il d'affirmer une égalité des armes devant la justice? Comment l'avocat peut-il construire des lignes de défense tout en restant partenaire de justice? En définitive, est-il possible de comprendre l'acte même de défense des actes extrêmes, des crimes monstrueux sans prendre conscience de la complexité d'une réflexion éthique? Avocats, magistrats, policiers, journalistes, bâtonniers, et bien sûr tous ceux qui se destinent à ces professions, et puis encore les citoyens qui s'intéressent à la justice et les citoyens qui la découvrent en tant que jurés, tous ceux-là, pour des raisons très diverses, tireront profit de la lecture de cet ouvrage. (shrink)

La 4e de couverture indique : "Les Lumières sont souvent invoquées dans l'espace public comme un combat contre l'obscurantisme, combat qu'il s'agirait seulement de réactualiser. Des lectures, totalisantes et souvent caricaturales, les associent au culte du Progrès, au libéralisme politique et à un universalisme désincarné. Or, comme le montre ici Antoine Lilti, les Lumières n'ont pas proposé une doctrine philosophique cohérente ou un projet politique commun. En confrontant des auteurs emblématiques et d'autres moins connus, il propose de rendre aux (...) Lumières leur complexité historique et de repenser ce que nous leur devons : un ensemble de questions et de problèmes, bien plus qu'un prêt-à-penser rassurant. Les Lumières apparaissent dès lors comme une réponse collective au surgissement de la modernité, dont les ambivalences forment aujourd'hui encore notre horizon. Partant des interrogations de Voltaire sur le commerce colonial et l'esclavage pour arriver aux dernières réflexions de Michel Foucault, en passant par la critique post-coloniale et les dilemmes du philosophe face au public, L'Héritage des Lumières propose ainsi le tableau profondément renouvelé d'un mouvement qu'il nous faut redécouvrir car il ne cesse de nous parler.". (shrink)

English summary: This book examines the philosophy of Elisabeth of Bohemia in conjunction with Descartess. She maintained a philosophical dialogue with another philosopher employing pertinent arguments. In addition, she perhaps developed her own theses, truly philosophical theses which can be better understood in consideration with her numerous correspondents. The study seeks to better understand Elisabeths role in Cartesian thought, and to determine her own philosophical thought. French description: Le titre meme de ce volume, sous forme d'interrogation, est a comprendre comme (...) un postulat. Il s'explique comme suit : il s'agit de s'interroger sur la pensee philosophique d'Elisabeth tout autant que sur celle de Descartes. La reflexion d'Elisabeth semble en effet posseder une dimension philosophique a deux titres au moins : d'abord parce que la princesse entretient un dialogue philosophique de haute tenue avec un autre philosophe, en deployant des arguments pertinents; ensuite parce qu'elle developpe peut-etre elle-meme des theses qui lui sont personnelles, qui seraient des theses au sens fort et pleinement philosophique du terme, et dont l'etude pourrait etre affinee par la prise en consideration de ses tres nombreux autres correspondants. Reste un scrupule : celui de trahir le souhait meme d'Elisabeth de cantonner ses echanges intellectuels au plan prive, en la propulsant en pleine lumiere et en lui faisant endosser une posture philosophique qu'elle a soigneusement evitee de son vivant. Qu'on songe qu'elle voulait que cet echange soit code! Mais comme le premier traitre fut Descartes lui-meme, transmettant les lettres d'Elisabeth a Christine de Suede, considerons-nous comme habilites, en bons cartesiens, a divulguer la pensee de la princesse palatine. C'est a ce prix en effet, que nous pourrons redefinir le role de cette derniere dans le cartesianisme, determiner s'il existe une pensee propre d'Elisabeth et enfin, si elle existe, savoir en quoi elle consiste. (shrink)

Plus que Malebranche lui-même, ce volume interroge les potentialités complexes de ses textes et les différents prismes qui les ont réfractées, dans des contextes et à des desseins souvent bien différents de ceux de l'Oratorien. Plus que de savoir si telle ou telle réception est ou non "fidèle" aux "intentions" de Malebranche, ce volume entend participer à une réflexion plus large sur une méthodologie de l'histoire des idées soucieuse de n'occulter aucune des lectures réelles d'une œuvre à la fois apologétique (...) et grosse de matériaux subversifs. (shrink)

This volume explores the relationship between physics and metaphysics in Descartes’ philosophy. According to the standard account, Descartes modified the objects of metaphysics and physics and inverted the order in which these two disciplines were traditionally studied. This book challenges the standard account in which Descartes prioritizes metaphysics over physics. It does so by taking into consideration the historical reception of Descartes and the ways in which Descartes himself reacted to these receptions in his own lifetime. The book stresses the (...) diversity of these receptions by taking into account not only Cartesianisms but also anti-Cartesianisms, and by showing how they retroactively highlighted different aspects of Descartes’ works and theoretical choices. The historical aspect of the volume is unique in that it not only analyzes different constructions of Descartes that emerged in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, but also reflects on how his work was first read by philosophers across Europe. Taken together, the essays in this volume offer a fresh and up-to-date contribution to this important debate in early modern philosophy. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce qu'être cartésien? Qu'est-ce qui fait la spécificité du cartésianisme dans l'histoire des idées? Ce volume propose une réponse â cette question : le cartésianisme peut tout aussi bien se penser à l'aide des outils d'une histoire de la philosophie classique recourant à la philologie, aux " sources " et à l'intertextualité, y compris en des termes critiques ; que dans les lexiques de la réfraction, de la transformation voire de la construction, rationnelle ou imaginaire. Dans ce dernier cas, on (...) peut parfaitement revendiquer la neutralisation des exigences de continuité attestables entre l'invention et la source originelle et tenter de penser des Descartes ad hoc, étant entendu qu'une telle entreprise aura toujours, en retour, quelque chose à nous apprendre sur le corpus d'origine. De Descartes à la période contemporaine, les contributions présentées offrent une synthèse inédite du prisme de ces lectures possibles, toute appelées, tendanciellement mais différemment, par l'oeuvre de Descartes. (shrink)

In the following article, starting from a progressive understanding of his own subjectivity, a determining factor in developing his capacity to listen to adolescents, the author puts forward the hypothesis that a professional position he describes as "in-between" requires rigor and flexibility, enabling professionals to remain permeable to the unconscious mobilizations of the adolescent-subjects as well as to his own. The author will draw on the results of a longitudinal, partnership-based study that he conducted with ten adolescents, from 2015 to (...) 2020, involving a team of specialized prevention educators. More specifically, the author will retrospectively analyze some excerpts from his encounter with one of the teenagers to reveal possible ways in which a "professional of the social bond" might adopt a rigorous in-between position. (shrink)