Victims of oppression are often called to let go of their anger in order to facilitate better discussion to bring about the end of their oppression. According to Amia Srinivasan, this constitutes an affective injustice. In this paper, we use research on emotion regulation to shed light on the nature of affective injustice. By drawing on the literature on emotion regulation, we illustrate specifically what kind of work is put upon people who are experiencing affective injustice and why it is (...) damaging. We begin by explaining affective injustice and how it can amount to a call for emotion regulation. Then we explain the various techniques that can be used to regulate emotions and explain how each might be harmful here. In the penultimate section of the paper, we explain how the upshot of this is that victims of affective injustice are left with a dilemma. Either they try to regulate their anger in a way that involves ignoring the fact of their oppression or they regulate it in a way that is likely to be harmful for them. Finally, we consider whether there are any good solutions to this dilemma, and how this issue opens up the possibility for further research into emotion regulation and moral philosophy. (shrink)

I will begin by considering how the social world appears to the scientific observer and ask the question of whether the world of scientific research, with all its categories of meaning interpretation and with all its conceptual schemes of action, is identical with the world in which the observed actor acts. Anticipating the result, I may state immediately that with the shift from one level to the other, all the conceptual schemes and all the terms of interpretation must be modified.Proceeding (...) in this direction, I encounter several problems overlapping with the problem of rational action and the “rational act unit” in Professor ParsonsParsons, Talcott’ sense. First: The conceptual scheme of rational action presupposes a more or less definite knowledge of, or orientation within, the world in which this action is performed. In this sense the term, “rationality”, is not specific to the conceptual scheme of action; it embraces the conceptual scheme of the world in general and is only one element in it. Therefore, we also must examine the problem of orientation in this world. Second: We ought to keep in mind that all interpretation of the social world has to start from the actor’s subjective point of view. Therefore, we cannot accept the term, “unit act”, as such, without trying to reduce it to its subjective meaning. Here I have to discuss in general terms why I insist on the subjective point of view. This is more than the whim of a few social scientists; social science cannot be built up except by taking cognizance of the subjective meaning the actor connects with his acting. Finally, I have to discuss the fact that there are social sciences operating on high theoretical levels that, like economics, apparently prefer to deal with statistical curves and mathematical formulae rather than with actions of human beings in the social world, yet they use the term, “rational action”, as an indispensable element of their systems. I will have to show what modification this term undergoes in these types of social sciences..). (shrink)

The first three chapters are personal history, highly picturesque and amusing, illumined by flashes of his lively humor....From here the chapters go on into Philosophy, Education, and Science. covering a span of thrity years though these writings do, they are surprizingly unified. Atlantic.

Compatibilists about free will maintain that free will is compatible with determinism, and incompatibilists disagree. Incompatibilist believers in free will have been challenged to solve a problem that luck poses for them—the problem of present luck. This article articulates that challenge and then explores a novel compatibilist view recently proposed by Christian List. It is argued that List’s view, unlike standard compatibilist views, faces a very similar problem about luck.

Der Laie spricht manchmal die Ansicht aus, die Mathematik ware heutzutage schon eine tote Wissenschaft: nachdem sie einen ungemein hohen Grad der Entwicklung erreicht hat, sei sie in ihrer steinernen Vollkommenheit erstarrt. Dies ist ein vollig irriges Bild der Situation: nur wenige Wissenschaftsgebiete befinden sich heute in der Phase einer solch intensiven Entwicklung wie die Mathematik. Diese Entwicklung ist dabei auBerordentlich vie1seitig: die Mathematik erweitert ihre Domane nach allen moglichen Richtungen, sie wachst in die Rohe, in die Weite und in (...) die Tiefe. Sie wachst in die Rohe, da auf dem Boden ihrer alten Theorien, denen eine jahrhundert-, ja sogar jahrtausend- lange Entwicklung zugrunde liegt, immer wieder neue Prob1eme auftauchen, immer scharfere und vollkommenere Resultate er- zielt werden; in die Weite, da ihre Methoden andere Wissen- schaftszweige durchdringen, ihr Untersuchungsbereich immer umfangreichere Gebiete von Erscheinungen umfaBt und immer neue Theorien in den groBen Kreis mathematischer Disziplinen einbezogen werden; und schlieBlich in die Tiefe, da ihre Grund- lagen immer mehr gefestigt, die bei ihrem Aufbau angewandten Methoden immer vollkommener werden und ihre Prinzipien an Dauerhaftigkeit gewinnen. In dem vorliegenden Buch wiinschte ich dem Leser, der fiir die gegenwartige Mathematik Interesse aufweist, aber ihr fern- steht, mindestens einen ganz allgemeinen Begriff von dieser dritten Entwicklungslinie der Mathematik, d. i. von ihrer Ent- wicklung in die Tiefe, zu geben. (shrink)

The thought that acts of supererogation exist presents a challenge to all normative ethical theories. This chapter will provide an overview of the consequentialist responses to this challenge. I will begin by explaining the problem that supererogation presents for consequentialism. I will then explore consequentialist attempts to deny the existence of acts of supererogation. Next, I will examine a range of act consequentialist attempts to accommodate supererogation: including satisficing consequentialism, dual-ranking act consequentialism and an anti-rationalist form of consequentialism. Finally, I (...) will explore how indirect consequentialists have responded to this problem. Throughout the chapter, I will argue that in responding to the challenge of supererogation, consequentialists must choose between a more theoretically satisfying version of consequentialism and a form of consequentialism that is better able to accommodate our everyday moral intuitions and concepts. (shrink)

The bases of tenets of the World came from the East; Pythagoras learnt all there up the 26 years. At a home, the east ideas where took in no; then he bound the mathematics with the elements of matter. This was the best way to a blood feud of the all Humanity. The 17th age gave the bases of mathematics and the Greek atomism; this had led to the paranoia in all sciences. The LCE was brought in 19th age with (...) bases no; really it was the box of Pandora in the form of wrong sciences of the Nature. The wise revenge of Pythagoras was in the form of riddle for the best thinkers in the World in all times; us solved one in the 50th years. A base of the World is of the material space (MS) with praatoms (PAs) Ao; they are of the affinity to matter. A density of the MS is of ~ 5.10‐6 kg/m3 close to the Ears. PA Ao is of quant of matter and antimatter; they are of rotate in the different sides. All matter takes up Ao and to grow. In the giant stars to go the bursts giving Ao, or caloric. The matter of being in the World on base of the key law of conservation of heat (caloric) and matter by loss of energy; it is main. Leibniz offered to the conservation of mv2 in the World. But Newton knew that any move is damped, and it need in filled up. This the author proved by tests over the 300 years just. D.Bernoulli given to the model of gas. I. Kant proved that mv2 is the quantity of heat by stop of the body; it is no the energy! A key leitmotiv of thought is blocked the grasp of facts if ones not leaded to an accepted concept. P. Mayer had the blunder in base of the LCE; a work of gas expansion in Torricelli tube is equal nil strong! This is the gross blunder of a sick paranoiac! The 21 age gave up a new philosophy and a way to endless engine. The super skills from ideal quartz with moving jaws to respond to the all new philosophy and sciences. (shrink)

64 . 1. La théorie des objets percevants dépasse le cadre de cet ouvrage dont le but est de démontrer les principes de la connaissance naturelle par l’examen des données et des lois expérimentales fondamentales pour la physique. Un objet percevant est en un certain sens au-delà de la nature. Mais la nature inclut la vie ; et la manière de concevoir la nature dans le chapitre précédent..