De scientiis: translation by Gerard of Cremona of (romanized: Ibsā al-ʻulūm)--De intellectu et intellecto: anonymous translation of (romanized: Risālah fi al-ʻaql).

1. Uyun al-hikma, et l'opuscule d'Abu'l Faraj et la réfutation d'Ibn Sina, édité et annoté par H.Z. Ülken.--2. Les opuscules d'Ibn Sina, et Le livre de la différence entre l'esprit et l'âme, par Qosta b. Luqa; édité, étudié et onnoté [sic] par H.Z. Ülken.--3. Aşkın mâhiyeti hakkında risâle, neşreden ve Türkçeye çeviren A. Ateş.

This article aims to unravel the doctrine of the “sign from the manifest to the hidden” of Abū Hāšim al-Ğubbāʾī. It shows that Abū Hāšim tended to interpret this sign as an inference, of which he recognized two main types: Type-1 proceeds by analytical deduction of concepts by neutralizing the conditions of their realization, i. e. their ontological basis. This is, typically, the procedure most directly consonant with Abū Hāšim's modal ontology. Type-2 exhibits the same causal relationship at the known (...) and unknown levels and considers causality at the known level to be itself the cause of causality at the unknown level. This partition was completely new in philosophy and kalām at the time of Abū Hāšim, but it is foreshadowed in al-Ḫwārizmī’s Algebra. In this book, al-Ḫwārizmī distinguishes between proof “by cause”, which consists in transferring a certain geometric deduction to algebra, and proof “by expression”, which operates directly on algebraic expressions, which it reduces analytically. A text by Abū Hāšim devoted to human knowledge that seems to refer to the work of al-Ḫwārizmī suggests, finally, that the close parallel between al-Ḫwārizmī’s doctrine of proof and Abū Hāšim's doctrine of the sign may not be a mere coincidence. Two appendices have been added. The first deals with al-Fārābī’s reading of Abū Hāšim's theory of inference. The second, based on all available data, establishes for the first time the correct and precise dates of Abū Hāšim's life. (shrink)

: While Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī is known to posterity primarily as a historian and commentator on the Qurʾan, his most creative work may have been in the law, and Ibn al-Nadim places his main entry on al-Ṭabarī in Book VI of the Fihrist, on law. Unfortunately, most of his legal works have been lost. Building on and revising George Makdisi’s analysis of the relationship between the ṭabaqāt genre and the theoretical justification of the legal madhhabs, this study (...) argues that one of these lost books, Marātib al-ʿulamāʾ “Degrees of the Scholars,” was devoted to the generations of jurists and intended to provide a theoretical basis for the authority of the Jarīrī madhhab, one among a number of pieces of evidence that suggest al-Ṭabarī was consciously designing and creating his own legal madhhab, in contrast to earlier jurists, such as Abū Ḥanīfah and al-Shāfiʿī, whose legal madhhabs were created by subsequent generations of students. (shrink)

Este artículo estudia la obra inédita sobre metrología y numismática Itbāt mā laysa min-hu budd li-man arāda l-wuqūf ‛alā ḥaqīqat al-dinār wa-l-dirham wa-l-sā‛ wal-mudd, compuesta por Abū l-‛Abbās Aḥmad al-‛Azafī al-Sabfī. Se recogen informaciones biográficas sobre el autor y se estudia y analiza el contenido del texto, sus fuentes y su metodología. Se incluye la traducción de los capítulos relativos a la legitimidad y la necesidad de acuñar moneda, en los que el autor discute la posición de Ibn Ḥazm al (...) respecto. (shrink)

RésuméCet article se propose de mettre au jour les relations profondes qui existent entre l'argument de l’« homme volant » d'Avicenne et des considérations modales de l’école d'Abū Hāšim al-Ǧubbā’ī. Il montre qu'Avicenne réemploie des arguments développés originellement par Abū Hāšim pour démontrer la présence d'un mode de la totalité dans le cas du vivant – argument lui-même opposé à la psychologie aristotélicienne et néoplatonicienne – pour établir, contre l'ontologie modale de ce dernier, la nature incorporelle de l’âme. On voit (...) ainsi se dessiner le jeu subtil d'Avicenne par rapport à celui qu'il avait très probablement identifié, fût-ce à son corps défendant, comme l'un des plus grands métaphysiciens de langue arabe. (shrink)

Aristotle Middle Commentary on the Topics, comparing them, where necessary, to the testimonies collected by Boethius in his De topicis differentiis. In addition we show that the Themistian classification of loci was taken up by Abt al-Badb al-mub al-mu al-Barak thus reveals himself to be closer than Averroes to the testimony of Boethius. This suggests the idea of a double redaction by Themistius of the classification of loci: one, more concentrated, comes from an introduction to the paraphrase of the central (...) books of the Topics, which may have inspired Averroes; the other, more extensive, which will have been part of an original work, and inspired the classifications of Boethius and of Abt al-Badī. (shrink)

RésuméʾAbū Saʿīd al-Siǧzī, astronome et mathématicien du ive/xe siècle, fut l'un des premiers auteurs du genre ʿilm al-hayʾa ; mais on connaît peu la genèse de cette discipline et sa relation aux autres écrits et pratiques en astronomie. Dans cet article, je présente de nouvelles découvertes permettant de préciser la biographie d'al-Siǧzī. Je décris ensuite, pour la première fois, une composition d'astronomie théorique du ive/xe siècle, la « Structure des orbes » d'al-Siǧzī, et je montre sa place dans la formation (...) de la discipline ʿilm al-hayʾa en comparant ce livre à l'ouvrage antérieur d'al-Farġānī sur la taille de la Terre et le nombre des sphères célestes. Je conclus que la Tarkīb al-aflāk d'al-Siǧzī est le plus ancien exemple connu d'un livre traitant des sujets abordés plus tard en hayʾa, et qu'il contient peutêtre la première occurrence du neuvième orbe céleste, classique dans les écrits du genre. (shrink)

This article revisits the controversy between Abū Bakr al-Rāzī and Abū al-Qāsim al-Balḫī. Based on the testimony of the Kitāb taṯbīt dalāʾil al-nubuwwa of the Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ǧabbār, it is shown that the two philosophers must have clashed at the court of Aḥmad b. Sahl al-Marwazī, governor of Balḫ, during the 910s, and that the virulence of the tone of their exchange can be explained above all by this context of professional rivalry. In terms of content, their conversation must have (...) focused on the question of divine justice and on the best way to give an account of prophecy and Qurʾanic wisdom. We then turn to the study of chap. VIII, 4 of Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Al-maṭālib al-ʿāliya and show that, contrary to a recently held view, this chapter constitutes an echo not of Abū Bakr al-Rāzī, but of the first argument of Ibn al-Rāwandī's Kitāb al-zumurrud, which contrasted the autonomy of reason with the necessity of prophecy in order to conclude from the former to the negation of the latter. Finally, it is suggested that Abū Bakr al-Rāzī's doctrine of prophecy, like that of the great theologians of his time, both Muʿtazilites and Ašʿarites, aims to escape the dilemma set up by Ibn al-Rāwandī a few decades earlier. (shrink)

RésuméQuels sont les objets de la perception? Deux réponses célèbres à cette question soutiennent que ce sont soit les images des objets extramentaux, c'est-à-dire la façon dont ils nous apparaissent, soit les objets eux-mêmes. Dans cet article, je présente une analyse de cette question par Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī, un savant post-avicennien dont l'impact sur l'histoire de la philosophie islamique a été largement négligé. Abū l-Barakāt s'est opposé au dualisme épistémologique traditionnel aristotélicien-avicennien, qui établit une distinction entre la perception sensorielle des (...) particuliers matériels et la conception des universaux immatériels, notamment en ce qui concerne le percevant et/ou la structure de la perception. Selon la théorie d'Abū l-Barakāt, tous les actes épistémiques ont la structure unifiée d'une relation directe entre un même percevant et les objets eux-mêmes – matériels et immatériels. Sa thèse principale consiste à dire qu'avoir des organes corporels n'est pas nécessaire pour la perception sensorielle. Dans la dernière section de cet article, je montre que la critique d'Abū l-Barakāt de la tradition aristotélicienne-avicennienne fut considérée comme une innovation révolutionnaire en épistémologie. Cela peut avoir déterminé les théories épistémologiques de deux des philosophes arabes postavicenniens les plus importants : Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī et Šihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Der Islam Jahrgang: 94 Heft: 1 Seiten: 220-233.

This article examines the development and critique of analogical arguments in the kalām tradition. There are two basic positions on analogical arguments: (i) one holds that if analogical arguments yield certainty, then they are analyzable as deductive inferences, rendering the analogy itself redundant. Proponents of this view thus hold that if the analogy is useful at all, it will never yield the certainty demanded in the rational sciences; (ii) another holds that the analogy remains useful even when the argument is (...) deductively sound, either because the universal premise is epistemically dependent on the source case, or, because the source case is useful in dialectical contexts. The exploration of these themes will center around Juwaynī’s formalization and subsequent critique of analogical arguments in the kalām tradition. (shrink)

RésuméLe problème de la détermination de la Qibla est l'une des questions cruciales qui se posent à la culture scientifique de l'Islam médiéval; le résoudre correctement nécessite tant des théories mathématiques que des observations. Les mathématiques relèvent de deux chapitres: la trigonométrie plane et la trigonométrie sphérique. L'observation et les instruments d'observation sont indispensables à la détermination des coordonnées géographiques de La Mecque et du lieu donné; ces coordonnées sont en effet les données que l'on entre dans les formules donnant (...) la Qibla. Dans son Almageste, Abū al-Wafāʾ résout brillamment ce problème. Son travail porte tant sur les mathématiques que sur l'observation; il obtient des solutions modernes, adéquates et faciles. En trigonométrie plane, il donne de nouvelles définitions des fonctions trigonométriques, démontre les formules des sinus, donne une approximation de sin 1° grâce à laquelle il construit des tables de sinus et de tangentes d'une grande précision. En trigonométrie sphérique, il démontre quatre nouveaux théorèmes dont la règle des tangentes ; cette règle lui permet de trouver, comme nous le montrerons, des solutions simples au problème de la détermination de la Qibla. En ce qui concerne les observations, il décrit trois instruments utilisés par lui plusieurs années de suite à Bagdad. Cet article, nourri de nombreux textes arabes originaux traduits et commentés, donne une description détaillée, technique et analytique, des méthodes mathématiques d'Abū al-Wafāʾ pour la détermination de la Qibla. (shrink)

This paper explores the philosophical aspects of the "Great Introduction" of Abū Ma'šar, one of the great figures of Arabic astrology and an associate of al-Kindī, the great 9th century philosopher. I argue that the following points of philosophical interest may be found in this text: 1. Astrology is described as a "master science" along the lines proposed by Aristotle, i.e. it provides principles for lower sciences. Also he supplies arguments to ground astrology on methodological grounds, such as the use (...) of empirical evidence and testimony. 2. Abū Ma'šar broadly follows al-Kindī's explanation of how the stars influence the sublunary world, by heating the elements. This agrees with al-Kindī's work "On the Proximate Agent Cause of Generation and Corruption," and I identify some parallels between the two works. 3. Finally, Abū Ma'šarr considers whether human freedom is compatible with this causal account. He holds that human actions do fall under the class of the "possible" and not the "necessary," but only because for him the "possible" is what happens sometimes, not always. Thus he seems tacitly to hold that genuine choice is compatible with causal necessitation. (shrink)

ʿAlī fils d’Abū Ṭālib, gendre et cousin du prophète Muḥammad, premier imam (chef, guide, leader) des Shi’ites et quatrième calife, est sans doute une des figures les plus centrales de différents types de spiritualité en islam. Cependant c’est surtout dans la spiritualité shi’ite, fondée principalement sur la figure de l’imam, qu’il constitue le véritable pivot autour duquel gravitent les doctrines religieuses les plus importantes. L’article envisage ce rôle à travers une problématique précise, celle des rapports qui lient la figure de (...) ʿAlī au Coran. Ainsi, sont examinés respectivement les rôles de ʿAlī d’abord comme acteur et sujet de l’exégèse de la Révélation, ensuite comme contenu et objet ultime de celle-ci. Cette dimension duelle semble s’appuyer sur la double nature, humaine et divine, de ʿAlī. C’est la raison pour laquelle l’article se termine par l’hypothèse de l’identification possible, par certain proto-Shi’ites, entre leur premier imam et le Christ. (shrink)

RésuméCet article se propose de reconstruire une partie du livre IV du traité perdu Sur la démonstration de Galien à partir des témoignages transmis par Abū Bakr al-Rāzī dans les Doutes sur Galien, et d'une source encore jamais exploitée, la Solution aux Doutes sur Galien de Abū al-ʿAlāʾ ibn Zuhr. L'hypothèse à laquelle nous sommes parvenue est que, dans le livre IV, Galien revient sur le caractère indécidable de la question de l’éternité du monde, et critique la démonstration donnée par (...) Aristote dans le traité Du Ciel, I. Seul un des arguments d'Aristote, qui occupe le court passage I, 3, 270b12–17, lui semble pouvoir être sauvé, car il est fondé sur des indications empiriques. C'est sur ce passage que se concentre al-Rāzī. Cette reconstruction permet de réduire les contradictions entre les fragments du livre IV transmis par Philopon dans Contre Proclus sur l’éternité du monde et le compte rendu d'al-Rāzī. Enfin, cet article montre que si al-Rāzī porte autant d'intérêt à ce passage chez Galien, ce n'est pas seulement à des fins polémiques, mais afin de servir ses propres objectifs philosophico-théologiques. Les objections d'al-Rāzī montrent qu'il considère que la téléologie galénique est adossée à un arrière-fond éternaliste qui ne lui permet pas de reconnaître la primauté de la théodicée pour la cosmologie comme pour la biologie. (shrink)

RésuméAbū al-Jūd Muḥammad ibn al-Layth est l’un des mathématiciens du xe siècle qui ont le plus contribué au nouveau chapitre sur les constructions géométriques des problèmes solides et sur-solides, ainsi qu’à un autre chapitre, sur la solution des équations cubiques et biquadratiques à l’aide des coniques. Ses travaux, importants pour les résultats qu’ils renferment, le sont aussi par les nouveaux rapports qu’ils instaurent entre l’algèbre et la géométrie. La bonne fortune nous a transmis sa correspondance avec le mathématicien et astronome (...) al-Bīrūnī. Les questions qui y sont débattues, les réponses apportées, nous offrent, in vivo, plusieurs perspectives sur la recherche qui était alors menée. Le lecteur trouve dans cet article l’édition critique de cette correspondance, sa traduction française ainsi qu’un commentaire historique et mathématique. (shrink)

The philosophical debate presented in these pages is extracted from a 13th-century Coptic Arabic summa ecclesiastica. The venue is alleged to have taken place in Alexandria under the aegis of its proper founder. In a gathering of five philosophers or sages coming from India to the Maghreb, passing of course through Greece, amongst whom was present the great Aristotle, Alexander's preceptor and the undisputed authority that summed up the debate and put an end to it. The disputation turns on the (...) existence or not of a supreme creator and organizer, reminding the public sessions convened by the Sassanid and Muslim Rulers. However, the mise en scène here is linked without contest to the famous encounter of 325 b.C. between the Macedonian Conqueror and the Brahmans or Indian gymnosophites. We know how this episode was glossed in different ways in the Greek literature until it was “recovered” in an apologetic monotheistic view by the new Christian imperial order from the 4th century a.C. onward. Although our Coptic writer from the Middle Ages intends to prove with the text he offers to us the rightness of the “miaphysite” teaching of his Church, he, or his source, stands fully in line with that tradition, despite the fact that we could not trace a specific source from the rich variety of linguistic traditions on the matter. All the same, the ideological and linguistic analysis of the text brings us to suggest a Greek original that goes back to Late Antiquity.RésuméTiré d'une somme ecclésiastique copto-arabe du XIIIe siècle, le débat philosophique que nous présentons ici, est prétendu avoir eu lieu à Alexandrie, sous l'égide de son propre fondateur. S'y trouvent réunis cinq sages ou philosophes, venus depuis l'Inde jusqu'au Maghreb, passant bien sûr par la Grèce, dont la délégation ne manque pas d'inclure le grand Aristote, le précepteur d'Alexandre le Grand et l'autorité incontestée qui récapitule et clôt le débat. La ‘dispute’ porte sur l'existence ou non d'un créateur-ordonnateur suprême, rappelant les sessions publiques convoquées par les souverains sassanides ou musulmans. Mais la mise en scène ici se rattache incontestablement à la célèbre rencontre du Conquérant macédonien avec les brahmanes ou gymnosophistes indiens en 325 av. J.-C. On sait comment cet épisode a été glosé de différentes manières dans la littérature grecque, jusqu'à sa cristallisation dans le Roman d'Alexandre, avant d'être “récupéré”, dans une perspective monothéiste apologétique, par la nouvelle donne impériale chrétienne depuis le IVe siècle ap. J.-C. Si notre auteur copte du Moyen Âge arabe veut voir dans le texte qu'il nous livre une confirmation de la doctrine “miaphysite” de son Église, il se situe néanmoins, lui ou sa source, dans cette ligne-là, sans qu'on ait pu, pour autant, en retracer la source dans les différentes traditions linguistiques existantes. Ceci dit, l'analyse idéologique et linguistique du texte du débat nous mène à suggérer, comme source immédiate, un original grec de la Basse Antiquité. (shrink)

Abū al-Jūd Muḥammad ibn al-Layth is one of the mathematicians of the 10th century who contributed most to the novel chapter on the geometric construction of the problems of solids and super-solids, and also to another chapter on solving cubic and bi-quadratic equations with the aid of conics. His works, which were significant in terms of the results they contained, are moreover important with regard to the new relations they established between algebra and geometry. Good fortune transmitted to us his (...) correspondences with the mathematician and astronomer al-Bīrūnī. The questions they debated, and the answers they yielded, all offer us multiple in vivo perspectives on the research that was undertaken in that period. The reader would find in this article a critical edition and French translation of this correspondence, with historical and mathematical commentaries. Résumé Abū al-Jūd Muḥammad ibn al-Layth est l’un des mathématiciens du x e siècle qui ont le plus contribué au nouveau chapitre sur les constructions géométriques des problèmes solides et sur-solides, ainsi qu’à un autre chapitre, sur la solution des équations cubiques et biquadratiques à l’aide des coniques. Ses travaux, importants pour les résultats qu’ils renferment, le sont aussi par les nouveaux rapports qu’ils instaurent entre l’algèbre et la géométrie. La bonne fortune nous a transmis sa correspondance avec le mathématicien et astronome al-Bīrūnī. Les questions qui y sont débattues, les réponses apportées, nous offrent, in vivo, plusieurs perspectives sur la recherche qui était alors menée. Le lecteur trouve dans cet article l’édition critique de cette correspondance, sa traduction française ainsi qu’un commentaire historique et mathématique. (shrink)

Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d'un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l'exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle. Pages de début Préface Présentation Introduction Première partie. Jusqu'à Maïmonide Les mutakalimoun et autres penseurs juifs inspirés des mouvements théologiques musulmans Les néo-platoniciens Juda ha-Lévi et le dépassement de la philosophie Abu-l-Barakat : Une philosophie hors des (...) courants Les aristotéliciens Deuxième partie. La fin du Moyen Âge Le treizième siècle Le quatorzième siècle Le quinzième siècle Tableau Chronologique des principaux philosophes juifs du Moyen âge BibliographiePages de fin. (shrink)

Özet Şii-İmamiyye’nin usûlde Mu’tezilenin etkisinde kaldığı iddiaları, hicri dördüncü asırdan itibaren dile getirilmektedir. Buna karşılık usûlî düşüncenin ilk mümessili sayılan Şeyh Müfîd’den itibaren mezhep içinden yükselen sesler bu iddiaları şiddetle reddetmişlerdir. Biz bu çalışmada Mu’tezile kelamına sistematik hüviyet kazandıran ve yazdığı eserlerle Mu’tezile kelamının bugüne ulaşmasında büyük pay sahibi olan Kâdî Abdülcebbâr ile İmamiyye’nin kelam düşüncesinin istikrar bulmasında ve Şeyh Müfîd’le başlatılan usûlî yaklaşımın benimsenip yaygınlaşmasında büyük bir yeri olan Ebû Ca’fer et-Tûsî arasında adalet ilkesi üzerinden bir karşılaştırma yaparak, söz (...) konusu iddiaların ne kadar sübut bulduğunu tespit etmeye çalıştık. Kısmi farklı izahları bir kenara bırakırsak, adalet ilkesinin ispat ve yorumlanmasında iki kelamcı arasında kayda değer bir farklılığın olmadığı görülmektedir. Abstract The claim that the Shi’i Imamite thought is heavily influenced by the Mu’tazilite outlook has been alleged since the fouth century of hijra. However, beginning with Shaikh Mufid, the first representative of the Usuli branch of Shi’a, the Shi’is vehemently denied this allegation. In this article, this issue is dealt with by making a comparison between the idea of Qadi Abd al-Jabbar, the prominent Mu’tazilite scholar who made a major contribution to the consolidation of the schools’ theaching and that of al-Tusi, who also made a contrubitued to the integration of the Shi’ite kalam and the spreading of the usuli approach initiated by Shaikh Mufid. Leaving aside the differences in deatil, it seems that there is no noteworthy difference between their approcah to the issue of justice. Key Words: Qâdî Abd al-Jabbâr, Abû Ja’far al-Tûsî, Husn-Qubh, Divine Justice, Free Will. (shrink)

This article examines the development and critique of analogical arguments in the kalām tradition. There are two basic positions on analogical arguments: one holds that if analogical arguments yield certainty, then they are analyzable as deductive inferences, rendering the analogy itself redundant. Proponents of this view thus hold that if the analogy is useful at all, it will never yield the certainty demanded in the rational sciences; another holds that the analogy remains useful even when the argument is deductively sound, (...) either because the universal premise is epistemically dependent on the source case, or, because the source case is useful in dialectical contexts. The exploration of these themes will center around Juwaynī’s formalization and subsequent critique of analogical arguments in the kalām tradition. (shrink)

Cet article analyse un bref texte arabe qui propose une division des catégories d’Aristote, en catégories simples et catégories composées ; ce fragment est attribué à Aḥmad Ibn al-Ṭayyib al-Saraḫsī, philosophe du neuvième siècle et disciple majeur d’al-Kindī, le « premier philosophe des Arabes ». L’article montre que la division d’al-Saraḫsī trouve son origine dans la tradition alexandrine des commentateurs aristotéliciens. Le fragment est replacé dans le contexte de la philosophie arabe en analysant différentes divisions des catégories avancées, respectivement, par (...) Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, al-Kindī, les Frères de la Pureté et Abū l-Faraǧ ibn al-Ṭayyib. Des collections de définitions et de divisions philosophiques en grec et en syriaque constituent très probablement le mode de transmission de la division au monde de l’islam. Le fragment illustre également que, pour ce qui concerne la philosophie aristotélicienne, al-Saraḫsī ne suit pas toujours l’exemple de son maître al-Kindī. (shrink)

Concerning the book by R. Arnzen Abū l-'Abbās an-Nayrīzīs Exzerpte aus (Ps.-?) Simplicius' Kommentar zu den Definitionen, Postulaten und Axiomen in Euclids Elementa I, the present paper offers a survey of the way the late Neoplatonists used to conceive and compose their commentaries. Far from trying to be original, each commentary is largely based on the works of predecessors.

This article discusses the photographs of torture conducted by American soldiers in Iraq, at Abu Ghraib prison, with a focus on the novelty of the phenomenon in which the participants seek to produce a collective representation of themselves performing the act of torturing prisoners. If one considers that these activities were, in many respects, staged for the camera, it is possible to interpret these images of atrocities as belonging to the tradition of amateur photography, particularly pornography. The publication of this (...) material is of immense ethical and political significance, as it shows the hidden side of American values as exported to Iraq. Although the Abu Ghraib archives represent something which is inherently unspeakable, ineffable, the images are enough to reveal what otherwise would have been denied. This seems especially evident in light of the fact that recent wars have been conducted with an unprecedented degree of visual censorship and government manipulation. (shrink)

ABSTRACT. — This article examines the concept of adaptive preference as it has appeared in feminist political philosophy since the 2000’s. This concept refers to preferences shaped in compliance with an oppressive environment and that jeopardizes one’s well-being. In the first part, the two most influential conceptions of adaptive preference will be discussed : the ones provided by the philosophers Martha Nussbaum and Serene Khader. Afterwards, I will assess these conceptions in the light of recent work by feminist anthropologists Saba (...) Mahmood and Lila Abu-Lughod, in which they revaluate the political project of feminist philosophy underlying adaptive preferences. -/- RÉSUMÉ. — Cet article porte sur le concept de préférence adaptative tel qu’il est apparu en philosophie féministe politique et anglophone depuis les années 2000. Ce concept désigne les préférences formées conformément à un milieu oppressif et qui vont à l’encontre du bien-être. Dans un premier temps, il sera question des deux théorisations les plus influentes à l’heure actuelle: celles développées par les philosophes Martha Nussbaum et Serene Khader. Ensuite, j’évaluerai ces positions à l’aune des récents travaux des anthropologues fémi- nistes Saba Mahmood et Lila Abu-Lughod, dans lesquels elles remettent en question le projet politique de la philosophie féministe sous-jacent aux préfé- rences adaptatives. (shrink)

The recent publication of a complete edition of Abū l-Qāsim al-Balḫī's (d. 319/931) Maqālāt ahl al-qibla opens new perspectives on the history of the Islamic doxographical tradition. Through a comparison of al-Balḫī's Maqālāt with Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ašʿarī's (d. 324/935-6) Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn wa-ḫtilāf al-muṣallīn, this article demonstrate that al-Balḫī is the direct source of al-Ašʿarī's chapter on the Šīʿa. This conclusion hence allows us to analyze the evolution of the maqālāt genre during the 3rd/9th-4th/10th centuries, most notably its progressive assimilation to (...) a distinctively heresiographical practice. (shrink)

Les musées contemporains sont en pleine mutation, ils passent du statut de « temples de l’art et de la culture » à celui de pourvoyeurs d’activités culturelles et ludiques. Censés instruire, ils s’engagent dans la voie controversée de plaire en vue d’exister, le but ultime étant de drainer le plus de « clients » possible pour assurer la continuation. Et dans la mouvance, ils n’hésitent pas à s’exporter au même titre que les enseignes commerciales vers des cités-nations à la recherche (...) d’une « présence » sur la mappemonde globalisée. Le Louvre-Abou Dabi est un exemple saillant de cette tendance mondialisée, tout comme Guggenheim, il devient un jalon mobile de l’art et de la culture. Dans cette phénoménologie de « l’existence par l’architecture », les œuvres architecturales deviennent des objets-outils de notoriété et de communication, plus inhérents au marketing qu’à la culture. Mais quelle part d’intérêt va pour les collections dans ce nouveau statut du musée ou le bâtiment est à lui seul un gage d’existence et de contemporanéité ? Et dans quelle mesure, la part de responsabilité publique qui incombe aux musées dans le développement culturel de la collectivité, risque-t-elle d’être compromise par les lois du marché?Contemporary museums are rapidly evolving from “temples of art and culture” to providers of cultural and recreational activities. Although supposed to be instructive, they are embarking on a controversial policy of pleasing the public in order to exist, the ultimate aim being to draw as many “customers” as possible to secure their future. And in pursuing these aims, they have been exporting themselves, just like any commercial brand, to nation-cities seeking a “place” on the globalised map. The Abu Dhabi Louvre is a striking example of this global trend, as is the Guggenheim, which has now become a movable landmark in the arts and culture landscape. This phenomenon of “existence through architecture” is turning architectural works into objects as well as tools to enhance communication and notoriety, a development that has more to do with marketing than with culture. But given this new status, where the building itself guarantees the museum’s existence and contemporaneity, how much interest is there in its collections? And to what extent is every museum’s share of public responsibility for collective cultural development likely to compromised by “market forces”? (shrink)

The traditions about isrāʾīliyyāt that were seen almost in all the types of Islamic sciences appeared in the sources of tafsīr from early periods. These traditions that were generally used to explain the Qurʾān were seen problem and critisized by some exegetical specialists. Even though corresponding to a relative later period in the classical era, an approach was tried to put forward in view of the traditions about isrāʾīliyyāt. This methodological concern for isrāʾīliyyāt in classical period has increased and been (...) influential for many researchers from east and west to work on this issue in modern times. There has been reached to important results about the issues of the definition of isrāʾīliyyāt, the source of it, its spread in Islamic sciences, its aim of usage, the progress of these positive-negative attitudes against these traditions in historical process. But it is important to discuss some evaluations and analysis again that put forward in this process when different cases about the issue are taken into consideration. According to this, a series of problem, such as how the isrāʾīliyyāt can be defined in tafsīr, when the criticism of isrāʾīliyyāt started, whether Biqāʿī was the first exegete who made reference to Bible or not will be discussed considering relevant resources in this article.Summary: Since the early periods, isrā’īliyyāt narratives were used as a source of information in tafsīrs. These narratives, which are transmitted in various tafsīrs of the Qur’ān, one of the main sources of Islamic religion, have also taken the methodological interests of some exegete since the early periods. This interest continued in the modern period, and both Western and Eastern researchers made research on isrā’īliyyāt. Some of the findings, analyses, and claims available in researches on this subject will be reexamined in this article. The first of these is the problem of the definition of isrā’īliyyāt. In contemporary research, inclusive definitions are made for isrā’īliyyāt, seen in all sources. These definitions do not allow for a refined description of isrā’īliyyāt which is handled in terms of different intentions in the sources of each different field and which varies in terms of the issues it covers, leading to the underestimation of some of its aspects in relevant fields. In the definitions, it is stated that isrā’īliyyāt is mostly learned from the Ahl al-Kitāb, (the People of the Book) it became widespread along with Islām and it included narratives about caliphs, dynasties, and Mahdī, as well. Another issue is to be emphasized that they are fictive or mythological. In classical tafsīrs, isrā’īliyyāt is observed to be related mainly with the history of the Ahl al-Kitāb or with the subjects they know about. In the modern era, the narratives about the ancestors of the Arabs have been identified as isrā’īliyyāt. If some of the isrā’īliyyāt narratives are related to the history of Arabs, then their resource should be the historical-cultural memory of Arabs. However, as almost all Qur’ānic stories were somewhat known before the revelation period and relations with the Ahl al-Kitāb dated back to times long before the Islamic period, the claim that these narratives became widespread along with Islām should be revised. It is also problematic to emphasize the legendary nature of some of the isrā’īliyyāt and to make that as a reason to reject all. Such emphasis also leads to the underestimation of the functions of narratives in tafsīrs. In isrā’īliyyāt, tafsīr was used for i) interpreting the ambiguous words in the stories, ii) to bring evidence to the Ahl al-Kitāb, and ii) tarhīb-targhīb (encouragement-warning). These narratives can be used as a source in tafsīr unless they are explicitly falsified by the data of fields such as history, history of religions and archaeology as well as the Qur’ān and the true Sunnah. The first criticisms of isrā’īliyyāt are claimed to belong to exegete like Ibn al-‘Arabī (d. 543/148) or Ibn ‘Aṭīyah (d. 541/1147). However, criticism of isrā’īliyyāt is also observed in the tafsīrs of earlier exegete, such as al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944), al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058) or al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067). They do not necessarily have to use the term isrā’īliyyāt explicitly in their criticism like the later ones. If the narratives they criticize and the reasons for their criticism are the same as those of the later exegete, it will be necessary to date the criticism of isrā’īliyyāt back to the 4th Century of the Hegira. The understanding that "the expression in the story is sufficient, it is unnecessary to deal with the ambiguities; instead, it is necessary to deal with the lesson and wisdom in the story" is one of the criteria that Muḥammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905), who is deemed to be the pioneer of the strict criticism of isrā’īliyyāt in the modern period, took as basis in this criticism, is valid for the exegete of the classical period, as well. Although exegete, such as al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923), al-Māturīdī, al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), and Abū Ḥayyān (d. 745/1344) who had this understanding, gave place to isrā’īliyyāt, these people recognized that "these narratives were not final, binding or necessary”, indeed. The understanding that such expression in the story is sufficient, which is one of the reasons for such awareness in the classical period, seems to have turned into a strict rejection in the modern period. Another issue is the claim that Biqā‘ī (d. 885/1480) was the first exegete to systematically benefit from the Bible in tafsīr in the classical period. However, al-Daylamī (d. 593/1197) before Biqā‘ī, is also observed to have used the Old Testament systematically in tafsīr. He cited the Tanakh in his period in two ways. He either directly quoted from the translation of Tanakh or the Hebrew text written in Arabic letters. Another exegete who used the Tanakh as a source in his tafsīr was al-Ṣafadī (d. 696/1296). He enriched his tafsīr with systematic quotations from the Tanakh. Therefore, the use of the Bible as a source of interpretation in the classical period should not be started with Biqā‘ī. The reason why the pioneer exegete of the classical period did not directly use the Bible is claimed to be the fact that they falsified it and deemed the isrā’īliyyāt narrated from the predecessors to be more reliable. However, it is known that a significant portion of the isrā’īliyyāt, which was orally transferred from the predecessors, is based on written sources, particularly including the apocryphal texts. So just like the Bible, isrā’īliyyāt, which was orally transferred from the predecessors, is problematic in terms of authenticity. This allows us to argue that classical exegete have an inconsistent attitude, indeed. On the other hand, when we take into account the fact that classical exegetes criticize these narratives from time to time and believe that they are not final or binding, the problem of potential inconsistency disappears. Accordingly, they did not deem chain transmission of these narratives from the predecessors by reliable transmitters to be a sufficient reason for their acceptance and adoption for good and all. (shrink)

Essay Review of “Les Arithmétiques de Diophante. Lecture historique et mathématique” by Roshdi Rashed and Christian Houzel, and Histoire de l’analyse diophantienne classique : d’Abū Kamil à Fermat by Roshdi Rashed.

Despite the hadiths and narratives that warn about the interpretation of the Qur’ān by opinion, the question of how Qur’ānic verses can be understood is about the nature of Qur’ānic exegesis. These narratives, which limit the interpretation to the exact field and indicate the invalidity of the specification of the intention with the imprecise information, bring with it the question of how to understand the Qur’ān in each period and society. The issue that has been questioned in the frame of (...) the commentary from the earliest periods is based on the possibility of commenting besides the narration and defining the area that the thought belongs to the commentator. In this context, it is seen that the distinction between the conceptualization of tafsīr-taʾwīl words in classical commentary literature deals with the subject of the tafsīr, their belongings, epistemological values and contexts. Mainly, this study will question whether authors who do not distinguish between tafsīr-taʾwīl categorize the information about commentary in a different context, then it will analyze two basic approaches on tafsīr and taʾwīl. In the paper, it will be suggested that these classifications in the classical literature should be evaluated together within the framework of the search for methodology in exegesis. Summary: The Prophet, who was the first glossator of the Qur’ān, forbade people to talk about the Qur’ān with their own judgments. The prominent people of the companions refused to comment on some words that were closed in meaning (garīb). The words quoted from Abū Bakr and ʿUmar on this subject are quite famous. However, the Qur’ān is a universal book revealed to be understood in all ages and geographies till the doomsday. The fact that all the verses were not interpreted by the Prophet, and the expansions of meaning observed in the Qur’ān wording necessitate the interpretation of the Qur’ān. The fact that the Prophet forbade people to talk with their own judgments about the Qur’ān and the necessity of understanding the Qur’ān in every era constitutes a dilemma that must be explained. The resolution of this issue will both determine the legitimacy of tafsīr (interpretation) and reveal the difference between the Prophet's tafsīr and the tafsīrs by other people. In this context, a distinction was made between the interpretations of the Prophet and of the companions who witnessed the revelation period from the Tabarī (d. 310/923) in the classical tafsīr literature and the interpretations by glossators in terms of their bindingness and information values. Thus, before even starting the interpretation, glossators questioned the possibility of interpretation of the Qur’ān without the tafsīr of the Prophet and the narratives from the companions that have the force of hadith marfūʿ.It is seen in classical tafsīr literature that distinctions between the tafsīr of the Prophet and the interpretations of the glossator are usually constructed on the terms of tafsīr and ta'wil, to which terminological meanings are attributed. In this regard, the methodology of Māturīdī (d. 333/944) is quite specific and clear. According to Māturīdī, tafsīr is an exact field. Only the tafsīr of the Prophet and the narratives of the companions that have the force of marfūʿ can be included in this field. Taʾwīl, on the other hand, is an area based on supposing. Preferences to be made from possible meanings are supposition and related to taʾwīl. The fact that Māturīdī included the explanations of the Prophet and his companions in the tafsīr field and stated that they expressed exact information shows that he regarded this information in the value of the statement of mutakallim. The data included in the field of taʾwīl are not as the data included in the field of tafsīr in terms of their bindingness and information value. The interpretations made in the field of taʾwīl include supposition; so they cannot be attributed to the desire of God. The field that the Prophet forbade people from declaring their own views is the field of tafsīr in the methodology of Māturīdī. The exactness of this field is an indication that the tafsīr is related to God's desire. It is not right to declare an opinion with supposition in the field that is exact and definite. Even though the interpretation in the field of tafsīr is in accordance with the truth, this cannot eliminate the responsibility of the interpreter that make determinations based on supposition in the exact and definite field. Some scholars, such as Qushayrī (d. 465/1072), also classify the narrative-sagacity areas by means of tafsīr-taʾwīl concepts. This classification deals with the data that is the subject of tafsīr in terms of their belongingness. Indeed, tafsīr science includes both the data that are linked with transmission and non-transmittable elements that can be achieved by following a methodology. Non-transmittable elements included in the taʾwīl field by those who make a distinction between tafsīr and taʾwīl based on narrative-sagacity are the meanings reached through linguistic efforts. Language is an element that holds possibilities in itself. Considering closeness of meaning, multi-meanings, metaphors and allusions in the wording, it can be thought that the meanings reached by linguistic methods include supposition. In the methodology of Māturīdī, the field of tafsīr is composed of the explanations of the Prophet and the narratives of the companions who witnessed the revelations while in the classifications of those who make a distinction between tafsīr and taʾwīl based on narrative-sagacity, tafsīr generally includes narratives. When the issue is handled within the framework of the desire of God and the statements of the mutakallim, it seems that the classification of Māturīdī is more punctual. However, it is understood that this approach does not give a satisfactory answer to the subsequent situations and bindingness of the mentioned data. In the classifications based on narrative-sagacity, the narratives in the field of tafsīr are taken as a whole without analyzing their health grades and their signification. However, some of these narrations are not authentic; so, in this respect it is a problematic issue that they are the subjects of the field of tafsīr. Besides, sometimes there can be different narrations about the tafsīr of verses from the companions. The evaluation these narratives in a field attributed to the desire of God may also pose a problem. The linguistic data that both Māturīdī and those who make a distinction between tafsīr and taʾwīl based on narrative-sagacity include in the field of taʾwīl does not appear to have a homogeneous structure -as is the case with the narratives-. Indeed, among this data, there are elements whose meanings are quite hard to determine as well as firm ones that possibly have only one meaning. It is controversial that these expressions, which have only one meaning and to the validity of whose meaning other evidence point out are included in the field of taʾwīl.The distinction between meaning and interpretation fields in tafsīr is very important in terms of tafsīr methodology. This field designation is in a way a description of nature of the science of tafsīr. Thus, in matters where the human intelligence remains insufficient with the tafsīr narratives from the Prophet, the bindingness of the narratives from the companions are clarified; furthermore, beyond the narrative, the validity and the information values of interpretations of the glossator are determined. In this regard, the tafsīr-taʾwīl distinctions made in the classical tafsīr literature provide us with a rich content and a multifaceted point of view. However, when addressed separately, these distinctions present a number of problems in terms of scope and applicability. Our study proposes the evaluation of tafsīr-taʾwīl distinctions in classical literature together while the meaning-interpretation fields are specified in the framework of the search for methodology in tafsīr. Thus, the incomplete aspects of the classification will be eliminated and a much more comprehensive and functional classification will be achieved. At this point, the methodologies of some figures as Tabarī, who is known to have used the terms of tafsīr and taʾwīl in the same meaning, must also be evaluated separately. Indeed, when the works of these names are analyzed, it is seen that these names also distinguish the meaning-interpretation fields in tafsīr, but they do not do this through the tafsīr-taʾwīl concepts. (shrink)

In the ḥadīth sources it is being conveyed that the companions (ṣaḥāba) refrained from asking questions to the Prophet. This situation is generally associated with the verse of sūrat al-Māʾida 5:101. An-Navvās b. Samʿān (d. 50/670), Abū Umāma al-Bāhilī (d. 86/705) and Anas b. Mālik (d. 93/711-12) are among the companions who consider this situation as the ban on the asking questions. The concern that asking questions may cause additional obligations that were not presumed to be obligatory also attracts attention (...) in these records. Keeping all numerous questions addressed to the Prophet in mind we may ask if there is a Prophetic prohibition on asking questions. We will seek an answer to this question, which constitutes the main axis of this article, especially in the framework of the narrations mentioned among the reasons of the al-Māʾida 101. We will evaluate the information concerned in their historical context and internal coherence inductively. Our investigation differs in this respect from the investigations, which dealt with the disapproval of excessive and unnecessary questions. As a result of our research, we think that it is possible to talk about a ban on asking questions about religious issues in the last three years of the Medina period. We will first discuss the dating and nature of this ban, from which only Bedouin and visitors who come to Madina were excluded. Then, we especially will evaluate the theological consequences of answer of the Prophet, which mentioned in the same context, of whether the pilgrimage is religious duty for every year. In the last part of the article, the prohibition of asking questions will be discussed in the light of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s principle “Der hermeneutische Vorrang der Frage”, which deals with the effect of the questions on the direction and nature of the answer.Summary: It is reported in Qurʾān and Ḥadīth that the Prophet Muḥammad (PBUH) was asked a lot of questions and he responded based on the revealed knowledge or his own. He did not like the questions which remain outside of the daily religious life like the questions whether he is able to know the end of the world or to show miracle. There are some reports which covey that the Prophet frowned upon some questions because they could cause new assignments or lead to complicate the existing ones. The Companions like an-Nawwās b- Samʿān (d. 50/670), Abū Umāma al-Bāhilī (d. 86/705) and Anas b. Mālik (d. 93/711-12) have been describing this situation as the ban of asking of religious implications.This issue which companions formulated exactly as the ban of the asking questions was regarded in research until now just as the depreciation of the Prophet upon the unnecessary questions. In this interpretation the idea played a role that the ban of the asking may not conform to the religious pedagogic of the Prophet and the real existence of a lot of asked questions contradict that. Therefore the imperative “do not ask” in al-Māʾida 5:101 (O believers, do not ask about things which, if made known to you, may vex you) were interpreted not as the prohibition of the asking questions in real sense, but as just the depreciation of the unnecessary questions.We argue that it is possible to talk about a prohibition of the asking questions in real sense. We are of the view that the asking to religious matters was prohibited in the last years of the Medina period. In a time of Madina period when the fundamental principles of Islam emerged the questions of companions let the Prophet think that they may lead to additional religious obligations. Therefore the Prophet warned his companions in these words: “Do not ask me about the details of the things which I do not mention to you” and “Allāh Taʿālā has remained silent about some things, out of compassion for you, not forgetfulness so do not seek after them.”The imperative “do not ask” in al-Māʾida 5:101 has to been understood in the light of the Prophet’s advice as quoted above. According to the expressions of the companions reported in hadith collections, it is obvious that the imperative “do not ask” signifies not only “do not ask unnecessary questions”, but “do not ask questions related to theology matters in general”.Anas b. Mālik served the Prophet nine or ten years and was not criticised by the Prophet anytime. A companion like Anas cannot have refrained from the asking questions because they may be unnecessary. Anas interpreted “ do not ask” in al-Māʾida 5:101 in words: “We were forbidden in the Qurʾān that we ask the Prophet anything". Anas’s observation reveals that the companions considered the “do not ask” in al-Māʾida 5:101 as a general prohibition for the questions to religious issue.According to our research it seems this ban was promulgated in last three years of Medina Period, and Bedouin and visitors were excluded. Al-Nawwās b. Samʿān noticed that the ban of the asking questions was only for the residents in Medina: “I was in Medina one year. The reason why I did not stay in Medina was my wish to ask the Prophet a religious issue. So, whoever stayed in Medina was not permitted to ask the Prophet questions.” Abū Umāma al-Bāhilī interpreted the ban of the asking in al-Māʾida 5:101 as a general ban. He reported that the companions give a garment (burda) as gift to a Bedouin in order to let him ask the Prophet questions. The ban on asking questions in Medina was not related to unnecessary questions. It was indeed related to the questions that might have caused addition to already well-defined obligatory rulings in Islam. Accordingly, the questions became unnecessary because they were asked in the time of revelation. With the ban of the asking the Prophet questions accentuated that God and his Messenger are aware what necessary and what was not. It means that God can intervene if it is necessary. For that they do not need ask the Prophet. Aṭ-Ṭabarī, al-Qurṭubī, en-Nawawī, Ibn RaJab el-Ḥanbalī and Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī are the scholars who interpreted the ban of asking in this general sense.We especially will evaluate the theological consequences of the Prophet’s response, as reported in the sources: “ If I said yes, the pilgrimage will be a religious duty for every year.” Here one may not misconstrue that the Prophet could determine the religious obligations arbitrarily. He meant that the believers have to practice only that which were revealed to them. The Prophet wanted to teach his followers the principle that became essential rule of Islamic jurisprudence: “What is not forbidden is permitted”.The Prophet did not perform tarāwīḥ-prayer in congregation in the month of fasting due to the apprehension that it might become obligatory for the believers and they would not be able to follow it. In this human reaction of the Prophet we see that the Prophet did not consider himself as the founder of the Islamic norms. In this context the following questions are important: Does God consider the human questions when making something obligatory? Is God influenceable in terms of His orders? Ibn Ḥajar observes: The scholars of Ahl al-Sunnah accept the causality in terms of the Islamic norms. Accordingly something can become a religious norm because the humans asked about that. But God’s decision does not depend on the humans. God can consider human questions, if He so wills. (shrink)