Recently, American Psychologist published a review of the evidence for parapsychology that supported the general claims of psi (the umbrella term often used for anomalous or paranormal phenomena). We present an opposing perspective and a broad-based critique of the entire parapsychology enterprise. Our position is straightforward. Claims made by parapsychologists cannot be true. The effects reported can have no ontological status; the data have no existential value. We examine a variety of reasons for this conclusion based on well-understood scientific principles. (...) In the classic English adynaton, “pigs cannot fly.” Hence, data that suggest that they can are necessarily flawed and result from weak methodology or improper data analyses or are Type I errors. So it must be with psi effects. What we find particularly intriguing is that, despite the existential impossibility of psi phenomena and the nearly 150 years of efforts during which there has been, literally, no progress, there are still scientists who continue to embrace the pursuit. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Psycholinguistics re-emerged in an almost explosive fashion during the 1950s and 1960s. It then underwent an equally abrupt decline as an independent sub-discipline. This paper charts this fall and identifies five general factors which, it is argued, were responsible for its demise. These are: (a) an uncompromisingly strong version of nativism; (b) a growing isolation of psycholinguistics from the body psychology; (c) a preference for formal theory over empirical data; (d) several abrupt modifications in the Standard Theory in linguistics; and (...) (e) a failure to appreciate the strong commitment to functionalism that characterizes experimental psychology. In short, what looked like a revolution two decades ago turned out to be merely a local reformation that occurred along side of and largely independent from the real revolution in the cognitive sciences. (shrink)

Toute innovation, surtout si elle est qualifiée de démocratique, ne comporte pas sa justification par sa seule énonciation. L’ expérimentalisme démocratique ne se précipite pas vers une institutionnalisation de la participation citoyenne sans avoir analysé avec précaution ces deux moments que furent le Grand débat national et la Convention citoyenne pour le climat. Une innovation retient plus particulièrement l’attention ici : la présence d’un comité légistique pour transcrire les propositions des 150 membres de la Convention. N’a-t-on pas commis un contresens (...) comme beaucoup d’entrepreneurs de la participation qui en appellent à Habermas, alors qu’il défend l’État de droit plutôt que la politique délibérative? A-t-on pris un risque en soumettant le droit à une discussion faiblement instituée? Ces deux expériences sont des révélateurs du chemin qui reste à faire pour arriver à joindre le projet liant droit et démocratie avec des publics hétérogènes et pas comme « la fiction » qu’Habermas revendique. C’est donc un exercice de modestie dans lequel les citoyens apprennent qu’ils ne sont pas les explorateurs d’une terra incognita, ni en matière climatique et ni en matière institutionnelle. (shrink)

O.T. 463 sq.BRUHN followed Zielinski in adopting είδε from F, and used the variant together with others as establishing the value of Fas an independent source. We have already seen reason for refusing to attach much importance to the authority of this MS. , but it should be observed that both readings are recognized by Σ, and the question between επε and είδε must be settled on its merits. Γ itself has πε written over the last syllable of είδε, and (...) Zenodotus read επ for εδ in Hom. O 207. Zielinski thinks that Eur. Andr. 998 τελουμένων δ Δελς εσεται πέτρα is an echo of this passage, but the inference is by no means certain. It may be that the original text of Trin points to the true solution, that πε fell out by haplography, and the isolated ε became εσε or δε. (shrink)