Jerry Fodor has argued that concept acquisition cannot be a psychological or “rational-causal” process, but can only be a “brute-causal” process of acquisition. This position generates the “doorknob  DOORKNOB” problem: why are concepts typically acquired on the basis of experience with items in their extensions? I argue that Fodor’s taxonomy of causal processes needs supplementation, and characterize a third type: what I call “intelligible-causal processes.” Armed with this new category I present what I regard as a better response than (...) Fodor’s to the doorknob  DOORKNOB problem. (shrink)

This is a chapter about changing the desires of others. People often have to coordinate their actions in order to get what they want. The need for coordination produces a practical problem and a philosophical problem. The difference between the problems is that in dealing with the practical one he/she does not have to get hung up about rationality. Different coordination problems generalize in different ways to more than two people or more than two actions. The prisoner's dilemma has received (...) more attention than these other situations because it has seemed to present the most intractable problems. If one can show how agents faced with prisoner's dilemmas can find their way to cooperation, then it will no longer seem implausible that people pursuing their individual good can achieve stable and mutually satisfactory social arrangements. (shrink)

This chapter describes a way of thinking, really a family of ways of thinking, which allows incomparables to be left incomparable. In the chapter, the patterns of decision making are very ordinary and unsurprising. But the point is to show that people do have ways of thinking that do not require them to balance the unbalanceable, and to begin to develop a vocabulary that helps reveal how they do this. The chapter discusses the following five dilemma‐managing principles: the rain‐check principle; (...) the anti‐compromise principle; compensation; the looking back principle; and unequal opportunities. It also considers how people think through some moral non‐dilemmas. That will help them to see what is going on in some non‐moral dilemmas. The given example concerns broken promises. Things get more complicated when the choice is not between two simple possibilities but a series, among some of which one has preferences. The chapter explains this with another trivial example. (shrink)

A good decision is one that leads to people's getting what they want. Luck plays a smaller role if they ask what makes a good decision‐making method or policy. This chapter discusses how often people will get more of what they want if their decisions are formed in this way, than they would have had they reasoned differently. It also describes the advantages or disadvantages of the dilemma‐managing strategies, and presents a systematic view of the strategies (partition‐shifting strategies, spreading strategies, (...) and revaluing strategies), with an emphasis on how to evaluate them. Different decisions involve different partitions. The choice of a suitable partition is one of the secret skills of decision‐making. A good partition should reveal the important factors that can affect the outcomes of the acts being considered, in such a way that these outcomes can easily be compared. (shrink)

To see some of the ways of changing desires begin with a comparison with the rather different case of belief. In the case of belief there are 'rational' ways of changing the opinions, by considering arguments and evidence, and 'non‐rational' ones, such as being hypnotized or joining a religious sect. This chapter discusses cases in which someone wants to change their desires. There is then a conflict between their second order desires and their simple, first order, desires. The chapter also (...) describes how to resolve a conflict between first and second order desires. In evaluating the lives that would follow from possible changes in one's desires one can take account of the pattern as well as the amount or variety of desires that are satisfied. This is inevitable, really, since one's second order as well as one's first order desires have to come under the scope of the shift. (shrink)

Family life and one's career are incomparable values for him/her. The whole topic of incomparability of desires is veiled in confusion and controversy. Some people deny that there are any incomparable desires. This chapter explains meaning of incomparability, discusses incomparability as a fact of life that many of the desires are incomparable, and also examines why incomparability makes an enormous difference to decision‐making what patterns of incomparability the desires exhibit. The first dimension of incomparability is depth: how much thought and (...) how many comparisons with other wants the inability to choose will survive. Another dimension is generality, whether the incomparability concerns just individual wants or also the values that usually underlie them. The significance of some patterns of incomparability becomes clearer if one add another ingredient to the brew: the influence of beliefs on desires. The chapter considers an example to illustrate this influence. (shrink)

People need strategies, to tell them either how to balance the preservation of life against the avoidance of pain or how to allocate the resources without having to balance them. This chapter describes a non‐balancing strategy. This strategy could be a helpful part of a society's decision‐making resources. The chapter also gives many non‐medical cases which present problems which are similar in one way or another. In all these cases the tension is between the preservation of life and various kinds (...) of welfare. The famine relief case could have been described also in terms of a slightly different tension, between avoiding misery as well as death and promoting only relatively trivial forms of welfare. The chapter suggests a revaluing of the aversion to death. In preventing a death one is preserving what one might call the fullness and the fillability of life. (shrink)

This chapter describes just one of the many attributes that a worthwhile life can have, one which connects both with the experience of the satisfyingness of life and with the dilemma‐managing strategies. Several of the dilemma‐managing strategies link choices to the overall pattern of the decision‐maker's life. All of these strategies resolve dilemmas by relating the incomparable desires that produce them to more nearly comparable preferences for kinds of lives. These strategies could be crudely summarized as: take the option which (...) will give him/her the better life. Or rather, they could be summarized this way if one accepts that lives are good when they conform to plans. In the chapter, the author argues that the sense of the satisfyingness of one's life need not come from any plan or pattern to it. In all of his examples, life has been organized by its connection with a single object of concern. (shrink)

The difficulty of a dilemma is often due to the pattern of one's desires: the way in which your wants for different things are related to one another. When one sees how many patterns desires can take one begins to appreciate the real difficulty of decision making. But one also begins to see that dilemmas are not all unfortunate and insoluble traps. There are good and not so good strategies for dealing with them. In dealing with the resulting dilemmas the (...) strategy may find ways of reducing them to more comparable desires, or it may not. Desires of each kind are often fairly easy to compare among themselves. Qualified trumps are a form of incomparable desire. This chapter gives simpler examples of this desire. In some cases, it is much less obvious how a conflict between first and second order desires should be resolved. The chapter discusses such case. (shrink)

This chapter presents a model of risk‐taking behaviour. That is, it describes some simpler patterns of preference than real people ever have, and then discusses some strategies that would make sense for people with these simple preferences when faced with choices between risky options. These strategies can also make sense for people, with the more complicated preferences. The chapter also discusses some more detailed assumptions about snobs' preferences. There are several ways in which the Snobs can find their way through (...) risky situations. The chapter considers two. The first is, in effect, to refuse to reason probabilistically. Given every risky prospect they can decide what the most likely outcome is, equate it to a certainty of that outcome, and choose accordingly. In more complex situations something closer to real probabilistic reasoning will be needed. And this is the second way in which preferences such as those of the snobs can come to terms with risk. (shrink)

Family life and one's career are incomparable values for him/her. The whole topic of incomparability of desires is veiled in confusion and controversy. Some people deny that there are any incomparable desires. This chapter explains meaning of incomparability, discusses incomparability as a fact of life that many of the desires are incomparable, and also examines why incomparability makes an enormous difference to decision‐making what patterns of incomparability the desires exhibit. The first dimension of incomparability is depth: how much thought and (...) how many comparisons with other wants the inability to choose will survive. Another dimension is generality, whether the incomparability concerns just individual wants or also the values that usually underlie them. The significance of some patterns of incomparability becomes clearer if one add another ingredient to the brew: the influence of beliefs on desires. The chapter considers an example to illustrate this influence. (shrink)

Decision making comes under pressure when the stakes are high and the information is imperfect. That is risk. Most of the risks can be most easily presented in terms of tensions between the recommendations of a simple theory and the complex reactions. The theory is the standard philosophers' and economists' account of rationality in the face of risk, in terms of expected utility, and the cases derive mostly from the intuitive sense many people have had that there is something wrong (...) with the theory. This chapter aims to give a diagnosis of what underlies these intuitions. It also presents an extreme example bringing out one aspect of risk‐aversion. It further considers a family of related examples which bring out both the force of the EU rule and some of the problems with it. An appeal of EU lies in its connections with the intuitive 'grammar' of risk taking. (shrink)

This chapter contrasts moral motivation, as a problematic thing, with the apparently straightforward motives of self‐interest. It also contrasts moral dilemmas, in which one has to find an acceptable action in the midst of conflicting responsibilities and obligations, with practical or prudential dilemmas, in which the problem is getting as much as he/she can of what he/she want. The problem is that these contrasts are all different. They cut in different directions. For any two of the contrasts there are situations (...) which link the 'moral' side according to one contrast with the 'non‐moral' or merely self‐interested side according to the other. Thus in the case of the ageing addict self‐interest as getting what you want and self‐interest as getting a better life conflict. The chapter also gives the example that combines the plots of two famous novels (George Eliot's Silas Marner, and Balzac's novel Le Pe're Goriot), each clearly making a quasi‐moral point. (shrink)

This chapter discusses four ways in which the question of the price of a choice can arise: one trivial, one about risk, one awful, and one moral. It is very hard to compare the awfulness of a choice to the desirability or undesirability of the things one is choosing between. The undesirability of having to choose between loyalty to the child and opposition to terrorism seems to be incomparable both to the loyalty and to the opposition. The final decision is (...) made with the valuation one would use if forced to make a choice between all the options, and along the way to this final decision one discards less trusted valuations. The chapter also considers agenda‐manipulating strategies. They deal with a decision‐making situation by structuring the comparisons that are to be made in order to think it through. Agenda‐manipulation will arise naturally in many dilemma‐managing strategies. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Comments and Replies Conclusion Acknowledgments References.

This chapter contains sections titled: Information and Meaning Information and Knowledge Acknowledgments References.

This chapter contains sections titled: First Misconception Second Misconception The Chapters Conclusion Acknowledgments References.

This chapter contains sections titled: Two Philosophers of the Information Age Wiener's Role in the Birth of the Information Revolution Wiener on the Nature of the Universe Digital Physics Human Nature Artificial Agents Wiener on Society in the Information Age The Philosophy of Information: Floridi's Ambitious Project Floridi on the Nature and Goodness of the Universe Artificial Agents and Ethics Human Nature and the Information Society Concluding Remarks: Comparing Wiener and Floridi Acknowledgments References.

Resistance is a puzzle for politics. Its presence is perceived as the sign of a healthy political culture, yet the controversies it raises cannot always be resolved without changing the fabric of the political community. In this, some see it as a fundamental danger, a risk within democracy. Resistance is thought of as a problem to solve, a matter to handle, an irritant to quell, a brake on progress and development. Yet there exists a strong current in political theory, and (...) practice, that stood this perspective on its head. This tradition assigns to resistance the role of prime mover in social ontology, and of creative drive in political relations. This paper discusses this contribution and its legacy. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Preliminaries The Knowledge‐Game Quartet AI, Contra Floridi, Can Handle KG4 Objections Conclusion Acknowledgments References.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Computer Science as the Master of Its Domain The Concept of Law in Computer Science Computer Science Laws as Invariants The Interplay of Freedom and Constraint Conclusion References.

This chapter contains sections titled: Information and the Veridicality Thesis Information as a Mongrel Concept Natural Information Without Truth Nonnatural Information: The Case for the Veridicality Thesis Nonnatural Information Without Truth An Objection Conclusion Acknowledgments References.

This chapter contains sections titled: Information and Structural Realism Partial Information and Partial Structures Partial Structures, Structural Objects, and Informational Structuralism Conclusion Acknowledgments References.

This chapter contains sections titled: Signaling Games and Repeated Play The True Belief Game as a Signaling Game Nash Equilibria and ESS in the True‐Belief Signaling Game The Value of Knowledge Appendix Acknowledgments References.

This chapter contains sections titled: Pluralistic Ignorance Modal Operator Epistemology Agents and Inquiry Methods Multimodal Systems Knowledge Transmissibility Knowledge Transmissibility and Public Announcement Knowledge Transmissibility and Pluralistic Ignorance References.

This chapter contains sections titled: History, Historicism, and Context Impartialism and Universalism Within the Limits of Reason Alone You Can't See Nothing from Nowhere Sociopoiesis: Justice Means Competition Is Cooperation Reverence from the Inside Out References.

A forcing poset of size 221 which adds no new reals is described and shown to provide a Δ22 definable well-order of the reals . The encoding of this well-order is obtained by playing with products of Aronszajn trees: some products are special while other are Suslin trees. The paper also deals with the Magidor–Malitz logic: it is consistent that this logic is highly noncompact.

On February 22, 2001, three Bosnian Serb soldiers were found guilty of crimes against humanity. Their offense? Rape. This is the first time that rape has been pros-ecuted and condemned as a crime against humanity. Appealing to Jacques Derrida's democracy of the perhaps and Judith Butler's politics of performative contradiction, I see this judgment inaugurating a politics of the vulnerable body which challenges current understandings of evil, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

When Donald Davidson published his influential article ‘Actions, Reasons and Causes’ [1963], many of his contemporaries were convinced that reasons for action could not be causes of anything, so that even an explanation such as ‘Gilbert knelt because he had decided to propose to Gertrude’ did not work by citing Gilbert’s decision as a cause of his kneeling. Davidson was mainly responsible for demolishing that consensus and reinstating causalism—the thesis that psychological or rationalizing explanations of human behaviour are a species (...) of event-causal explanation—as the dominant view in the philosophy of action, so that it is now often regarded as an obvious truth. (shrink)

: On February 22, 2001, three Bosnian Serb soldiers were found guilty of crimes against humanity. Their offense? Rape. This is the first time that rape has been prosecuted and condemned as a crime against humanity. Appealing to Jacques Derrida's democracy of the perhaps and Judith Butler's politics of performative contradiction, I see this judgment inaugurating a politics of the vulnerable body which challenges current understandings of evil, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

In ”Virtues in Epistemology,” John Greco presents and evaluates two main notions of intellectual virtue. The first concerns Ernest Sosa's development of this concept as a disposition to grasp truth and avoid falsehood. Greco contrasts this with moral models of intellectual virtue that include a motivational component in their definition, namely a desire for truth. Instead, Greco argues that a minimalist reliabilist account of intellectual virtue “in which the virtues are conceived as reliable cognitive abilities or powers,” can be illuminating (...) in an account of knowledge. He sets out to support this on the grounds that his approach to intellectual virtue can adequately address three major problems on the theory of knowledge: Humean skepticism, the Gettier problem, and the problem of showing that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. (shrink)

Use of Psalm 22 through the pre-Christian centuries and critical analysis of our Gospels working back from them to Jesus meet in a picture of the cross as lament in suffering and thanksgiving for what God then did. To that extent, the intent of the psalm came to supreme expression in Jesus.

You know the story. You have a few intuitions. You propose a few theories that fit them. It’s a living. Of course, things are more complicated than this. We are sensitive to counterexamples raised by others and wish to accommodate or explain away an ever-wider base of intuitive starting points. And a great deal of the action occurs in rational reflection that can alter what is intuitive, and in theorizing that overturns formerly justified beliefs and moves us to new justified (...) beliefs. Details aside, this method in ethics and elsewhere—of first relying on intuitions to form justified beliefs, and subsequently using best-fit (or reflective equilibrium) theorizing on all justified beliefs to move to other justified beliefs—has received a lot of critical attention lately. But it is not a bad method. It is a good method caught in a bad relationship. For its presumptive metaethical companion, realism, would have us believe that intuitions support beliefs about real, stance-independent facts of the matter. That strikes many as dubious. After sorting through some relevant concerns in this vicinity, I argue that the solution is not to reject intuitional methods but to embrace quasi-realism. (shrink)

In 1934, Karl N. Llewellyn published a lively essay trumpeting the dawn of legal realism, "On Philosophy in American Law." The charm of his defective little piece is its style and audacity. A philosopher might be seduced into reading Llewellyn’s essay by its title; but one soon learns that by "philosophy" Llewellyn only meant "atmosphere". His concerns were the "general approaches" taken by practitioners, who may not even be aware of having general approaches. Llewellyn paired an anemic concept of philosophy (...) with a pumped-up conception of law. Llewellyn’s "law" included anything that reflects the "ways of the law guild at large" - judges, legislators, regulators, and enforcers. Llewellyn argued that the legal philosophies implicit in American legal practice had been natural law, positivism and realism, each adopted in response to felt needs of a time. We must reckon with many other implicit "philosophies" to understand the workings of the law guild, not the least of which has been racism. Others, maternalism and paternalism, my foci here, persist in American law, despite women’s progress toward equality. Both maternalism and paternalism were strikingly present in a recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Gonzales v. Carhart, upholding the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. (shrink)