How to Change Your Desires

In Disasters and Dilemmas. Oxford, UK: Wiley. pp. 132–144 (1990-11-22)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

To see some of the ways of changing desires begin with a comparison with the rather different case of belief. In the case of belief there are 'rational' ways of changing the opinions, by considering arguments and evidence, and 'non‐rational' ones, such as being hypnotized or joining a religious sect. This chapter discusses cases in which someone wants to change their desires. There is then a conflict between their second order desires and their simple, first order, desires. The chapter also describes how to resolve a conflict between first and second order desires. In evaluating the lives that would follow from possible changes in one's desires one can take account of the pattern as well as the amount or variety of desires that are satisfied. This is inevitable, really, since one's second order as well as one's first order desires have to come under the scope of the shift.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,261

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 173-187.
Reasons From The Humean Perspective.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):777-796.
Ambivalent desires and the problem with reduction.Derek Baker - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):37-47.
Prudence and the reasons of rational persons.Duncan MacIntosh - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):346 – 365.
Imagination, Desire, and Rationality.Shannon Spaulding - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (9):457-476.
Non-Epicurean Desires.Fabien Schang - 2016 - Filosofia Unisinos 17 (1):63-68.
On desires and practical reasons.John J. Tilley - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (32):5-18.
Desires and reasons.Alan Goldman - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):291 - 304.
Consistent desires and climate change.Daniel Coren - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (2):241-255.
Autonomy, Value, and Conditioned Desire.Robert Noggle - 1995 - American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1):57 - 69.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-06-15

Downloads
5 (#1,544,856)

6 months
2 (#1,206,802)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Adam Morton
PhD: Princeton University; Last affiliation: University of British Columbia

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references